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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t3: (III) Removal of Kleśāvaraṇa and not Jñeyāvaraṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t3

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(III) Removal of Kleśāvaraṇa and not Jñeyāvaraṇa

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The Laṅkāvatāra⁴ while explaining the position of the Hinayānists says that they believe in the reality of saṃsāra (worldly existence) and are frightened by its attendant miseries from which they seek release; this is only due to their ignorance of the non-existence of any difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The standpoint of the Hinayānists is that the world or things around us are produced out of the five skandhas or seventy-two elements having real existence. The constituted things which originate through some causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna) are in a constant state of flux and devoid of any substance.⁵ The mental and physical constituents undergo momentary (kṣaṇika) changes and there is no permanent entity apart from them. It is by the removal of the notion of the existence of an ātman as identical with one of the skandhas or something apart from them that a person attains Nirvāṇa.

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⁴ Laṅkā., p. 61.

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⁵ Paṭis. M., II, p. 177 devotes a chapter to the exposition of Suñña. The general definition offered by it is that the things of the world are devoid of attā or attaniya. Then it says that the Suñña can be explained in 24 ways, viz., suññasuññaṃ, saṅkhārasuññaṃ, vipariṇāmasuññaṃ, etc., up to paramatthasuññaṃ (=Nibbāna). The various suññas may well be compared to the 18 kinds of the Śūnyatās of the Mahāyāna scriptures.

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The Mahāyānists do not admit the real existence of the skandhas or elements composing a being. They assert that the skandhas exist only in imagination (vikalpa) or are illusory conceptions (māyā) held by the so-called beings suffering from a defective vision due to ignorance. So the Truth, according to the Mahāyānists, is Śūnyatā or Dharma-nairāt-mya. The Puṇḍarīka¹ therefore says that he who knows the dharmas as devoid of ātman knows the truth. It is because one does not possess this knowledge of the essencelessness of dharmas (śūnya-jñāna-vihīnatvāt) that one is called a Śrāvaka. The Kāśyapa Parivarta sarcastically compares the Pudgala-śūnyatā of the Śrāvakas with the hole made by a termite, and the Dharmaśūnyatā of the Bodhisattvas with the infinite space (ākāśa).² Of the seven reasons adduced by the Sūtrālaṅkāra to show why Mahāyāna should be considered superior to Hinayāna, one is that the knowledge of the Mahāyānists is on a higher level, for it penetrates both Pudgala-nairāt-mya and Dharma-nairāt-mya.³ The Triṃśikā⁴ brings out very clearly the difference between Pudgala- and Dharma-nairāt-mya. It says that the realisation of the two forms of Nairāt-mya is needed for the removal of the two screens (āvaraṇa) viz., that of passions (kleśa) and that hindering true knowledge (jñeya). The passions of desire, attachment, etc. arise on account of a belief in a self; so when one realises the non-existence of self, his egoism is destroyed, and as a result his passions are eliminated. The realisation of the non-existence of the things of this world (dharma-nairāt-mya) removes the screen over true knowledge. The removal of both the screens is needed for the attainment of emancipation (mokṣa) and omniscience (sarvajñatva). The passions are obstacles to the attainment of emancipation (mokṣaprāpterāvaraṇam); hence the removal of passions leads to mokṣa. The screen of jñeya works as a hindrance to the functioning of knowledge (jñāna), i.e., in the apperception of things through knowledge. When it is removed knowledge penetrates unhindered into all objects of knowledge in detail (sarvākāra) without, however, causing attachment of any kind and this is called the attainment of omniscience or Bodhi.

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¹ Sad. P., p. 138; Kāś. P., pp. 115f.

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² Kāś. P., 114, Pañca., leaves 77, 78.

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³ Sūtrā., p. 171.

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⁴ Siddhi, p. 15; cf. Sūtrā., p. 94.

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The Hīnayānists, however, do not admit that they shake off only the kleśāvaraṇa and not jñeyāvaraṇa as stated by the Mahāyānists. They contend that by the removal of the screen of actions (karmāvaraṇa), of the effects of karma (vipākāvaraṇa) and of afflictions (kilesāvaraṇa),¹ the Arhats attain full knowledge without any veil (anāvaraṇa).² They completely eradicate from their minds the āsavas including the avijjāsava. Of the three branches of their spiritual culture, viz., sīla, samādhi and paññā, the last, according to them, brings home to an Arhat the Truth,³ which is the same for Arhats and Buddhas. The function of Paññā consists in destroying Avijjā, the veil of ignorance, the source of worldly existences, and therefore, of all miseries (dukkha). It is Avijjā, which (i) causes experience of things which ought not to be experienced, e.g., evils through thoughts, words and deeds; (ii) veils things which ought to be known, e.g., the merit of observance of good conduct and so forth; (iii) acts as a hindrance to the realisation of the fact that the five khandhas are in reality an undifferentiated heap (rasatthaṃ), and that the perceptions of the organs of sense are essenceless and that the truths are the same tathatthaṃ;⁴ (iv) drives (javāpeti) beings into the various forms of existence in the Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa worlds without cessation; (v) causes one to discriminate between things which in the ultimate analysis have no real difference and clouds one’s vision from the real nature of the khandhas; and (vi) blinds one to the relative nature of the world, *i.e.*, its dependence on causes and conditions (paṭicca-samuppana).¹ By the complete removal of this Avijjā through paññā, a person becomes Arhat and reaches the state which is beyond change, beyond destruction—the state of immortality. There can be no state higher than this. The Hinayānists acknowledge that the Buddhas by their extraordinary merits accumulated in the past acquire omniscience (sabbaññutañāṇa)² and many other powers unattainable by Arhats,³ but they do not admit that the Nibbāna of Buddha is different from that of an Arhat. The knowledge (ñāṇa) acquired by Arhats and Buddhas is *anāvaraṇa* (without any veil) with this difference in the case of a Buddha that his knowledge is detailed and superior in some respects to that of the Arhats.⁴

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¹ The Mahāyānists perhaps made capital out of the statements very often found in the Hīnayāna works like “Arahattamaggena sabbakilesehi vimuccatīti”. Paṭis. M., II, p. 243.

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² Paṭis. M., I, pp. 124, 131.

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³ Ibid., II, pp. 31, 244: arhattamaggena sabbakilese saṃvaratthena sīlavisuddhi, avikkepatthena cittavisuddhi, dassanatthena diṭṭhivisuddhi.

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⁴ Paṭis. M., p. 104 explains tathatthaṃ thus: Cattāro dukkhassa dukkhatthā tathā avitathā anaññathā; dukkhassa pīlanattho saṅkhatattho santāpattho vipariṇāmattho...Evaṃ dukkhaṃ tathatthena saccam. In this way the other truths are also explained.

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¹ *Vis. M.*, p. 526.

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² *Kvu.*, xxi, 3; i. 2.

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³ For a comparison of the powers (bala) of Arhats and Buddhas, see *Paṭis. M.*, II, pp. 173 ff.

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⁴ *Paṭis. M.*, I, pp. 131 ff; II, pp. 31, 32. The Buddhas possess 14 ñāṇas, of which eight are common to the Arhats and Buddhas.

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