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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c6.s2: The Extent of Agreement re. the Conception of Śūnyatā

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c6.s2

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The Extent of Agreement re. the Conception of Śūnyatā

c6.s2.1

That all is transitory and all is egoless sometimes expressed by the words *sarvam śūnyam* (all is essenceless) formed the subject of keen controversies among the various sects. The differences of opinion centred round the extent to which the transitory nature of the world should be carried. The Hīnayānists remained satisfied with a simple definition of Śūnya, declaring that as the world is void of individuality or anything belonging to an individuality, it is called śūnya (*yasmā ca suññam attena va attaniyena va tasmā suñño loko ti vuccati ti*). In other words, they say that as there is nothing permanent or personal in this world, the world is devoid of any substantiality. The Mahāyānists, especially the Mādhyamikas, however, would not stop there. They would carry the conception of Śūnya to its farthest limits, arriving at the Śūnyatā of not only the apparent existences but also of the so-called Tathāgata,⁴ Nirvāṇa, or Ākāśa.

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⁴ *Śata.*, p. 120: *Nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta Buddha iti*.

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They add that the Tathāgatas never trouble themselves about these terms, which to them are as meaningless as the self-contradictory expression like ‘the son of a barren woman’.¹ The usual way in which they speak of the non-existence of anything is

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¹ Laṅkā., p. 19: Alabdhātmaka dharmāḥ katame yaduta śaśakharoṣtra-vājiviṣāṇa-bandhyāputra-prabhṛtayo dharmāḥ.

c6.s2.5

Na śūnyatayā rūpaṃ śūnyam, nānyatra rūpāt śūnyatā, rūpam eva śūnyatā, śūnyataiva rūpam (form is not devoid of śūnyatā, śūnyatā is not outside form, form is śūnyatā, and śūnyatā is form).²

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² Śata., p. 118: rūpam (lit. form=material constituents of a body) has been taken here as X, i.e., any term may be put for it. In the Pañcavimśati (leaf 72b), ‘Māyā’ has been used for ‘Śūnyatā’ in a formula exactly like this.

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It is remarkable that this form of generalisation of the śūnyatā has been resorted to not only by the early Mahāyānists in the Prajñāpāramitās but also by the Mādhyamikas³ and the Yogācāras.⁴ An attempt has been made to show with the help of this passage that though śūnyatā seems to be the ultimate abstraction of all dharmas (things), it is actually the name which is given to the real svabhāva (nature) of things (dharmas or dravyas). It is dharmatā in the sense that it is neither apart from the dharma nor identical with it. If we say that it is apart from dharma, then the dharmas would be void, and if we say it is identical with dharma then the dharmas would be nitya (permanent). This conception of Śūnyatā is only foreshadowed, but does not appear in a developed form in Pāli literature in passages like—

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³ M. Vr., p. 248.

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⁴ Sūtrā., p. 76. In the Vijñaptimātratā, śūnyatā is the same as bhūta-tathatā.

c6.s2.10

Avyākataṃ mayā taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ or aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ. Hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā; na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā; hoti ca na hoti ca tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā; n’ eva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā”.⁵ (It has not been explained by me whether soul is the same are all relative, appearing and disappearing through some causes and conditions, and asserts that the moment a person realises this fact he is emancipated and knows the Truth, Śūnyatā.¹ The Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists differ as regards the Truth but they agree that the Truth, as conceived by them, is attainable through the comprehension of the causal law, and so the Buddhist texts, whether Hinayānic or Mahāyānic,² are unanimous in holding—

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⁵ See, e.g., Dīgha, I, p. 188; Anesaki takes the word ‘Tathāgato’ in stead of ‘Buddha’ as significant. See E.R.E., vol. iv, p. 836.

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¹ Nāgārjuna even identified Pratītyasamutpāda with Śūnyatā, see M. Vr., pp. 503, 542: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tām praca-kṣmahe.

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² Majjhima, I, p. 191; Saṃyutta, III, p. 120; Itiv., p. 92; Sad. Saṅ. (J.P.T.S.), 1890, p. 69 Mil., p. 71; Dīgha, II, p. 154; Bodhic., p. 386; M. Vr., pp. 6, 160; Sālistambasūtra, p. 70.

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Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dharmaṃ paśyati, yo dharmaṃ paśyati so buddhaṃ paśyati. (He who realises the causal law of things sees the Truth; one who sees the Truth sees the Buddha.)

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The formula of the Causal Law appealed so much to the Buddhists of all times and places that not only the scriptures of the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists but also the inscriptions of different periods record

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Ye dharmā utprabhavā hetum teṣāṃ tathāgataḥ hyavadat, Teṣāṃ ca yo nirodha evaṃvādī mahāśramaṇaḥ.

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(The Tathāgata explained the origin of those things, which proceed from a cause. He explained their cessation as well: this is the doctrine of the great Śramaṇa).

c6.s2.18

These show that there was complete unanimity amongst all the sects with regard to the fact that Buddha preached the Causal Law and the Āryasatyas. But it has to be admitted that though the Āryasatyas, the Pratītyasamutpāda and the uncaused and uncreated Nirvāṇa find a place in the doctrines of all the schools, the standpoint from which each of them is being viewed is as apart as the poles. In fact, around these three principles have developed various conflicting opinions, giving rise to a number of schools, each trying to show that its own view of the principles is right, while the views of the others are wrong.

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