Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t12: Nirvāṇa as Viewed by Prof. Keith
Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t12
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Nirvāṇa as Viewed by Prof. Keith
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Prof. Keith on the basis of the Nikāya passages where there is an emphatic assertion of the existence of Nirvāṇa as something unfathomable, unborn, uncreated, unconstituted, and so forth,—a description echoed in the works of Nāgārjuna,—and also on the strength of the discussions in the Buddhistic literature on the existence of the Tathāgata during his life-time or after his decease, thinks that the Madhyamaka view can be traced in the Nikāyas, and that there are "positive assurances of the reality of something over and above the empirical world".¹ He says further that "the great sermon at Benares on the characteristic of that which is not self does not deny in express terms that there may exist another realm of existence which is exempt from empirical determination, and which therefore must be regarded as absolutely real".² Though Prof. Keith thinks that the view of a section of the early disciples about the "existence of an absolute reality admits of serious support" and that passages or expressions can be traced in the Nikāyas having the colour or flavour of the Brāhmanic Upaniṣads or the Mahābhārata, he puts forward the proviso that on the basis of these coincidences it would not be proper to say that the Buddhist Nirvāṇa is "essentially the absolute parallel with the Brahman", for the Buddhists "like every new belief were largely compelled to put their wine in old bottles".³ He also does not ignore the fact that there are ample evidences in the Nikāyas to show that "Buddha was a genuine agnostic",⁴ though he himself is not much in favour of the view. In short, Prof. Keith is of opinion that the Nikāyas do not teach annihilation, or eternal death. He finds in Nirvāṇa only a negative aspect of the Absolute or the Void and would not recognize it to be the same as Brahman of the Upaniṣads or the Vedāntists. Prof. Poussin also would subscribe to this view if it be taken as the Mahāyānic conception of Nirvāṇa, for, according to him, the Hinayānic Nirvāṇa is something definite and real, a tangible reality. Prof. Stcherbatsky rises above all hesitations and asserts that the Hinayānic Nirvāṇa is eternal death, while the Mahāyānic Nirvāṇa is eternal life, and that the latter is the same as the Monism or Advaita Brahman of the Vedāntists.¹ Though he may be partial to Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna, he cannot be justified in ignoring or explaining away the passages of the Nikāyas which interpret Nirvāṇa differently from Vasubandhu. The opinion of Prof. Poussin that "there is a great deal of Mādhyamika philosophy in the Pāli canon",² and the reference of Prof. Keith to passages or suttas of the Nikāyas indicative of the reasonableness of holding such an opinion, appear startling to Prof. Stcherbatsky, and against them he holds without mentioning any authority or citing any passage, that "it is quite impossible to maintain that Hinayāna is an advaita system"³ and that it is going too far to see a "full-fledged Prajñāpāramitā" in the Majjhima Nikāya.
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¹ Keith, B. Phil., p. 67.
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² Ibid., p. 61.
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³ Ibid., p. 68.
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⁴ Ibid., p. 63.
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¹ Dr. F. Otto Schrader in his article on Nirvāṇa in the J.P.T.S. (1904-5) favours the metaphysical conception of the Absolute as the real interpretation of Nirvāṇa of the early Buddhists.
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² E.R.E., sv. Nirvāṇa. Prof. Poussin has also traced Vijñānavāda ideas in the Aṅguttara; see his Nirvāṇa, p. 65.
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³ Con. of N., p. 42 fn.
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Now that we have stated the views of the latest exponents of the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa, we shall proceed to examine some of them in the light of evidences yielded by the Pāli works.