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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s5: Amarāvikkhepika

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8.s5

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Amarāvikkhepika

IV. Four kinds of Amarāvikkhepikas (evasive disputants)

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There are some thinkers who do not want to draw a line of demarcation between good and evil actions; so when they are confronted with inquiries about good and evil, they do not give a categorical answer, for they believe that they may be wrong in their answer and be opposed by others and that will produce in their mind either conceit and pride, or ill-will and hatred,¹ both of which will be a hindrance to their spiritual progress. If the opinion of an Amarāvikkhepika be contradicted, he would bear ill-will or hatred and this fact proves that he was wrong and guilty of speaking a falsehood, and hence would create a hindrance to his spiritual progress. Should he, however, obstinately adhere to his own view and not accept the view as corrected by his opponents, he would have *upādāna* (cause for rebirth) and that would also be a hindrance to his further spiritual progress.

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¹ See *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 116. Chando=dubbalarāgo; rāgo=balavarāgo; doso=dubbala-kodho; patigho=balava-kodho.

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The third and fourth classes of Amarāvikkhepikas are those who are afraid of facing a well-trained logician with any positive opinion about good and evil, lest they be vanquished in the dispute and thus be led to bear an ill-will towards their opponents. This ill-will would cause hindrance to their spiritual progress.²

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² See B. M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 329.

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These disputants have thus their own good reason for the line of action followed by them in view of the fact good (*kuśala*) and evil (*akuśala*) are relative terms, and no hard and fast line can be drawn between them. To a Mahāyānist or a Vedāntist there is ultimately nothing as good or evil, and hence no positive statement can be made about them, the best course therefore would be either to remain silent or evade a positive answer, and the latter course has been preferred by the Amarāvikkhepikas. Whatever may have been the justification for the disputants becoming Amarāvikkhepikas, they were, in the eyes of the Buddhists, men of weak intellect and deluded, and supposed to have been generally incapable of being *brahmacārins*. Hence they were not regarded as capable of attaining the highest truth.¹

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 521. ² See chap. IV, p. 39-40. ³ In the *Saṃyutta*, II, p. 20 it is said that Kassapa once asked Buddha whether misery is uncaused and not due to one's own and others' actions (*asayaṃkāraṃ aparaṃkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ dukkhan ti*). See also *Dīgha*, III, p. 139; *ante*, chap. IV, p. 35-6. ⁴ See *Vis. M*, p. 172, Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 10.

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Sañjaya, one of the six heretical teachers, has been classed as an Amarāvikkhepika.² The advocates of Navya Nyāya love to indulge in evasions of issues. It is not improbable that these Amarāvikkhepikas were the fore-runners of the Naiyāyikas who very often indulged in slippery arguments (*vitaṇḍā*).

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*Adhiccasamuppannika*

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V. Two classes of *Adhiccasamuppannikas* (Fortuitous Originists). There are some thinkers who hold that the soul and the world originate accidentally without any cause (*adhiccasamuppannika*).³

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(a) The texts speak of one class of such thinkers thus: There are some meditators who take up *Vāyo-kasina*⁴ for meditation and then reaching the fourth *jhāna* discover that mind is the source of all troubles, and so they induce a state in which mind does not function. Should they die while thus meditating, they are reborn as ‘*Asaññasattā*’ gods. Some of these again fall from that state by developing *saññā* and are reborn in the mortal world where some of them practise meditation and develop the power of remembering former births. Their memory does not go beyond the *Saññuppāda* state, i.e., the time of their fall from their position as ‘*Asañña-sattā*’ gods, and so they declare that the soul and the world originate fortuitously.

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(b) The second class of *Adhiccasamuppannikas* comprises those who arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion through reasoning. As a parallel to this doctrine, we may refer to the *Lokāyatikas* or *Bārhaspatyas* who hold that the happiness and misery of persons are brought about by the laws of nature, and that there is no other cause. It was by an accidental combination of elements that the living beings such as a peacock of variegated colours or a human being is born. The conceptions of heaven and hell, merit and demerit, and so forth, according to them, are creations of designing minds. The doctrine of Ajita Kesakambalin is similar to what has been stated above. According to him, there is no preceding cause or condition for the affliction or purification of a person and hence there is no need for exertion. It is a mistake to think, he says, that one can change the course of his life by the observance of precepts or performance of rituals or practice of asceticism.*

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¹ *Digha*, I, p. 53-54; *Samyutta*, III, p. 211. Cf. *ante*, ch. IV, p. 37-38.

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∗ NOTE: In the *Digha Nikāya* (I, p. 30) the five classes of thinkers including the Antānantikas dealt with before are called Pubbanta-kappikas (i.e. those who speculate about the beginning of the universe) In the *Mādhyamika-vṛtti* (pp. 536, 572), however, the Śāśvatavādins are only called Pūrvāntikas, while the Antānantikas are called Aparāntikas (i.e. those who speculate about the future of the universe) (See also *Majjhima*, II, pp. 228 ff.; *Paṭis.*, I, p. 155). Buddhaghosa remarks in a general way that some of those who have developed the power of remembering former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) become Pubbantaka-

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