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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t23: Nāgārjuna on Nirvāṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t23

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Nāgārjuna on Nirvāṇa

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Nāgārjuna also supports this conception but his arguments are those of an expert logician and philosopher. He takes into account the views of the Hinayānists, mainly the Sarvāstivādins and shows the weak bases of their views. The Hinayānists, he says, speak of two kinds of Nirvāṇa, sopādiśeṣa and nirupādiśeṣa, and think that Nirvāṇa is the nirodha (extinction) of kleśas (defiling elements) and skandhas (constituents) existing in a being. They wonder how the Mahāyānists can conceive Nirvāṇa if they think that everything is unreal (śūnya) without origin and decay. What is it then, from which Nirvāṇa confers release. Nāgārjuna answers: If kleśas (defiling elements) and skandhas (constituents) be elements existing by themselves, how can they be destroyed?³ The Śūnyatāvādins do not seek a Nirvāṇa where there is an end of kleśas and skandhas. Their Nirvāṇa is

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³ The arguments of Nāgārjuna are found in the Mādhyamika Vṛtti, Ch. XXV translated by Professor Stcherbatsky as an Appendix to his Con. of N. In places, however, there are differences between Stcherbatsky's interpretation and the one that is given here.

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Aprahīṇam asamprāptam anucchinnam aśāśvatam,
Aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvāṇam ucyate.

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(Nirvāṇa is that which is neither discarded nor attained; it is neither a thing destroyed nor a thing eternal; it is neither suppressed nor does it arise). Candrakīrti, in commenting upon this verse, says that it is not to be eradicated like rāga (passion) etc. nor to be attained like the fruits of a saintly life (e.g. srotāpatti, sakṛdāgāmi, etc.). It is not eternal like aśūnya (real elements).¹ It is by its nature without origin and decay, and its lakṣaṇa (characteristic) is that it does not admit of description.² In such an indescribable thing, how can an imagination (kalpanā) of the existence of kleśas and skandhas, and their eradication through Nirvāṇa find a place? So long as those activities of our imagination continue to exist, there can be no Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is realised only when all prapañcas, i.e., attempts at particularization or definition cease. To the argument of the Sarvāstivādins that even admitting the non-existence of kleśas and skandhas at the stage where Nirvāṇa is reached, it may be that they exist in saṃsāra, i.e., before the attainment of Nirvāṇa,—the Mahāyānists give the forcible reply that there is not the slightest difference between Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra. So, in fact, Nirvāṇa requires no process of eradication. Nirvāṇa is really the complete disappearance (kṣaya) of all figments of the imagination. The kleśas, skandhas, etc., the disappearance of which is generally supposed to be necessary in Nirvāṇa,³ have, according to the Mādhyamikas, no real existence whatsoever. Those who cannot get rid of the conception of "I-ness" or "Mine-ness" usually assume the existence of non-existent things. The sufferings of those who are in a stage in which they recognize the existence and non-existence of things will never end. Candrakīrti includes in the category of such sufferers the schools of Kaṇāda, Kapila, etc. and also the Vaibhāṣikas who believe in the existence of real entities; he also includes the Atheists (Nāstikas⁴) who deny their existence, the Sautrāntikas who deny the existence of the past, the future and the citta-viprayuktas¹ but admit that of all else, and the Yogācāras who do not believe in the existence of parikalpita (imaginary) things but admit the reality of the pariniṣpanna (the ultimate)—the pure consciousness (vijñaptimātratā).² Nāgārjuna says that Nirvāṇa does not consist in the eradication or destruction of anything. It is really the avoidance of all imagination (kalpanā) of eradication, destruction, etc. Just as a man imagines that he has taken poison and faints, though, in fact, the poison has not entered his stomach, so also a being in this world, not knowing really what the ego is, conceives of "I-ness" and "Mine-ness," and suffers on that account. Nirvāṇa is beyond the limits of existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva). A being fancies that something exists and that Nirvāṇa is the end of it, while, in fact, that something does not exist and therefore there can be neither its continuance nor extinction. Nirvāṇa really consists in the avoidance of the conception that something exists.³

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¹ Prof. Stcherbatsky suggests in the footnote that Aśūnya=Nirvāṇa of the Hīnayānists=Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya.

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² Prof. Stcherbatsky translates 'prapañca' by plurality and then sometimes even stretches this sense of the word.

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³ M. Vr., p. 445.

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⁴ Prof. Stcherbatsky prefers to call the Nāstikas, Materialists.

