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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c6.s4: Points of Agreement between the Two Yānas Mentioned in the Mahāyānic Texts

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c6.s4

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Points of Agreement between the Two Yānas Mentioned in the Mahāyānic Texts

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Some of the Mahāyānic texts have also attempted to prove the simultaneous origin and the essential unity of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by bringing out the points of agreement existing between the two Yānas. The (Tibetan) Madhyamakāvatāra remarks on the basis of Nāgārjuna’s statement in his Mādhyamika-sūtras about the conception of Śūnyatā of the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists that “it is the same śūnyatā (vacuity) whether it be in the sense of destruction or of non-origin” and takes this fact as a proof of the simultaneous origin of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.² The Sūtrālaṅkāra³ also attempts to prove that there is only one yāna, not two or three, and that Hīnayāna is not altogether different from Mahāyāna. Its object is to show that the only Yāna (Ekayāna) is really Mahāyāna, the other two Yānas being subservient to it. It points out that there are many things common to the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists, some of which are:

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² La Vallée Poussin’s Fr. transl. in the Le Muséon, VIII, (N.S.), p. 271: “Ce point est enseigné par (Nāgārjuna) notre maître, quand il dit: Le Grand Véhicule enseigne la non-naissance, l’autre Véhicule la destruction; c’est la même vacutié dans la sens de destruction et de non-naissance”. Cf. Madhyamaka Sāstra, XV, 7; M. Vr., p. 269, Kātyāyanavavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam, pratisiddham bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā. Cf. also Saṃyutta, II, p. 17.

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³ Sūtrā., pp. 68-70.

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(i) Sameness of the *dharmadhātu* (totality of existence or things), i.e., the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas emanate from the identical *dharmadhātu*.¹

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¹ Cf. *Kāś. P.* p. 116, § 80; *Kārikā* (A.S.B. ms.), leaf 2a; *Dharmadhātor asambhedāt gotrabhedo na yujyate; Ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tad bhedaḥ parigīyate*. 39.

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(ii) Sameness of *nairātmya* (absence of any substance). The Śrāvakas assert the absence of substance (*ātmabhāva*), the difference between the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas being that the former apply it to Pudgala (person) only, while the latter apply it to both Pudgala and Dharma (world).

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(iii) Sameness of *vimukti* (liberation). It refers to the *kleśa-vimukti* (abandonment of passions) which is sought for by both the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas, the latter seeking something more, viz., the *Jñeyāvaraṇa-vimukti* (abandonment of the screen obstructing knowledge).

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(iv) In spite of the *gotrabheda* (difference in *gotras*), there are many who are of the *Aniyata-gotras* and become Mahāyānists. The *Aniyata-gotras* include two classes of individuals, one class prone to become Śrāvakas and the other Bodhisattvas. Many of the former class are attracted to Mahāyāna, while those of the latter are not allowed to slip (*saṃdhāraṇāya*) from Mahāyāna.²

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² See *Sūtrā.*, p. 69, v. 54.

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(v) Though Buddhas and Śrāvakas have two different *āśayas*, still there is a point of contact between the two. On the one hand, Buddhas identify themselves with all beings, while on the other, those of the Śrāvaka-*gotras*, before they turn definitely to Śrāvaka-yāna, perform meritorious deeds which enable them to attain Bodhi, and also cherish a desire (*āśaya*) to become Buddha.³ There is no difference between Buddhas and Śrāvakas in the matter of getting release from the series of births. Hence, after obtaining release, the Śrāvakas develop a desire (*āśaya*), through the grace and influence of Buddhas, to become Buddhas, and ultimately the two āśayas become identical and so there is only one Yāna.

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³ Prof. Lévi corrects the reading of the text from ‘*anātmani buddhāśaya*’ to ‘*ātmani buddhāśaya*’. See his *Transl.*, p. 125, fn.

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(vi) Buddha’s exhibition of attainment of parinirvāṇa through Śrāvakayāna. It refers to the fact of Buddha’s attaining Mahāparinirvāṇa as conceived by the Hīnayānists. The Mahāyānists usually explain it away by saying that it was the parinirvāṇa of the Nirmāṇakāya of the real Buddha, but the text here takes it as a point of contact between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

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(vii) Ultimateness (paryantāt) of the Mahāyāna, i.e., as there is nothing beyond Mahāyāna, so it is the only Yāna, Śrāvakayāna making only some progress towards it.

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The above arguments of Asaṅga adduced by him to demonstrate the agreements between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna are more or less laboured. His idea clearly is that there is only one Yāna properly so called, viz., the Mahāyāna and that the Śrāvakas pass through a course of Śrāvakahood only to take to Mahāyāna in order to become Buddhas in course of time. The commentator explains it by a reference to the Śrīmālāsūtra, in which it has been stated that a Śrāvaka becomes a Pratyekabuddha, and ultimately a Buddha.¹

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¹ Sūtra., p. 70: tam avasthātrayastham saṃdhāyoktam Bhagavatā Śrīmālāsūtre, śrāvako bhūtvā pratyekabuddho bhavati punaś ca Buddha iti.

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The Laṅkāvatāra² is more emphatic in its assertion that all Yānas are one and the same. Its point of view, however, is quite different, for all its remarks are made mainly from the pure Yogācāra standpoint that everything is mental delusion. It establishes the fact that all Yānas are essentially one and that they have been looked upon as different only because of their suitability to people according to the degree of progress made by them in mental and spiritual development. It says—

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² Laṅkā., pp. 65, 243.

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Triyānam ekayānam ca ayānam ca vadāmyaham,
Bālānām mandabuddhīnām āryānām ca viviktatām.

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Dvāraṃ hi paramārthasya vijñaptidvayavarjitam, Yānatrayavyavasthānaṃ nirābhāse sthite kutaḥ.

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[On account of the distinction existing among the ignorant, the dullards and the sages, I speak of Triyāna, Ekayāna, or Ayāna, (i.e., absence of any yāna) as the entrance leading to Paramārtha, (i.e., the absolute truth), which is devoid of the two kinds of designations (vijñapti); in the absence of appearances (nirābhāse) how can this discrimination of three yānas stand.] Still more philosophical is its definition of Ekayāna, when it says¹ that the realisation of Ekayāna means the cessation of all thought-creations (vikalpa) by thoroughly comprehending that the subject and the object are mere delusions. This, according to the text, was discovered for the first time by Buddha; it was not known to the non-buddhists, Śrāvakas, or Pratyekabuddhas; hence it should be called Ekayāna.

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¹ Laṅkā., pp. 133: Ekayānamārgādhigamāvabodhaḥ katamo yaduta grāhyagrāhakavikalpa-yathābhūtāvasthānād apravṛtter vikalpasyaika-yānāvabodhaḥ. See also p. 155.

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