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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s1: The Avyākatas

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s1

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The Avyākatas

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There are a few problems said to have been left unanswered (avyākata) by Buddha, the reason assigned for doing so being either that they relate to topics or notions which have sophical tenets embodied in the Upaniṣads and other Brāhmanic philosophical works, but that does not go to establish that the Brahmajālasutta was composed with any reference to them, the cases of agreement being only accidental. The Sutta, however, has served two important purposes, viz., disabusing our minds of many deep-rooted current notions about the world, the soul and their ultimate condition, and cautioning us against interpreting the doctrine of Buddha in the light of our preconceived notions. By way of illustration, I may point out that the notion of Ātman as a permanent, immaculate entity existing within our body unaffected by karma (actions) is likely to distort the true import of the Attā or Puggala of the Buddhist texts, and in the same way the notion of Nihilism (Ucchedavāda = Natthatta) may influence the interpretation of Anattā or Suññatā doctrine of the Buddhists. A typical instance is given in the Majjhima Nikāya (I, pp. 136-137): A Sassatavādin hears Buddha's teaching about the attainment of Nibbāna by the destruction of passion, desire, wrong views etc. and concludes therefrom that Buddha is an Ucchedavādin. Childers writes in his article on Nibbāna (Pali Dictionary, p. 267): "There is probably no doctrine more distinctive of Sākyamuni's original teaching than that of the annihilation of being" (p. 274): Burnouf "is decidedly in favour of the opinion that the goal of Buddhism is annihilation."

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The best purpose that has been served by the Sutta is that it shows us the way to distinguish Buddha's doctrines from those that were not his. In the fifth century B.C. or a little later, it was almost impossible for any teacher to give out any fresh line of thought without the chance of its being confused with one or other of the current opinions, and this confusion could best be avoided by pointing out the pitfalls, in which the later interpreters were likely to fall. This has been done in this Sutta to a certain extent. Then again, Buddha, like the other great teachers, had at times recourse to enigmatical language, baffling nothing to do with the highest Truth, or that they divert our attention from the real goal of our life.¹ These problems are mentioned almost in the identical language throughout the Piṭaka thus:

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1. *Sassato loko* (the world is eternal)
2. *Asassato loko* (the world is not eternal);

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the attempts of many an erudite commentator to find out the exact sense. The Buddhist texts abound in such enigmatic expressions. This Sutta, in marking out what Buddhism is not, serves, therefore, as an excellent guide for the comprehension of the sense of such expressions. Inspite of this Sutta, the terse saying did give rise to so many Buddhist schools of thought within a century or two after Buddha's death, not to speak of the divergent explanations offered by the present day scholars of Buddha's conception of Soul and Nibbāna. Though the Sutta contains many statements of doubtful value, an exposition of it as a whole may serve to remove many of our misconceptions.

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1 The usual English synonym chosen for *avyākata* is 'indetermined.' It is equated to *avyākṛta*, which, literally, means 'not-explained' or 'not-determined.' *Avyākṛta* is a Buddhist-Sanskrit form derived from the word *Avyākata*. The Pāli word *avyākata* may well be taken as corresponding in sense to Sanskrit *avyakta*, meaning 'inexpressible' or 'unanswerable' because the question does not arise, and all answers are inadmissible. It, however, does not bear the philosophical sense of *avyakta* which is commonly in use in Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, but it is quite plausible to hold that Buddha meant by *avyākata*, inexplainable in worldly language, i.e., the nature of Nibbāna is as unfit for answer as is the question of the existence of the sky-flower. See Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, p. 228.

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It is this *avyākata* attitude of Buddha to the ultimate problems that has led the present day scholars to dub Buddha as agnostic. Prof. Kieth goes further and remarks (in his *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 45) that Buddha's "agnosticism in these matters is not based on any reasoned conviction of the limits of knowledge; it rests on the two-fold ground that the Buddha has not himself a clear conclusion of the truth on these issues, etc."

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3. *Antavā loko* (the world is finite);
4. *Anantavā loko* (the world is not finite);
5. *Tam jīvam tam sarīram* (the soul is identical with the body);
6. *Aññam jīvam aññam sarīram* (the soul is different from the body);
7. *Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata exists after death);
8. *Na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata does not exist after death);
9. *Hoti ca na ca hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata both exists and not exists after death);
10. *N'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata does neither exist nor not exist after death).¹

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¹ See, e.g., Aggi-Vacchagotta-sutta in the *Majjhima*, I, pp. 157, 426, 483-489, Avyākata-saṃyutta in *Saṃyutta*, IV, pp. 376 ff., also III, pp. 214 ff.; Poṭṭhapāda-sutta in *Dīgha*, I, p. 191; see also *Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, p. 446 (mentioning 14 problems), 536; and ch. XXII; *Mahāvyutpatti*, 206.

