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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c5.s7: Metempsychosis or Rebirth

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c5.s7

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Metempsychosis or Rebirth

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The ancient brāhmaṇas and the Buddhists were in agreement in the belief that the karma of a previous existence shaped a being's subsequent existence, but the two systems differed in respect of the carrier of the karma from one existence to another. The Brāhmaṇic system insisted on the conception of an undying soul (*ātman*) as the unit keeping up the link between two existences while the Buddhists vehemently denied any such entity and maintained in its stead a changing group of entities called *skandhas* which are divided into two classes, viz., *rūpa* (matter) and *nāma* (mental states) such as *vedanā* (feeling, good, bad and indifferent), *saṃjñā* (vague perception), *saṃskāras* (impression), and *vijñāna* (clear perception by the organs of sense). The *skandhas*, according to the Buddhists, may be of the grossest or the subtlest form, and are changing every moment (*kṣaṇika*) and as such they are having their normal course even when a being dies and takes rebirth, which event also is a momentary affair. Of the five *khandhas*, *viññāṇa* is sometimes misconceived as the unit maintaining the link between one existence and another. A discussion relating to this misconception and the Buddhist attitude towards metempsychosis is clearly brought out in the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta*:¹ a bhikkhu Sāti, son of a Kevaṭṭa, gave out that the *viññāṇa* is the speaker, feeler and enjoyer of the fruits of karma, good or bad,² and that it is the self-same *viññāṇa* which passes from one existence to another.³ Buddha condemned the view of Sāti as wrong and corrected him by pointing out that *viññāṇa* can originate only through cause and condition⁴ and may well be compared to fire. As fire is given a name according to the nature of the fuel, so *viññāṇa* is given a name in accordance to its source and sphere of function, e.g. when it originates by means of *cakkhu* and have *rūpa* as its basis, it is called *cakkhu-viññāṇa*, and so forth. In the formulae of the chain of causation, it is shown that *viññāṇa* originates out of *saṅkhārā* which in their turn issue out of *avijjā* (ignorance of the truth) or *taṇhā* (desire) or *āhāra* (food), hence *viññāṇa* cannot have an independent existence of its own. Its appearance is always dependent on an immediately preceding cause and condition (*paṭiccasamuppanna*). In short, the Buddhists excepting the Sammitīyas rejected the Brāhmaṇic view that a soul (*pudgala*) or *viññāṇa* keeps a link between two existences, and held that it is as momentary as any one of the other khandhas.

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, pp. 256 ff.

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² *Ibid.*, p. 258: Katamaṃ taṃ Sāti viññāṇaṃ ti? Yvāyaṃ vado vedeyya tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedetīti.

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³ *Ibid.*, p. 256: tad ev' idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvāti saṃsarati anaññaṃ.

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⁴ *Majjhima*, p. 259: aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇasa sambhavo ti. Buddhaghosa in commenting upon the view of Sāti says that Sāti was merely a *Jātakabhāṇaka* (reciter of the Jātakas), he was misled by the concluding words in a Jātaka, in which Buddha identified himself with the Bodhisatta. A similar reason is assigned by Buddhaghosa in his comments on the view held by the Pudgalavādins. See Dutt, *Doctrines of the Three Principal Schools of Buddhism* 1939.

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