Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t10: Prof. La Vallée Poussin on Nirvāṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t10

Language: English

Prof. La Vallée Poussin on Nirvāṇa

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Prof. La Vallée Poussin starts with the statement that it is possible to distinguish Buddhism on the one hand as popular and devotional, and on the other as clerical and mystic.¹ The former is meant for the laity and the latter for the monks. The popular and devotional form of Buddhism holds out the prospect of paradise to the laity. It is only a means to an end, for the layman in one of his later lives is to become a monk and take to the clerical and mystic side of Buddhism and ultimately attain Nirvāṇa. Prof. Poussin then proceeds to define Nirvāṇa. He says that Nirvāṇa is undoubtedly the highest happiness, putting a stop to duḥkha and transmigration. It implies the absence of merit as well as of demerit. It requires a purely ascetic discipline to bring the desires or passions to an end.² The monks unlike the laity do not seek paradise, for even the life in paradise ends with the exhaustion of one's good karma.³ They therefore seek a state which affords eternal (dhruva) beatitude (sukha).⁴ The very common appellation to denote this state is Amatapadam (immortality), which Prof. Poussin considers to be a very old and characteristic expression used to describe Nirvāṇa. He thinks that the notion of deliverance has been made precise in the early Buddhist literature. It is an *abode*, supreme and definite, but yet this notion has not been coloured by any positive philosophic doctrine or by speculation upon God, soul, or being in itself.¹ He, as also Dr. E. J. Thomas², refers to the fact that the early Buddhists did not speculate about such Upaniṣadic doctrine as the Parabrahman which was developed by the Vedāntists long after Buddhism. They knew only of the highest heaven called Brahmaloka. Dr. Thomas remarks in connection with the *Brahmajāla Sutta* that "among all these views there is no expressed contradiction or even recognition of the Vedāntic theory of Ātman or Brahman as the one ultimate reality" ³. Prof. Poussin also points out that it is not correct to hold that Buddhism originated purely in opposition to Brāhmanic theories. He says that there is nothing which permits us to affirm that Nirvāṇa was conceived in opposition to any Brāhmanic theory. Nirvāṇa, Immortality, or Deliverance appears to be a rudimentary idea free from all metaphysical speculations. It is connected more with myths than with metaphysics. Nirvāṇa is an invisible abode where the saint disappears, often in the middle of a flame, or in a kind of apotheosis.⁴ In short, the Hinayāna Buddhism from the time of the *Mahāvagga* to Buddhaghosa emanated, so to say, from the Yoga almost without any mixture. The Immortal State, the Inexpressible is what a saint aims at, because it is the deliverance from birth and death. It is, however, not possible to establish any relation, philosophical or ontological, between the Immortal and the world of beings who transmigrate. Immortality is the name given to Nirvāṇa; in other words, perfect happiness, extinction, detachment are terms which are devoid of doctrinal complexities, and which, in fact, appear to signify merely the extinction of the fire of desire, or, to put it in another way, constitute the road to the Immortal State, or the Immortal State itself.⁵ It is obvious that Prof. Poussin wants to contradict the longadvocated view that Nirvāṇa is annihilation. He cites several passages to show that the self-originating fire in which a saint consumed himself, as also the saint himself, was not annihilated.¹ While summarising his views, he gives the following different uses of the term Nirvāṇa:

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¹ Nirvāṇa, pp. 1,7, 8. Cf. Karma and Jñāna of Brāhmanic philosophy; the former leads to svarga (heaven) while the latter to mokṣa (emancipation).

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² Nirvāṇa, p. 4.

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³ Cf. Chāndogya, 8, 1, 6; Tad yatheha karmajito lokaḥ kṣīyate, evam evāmutra puṇyajito lokaḥ kṣīyate (just as the things produced by efforts of people are exhausted by their use, so also heavenly lives, etc., earned by sacrifices, merits, etc., are exhausted by their use).

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⁴ Nirvāṇa, pp. 48, 60.

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¹ *Nirvāṇa*, p. 49: "La notion de la deliverance était précise: l'ascète ne doute pas que la délivrance ne soit un séjour suprême et definitif".

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² *Life of Buddha*, p. 200.

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³ *Ibid.*

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⁴ *Nirvāṇa*, p. 57

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⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-4.

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¹ Nirvāṇa, p 58.

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(i) The Nirvāṇa, the Absolute, the Uncaused which is by itself the Destruction of passion, of duḥkha.

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(ii) The complete possession of Nirvāṇa, which reduces all passions and all new existences to the quality of anutpattika (not being capable of reproducing); in other words, that which constitutes the saintship, the deliverance from thought (or conceptions), the Sopadhiśeṣa Nirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa with corporal residue).

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(iii) The consciousness of the possession of Nirvāṇa, consciousness obtained in ecstasy which is beatitude, and which is the best form of Nirvāṇa in the world, and properly speaking, the only Nirvāṇa.

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(iv) The possession of the Samādhi of the cessation of ideas and sensations (saṃjñāvedayitanirodha), a possession obtainable by saints, perfect or imperfect, a samādhi which appears like entering into Nirvāṇa, and of which one becomes conscious through the body only, since the thought is then stopped.

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(v) The entering into Nirvāṇa at the last moment of thought, the end of duḥkha, the entering into Anupadhiśeṣa Nirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa without any corporal residue).

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(vi) The possession of Nirvāṇa relating to such and such a passion which carries with it the quality of not being able to reproduce itself for such passion and such future existences; an incomplete sanctity which one enjoys in ecstasy.²

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² Ibid., pp. 83-4.

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Prof. Poussin has endeavoured to show that the Nirvāṇa of the early Buddhists is not annihilation; it is a state which may well bear comparison with the paradise of the laity but it is free from the implication of a life in paradise, i.e., unlike the life in a paradise, it is eternal (dhruva), it is beatitude, but without any sensation even of bliss.¹ It is beyond merit and demerit, a quiescent state which is obtainable in this life by saints when they establish themselves in the samādhi of saṃjñāveditanirodha (cessation of ideas and sensations). In this state as the thought is completely stopped, the saint feels only by his body the supreme bliss. He however warns us not to identify the supreme state of bliss with the Vedāntic Parabrahman, for the Buddhists had not yet arrived at that conception. His reason for holding this opinion is, chiefly, that the early Buddhists were not interested, to any appreciable extent, in metaphysical speculations, but were rather busy with myths. Hence, their conception of Nirvāṇa was not of a metaphysical nature but just the utmost possible extension of the conception of paradise.

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¹ Cf. Dhammasaṅgaṇi, 1389, 1579 ff.: Nibbāna is not to be taken as accompanied by pīti (delight), sukha (happiness), or upekkhā (equanimity). In the I.H.Q., IV, p. 347, Prof. Poussin says, "Nirvāṇa from the beginning is perfect happiness, the summum bonum, much better than any paradise, not a paradise (of course) without any conceivable relations with any form of existence. The canonic literature states clearly that the happiness of Nirvāṇa, end of suffering, is blissful because it is not vedita".

Linked texts (2)

Chāndogyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Dhammasaṅgaṇī — Pāli