Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c10.s1: Two lines of argument
Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c10.s1
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Two lines of argument
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The Buddhists therefore take to two lines of argument, viz., that the soul should either be identical with one or more or all of the skandhas, or be wholly different from the skandhas, the stock Pāli expression for this is tam jīvam tam sarīram or aññam jīvam aññam sarīram. The Pāli texts assert without giving sufficient reasons, that both the above propositions are wrong (micchādiṭṭhi), while Nāgārjuna has recourse to his usual line of reasoning, viz., reductio ad absurdum to show that it is absurd to suppose a relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas. We shall state here concisely Nāgārjuna's arguments:
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What is the Ātman—the basis of the sense of I-ness (Ko'yam ātmā nāmeti yo'haṅkāraviṣayaḥ)? It should be either the skandhas themselves (skandhasvabhāva) or something apart from the skandhas (skandhavyatirikta). That is, the relation between the soul and the skandhas should be either one of identity (ekatva) or difference (anyatva). Both these positions according to Nāgārjuna, are untenable on the ground:
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आत्मा स्कन्धा यदि भवेदायव्यायभागभवेत् ।
स्कन्धेभ्योऽन्यो यदि भवेद्भवेदस्कन्धलक्षणः ॥
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If ātman be the same as the skandhas, it would be subject to origin and destruction, again if it be different from the
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1 In the case of anyatva again, the question of the relation of the container and the contained (ādhāra ādheya) arises, viz., whether Ātman is in the skandhas or the skandhas are in the Ātman See ante, p. 84; also M.yut., p 268 skandhas it would be without the characteristics appertaining to the skandhas (phuṅ. poḥi mtshan. ñid med. par ḥgyur).¹
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¹ M. Vṛ., p. 340.
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Hence, it is not possible to establish any relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas.
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(1) Identification of the Soul with the Skandhas how faulty?
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The following are some of the untenable positions that would arise by the identification of ātman with the skandhas:—
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(a) ātman, which had no existence before, comes into being, so it becomes an object constituted (kṛtaka) and hence impermanent, but ātman is regarded by the opponents as unconstituted (akṛtaka) and permanent;
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(b) ātman requires a creator but a creator of ātman, apart from the ātmā itself, is not known. If the ātman be conceived as the creator of itself, then the contingency arises that the world has a beginning and that a being which did not exist before can appear, and so ātman becomes constituted (kṛtaka);²
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² M. Vṛ., p. 581.
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(c) ātman originates without any cause (sambhūto vāpya-hetukaḥ). If it be said that ātman had no existence before and there was no creator, and then if its present existence be admitted, it would be admitting origination of an object without cause, but this is not permissible;³
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³ M. Vṛ., p. 581.
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(d) ātman has momentary origination and destruction like the skandhas or upādāna-skandhas, but that is not acceptable;⁴ (e) upādāna (the material cause) and upādātṛ (the agent) become one. Upādāna requires an agent in order that it may be given a shape. If the agent be the same as upādāna, then it would lead to the oneness (aikyam) of the agent and the thing produced by the agent, e.g. between the feller of the tree and the tree, the potter and the pot, the fire and the firewood; but this is not admissible;¹
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⁴ Further, at the moment just preceding Nirvāṇa, the destruction and origination of ātmā would take place according to the doctrine of momentary existence (kṣaṇikavāda). If the agent has been destroyed, who is it that enjoys the fruit? The contingency that arises is that one acts and another enjoys the fruits.
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¹ M Vṛ., p. 576.
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(f) ātman is many like the skandhas;
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(g) there is no contradistinction (vaiparītyam) between the characteristics of matter (dravya) and those of ātman;
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(h) ātman is extinct (uccheda) in nirvāṇa.
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Thus, it follows that it is futile to establish between the ātman and the skandhas a relation of identity (ekattva) or difference (anyatva), or to give ātman the attributes of permanency (nityatva) or impermanency (anityatva). To say that ātman is permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya) would make one either a Śāśvatavādin or an Ucchedavādin, both of which views are condemned in the Buddhist texts in unequivocal terms. Therefore, ātman should not be identified with the skandhas (upādāna-skandhas).
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(11) Distinguishing the Soul from the Skandhas how faulty?
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Having asserted that ātman cannot be identified with the skandhas, Nāgārjuna takes up the counterproposition, viz., whether ātman is different from the skandhas (skandha-vyatiriktaḥ), and shows the absurdities to which this would again lead:
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(a) If ātman be different from the skandhas, then it must not have the characteristics of the dependently originating skandhas, viz., origin, continuity and destruction (*utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga-lakṣaṇa*). As these characteristics are absent in ātman, being different from the skandhas, and as it is said to be not dependently originated, therefore it must be admitted that it is non-existing like the sky-flower, for no definition can be offered of such ātman. It can only be pointed out as the basis of the sense of I-ness.
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(b) Again each of the five skandhas possesses some characteristics of their own, e.g. rūpa possesses the characteristic of taking forms (*rūpana*),¹ vedanā and saṃjñā that of ascertaining the cause of direct perception (*anubhavanimittodgrahaṇa*) and vijñāna of having detailed knowledge of objects. If ātman be distinguished from the skandhas as vijñāna is done from rūpa, then it should have some characteristics of its own, e.g., it would be something like mind (*citta*) as distinguished from matter (*rūpa*). If its special characteristics be denied, it is meaningless to say that it has existence as something different from the skandhas.
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¹ *M. Vṛ.*, p. 343 n; cf. uppanalakkhaṇam rūpaṃ; rūpa, the object and instrument of nirūpaṇa.
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It may be contended that the non-Buddhists attribute to ātman some characteristics which are different from those of the skandhas, viz., that ātman is not an agent, but an enjoyer of fruits, attributeless and inactive; it is only when it takes something of the world (*prakṛti*) as support then only its distinctions are known.²
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² *M. Vṛ.*, p. 344.
Cites (1)
- Mahāvyutpatti — Sanskrit