Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c9.s1: Is T. the same as the skandhas?

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c9.s1

Language: English

Is T. the same as the skandhas?

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N. first takes up the proposition that the T. is something pure and indescribable and is identical with the skandhas. There are two sets of skandhas, one being the usual five viz., *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra* and *vijñāna* and the other, the five dharmas which make one a Buddha viz., *śīla*, *samādhi*, *prajñā*, *vimukti* and *vimuktijñānadarśana*. As the latter set of skandhas is not found in all beings (*avyāpaka*), he takes up the question of identity of the first set of skandhas, *rūpa*, *vedanā* etc. with the T., and points out the absurdities, to which this identity would lead. He argues thus:

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(i) If fire be taken as identical with firewood, or Buddha with upādāna (= skandhas, i.e., elements which make an individual) then the doer, and the thing done, become one.

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(ii) If Buddha (i.e., the Ātman of pure being) be identical with skandhas, then Buddha (or pure Ātman) would be subject to origination and destruction¹

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¹ See M. Vṛ., p. 434 and infra, pp. 85, 89 f.

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*Is. T. different from the skandhas?*

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N. then assumes that T. is different from the skandhas, and points out the absurdities, to which this assumption would lead. He says:

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(i) If fire be different from firewood, fire could exist without the firewood. Again not being dependent on any other material, it does not require to be ignited. It would be self-existent, proving thereby the futility of exertion (*ārambha-vaiyartham*). Analogously it may be said that Buddha and upādāna being different, Buddha is devoid of upādāna, so he is causeless and is self-existent from this it follows that no exertion is needed to become a Buddha.

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(ii) If Buddha be different from the skandhas, he would be devoid of the characteristics of the skandhas.²

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² Ibid., p. 434; for detailed treatment, see infra, pp. 89 f.

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It follows then that skandhas cannot be different (*vyatirikta*) from the T. Now, when skandhas and T. are not different entities, the other propositions, viz., skandhas are in T., T. is in skandhas or T. is possessed of skandhas, fall to the ground, for these relations can exist only between two distinct entities.

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Thus, Nāgārjuna by the line of reasoning *reductio ad absurdum*, establishes that the Tathāgata can neither be proved to be identical with the skandhas nor different from them, and hence there is no Tathāgata—the Tathāgata which is popularly supposed to be the ultimate perfect state of beings. At the same time Nāgārjuna adds, there is no transmigrating being (bhava-saṃtati), who is supposed to become the Tathāgata ultimately.

Cites (1)

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā — Nāgārjuna, Sanskrit