Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Outlines of Jainism c14: Appendix I. Jaina Logic

Outlines of Jainism c14

Language
English

Contents

Appendix I. Jaina Logic

c14.2

Western logic is material or formal and inductive or deductive. Its chief topics are the term, the proposition, and the syllogism. Its aim is consistency in argument—formal truth mostly.

c14.3

Jaina logic has for its aim to remove ignorance; to acquire knowledge; to know what is harmful, what is beneficial and to be adopted, and to what it is fit to be indifferent. The whole of Jainism follows the maxim: Do not live to know, but know to live. Logic is not mental training merely; it is a necessary help in ascertaining the truth, as we move along.

c14.4

How to achieve this aim? By proving things through *pramāṇa*.

c14.5

What is *pramāṇa*? It is that by which is established the knowledge of the self and of that which was not known before.

c14.6

It also means the way of knowing a thing without doubt, perversion, and indifference; e.g. I know a jar by myself. Conviction in this proves existence of the self and the jar both. [Compare the conclusion of Descartes: *Cogito, ergo sum.*]

c14.7

Besides (i) *pramāṇas* we have (ii) *nayas* and (iii) *syād-vāda*.

c14.8

*Pramāṇas* are of two kinds: *pratyaksha* and *paroksha*.

Pratyaksha

c14.s1.1

It is of two kinds: *sāmvyavahārika-pratyaksha*, or the way of knowing things by means of the five senses and the mind; *pāramārthika-pratyaksha*, the way of knowing things by the soul itself through removal of all karmic matter that obscures its knowledge.

Paroksha

c14.s2.1

This is of five kinds:
1. *smṛiti*, remembrance;
2. *pratyabhijñāna*, memory by sight, i.e. recognition;
3. *tarka*, argument from association; e.g. birth and pregnancy; smoke and fire; rain and wet pavement; dawn and lotus-blossoming;
4. *anumāna*, inference; this is of two kinds:
(1) *upalabdhi*, establishing an affirmative or negative proposition by a positive middle.
(2) *anupalabdhi*, establishing an affirmative or negative proposition by a negative middle.
5. *āgama*, *śabda*, knowledge from what the Teacher has said.

c14.s2.2

Under 4 (*anumāna*) *upalabdhi* is of six kinds, which are *aviruddha*, viz. according as the (positive) middle term is:
1. *vyāpya*, comprehended: infer fire by smoke;
2. *kārya*, effect: wisdom by eloquent speech;
3. *kāraṇa*, cause: shade by tree;
4. *pūrva-chara*, priority: darkness by sunset;
5. *uttara-chara*, posteriority: sunset by darkness;
6. *saha-chara*, concomitance: sweet-mango by yellow-ripe.

c14.s2.3

Seven kinds, which are *viruddha*, viz. according as the (positive) middle term is:
1. *svabhāva*, property of major: no cold by heat;
2. *vyāpya*: no quiescence by anger;
3. *kārya*: no cold by smoke;
4. *kāraṇa*: no happiness in the world by soul is impure;
5. *pūrva-chara*: no sunset by daylight;
6. *uttara-chara*: no daylight by sunset;
7. *saha-chara*: no not-sweet by yellow-ripe mango.

c14.s2.4

*Anupalabdhi* also has sub-kinds: *aviruddha* and *viruddha*. Seven *aviruddha* kinds, viz. according as the (negative) middle term is:
1. *svabhāva*: no jug here, because none is visible;
2. *vyāpaka*: no mango-tree, because no tree;
3. *kārya*: no good seed, because no sprout;
4. *kāraṇa*: no smoke, because no fire;
5. *pūrva-chara*: no rise of *Rohiṇī* (constellation) in two *ghaṭīs*, because *Kṛttikā* has not risen now;
6. *uttara-chara*: no rise of *Bharaṇī* two *ghaṭīs* ago, because *Kṛttikā* has not risen now;
7. *saha-chara*: no rise in one scale-pan, because there is no lowering of the other.

c14.s2.5

Five *Viruddha-anupalabdhis* (with negative middle):
1. *svabhāva*: things are many-sided, because we cannot get a purely one-sided thing;
2. *vyāpaka*: shade by no heat;

c14.s2.6

3. *kārya* : this man is ill, because he has no appearance or sign of health ;

c14.s2.7

4. *kāraṇa* : this man is in pain, because he has not attained his desire.

c14.s2.8

5. *saha-cara* : false view by no true view.

c14.s2.9

The objects of *pramāṇa* are *sāmānya*, common qualities, i.e. generic attributes; or *viśeṣa*, distinguishing attributes, i.e. differentia. This twofold distinction is applied to substances, attributes, and modifications.

