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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t9: Nirvāṇa, the Inconceivable State, the Infinite Consciousness

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t9

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Nirvāṇa, the Inconceivable State, the Infinite Consciousness

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On account of this admixture of materials, it is possible to make a selection of passages of the Pāli Nikāyas in such a way as to substantiate any one of the four interpretations of Nirvāṇa to which we have referred. The passages which give the impression that Nirvāṇa is annihilation, if read in the light of other passages, which interpret Nirvāṇa as an inconceivable existence, may convey a sense different from annihilation.

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Prof. Keith has, for instance, shown that the simile of the extinction of the flame, which is one of the many important similes relied on by scholars favouring the view of annihilation, has been worked out in the *Aggivacchagotta sutta* to show that it is not extinction but disappearance in the "deep, unmeasurable, difficult to fathom" state of existence¹. Buddhaghosa has drawn attention to one or two passages in the *Dīgha*² and *Majjhima*³ *Nikāyas* which present us with quite a new interpretation of Nibbāna. The passage runs thus:

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¹ Keith, *B. Phil.*, pp. 65-6: "The comparison is indeed significant, for there is no doubt that the Indian idea of the extinction of fire was not that which occurs to us of utter annihilation, but rather that the flame returns to the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire, in which it existed prior to its manifestation in the form of visible fire".

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² *Dīgha*, I, p. 223; *Sum. Vil.* in the *I. H. Q.*, II, i.

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³ *Majjhima*, I, p. 329; *Papañcasūdanī*, I, p. 413.

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Viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabham.
Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati,
Ettha dīghan ca rassañ ca aṇum thūlam subhāsubham,
Ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesam uparujjhati,
Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth’ etam uparujjatīti ⁴.

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⁴ Cf. the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p. 329) passage: Viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabham, tam pathaviyā pathavittena ananubhūtam, āpassa āpattena ananubhūtam, etc. The *Papañcasūdani* (I, p. 413) comments on it as follows:—*Padadvayena* (i.e., *viññāṇam anidassanam*) pi nibbānam eva vuttam. *Anantan ti* tayidam uppāda-vaya-antarhitattā anantam nāma....*Sabbato pabhan ti* sabbato pabhāsampannam. Nibbānato hi añño dhammo sappabhataro vā jotimattaro vā parisuddhataro vā paṇḍarataro vā n’atthi, etc.

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On a certain occasion a bhikkhu was advised by Buddha to put his question thus:—" What is that place where (distinctions like) water and earth, fire and air have no footing, where long and short, fine and coarse, good and bad, or name and form cease absolutely?" instead of asking "Where do the four elements earth, water, fire and air disappear absolutely?". (The answer quoted above was given to it.) "It is viññāṇa (consciousness), which is signless, infinite⁵, radiant on all sides (sabbato pabham)¹ where all the distinctions mentioned above cease, and where the (constituted) viññāṇa, after cessation, disappears”. Buddhaghosa in commenting upon this passage says that the first viññāṇa is another name for Nibbāna ² while the second viññāṇa is one of the five khandhas. His interpretation, it seems, is based upon a few Nikāya passages. In the *Samyutta Nikāya*³, Buddha referring to the parinibbāna of Vakkali bhikkhu said that the wicked Māra was searching for the viññāṇa (consciousness) ⁴ of Vakkali, who had been just dead, and predicted that Māra’s attempt would not be successful because Vakkali had passed away (parinibbuto) with viññāṇa which cannot be localised (*apaṭiṭṭhita*). The sense of *apaṭiṭṭhita-viññāṇa* is given elsewhere in the *Samyutta Nikāya*⁵, where it is explained as consciousness which requires no support (patiṭṭhā or ārammaṇa) for its origin’. It arises only when the attachment (rāga) to rūpa (material elements of the body), and the other four khandhas is removed. It is unconstituted, devoid of growth and independent of any cause and condition and hence free. Being free it is steady; being steady it is happy; being happy it is without any fear of change for the worse; being fearless it attains parinibbāna.

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⁵ Buddhaghosa says that it is infinite (ananta) because it has no origin, no decay, no duration (sthiti) and no change.

