Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s4: Antānantikā
Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s4
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Contents
- v1.c8.s4.t1 Nāgārjuna’s Comment — 17 parts
Antānantikā
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III. Four kinds of *Antānantikā* (limitists and unlimitists). The *Antānantikā* are those who hold that
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(a) the world is limited in extent and circular in shape;
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(b) the world is unlimited in extent and is without any end;
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(c) the world is limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise;
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(d) the world is neither limited nor unlimited (in any direction whatsoever).¹
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¹ In the usual enumeration of *diṭṭhis*, only the first and second are mentioned. See e.g., *Paṭis.*, I, p. 153.
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The reasons assigned for these conclusions are as follows: Some meditators who take the finite and circular world as their object of meditation and do not extend it to all the world systems (*Cakkavāḷas*),² arrive at the first conclusion. Those who take all the *Cakkavāḷas* as their object of meditation, arrive at the second,³ while those who take the *Cakkavāḷas* limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise as their object of meditation, arrive at the third.⁴
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² A *Cakravāḷa* has a Sun and a Moon as also a multitude of stars moving around the *Mahāmeru*.
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³ See also *Paṭis.*, I, p. 152-3.
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⁴ As an approach to this view we may point to the theory of the origin of the world in the *Aitareyopaniṣad*, where the heaven and the earth are conceived as "encompassed on the upper and nether sides by regions of water." Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 95. In the Buddhist cosmology a chiliocosm consisting of 1,000 or more worlds is encompassed by a gigantic wall. See McGovern, *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 48; Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 89.
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These three classes of speculators are, in fact, not concerned about the ultimate end of the world. They speak about the finiteness and infiniteness of the shape of the world or the universe. In popular Buddhism, the universe is believed to be composed of an infinite number of world systems, of which one thousand or one million or one thousand millions form a chiliocosm. The first three conclusions are, according to the *Sutta*, nothing but the three kinds of experiences obtained gradually through meditation. The author of the *Sutta* wants to show that those who have one of these experiences but have not yet obtained the highest conception of *Suññatā*,¹ give out one’s own individual experience as the true conception of the universe.
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¹ Cf *Sum Vil*, p 123. Imasmim pi Brahmajāle hetthā ditthi-vasena desanā utthitā, upari suññatāpakāsanam āgatam.
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As regards those who reach the fourth conclusion, the text says they are logicians who depend on pure arguments. The Buddhist logicians are evidently responsible for the fourth theory. Their characteristic method of exposition of all metaphysical topics is by the fourfold process (*catuṣkoṭika*).² It is, as a rule, not applied to empirical things. By this fourfold process it is contended that the world is non-existent as the Śūnyatāvādins hold, or is only a creation of the mind as the Vijñānavādins assert, and hence the question of the attributes of *anta* and *ananta* with reference to the world does not arise.
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² Viz, *hoti; na hoti, hoti ca na hoti ca, n’eva hoti na na hoti*.
Nāgārjuna’s Comment
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The exposition of the four *Antānantādi* views given above relates to cosmogony and appears to be a little laboured due, perhaps, to the expositor’s desire to bring them into a line with the previously mentioned *Sassatādi* views and to attribute three of the four views to ecstatic experiences. The exposition of these views elsewhere is of quite a different nature and sounds reasonable. Nāgārjuna has taken up these problems in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā* and has shown how these are untenable. He first states their four positions thus:
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(a) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world (*ātmano lokasya vā*), regard the world as limited (*antavān*);
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(b) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world, regard the world as unlimited (*na antavān*);
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(c) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world partially and not fully, regard the world as both limited and unlimited;
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(d) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world either partially or fully, regard the world as neither limited nor unlimited.
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Refuting the above four propositions, Nāgārjuna says:
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(a) The existence of *paraloka* (after-life or after-world) is admitted by the Buddhists, hence those who admit it should not say that the self or the world has an end because in that case there could not be an after-life or after-world.
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(b) Similarly if the existence of *paraloka* is admitted, one should not say that the self or the world has no end (*ananta*) because in that case also there cannot be a *paraloka*.
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(c) The third view that the world is both limited and unlimited is not tenable for the following reasons:
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(i) Take for instance, the case of a man reborn as a god; if it be held that the *skandhas* of the man had been destroyed at his death (i.e. *antavān*), then it cannot be said that they have given rise to a god. They would be like the extinguished lamp with oil but lacking a wick. As it is admitted that a being reappears after death, it should not be said that the self or the world is limited.
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¹ *M. Vr.*, pp. 536, 573, 587-591.
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(ii) Applying similar reason, it can be shown that the self or the world cannot be said to be unlimited. In the case when a man is reborn as a god, if it be said that the *skandhas* of the man had not been destroyed at his death, they could not have given rise to a god. The self or the world would be endless and indestructible (*ananto 'vināśī*) on account of not giving up its own form. It is only when the previous *skandhas* cease to exist, and that another set of *skandhas* comes into existence, as a result of the same, hence it is not proper to say that the self or the world is unlimited (*ananta*) as the previous *skandhas* do not exist any further.
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In Buddhism, the repeated existences of a being is nothing but the continuous flow of *skandhas* (*skandhasantāna*), the *skandhas*, however, are being destroyed every moment and have fresh existence like the flame of a lamp. In other words, the previous set of *skandhas* is destroyed every moment but at the same time it becomes a cause for the appearance of the next. It happens uninterruptedly and so it is said to be continuous, though it is not strictly so. The flame of a lamp appears to be continuous and even identical, but, in fact, it is not so because the drop of oil which once fed the flame is exhausted and another drop of oil takes its place to feed the flame, which therefore cannot be the previous one. On account of this apparent uninterruptedness, it is believed to be continuous and even identical. Hence to a Buddhist philosopher, the self or the world cannot be both limited and unlimited, it is ever flowing like a stream undergoing change every moment (until it reaches Nirvāṇa).
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Nāgārjuna then takes up for refutation the third view of both limitedness and unlimitedness. He says that the adherents of this view may say that one part of the man (i.e. body) is destroyed, hence antavān; while the other part (i.e. soul) remains undestroyed, hence anantavān. Nāgārjuna in reply says that it is absurd to hold that one part of a being is destroyed and the other is not. He, however, as a Buddhist philosopher, is not prepared to admit the existence of soul and body as two separate entities. He says that, according to his opponents then, a man, if reborn as a god, should be partly human and partly divine, but this is not possible, hence the opponents cannot uphold the view of the self or the world being both limited and unlimited.
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He then proceeds to show that this partial identity and partial change cannot be attributed either to the soul (upādātā) or to the elements of the body (upādāna) because it has been established elsewhere¹ that the soul has no existence of its own apart from the skandhas, hence to speak of a non-existing entity as partially the same and partially different is absurd on the face of it.
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¹ See infra, Ch VII.
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(d) When the third position is not tenable, i.e. when it cannot be said that the self or the world is both limited and unlimited, Nāgārjuna says that no argument need be adduced to refute the fourth view that the self or the world is neither limited nor unlimited.
Cites (3)
- Paṭisambhidāmagga — Pāli
- Aitareyopaniṣad — Mahidāsa Aitareya, Sanskrit
- Mūlamadhyamakakārikā — Nāgārjuna, Sanskrit