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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s4.t7: (a) Saṃvṛti

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s4.t7

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(a) Saṃvṛti

c7.s4.t7.1

Nāgārjuna as well as Śāntideva points out that the words in common usage, e.g., skandha, ātman, loka, etc., being enveloped (sāṃvṛta) on all sides are called conventional. The expression Saṃvṛti has three different senses, which are as follows:—

c7.s4.t7.2

(1) Saṃvṛti is the same as ignorance on account of its completely enveloping the reality, or, in other words, it is identical with ignorance (avidyā).² In elucidation of this, Prajñākaramati, the commentator of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, says that ignorance superimposes a form on a non-existent thing and thus creates an obstacle to the correct view of the reality. In support of his statement he quotes from the Śālistambasūtra a stanza, in which it is stated that ignorance (avidyā) is nothing but the non-realisation (apratipatti) of the truth, and faith in falsehood.

c7.s4.t7.3

² Bodhic., p. 352; Saṃvriyate āvriyate yathābhūtaparijñānam svabhāvāvaraṇād āvṛta(=abhūta)prakāśanāc ca nayeti saṃvṛtiḥ. Avidyā moho viparyāsa iti paryāyāḥ. It is called saṃvṛti because it envelopes the real knowledge and also because it helps to uncover that which is, as a matter of course, enveloped. It is synonymous with ignorance, delusion, or misconception. For Paramārtha being the same as Nirvāṇa, see infra.

c7.s4.t7.4

(2) Saṃvṛti implies a thing which depends on another for existence, i.e., subject to cause and condition,¹ for a really self-existent thing cannot have origin and decay, or any kind of transformation; so whatever is caused and conditioned is sāṃvṛta (phenomenal).

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¹ Bodhic., p. 352: pratīyasamutpannaṃ vasturūpaṃ saṃvṛtir ucyate.

c7.s4.t7.6

(3) Saṃvṛti refers to signs or words current in the world, i.e., accepted by the generality of the people and based on direct perception.² Śāntideva desires to point out that rūpa (form), śabda (sound), etc. should not be supposed to be really existing on account of being directly perceived by all in the same way. Their existence is substantiated by proofs which are valid from the worldly, and not from the transcendental, standpoint. If all that is perceived by the senses be true, then a fool knows the truth, and there is no need of exerting for the acquisition of truth. In support of his statement, he cites the illustration that the body of a woman, though impure in the highest sense, is regarded as pure by a man whose mind is swayed by attachment; hence a fact cannot be established merely by experience.

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² Ibid., pp. 374-5: pratyakṣam api rūpādi prasiddhyā na pramāṇataḥ.

c7.s4.t7.8

It may be argued that as the expressions like dhātu, āyatana, etc. occur in the scriptures, they are real, and besides had they been non-existent, the Teacher would not have referred to them as momentary, subject to decay, etc. Śāntideva explains this away by saying that the Teacher used them only as artifices to lead men, having minds engrossed in thinking of object as existent, to the conception of śūnyatā, i.e., things as really non-existent. Whatever Buddha said about skandha, dhātu, āyatana or their transitoriness is conventional and not real; hence the existence of dhātus and āyatanas in reality is not established. If it be held that every object of experience is unreal, how can we account for the experience of kṣaṇikatva (transitoriness) of pudgala by the yogins (ascetics) who have perfected themselves in the meditation of pudgalanairātmya (essencelessness of constituted things)? Śāntideva’s answer is very simple. He said that even the experiences of yogins are not above saṃvṛti, for saṃvṛti includes everything that falls within the scope of buddhi (intelligence), and the reality lies beyond it. The experience of the yogins that a woman’s body is impure contradicts the experience of an ordinary man who considers it to be pure. Thus it is proved that the scriptural authority does not establish the reality of skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc.

Cites (2)