Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c9.s2: Does T. exist relatively?
Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c9.s2
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Does T. exist relatively?
v1.c9.s2.1
N. then says that it may be contended by some that though it has not been possible to establish the existence of T. directly, it may be done, at least, indirectly (parabhāvataḥ) by proving the existence of the upādānas, and T. as their image. But this also is shown untenable by N. by the application of reductio ad absurdum thus:
v1.c9.s2.2
Against the argument that the existence of T. can be proved at least as a reflection of pure skandhas similar to the image of an object on a mirror, Nāgārjuna advances the following arguments:
v1.c9.s2.3
(a) That which appears by depending on something else, e.g. the reflection on a mirror is anātma (substanceless) and whatever is anātma is unreal (niḥsvabhāva). Hence, there is no ground for holding that the so-called T. exists in reality.
v1.c9.s2.4
(b) Again, if T. had been really existent, then only it would have been possible to establish the separate existence (parabhāva) of skandhas by showing their apartness (paratvam) from T. As it has been already proved T. is non-existent by its own nature (svabhāvataḥ), the question of separate existence (para-bhāva) of skandhas cannot arise, so it is futile to argue that the existence of T. can be proved at least indirectly (parabhāvataḥ) with reference to the skandhas, with which paratva (apartness) and hence parabhāvatva (separate existence) of T. is out of the question.
v1.c9.s2.5
An object must have either an existence of its own (*svabhāva*) or at least, its existence can be established with reference to some other thing (*parabhāva*) but T. has neither; hence, how can T. be said to be real.
v1.c9.s2.6
Does T. become apparent by means of *skandhas*?
v1.c9.s2.7
Now, it may be contended that T. is not to be spoken of as identical with, or different from, the *skandhas*; he is known only on account (*upādāya*) of the *skandhas*.¹ Nāgārjuna replies that the position also is not tenable, the reason being that it implies the existence of T. as prior to, and distinct from, *skandhas*; and that T. had the *skandhas* later on, just as we say, Devadatta exists and he later on acquires wealth. From all considerations, the conclusion that is arrived at is that T. cannot have an existence before he has taken up the *skandhas*, i.e., he cannot exist uncaused (*anupādāya*), for that would again give rise to the fallacy that things can originate without cause. That which does not exist at all,² how can it take up something else,³ in this case, the *skandhas* (*upādānas*).
v1.c9.s2.8
¹ The object of the opponents of Nāgārjuna is to say that T. exists for ever, but only when he takes up the aggregates (*skandhas*), he becomes apparent to us.
v1.c9.s2.9
² e.g. flower in the sky, son of a barren woman.
v1.c9.s2.10
³ Just as it is meaningless to say that the flower in the sky has red petals.
v1.c9.s2.11
From the above it follows that a thing, which is not taken up by something else, cannot be regarded as *upādāna*. N. says: now that it has been established that T. was non-existent before the acquisition of *skandhas*, and that T., in fact, did not take up the *skandhas*, then, is it proper to regard a thing as a cause of some other thing even if the latter does not receive the former (in some shape or other). Hence, the skandhas should not be regarded as the cause of T. A thing when not taken up by something else cannot be called *upādāna* (cause) of the latter; in the absence of such cause (*upādāna*), there can be nothing as producer (*upādātṛ*) out of that cause. As there is nothing without substantial cause (*nirupādāna*), there can be no Tathāgata.¹
v1.c9.s2.12
¹ This may be cleared by the following simile: Earth is normally the material cause of a jar. But unless a quantity of earth is taken up and converted into a jar, it cannot be called the cause of the jar. When earth remains unutilised, it is not the material cause of the jar; and the existence of the jar cannot be asserted. From this N.'s conclusion is that there is neither the material cause nor the jar.
v1.c9.s2.13
The T., when examined in the five-fold way (i.e. identity, difference etc.), has been shown as neither existing by itself (*svabhāvataḥ*), nor with reference to the skandhas (= *upādānas*), (i.e. *parabhāvataḥ*). Moreover the skandhas themselves are non-existent, because they are dependently originated (*pratītya-samutpannatvāt*).² Their existence also cannot be established indirectly (*parabhāvataḥ*), that is, by their relation to something else, e.g. the *upādātṛ*. The existence of *upādāna* is not possible without an agent (*upādātṛ*). Even if the existence of the agent (*upādātṛ*) be assumed, how can the reality of a thing be established by showing its relation to the agent (or originator) when the thing itself is non-existent which N. has shown in the chapter on *skandhaparīkṣā*. Nāgārjuna thus concludes that there is neither *upādāna* nor *upādātṛ*.³
v1.c9.s2.14
² For detailed arguments see *M. Vr.*, ch. IV.
v1.c9.s2.15
³ *M. Vr.* pp. 440-1:
v1.c9.s2.16
We need not follow Nāgārjuna any further, for he passes next to the abstruse conception of Śūnyatā, which is beyond our scope here. He is not satisfied with establishing his point that there is no Tathāgata the person—a fact accepted by the Hīnayānists, he goes further and shows that there are no *skandhas*, the existence of which is admitted by the Hīnayānists.
v1.c9.s2.17
Both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists agree in holding that there is no persisting entity (*pudgala*) in a being apart from the *skandhas*, and any question about the existence of the Tathāgata after his passing away really raises the issue whether there is any persisting entity in a being, and whether that entity continues to exist after the being is thoroughly cleansed of his impurities and passes away for ever. To put it in another way, does the entity (*pudgala*) exist in Nirvāṇa eternally, or not? As both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists deny the existence of that entity—the personality of beings, both refuse to give any answer to the question whether there is Tathāgata (the person) after he has passed away, for a question like that cannot arise and hence any answer, if given, would be misleading,¹ and so it is safer and better to leave it as *avyākata* or *anirvacanīya*.
v1.c9.s2.18
¹ It should be remembered that Nāgārjuna denies the existence of Tathāgata the person but not of Tathatā or Śūnyatā, for an exposition of which see my *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 214-5. To the Hīnayānists, Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, Nirvāṇa exists but is devoid of any individuality. It is like the sea of one taste, one colour etc. and in which all rivers of different names, colours, tastes lose their individual characters.