Pramāṇābhāsa (Fallacy)

c14.s3.1

Modes of acquiring knowledge, which look like *pramāṇa*, but are not really so. They are :

c14.s3.2

1. *a-sva-saṃvidita* : knowledge by which the self cannot be known, e.g. the Naiyāyika system ;

c14.s3.3

2. *gṛhītārtha* : knowing what is already known ; *dhārāvāhi-jñāna*, e.g. it is a jug, it is a jug, it is a jug. This does not add to our knowledge; what is not known before (*apūrvārtha*) is what we must know ;

c14.s3.4

3. *nirvikalpa-darśana* : intuitive perception. This cannot be true *pramāṇa* ;

c14.s3.5

4. *saṃśaya* : doubtful or ambiguous knowledge cannot be *pramāṇa* ; e.g. Is it a tree-trunk or a man ? ;

c14.s3.6

5. *viparyaya-jñāna* : perverted knowledge cannot be true *pramāṇa* ;

c14.s3.7

6. *anadhyavasāya-jñāna*: uncertainty ; e.g. treading a twig under foot, and saying : let it be ;

c14.s3.8

7. *pratyakṣābhāsa* : misleading appearance ; e.g. something appears to the senses to be A, but really is not A ; as a mirage ;

c14.s3.9

8. *parokṣābhāsa*: by mistake supposing what is apparent to the senses to be something which can be known only by an inner mental process; e.g. the Mīmāṃsaka system of philosophy. It is of many kinds;

c14.s3.10

9. *saṃkhyābhāsa*: believing in more or less than two *pramāṇas*;

c14.s3.11

10. *viṣayābhāsa*: believing in more or less than two *viṣayas*, or subjects;

c14.s3.12

11. *phalābhāsa*: the fallacy of believing the conclusion to be entirely distinct and separate from *pramāṇa*. It is a fallacy, because in the conclusion we get only what we put into the premises. There are many other *ābhāsas* (fallacies) in the details of the syllogism.

Nayas

c14.s4.1

Nayas are modes of expressing things.

c14.s4.2

There are two *nayas*, each with several subdivisions:

c14.s4.3

1. *dravyārthika*, from the point of view of substance;

c14.s4.4

2. *paryāyārthika*, from the point of view of modification or condition.

Syād-vāda

c14.s5.1

The great and distinctive doctrine of Jaina logic is the *syād-vāda*. Its chief merit is the *anekānta*, or many-sided view of logic. This, it would be seen at once, is most necessary in order to acquire full knowledge about anything. It is a corrective of the fallacy into which fell the two knights who saw the different sides of the shield. Tom Smith, for example, may be a father with reference to his son Willy Smith; and he may be a son with reference to his father John Smith. Now it is a fact that Tom Smith is a son and father at one and the same time; and still some may declare it impossible for a man to be a father and a son simultaneously. This fallacy is not quite so obvious in other cases, and is a fruitful source of much misunderstanding. Two seemingly contrary statements may be found to be both true, if we take the trouble of finding out the two points of view from which the statements are made. Seven classes of points of view are noted. They are:

c14.s5.2

1. *syād asti*: A is. A rose is;

c14.s5.3

2. *syān nāsti*: A is not. A rose is not, from the point of view of a clock;

c14.s5.4

3. *syād asti nāsti*: A is and is not. A rose is and is not, as in 1 and 2;

c14.s5.5

4. *syād avaktavya*: from a certain point of view it is impossible to describe A; e.g. from the point of view of integral calculus it may be difficult to describe a rose;

c14.s5.6

5. *syād asti cha avaktavya*: A is, and it is impossible to describe A. This is a combination of 1 and 4;

c14.s5.7

6. *syān nāsti cha avaktavya*: A is not, and it is impossible to describe A. This is a combination of 2 and 4;

c14.s5.8

7. *syād asti cha nāsti cha avaktavya*: A is and A is not, and it is impossible to describe A. This is a combination of 1, 2, and 4.

c14.s5.9

From these seven modes of expression the system derives also its second name: *sapta-bhaṅgī*, ‘sevenfold system of logic.’

Syllogism

c14.s6.1

The Jaina syllogism, like that of Gautama’s *Nyāya*, but unlike the syllogism of Aristotelian logic, consists of five propositions. To take an elementary example: Man is mortal. John is a man. ∴ John is mortal. The Jaina logician would argue thus: Jack died, Fox died, Herbert died, and so did William; Jack, Fox, Herbert, and William are truly universal types of man. ∴ All men die. John is a man. ∴ John will die.

c14.s6.2

It seems wasteful to have five propositions in a syllogism, when three would do. But really the great merit of Jaina logic is to combine the inductive and deductive methods, and so by its very method more or less to answer in anticipation the criticism that logic is a barren kind of intellectual gymnastics, and to a certain extent also that logic is merely formal and has nothing at all to do with the matter of the argument.

c14.s6.3

[NOTE.—As authorities for this chapter we may cite the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of Umā-svati, the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṃkāra* of Vādideva Sūri, the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī* of Malli-sheṇa, the *Parīkṣā-mukha* of Māṇikya-nandin, and the *Nyāya-bindu* of Siddha-sena Divā-kara, edited with English translation by Professor Satīśchandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa, also the English work by Mr. Jhaveri cited in the Preliminary Note.]

Cites (5)