Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c34.s6: IX. How Vijñānas function?
Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c34.s6
- Language
- English
IX. How Vijñānas function?
v2.c34.s6.1
The following opinions are attributed by Vasumitra to the Mahāsaṅghikas:
v2.c34.s6.2
(i) Beings of the Rūpa and Arūpadhātu possess all the six sense-perceptions (ṣaḍvijñānas)²
v2.c34.s6.3
² Or ṣaḍvijñānakāya or the group of six sense-perceptions.
v2.c34.s6.4
(ii) The five vijñānas conduce both to attachment (sarāga) and freedom from attachment (virāga); and
v2.c34.s6.5
(iii) The rūpendriyas (organs of sense) are nothing but lumps of flesh: the eyes do not see colours, the ears do not hear sounds, the nose does not smell odours, the tongue does not taste flavour, and the body does not feel touch.
v2.c34.s6.6
The *Kvu.* deals with these topics thus:
v2.c34.s6.7
(i) *Saḷāyataniko attabhāvo rūpadhātuyā ti?* (VIII. 7) and (ii) *Pañc’ evāyatanā kāmā ti?* (VIII. 4).
v2.c34.s6.8
(iii) *Cakkhunā rūpaṃ passati ti?* ...pe...*kayena phoṭṭhabbaṃ phusati ti?* (XVIII. 9).
v2.c34.s6.9
In the discussion relating to the six āyatanas (spheres of the organs of sense), the *Kvu.* shows that the Andhakas took literally the expression: *rūpī manomayo sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahinindriyo ti* and assert that there are in the rūpadhātu all the six indriyas and āyatanas with this difference from the Kāmadhātu, that out of the six āyatanas three, viz., ghāna, rasa and phoṭṭhabba do not exist but their *nimittas*, i.e., the subtlest forms exist.¹ In the Abhidhamma texts it is stated that the denizens of the Rūpadhātu have five khandhas and six (and not twelve) āyatanas, while those in the Arūpadhātu have four khandhas and two āyatanas (manāyatana and dhammāyatana only).²
v2.c34.s6.10
¹ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 405: In Kāmadhātu there are cakkhāyatana and rūpāyatana, sotāyatana and saddāyatana, etc., in all, twelve āyatanas.
v2.c34.s6.11
² *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 405-7.
v2.c34.s6.12
Relating to the third point the *Kvu.* contradicts Vasumitra and says that it is the Mahāsanghikas who held the opposite view, viz., the eyes see colours, ears hear sounds etc. by conceiving a *pasādacakkhu*, a subtle eye, which has not got the power of *āvajjana* (reflection) like *cakkhuviññāṇa* but possesses just the power of knowing (*paṭijānāti*) objects. In this case also, shall we account for the contradictions by saying that the opinion of ‘ekacce mahāsanghikā’ is represented by Vasumitra while the opinion of the ‘aññe mahāsanghikā’ is noticed in the *Kathā-* vatthu.¹ The Theravādins and a section of the Mahāsanghikas hold that the eyes, ears etc. are mere material conveyers of perception, the cakkhuviññāṇa, sotaviññāṇa, etc. being the actual percipients, in other words, eyes, ears etc. belong to the rūpa-khandha which is material, while cakkhuviññāṇa, etc. belong to the viññāṇa-khandha, which makes a being aware of the things around him.
v2.c34.s6.13
¹ See infra.
v2.c34.s6.14
X. How many avyākatas are there?
v2.c34.s6.15
The opinion of the Andhakas that "there is nothing which is indeterminate" (avyākṛta) has been explained by Masuda as that the Andhakas admitted only two natures of things, good or bad and not a third, neither good nor bad. This interpretation does not appear to be sound as in the Buddhist texts the three natures of things are accepted generally. The avyākatas also refer to those problems which Buddha left unanswered as any answer to them whether in the affirmative or in the negative would mislead the enquirer, or treated the question as absurd and unanswerable. These avyākata problems are always mentioned in a stereotyped form in all Buddhist texts whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna.² Nāgārjuna has utilised these problems in his Mādhyamika-kārikā to establish the Mahāyānic conception of Śūnyatā. If we accept Vasumitra's statement as correct, we shall have to say that the Śūnyatā conception was known to the Mahāsanghikas, and so to them the so-called avyākata problems were not avyākata (inexplicable), but this way of looking at the statement of Vasumitra seems to me to be too far-fetched and so, I think, Vasumitra’s statement is not complete. Perhaps it refers to the problem discussed in the *Kvu.*: *diṭṭhigataṃ avyākata ti?* (XIV. 8),—whether a person holding one of the unanswered views can be regarded as avyākata i.e. neither good nor bad. The answer of the Theravādins is that the holder of any one of the views is wrong, hence akusala and cannot be avyākata as supposed by the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas.
v2.c34.s6.16
² Sassato loko, asassato loko; antavā loko, anantavā loko; tam jīvam tam sarīram, aññam jīvam aññam sarīram; hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā, na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā, hoti ca na hoti caTathāgato param maraṇā, n'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā.
Cites (2)
- Kathāvatthu — Pāli
- Vibhaṅga — Pāli