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¹ J. d'Alwis' suggestion of ‘pabham’ for ‘paham’ has been preferred here. For a note on this, see *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, II, p. 283n. Buddhaghosa, it seems, preferred the word “Papam” (from Sanskrit Prapā=a shed on the roadside for providing passengers with water, Aufrecht, *Abhi. Ratnamālā*, p. 283) to “Pabham” more for maintaining the analogy between Nibbāna and sea just mentioned before this passage. He says that just as in a great sea no landing-place is provided for seafarers, so also in Nibbāna there is no particular name corresponding to the 38 kammaṭṭhānas (bases for meditation), through which a monk aims at Nibbāna, i.e., through whatever kammaṭṭhānas (compared here to landing-places) one may reach Nibbāna, there is nothing to distinguish it in Nibbāna. See also *ante*, p. 148, n. 4. For Prof. O. Franke's notes, see his *Dīgha Nikāya* (Quellen der Religions Geschichte), Leipzig, p. 166n.

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² *Sum. Vil.* (I. *H. Q.*, II, i), p. 33 : *Tattha viññāṭabban ti viññāṇaṃ; nibbānass' etaṃ nāmam*. With regard to the second ‘viññāṇa’ Buddhaghosa says “*Tattha viññāṇan ti carimaka-viññāṇam pi abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇan ti*” (Cf. *Vis. M.*, p. 689). He holds that the viññāṇa, the last consciousness of an arhat, is abhisaṅkhāra (constituted) and that it ceases like the flame of a lamp to pass into a state of indistinguishability (apaṇṇakabhāva). Cf. Keith, *B. Phil.*, pp. 47, 48 where Prof. Keith points out that Prof. Franke's attempt to prove that there is much of negativism in early Buddhism favours the view that Nibbāna of early Buddhism was more idealistic than negativistic. See also O. Franke's notes on Nibbāna in the *Z. D. M. G.*, lxix, pp. 475–481.

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³ *Samyutta*, III, p. 124; *Dhp. A.*, I, p. 432: *appaṭiṭṭhitena ca viññāṇena Godhiko Kulaputto parinibbuto*.

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⁴ *i.e.*, *Paṭisandhiviññāṇa*, see *Vbh. A.*, pp. 161, 192f.; *Dhp. A.*, I, p. 432.

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⁵ *Samyutta*, II, p. 65; III, pp. 53–61.

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In commenting on this passage Buddhaghosa further says that an arhat never has any maññanā (thought-construction)¹ in regard to the four elements or Nibbāna or anything whatsoever, which a puthujjana or a khīṇāsava² (but not yet an arhat) has. Buddhaghosa thus tries to show that Nibbāna is inexpressible, infinite and that any attempt to establish a relation between it and a being is a delusion of the mind. He is also constrained to say that such a description of Nibbāna had to be given as a set-off to the arguments of Brahmā,³ hinting thereby that even such statements are not permissible as Nibbāna is inexpressible. From such interpretations of the Nikāya passages as well as from his exposition of Nibbāna in the Visuddhimagga, treated later on,⁴ it will be apparent that he, far from supporting nihilism, held that Nibbāna is a transcendental, indescribable state. In fact, there was hardly any school of Buddhism, which favoured the view of annihilation, and so it seems that the opinions of scholars who supported annihilation do not rest on very sure foundations. Prof. La Vallée Poussin has criticised in detail the views of these scholars. He has given the gist of their views, showing the weak points in them along with his learned dissertation on the interpretation of Nirvāṇa (Études sur l'histoire de religions, 1925). As in his work he has reviewed most of the writings of his predecessors on Nirvāṇa, we need not deal with them again. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to state his opinion and those of Profs. Berriedale Keith and Stcherbatsky, the three latest exponents of the subject.

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¹ The Nikāya passages referred to here (Majjhima, I, p. 4) were not in harmony with Prof. Stcherbatsky's theory and so they did not appeal to him. See his remarks in Con. of N., p. 42n. The “maññanā” of Buddhaghosa reminds us of one of the passages of the Prajñā-pāramitās, in which they assert that all dharmas are like dreams and that Bodhisattvas ‘svapnam api na manyante, svapnena na manyante, etc.; see, e.g., Pañca. (A.S.B. ms.), leaves 225, 399b: saṃsāraṃ saṃsārato na vikalpayati, nirvāṇam nirvāṇato na vikalpayati and so forth.

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² For distinction between an Arhat and a Khīṇāsava, see Papañcasūdanī, I, p. 42.

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³ Papañcasūdanī, II, p. 413.

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⁴ See infra.

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