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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t22: The Prajñāpāramitās on Nirvāṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t22

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The Prajñāpāramitās on Nirvāṇa

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The conception of Nirvāṇa assumed a totally different form in the Mahāyānic works. We have seen that the Saddharma Puṇḍarīka understands by Nirvāṇa the realisation of the sameness of all dharmas. The sameness (samatā), as explained in the Prajñāpāramitās and the Sūtrālaṅkāra, means, from the standpoint of the highest reality (paramārthataḥ), the non-distinguishability between any two things and the impossibility of particularizing a thing. The Prajñāpāramitās develop this idea of sameness a little further and show that everything perceived or known in this world is really an illusion (māyā) to the unenlightened mind. So when any one speaks of Nirvāṇa or the attainment of Nirvāṇa, he imagines, because of imperfect vision, the existence of a man and his nirvāṇa, and thinks that the man after practising the disciplinary rules attains the ultimate state called Nirvāṇa¹. In reality, all these are merely his fancies (parikalpanā). One of the similes to show this unreality runs thus: Suppose a magician (māyākāra) or his disciple, expert in performing magical feats, creates the five kinds of enjoyable things (pañca-kāmaguṇa) and shows himself as enjoying these things². Does he, in fact, enjoy them? So also a Bodhisattva or Buddha speaks of the so-called worldly pleasures (kāmaguṇas), Bodhisattva practices, skandhas, (e.g. sila, samādhi, etc.), the eightfold path, Nirvāṇa, or Buddha. These, in fact, do not exist at all³; they are mere names invented to denote things, the existence of which is conceived by the unenlightened, e.g., something which has no real existence is called a sattva (being) or rūpa (form),⁴ but sattva or rūpa is only a term, a mere designation. That which is a designation has no origin or decay; it is used only as a symbol; its interior, or exterior, or both cannot be perceived. The Prajñāpāramitās carry it further by stating that even the designation (nāmadheya) must not be taken as having any form of existence⁵. There being no such thing as entrance (āya) and exit (vyaya) of anything whatsoever, not excluding sarvadharmatathatā or Buddha, it should not be said that there is Arhat or Buddha⁶, or any kind of relation between them. If Buddha creates some māyāpuruṣas (illusory men) and makes them pass through all the stages of sanctification and attain omniscience, no one inquires about the existence of the māyāpuruṣas, their practices or attainments.¹ Similarly we should not trouble ourselves with the definition of either a monk or his nirvāṇa. On ultimate analysis monk and nirvāṇa do not exist; they are hallucinations, and both being unreal (śūnya), the monk and nirvāṇa are the same in character. So we should remove all misconceptions about the world and make the realisation of advayam advaidhīkāram (non-duality) of everything whatsoever as our aim.²

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¹ Pañca. (A.S.B.Ms.), leaf 399b: A bodhisattva does not seek Nirvāṇa because he "samsāram samsārato na vikalpayati nirvāṇam nirvāṇato na vikalpayati".

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² Śata., p. 117.

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³ Śata., p. 432: Atyantayā bodhisattvo nopalabhyate; p. 613: Prakṛtiśūnyāḥ sarvadharmāḥ.

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⁴ See Śata., pp. 325ff, for sattva may be put a man, a doer, form, eye, bodhisattva, etc.

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⁵ Śata., p. 522: Nāmadheyam na sthitam na viṣṭitam nādhiṣṭhitam. Tat kasya hetoḥ? Avidyamānatvāt tasya nāmadheyasya.

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⁶ Śata., p. 552.

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¹ Śata., pp. 886ff.

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² Ibid., p. 825 : Sarvākārajñātā advayā advaidhīkārā sarvadharmā-bhāvasvabhāvatām upādāya.

Cites (3)