Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t21: Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga and Abhidharmakośa Analysed

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t21

Language
English

Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga and Abhidharmakośa Analysed

c7.s3.t21.1

We have now before us the expositions of Nirvāṇa as found in the Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga and Abhidharmakośa. The last two also present a fairly good view of the Sautrāntika standpoint. These may be analysed thus:

c7.s3.t21.2

(1) As against the Sautrāntika view that Nirvāṇa is unreal, that it is merely abhāva (absence) of kleśas, the mere destruction of rāga, etc., all the texts mentioned above maintain that Nirvāṇa has real existence, their grounds being that

c7.s3.t21.3

(i) it is realisable if the right path be followed (Vm.); it is realised by the Āryas (A. and Vm.)¹;

c7.s3.t21.4

¹ A.=Abhidharmakośa; Vm.=Visuddhimagga; and K.=Kathāvatthu.

c7.s3.t21.5

(ii) the arhats realize it in this life. It is known as the attainment of sopādiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu (A. and Vm.);

c7.s3.t21.6

(iii) the existence of Nirvāṇa has been described by Buddha in statements like “atthi bhikkhave ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ, etc.” (Vm.), or, with reference to its subtlety or depth or excellence in statements like “duddasaṃ duranubodhaṃ, etc.” (Vm. Ṭīkā), “virāga is the best of all dharmas” (A.) or by mentioning it as one of the Four Truths (A.) or the ārammaṇa (basis) of knowledge (Vm., K. and A.).

c7.s3.t21.7

(2) As against the Sautrāntika view that Nirvāṇa, being only abhāva, cannot be eternal, existing by itself like rūpa (form) or aṇu (atom), or that it cannot be asaṃskṛta since it is the result of magga, the texts maintain that

c7.s3.t21.8

(i) Nirvāṇa is eternal, exists by itself like rūpa or aṇu² (Vm. and A.); does not require any ārammaṇa (basis) like jñāna for its origin (Vm. and K.), and is unconnected with citta (acetasika, cittavippayutta) (Vm., K. and A.), but it should be distinguished from rūpa and aṇu by the fact that it is uncaused (Vm. and A.) and requires the practice of magga for its realisation (Vm.);

c7.s3.t21.9

² Cf. Belvalkar, Brahma Sūtra (Poona), II, 2, pp. 61-64.

c7.s3.t21.10

(ii) Nirvāṇa is eternal but not the parinibbuta puggala, i.e., individuality ceases in Nirvāṇa (K.); and that Nirvāṇa is one and not different for different Buddhas (Vm.)¹;

c7.s3.t21.11

¹ Cf. Dharmakāya of the Mahāyānists; see ante.

c7.s3.t21.12

(iii) Nirvāṇa is asaṃskṛta as it has no origin, no decay, and no change (Vm. and A.);

c7.s3.t21.13

(iv) the āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga leads only to the cessation of kleśas; nirvāṇa is not produced by mārga, but exists by itself eternally (Vm. and A.).

c7.s3.t21.14

(3) The Sautrāntikas understand the comparison of Ākāśa and Nirvāṇa in the sense that as ākāśa is really the absence or non-cognition of any resistible thing so Nirvāṇa is also the absolute absence of kleśas. The texts comment on it as follows:—

c7.s3.t21.15

Nirvāṇa is infinite, immeasurable and inexpressible like ākāśa (Vm., K. and A.); it has a positive existence, but the kleśas work as an āvaraṇa (screen) to the vision of beings, and so when the mārga removes the kleśas it is visualised (A.). The attainment of Nirvāṇa means the possession of the Visamyoga (disconnection) or Nirvāṇa (A.).

c7.s3.t21.16

(4) To the question why if Nirvāṇa exists, Buddha did not define its nature (svarūpa), the texts answer that it is very subtle (Vm. and A.), so much so that even Buddha at first hesitated to preach it (Vm.).

c7.s3.t21.17

(5) Buddhaghosa inclines towards the view that Nirvāṇa is inexpressible, indistinguishable, eternal and blissful. In the sopādiśeṣanirvāṇa, the Arhat obtains inwardly a vision of same and actually gets it when he enters into nirupādiśeṣa-nirvāṇa.

c7.s3.t21.18

(6) Vasubandhu emphasises the fact that Nirvāṇa is still a dhātu, a dravya (a thing in itself) but endowed with all the qualities mentioned above. The atoms or ions composing a being are continually changing, and ultimately, by the force of mārga which he has been following, the individual reaches the immaculate state and becomes indistinguishable from the eternal and immaculate elements called Nirvāṇa-dhātu. Professor Poussin, on the basis of the available descriptions of this Nirvāṇa-dhātu, prefers to find in it a perfectly blissful and eternal life while Professor Stcherbatsky, following the strict logic of the atomic theory, concludes that the Nirvāṇa-dhātu is “eternal death”, or the Sāmkhya’s undifferentiated matter.

c7.s3.t21.19

As to the difference of opinion between Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhu, it should be observed that Buddhaghosa is untrammelled by the atomic theory, the consistency of which has all along been maintained by Vasubandhu in his arguments. Buddhaghosa states unequivocally that Nirvāṇa transcends every conceivable form of existence (beyond all sattāvāsas or viññāṇaṭṭhitis), and is an infinite and inconceivable state. This looks very much like the metaphysical conception of the Vedāntic Brahman, though not strictly so, as has been pointed out by Profs. Poussin and Belvalkar.¹ But it is clearly not advaya brahman, for it involves the conception of innumerable beings having separate existences of their own and only losing their identity when they are parinibbuta-puggalas.

c7.s3.t21.20

¹ Brahma Sūtra (Poona, 1924), II. 2, p. 57; “Hinayāna has not developed any special aptitude for metaphysical theories and logical subtleties.” Cf. Śrībhāṣya, ed. by Durgācaraṇa Sāṅkhya-Vedāntatīrtha, p. 176 : Nirvikāra-svaprakāśa-caitanyamaya-brahma.

Cites (3)