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Of the problems mentioned in the list, the first six are exhaustively dealt with in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*. Though the treatment is not quite philosophical, it gives us a clear idea of what the early Buddhists had in their minds as to the implication of these problems. The heads of subjects as arranged in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* are as follows:—
1. Four kinds of Sassatavādā;
2. Four kinds of Ekaccasassatavādā;
3. Four kinds of Antānantikā;
4. Four kinds of Amarāvikkhepikā;
5. Two kinds of Adhiccasamuppannikā;
6. Sixteen kinds of Saññivādā;

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7. Eight kinds of Asaññivādā;
8. Eight kinds of N’evasaññīnāsaññivādā;
9. Seven kinds of Ucchedavādā; and
10. Five kinds of Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā.

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The correspondences between the two lists may be indicated thus:—

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| *Indeterminable problems* | *Problems in the Brahmajāla Sutta* |
| 1. Sassato loko | { 1. Sassatavādā |
| | 2. Ekaccasassatavādā |
| 2. Asassato loko¹ | 9. Ucchedavādā |
| 3. Antavā loko | } 3. Antānantikā |
| 4. Anantavā loko² | |
| 5. Taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ | } 6. Saññivādā |
| 6. Aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ | 7. Asaññivādā |
| | 8. N’evasaññīnāsaññivādā |
| 7. Hoti Tathāgato paraṃmaraṇā | |
| 8. Na hoti Tathāgato | |
| paraṃmaraṇā | |
| 9. Hoti ca na hoti | } 4. Amarāvikkhepikā |
| Tathāgato paraṃmaraṇā | |
| 10. N’eva hoti na’ na hoti | |
| Tathāgato paraṃmaraṇā³ | |
| Nil | { 5. Adhiccasamuppannikā |
| | 10. Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā |

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The above comparative table reveals the fact that the problems, which are generally treated in the Pāli text as indeterminable and their exposition as not conducive to the spiritual welfare of persons, are explained in as much detail as possible in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, and therefore the charge of

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1 The first and second are sometimes put as Sassato loko; Asassato 2 The third and fourth are usually put thus: Antavā loko; loko; Sassatāsassato loko; N’eva sassato nāsassato loko. Anantavā loko, Anatavānantavā loko; N’eva antavā nānantavā loko. 3 The items 7th to 10th are dealt with here in chapter VI.

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agnosticism sometimes laid against the founder of the religion by the present day writers is unwarranted. The explanations, however, have been given more or less in the light of the inner experiences of the Buddhist monks as stated above and are without any reference to the existing non-Buddhist opinions, or any attempt to refute or reconcile them.

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Nāgārjuna, in his *Madhyamaka-kārikās*, has shown as logically as possible what the indeterminable problems signify and how they are untenable. From the arguments put forward by him, it seems that he is true to the letter and spirit of the discourse as given in the Pāli texts, and that he penetrates right into the innermost core of the problems and brings out what the Teacher had in his mind.

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All of these views have been described in the Buddhist texts, whether Hinayānic or Mahāyānic, as wrong (*micchādiṭṭhi*) and are attributed to people’s natural inclination of adhering to the heresy of individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), consisting in regarding the body or any particular element of it as soul.¹

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¹ See *Samyutta*, IV, p. 286; also E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 202. *M.Vr.*, pp. 340, 361: *Satkāyadṛṣṭyupaśamāt sarvadṛṣṭyupaśamati*; *Samyutta*, IV, p. 287: *imā diṭṭhiyo sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā sati honti*. See also *Paṭis.*, I, pp. 149-150.

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Speaking about the object of the introduction of this indeterminable problems into the Buddhist texts, Buddhaghosa² almost echoed what the Mahāyāna teachers had said, namely, that they were necessary for the exposition of *Suññatā*, by which Buddhaghosa, of course, meant only *Puggala-suññatā* while the Mahāyānists meant both *Pudgalaśūnyatā* and *Dharmaśūnyatā*.

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² *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 102. *Tasmā sabbaññuta-ñāṇassa mahantabhāvadassanattham desanāya ca suññatā-pakāsana-bhāvattham*. . . .

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In our exposition of the problems we shall follow the arrangement of the *Brahmajāla Sutta* adding, where available, the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as presented in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*.

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