Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s4.t5: Śūnyatā is Neither Nāstitva nor Abhāva

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s4.t5

Language: English

Śūnyatā is Neither Nāstitva nor Abhāva

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Having dealt with the object of the teaching of śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna proceeds to an exposition of śūnyatā by stating its essentials (lakṣaṇas), which are as follows¹:—

(i) It is aparapratyaya, i.e., it cannot be imparted by one to another.² One is to realise the Truth within himself (pratyātmavedya), and not to understand it by listening to the instruction of Āryas (the Perfect), who can speak of the Truth only through superimpositions (samāropa).

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² Prof. Stcherbatsky (Con. of N., p. 41) translates it as "uncognisable from without" but the commentary of Candrakīrti does not seem to warrant the rendering.

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(ii) It is śānta, i.e., it has the nature of cessation,³ it is undisturbed by origination or destruction.

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³ See M. Vr., p. 160 where it is shown why śāntam is taken in the sense of svabhāva-virahitam. The point is that anything having real existence cannot be subject to the causal law; so whatever is subject to causal law has no real existence like the seed and the sprout. Hence both of them can be described as śānta or svabhāva-virahita. Prof. Stcherbatsky (op. cit.) uses the word "quiescent" for śānta.

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(iii) It is prapañcairaprapañcitam, i.e., it is inexpressible.⁴ The first prapañca is taken as a synonym of speech (vāk),⁵ i.e. the sense of śūnyatā is not utterable by words.

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⁴ Prof. Stcherbatsky (op. cit.) translates it "undifferentiated in words."

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⁵ M. Vr., p. 373.

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(iv) It is nirvikalpa or unrealisable in concepts. Vikalpa is thought-construction; so śūnyatā is beyond (lit. devoid of) thought-construction. And, lastly,

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(v) It is anānārtha, i.e., devoid of different meanings.

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Thus he points out that śūnyatā is not to be taken in the sense of nāstitva (nihilism) or abhāva (absence of something) as wrongly supposed by the Hīnayānists. He continues his exposition of śūnyatā by equating it with the pratītyasamutpāda, saying

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yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ taṃ pracakṣmahe, sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā. (We say that dependent origination is śūnyatā. It is in that sense that the path is middle.) All phenomenal things are relatively existent, e.g., sprout and seed, vijñānas with reference to cause and condition; hence, Nāgārjuna says that things, which are only relatively existent, have in reality no origination, and the fact of this non-origination in reality is śūnyatā. So it is asserted by the Teacher in the Anavataptahradāpasaṅkramaṇasūtra¹ that whatever is said to have come into existence through cause and condition (i.e. relatively) is really unborn; it cannot have real origination; and whatever is subject to cause and condition is śūnya. The statement made in the Laṅkāvatāra and elsewhere that all dharmas are śūnya (non-existent) refers to the non-origination of things in reality. It is in this sense that the connotation of śūnyatā has come into existence. Hence it is said that śūnyatā, which bears the sign of non-origination in reality, is the middle path. That which is really non-originated can neither be said to exist nor to vanish; hence is neither existent nor non-existent, and as such it is the Middle Path which keeps clear of the two extremes.²

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¹ M. Vr., p. 239.

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² Cf. Bodhic., p. 359 : na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam, catuskotivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ.

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We may consider this topic in another way. There is nothing which originates without cause and condition and therefore there is nothing which can be called aśūnya (non-relative). It is said in the Śataka and elsewhere that nothing is ever produced without cause and condition, or, in other words, there is nothing eternal. The ignorant only conceive of eternity, etc. in regard to Ākāśa. The wise know that all things are caused and conditioned, and they never fall into the delusion of either of the two extremes. If it be admitted, as is done by some of the Hinayānists,³ that things (i.e., the elements that constitute a being) are uncaused and unconditioned, then the four Āryasatyas are contradicted, for how can there be duḥkha, the first truth, if things come into existence without cause and condition (apratītya)?

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³ Referring evidently to the Sarvāstivādins.

Cites (3)

Bodhicaryāvatāra — Śāntideva, Sanskrit
Laṅkāvatārasūtra — Sanskrit
Bhallaṭaśataka — Bhallaṭa, Sanskrit