The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s5.t3: 4. Freedom of the Will and Determinism

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s5.t3

Language: English

4. Freedom of the Will and Determinism

That the soul is metaphysically speaking identical with God and therefore like him "eternal, pure, wise, and free" we have already seen repeatedly. But how is it with the soul so far as it is an empirical being connected with the Upâdhis? Is it free or unfree in this state which is conditioned by Ignorance but has nevertheless existed from eternity?--This question in our system takes the following form (p. 680, 12): "Is the activity of the soul, which, from the standpoint of Ignorance, is conditioned by the Upâdhis, dependent on God (îçvara) or not?"

c8.s5.t3.3

It is a fundamental principle of the original Brahman doctrine that everything existing, and therefore the soul also, is absolutely dependent on God; from this follows that He is on the one hand the necessary cause of the fate and sufferings of the soul, and on the other hand of its actions, whatever they are. The philosophical elaboration of the doctrine of the Vedānta has violated this principle in both directions by referring both the action and sufferings of man to a cause inherent in himself. It is true both are none the less dependent on God; but only in the same sense that the growth of plants depends on rain, which causes the seed to develop, but exercises no influence on its nature. We have already seen that the seed of the sufferings and destinies of this life is to be found in the works of the previous existence, which demand to be atoned for (above p. 279); and so too are the works of each existence necessarily determined by the works of the former existence—how this is possible is, as in the case of all moral questions, not plainly developed. According to p. 1131 (translated above p. 113) works are the product of the *nimittas* or motives and of the *çakti*, power, i. e., character; and this consists generally speaking in the natural disposition (destructible only by perfect knowledge) to activity and enjoyment; however as it produces works that differ individually, character must be imagined as specially modified in the case of each individual. We must think of an innate character of this sort, conditioned by the works of the previous existence, when the soul, in what follows, is described as "connected with defects like love and hate" (*rāga-dvesha-ādi-dosha-prayuktah* p. 681, 3); and when as the seed from which works grow appears the "effort of the soul directed towards good and evil" (*kritah prayatno jivasya, dharma-adharma-lakshanah*), which seems to be summed up just in that innate disposition of character.

c8.s5.t3.4

One might think, says Çankara, that we have no ground for assuming an influence of God on human action (p. 681, 2) so far as the soul alone, connected as it is with such defects as love and hate and equipped with the apparatus of the organs, suffices for activity (p. 681, 3); for it, like the ox at the plough, needs no further cause to move it to action (p. 681, 5). The actions of beings proceed only from their sense of justice and injustice; if the actions are referred to God, there happens *akrita-abhyāgamah* (p. 681, 11; cf. p. 798, 12) "the occurrence of something that has not been incurred [by the actions of the previous life],”—an expression applicable to the motivation of suffering but not of actions, which seems to show that our thinker had not made clear to himself the difference between the two.

c8.s5.t3.5

In reply to these objections Śaṅkara (in the passage translated above p. 86) explains that the soul involved in ignorance is dependent on God in respect of its action and sufferings (*kartṛtvam* and *bhoktṛtvam*) because by his permission (*anujñā*) Saṃsāra results, and by his grace (*anugraha*) liberation (p. 682, 5). For even if the soul is connected with defects like love, etc., and equipped with the apparatus, yet in all activity God is the active cause, for thus says the Scripture (Kaush. 3, 8, above p. 179): “for he alone causes him to do good works, whom “he will raise out of these worlds, and he alone causes him to “do evil works, whom he will make to descend.”—

c8.s5.t3.6

(p. 683, 2:) “God causes the soul to act, but in so doing “he has regard to the efforts made by it towards good or “evil; hence the objections raised do not hold good. The good “and evil done by the soul is unequal; having regard to this “God divides the corresponding fruits unequally, for he like “the rain is only the efficient cause (*nimittam*). For as in “life the common cause of different bushes and shrubs, of rice, “barley, etc. that spring each from their own seed, which is “not common to all, is the rain, because without rain their “differences in respect of sap, blossom, fruit, leaf, etc. could “not develop any more than they could without the special “seed of each sort—so God, having regard to the efforts made “by the souls, apportions good and evil (*śubha-aśubham*) among “them.—But can this regard to the efforts made by the “souls exist together with the dependence of all activity on “God?—Certainly! For though the activity depends on God, “it is only the soul that acts (*karoti*), while God causes it to “act (*kārayati*) when it acts; and as He now in causing it to “act pays regard to former efforts, so too He in causing it “to act formerly had regard to still earlier efforts; for Saṃ- “sāra is without beginning.”

Linked texts (1)

Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇopaniṣad — Sanskrit