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¹ M. Vṛ., pp. 444-5: Sautrāntikamate 'tītānāgatam śūnyam anyad aśūnyam, viprayuktā vijñaptiḥ śūnyā.

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² M. Vṛ., p. 445. In the enumeration of schools it will be observed that the Sthaviravādins have been omitted, as also the Vedāntists.

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³ Cf. the Prajñāpāramitā view, ante, pp. 185-6.

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According to Nāgārjuna, there are some (referring to the Vaibhāṣikas, etc.) who contend that Nirvāṇa does exist, for it works as a bar to the current of passions (kleśas), deeds (karmas), and births (janmas) like a dam arresting the course of a stream, and that a thing which is non-existent cannot be an effective barrier like a dam. In reply to this it is argued (by the Sautrāntikas) that Nirvāṇa has been defined as the effacement (kṣaya) of desires together with pleasures (nandi) and passions (rāga). So what is mere extinction cannot have any existence. It is like the extinction of the flame of a lamp. This argument does not convince those who conceive Nirvāṇa as a real object, for, according to them, the extinction of desires happens in the Dharma called Nirvāṇa.⁴

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⁴ This controversy is given also in the Kośa, see ante.

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Nāgārjuna refutes the opinion that Nirvāṇa is a bhāva (real thing) on the following grounds :

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(i) that a really existent entity like vijñāna (consciousness) must suffer decay and death which Nirvāṇa cannot, and therefore that which has no decay and death cannot be said to have any form of existence ;

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(ii) that an existent entity like vijñāna is necessarily constituted (saṃskṛta) but Nirvāṇa is unconstituted (asaṃskṛta) and hence cannot have existence;

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(iii) that an existent entity requires for its origin a causal substratum (svakāraṇasāmagrī), but Nirvāṇa does not require any, for it must be without a substratum (anupādāya).

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As against the opinion that Nirvāṇa is merely abhāva (non-existence), an opinion held by the Sautrāntikas, Nāgārjuna adduces the following reasons :

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(i) Nirvāṇa is not what is said to be the absence of defiling element (kleśa), birth (janma), etc., for, that would make transitoriness (anityatā) of kleśa, janma, etc. the same as Nirvāṇa. Transitoriness is the absence of kleśa and janma and nothing else, and so if Nirvāṇa be the absence of kleśa and janma then it must be the same as transitoriness of kleśa and janma, and in that case no exertion would be required to attain Nirvāṇa—which is not admitted.

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(ii) If Nirvāṇa be abhāva (non-existence), how can it be spoken of as being without any substratum and without any reference to a bhāva (existent thing)? For no question of substratum (upādāna) can arise in regard to a non-existent thing. Against this may be raised the objection that the son of a barren woman or the horn of a hare is also said to be an abhāva (absence) without any positive counterpart. Nāgārjuna meets this by saying that abhāva (non-existence) implies a change (anyathābhāva) undergone by a thing which is existent,¹ while the son of a barren woman or the horn of a hare is only imagination (kalpanā) without implying the existence of any object. As there can be no abhāva (absence) without a positive counterpart, so Nirvāṇa is not abhāva.

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¹ M. Vṛ., Ch. XV, 5, p. 267.

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Nāgārjuna now proceeds to state his conception of Nirvāṇa, which is neither bhāva nor abhāva. He says that coming and going, birth and death, are regarded sometimes as existing relatively, either antithetically like long and short, or as cause and effect like the lamp and its light, or the seed and its sprout. In both cases, they are shown to be a complex of causes and conditions. Everything whatsoever must therefore have a cause and a condition, but Nirvāṇa, in which birth and death have ceased, is uncaused and unconditioned and hence not produced (apravṛtti). Existence or non-existence cannot be predicated of what is not produced; so Nirvāṇa is neither existence nor non-existence. Those (i.e., the Sarvāstivādins and the Sthaviras) who believe in the transmigration of constituents (saṃskāras) state that the group of constituents has for origin and decay a causal basis. When there is no causal basis, the group is no longer produced (apravartamāna). Then it is called Nirvāṇa. Those (i.e., the Sāmmitiyas) who believe in the transmigration of pudgala (personality) say that permanence (nityatva) or impermanence (anityatva) cannot be predicated of personality. Its coming and going happen through its corresponding upādāna (substratum) and are dependent on it. When the substratum of this personality ceases to exist, then it is called Nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna contends that the presence (bhāva) and absence (abhāva) of the mere non-appearance (apravṛttimātrakam) of constituents (saṃskāras) or the personality (pudgala) cannot be conceived; similarly the existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) of Nirvāṇa cannot be affirmed. In support of his contention he quotes the saying of Buddha that desire for both existence (bhāva) and non-existence (vibhava) should be given up, and points out that Buddha did not say that desire for Nirvāṇa should be given up. If Nirvāṇa has the nature of existence (bhāvarūpa) or the nature of non-existence (abhāvarūpa), then, according to Buddha, it must be given up; so existence and non-existence cannot be predicated of Nirvāṇa.

