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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t26: Points of Agreement and Difference re. Nirvāṇa in Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic Works

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t26

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Points of Agreement and Difference re. Nirvāṇa in Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic Works

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Without going into the discussion on the conception of Nirvāṇa which Buddha had in his mind, and which is to be found in the Piṭakas—a topic ably discussed in many works, the latest of which is Professor La Vallée Poussin’s Nirvāṇa—we shall compare here the conceptions as found in the Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga and Abhidharmakośa on the one hand, and the Prajñāpāramitā, Mādhyamika Vṛtti, and Laṅkāvatāra on the other.

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All these texts agree in regard to the following points:—

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(i) Nirvāṇa is inexpressible (niṣprapañca); it is unconstituted, and has no origin, no decay and no change.

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(ii) It is to be realised only within one’s own self—the pratyātravedya of the Yogācārins and the paccattaṃ veditabbaṃ (viññūhi) of the Hinayānists.

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(iii) It is not abhāva (absence of anything) as maintained by the Sautrāntikas.

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(iv) It is one and the same for all Buddhas, past, present and future.

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(v) Mārga leads to Nirvāṇa.

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(vi) Individuality ceases in Nirvāṇa.

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(vii) The Hinayānists, in agreement with the Mahāyānists, hold that Buddhas possess extraordinary powers and knowledge, far superior to the Arhats. But they do not consider that the Nirvāṇa attained by Buddha is different from that attained by the Arhat.³ They thus object to the assertion of the Mahāyānists that the Nirvāṇa of the Arhats is a lower and not a perfect state.

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³ Jāt., I, Dīpaṅkara Buddha is said to have attained anupādisesa-nibbānadhātu.

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(viii) Vimukti (freedom) from afflictions (kleśa) as an aspect of Nirvāṇa is the same for Arhats and Buddhas.¹

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¹ Sūtrā., p. 36.

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The points of difference regarding the conception of Nirvāṇa as found in the works mentioned above are:—

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(i) The *K.*, *V.* and *A.*² mention that Nirvāṇa is existing, eternal (nitya), blissful (sukha) and pure (śuci). The Yogācārins subscribe to this statement when they identify Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa with Dharmakāya.³ Strictly speaking both the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins do not predicate of Nirvāṇa anything like eternal or non-eternal (nitya or anitya), blissful or without bliss (sukha or asukha), pure or impure (śuci or aśuci), for Nirvāṇa to them is beyond all predication and hence cannot be called nitya, anitya and so forth.

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² *K.* stands for *Kathāvatthu*; *V.* for *Visuddhimagga*; and *A.* for *Abhidharmakośa*.

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³ Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 354.

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The Mahāyānists following the warning of Buddha against the two extremes of śāśvata and uccheda decline to apply the predications to everything, including Nirvāṇa, but the *K.* and *V.* state that Buddha's warning refers only to the conception of soul, and not to Nirvāṇa.

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(ii) The *K.*, *V.* and *A.* consider that Nirvāṇa is a thing to be acquired (prāptam) while the *M.* and *L.*⁴ consider it to be unobtainable (asamprāptam).

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⁴ *M.* stands for *Mādhyamika Vṛtti* and *L.* for *Laṅkāvatāra*.

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(iii) The *K.* and *V.* maintain that Nirvāṇa forms an ārammaṇa (basis) for meditation and knowledge of monks. The *M.* and *L.* do not distinguish between Nirvāṇa and the monk, knowable and the knower, object and the subject.

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(iv) The *K.*, *V.* and *A.* define Nirvāṇa as a lokottara (transcendental) state, and as really the highest possible state conceivable by them.

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The *L.* and *M.* recognise a state higher than lokottara (*L.* calls it lokottaratama) and identify it with Nirvāṇa, remarking that in this state sarvajñatā (omniscience) is obtained—a state unattainable by the Hinayānists.

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The Yogācārins are of opinion that the Hinayānists attain only Vimuktikāya or Mokṣa, while the Mahāyānists attain Dharmakāya and Sarvajñatva. The Hinayānists subscribe to this view, for, according to them, Buddha is far superior in knowledge and powers to an Arhat and is omniscient while an Arhat is not.

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(v) The Hinayānists know only two forms of Nirvāṇa, sopādiśeṣa and nirupādiśeṣa, or pratisamkhyā and apratisamkhyā. The Yogācārins add to them Prakṛtiśuddha nirvāṇa¹ and Apratiṣṭhita nirvāṇa.²

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¹ Cf. M. Vr., p. 541; atyantaparinirvṛta.

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² The Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa is the state of one who after obtaining sopādiśeṣa-nibbanadhātu develops maitrī, benevolence or charity for the suffering millions and chooses not to let himself automatically pass, as he would otherwise, to anupādisesanibbāna-dhātu [Cf. Pañca. (A.S.B.ms.), leaf 157a : Śrāvakā nirupadhīśeṣanirvāṇadhātau pratiṣṭhitāḥ]. He is then said to be possessed of Nirvāṇa tinged with charity or benevolence. The Sūtrālaṅkāra (pp. 126-7) puts it very clearly: The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, being devoid of love, fix their minds on Nirvāṇa, consisting in the cessation of all misery. The Bodhisattvas, however, being full of compassion, do not like to fix their minds on Nirvāṇa: hence they are said to be in the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa. It will be noted that the Arhats are not entitled to seek the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa; they pass directly from sopadhiśeṣa to nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇadhātu. The Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa can be obtained by Buddhas only, and hence it is a state superior to that of the Arhats. The Vijñaptimātratā adds that Buddhas in the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa rise above the idea of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa (cf. Sūtrālaṅkāra, p. 36); hence Śākyamuni was not really influenced by love or charity after the attainment of Nirvāṇa. The Hinayānists conceive him as one without love (cf. Milindapañha, p. 160: vigatam tathāgatassa pemam vigato sineho), though in fact, they repeatedly mention that he preached the Truth out of compassion for the innumerable suffering beings (lokānukampāya bahujanahitāya sukhāya). Compassion presupposes the existence of love, which may be, and in fact in the case of Buddha (but not of Bodhisattvas) was purely unselfish and, as the Mahāyānists say, devoid of kleśa. For a detailed treatment of the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa see Masuda, Die individualistische Idealismus der Yogācāra Schule, pp. 49 f.; Stcherbatsky, Con. of N., pp. 185, 245-6; Lévi, Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṅkāra, ii, pp. 21, 27; Keith, B. Phil., pp. 257-8; Bodhic., p. 75; Vijñaptimātratā, x, pp. 99 (ed. of Saeki Kiokuga).

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(vi) The Mādhyamikas consider that Nirvāṇa is the impersonal absolute immanent in nature, and the only reality, everything else being mere thought-construction. It appears like the Absolute of the Vedānta, but lacks the *cit* (consciousness) and *ānanda* (bliss) of the latter.

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From this it follows that there is the dharma-samatā or the sameness of all things, even of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. These are related to each other as the sea and the waves.

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(vii) The Mādhyamikas hold with the Yogācārins that Nirvāṇa is advaya (non-dual), *i.e.*, in it there is no duality of subject and object, or positive and negative; and that all worldly things are mere illusions.

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(viii) The Mahāyānists conceive two ‘screens’ called kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa¹ which operate as hindrances to the attainment of Nirvāṇa. They hold that the Hīnayānists can get rid of only the kleśāvaraṇa, while they themselves get rid of both.

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¹ For details, see *ante*. Also *Laṅkā.*, pp. 97, 241.

Cites (11)