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There are again some (i.e., the Vaibhāṣikas) who contend that Nirvāṇa is both existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva). It is abhāva because in it there is absence of passion, birth, etc. It is bhāva because it exists by itself. Nāgārjuna refutes this on four grounds, saying that Nirvāṇa cannot be both bhāva and abhāva, for, in that case,

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(i) Mokṣa (deliverance) would be bhāva and abhāva, and this would mean that the presence of saṃskāras as well as their extinction represents deliverance (mokṣa). But the former cannot be mokṣa, and therefore Nirvāṇa is not both bhāva and abhāva.

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(ii) Nirvāṇa would be a dependent existence, for both bhāva and abhāva exist or arise through cause and condition. But as it is not so dependent, it is without any substratum.

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(iii) Nirvāṇa would be caused and conditioned (saṃskṛta), for bhāva and abhāva cannot but be uncaused and unconditioned.

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(iv) In Nirvāṇa, both bhāva and abhāva would exist together but this is impossible, for light and darkness cannot be simultaneously present at the same place. Hence Nirvāṇa cannot be both bhāva and abhāva.

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Lastly, Nāgārjuna takes up the question whether Nirvāṇa is the negation of both bhāva and abhāva and shows that it cannot be so by two arguments:

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(i) If bhāva and abhāva could have been realized, the negation of them would have been conceived as Nirvāṇa but as what is really bhāva and abhāva is not known, it is inconsistent to describe Nirvāṇa by their negation.

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(ii) If it be imagined that Nirvāṇa is neither not-bhāva nor not-abhāva, it is impossible to ascertain the knower of such Nirvāṇa. If it be admitted that beings in the phenomenal world cognize it, it may be asked whether they cognize it empirically by vijñāna (consciousness) or metaphysically by jñāna (knowledge). Vijñāna (empirical consciousness) needs signs (nimitta) for cognition but Nirvāṇa is animitta (signless). Jñāna (transcendental knowledge) has śūnyatā (essencelessness) as its basis. It is originless (anutpāda) and formless (arūpa). How then with the help of this knowledge, which is indefinable, and escapes every attempt at clear expression, can it be cognized definitely that Nirvāṇa is neither not-bhāva nor not-abhāva? What cannot be cognized or understood (lit. grasped) cannot be said to have existence.

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Nāgārjuna then points out that the fourteen problems, which Buddha did not think worth answering (avyākṛtam),¹ prove only the non-existence of things in reality and the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.

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¹ See, e.g., Dīgha, I, pp. 187 ff.; M.Vṛ., p. 536.

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If everything be non-existent some may question, why it is said that Buddha preached his dharma, and for whose benefit he preached it. Nāgārjuna answers this question by saying that the Mādhyamikas define Nirvāṇa as the cessation (upaśama), and of not being in process (apravṛtti) of prapañca (expressibility) and nimitta (signs) and as a state the nature of which is upaśānta (quiet) and śiva (peaceful).² When Buddha is in Nirvāṇa (a state as described above), how can he be expected to have preached doctrines to men and gods? In the Tathāgataguhya-sūtra it is said that not a single word was uttered by Buddha between the attainment of bodhi and mahāparinirvāṇa,³ but people, according to their individual tendencies and aims of life, conceive Buddha as giving discourses.

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² M. Vṛ., p. 538: Prapañcopaśama=vācām apravṛttiḥ Śiva=cittasya apravṛttiḥ ” =kleśānām apravṛttiḥ ” =janmano apravṛttiḥ ” =kleśaprahāṇena ” =niravaśesavāsanāprahāṇena ” =jñeyānupalabdhyā ” =jñānānupalabdhyā.

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³ M. Vṛ., p. 539: Avāca’nakṣarāḥ sarvaśūnyāḥ śāntādinirmalāḥ, Ya evaṃ jānāti dharmān kumāro buddha socyate. Cf. Laṅkā., p. 194: Uktam deśanāpāṭhe mayānyaiś ca buddhabodhisattvair yathaikam apyakṣaram tathāgatā nodāharanti na pratyāharanti ti.

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