Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c2: Foreword

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c2

Language: English

c2.1 — 4 parts

Foreword

c2.1.1

The present work forms an important contribution to the solution of a number of problems more in particular pertaining to the earliest developments of Indian philosophy. In 1925 P. Tuxen observed that in any future exposition of the history of this philosophy two factors should predominate: 1. the relation of early Buddhism to Indian thought; 2. the correlation of the latter to the Indian science of grammar.¹ In 1927 the famous Russian Buddhologist Stcherbatsky made the significant statement that even after a century of scientific study of Buddhism in Europe, we were still in the dark about the fundamental teachings of this religion and its philosophy. At the current state of inquiry—thanks to the assiduous and penetrating efforts of many scholars in West and East—a good deal of this 'darkness' has been dispelled. Yet, there are still various gaps in our knowledge to be filled. For one thing, even though we are at present fairly well acquainted with the later developments of systematic Indian philosophy, there is still much uncertainty about the actual origin and incipient formative stages, i.e. the 'pre-history' of its logical and epistemological and, to a less extent, of its linguistic aspects. For another, even to-day too many misconceptions about the exclusively mystic and recondite nature of this philosophy continue to prevail, especially in non-professional circles. For the sphere of thought indicated by the collective name of 'Indian Philosophy' is extremely complex.

c2.1.2

Indeed, in terms of the history of ideas, its chief attraction must be sought, not only in its spiritual and cultural unity or in the perennial truths of its monistic-idealistic metaphysics, but rather in its rich diversity. For this is indicative of its long development including an ever deepening confrontation with fundamental philosophical problems. This complexity has led to highly divergent value judgments on the part of Western philosophers as well as professional scholars, mostly of an earlier generation. They included those who regarded the very term 'Indian philosophy' as a 'contradictio in adjecto' and its teachings as vaguely indefinite displays of dreamy thoughts, lacking in clear-cut concepts and proper definitions. However, other scholars were convinced that it had reached a very high standard of development. Stcherbatsky (e.g.) stated that, in addition to its systems of empirical idealism and spiritual monism, it had produced an intricate logic and a remarkable epistemology and that the principal lines of its development showed parallels with those of Western philosophy, including rationalism and empiricism Even though valid objections may be adduced to the theory of 'parallel development', there are at present few doubts about the 'high standard'.

c2.1.3

Among other things, it is a fact that the consistent investigation of logical fallacies and contradictions, on the basis of exact canons of reason, form an essential part of nearly all the systems, orthodox and heterodox And, in the words of Faddegon, already in early Vaiśeṣika we find a purely theoretical attitude of mind and not 'that craze for liberation' which dominates nearly all forms of Indian thought . . . Rather, it is the theoretical desire for a correct classification and system of definition The variety of opinion, mentioned above, is to a large extent induced by the problems of Indian, i e Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit, philosophical language which—as shown in a number of recent publications—is itself correlated to the terminology and categories of the highly developed Indian science of grammar Especially, the correct interpretation of the intricate technical terminology presents many difficulties In many cases, the same terms have different connotations, or altogether different meanings, within different contexts and, historically, at the successive periods of their application.

c2.1.4

Indeed, already in ancient India, both the grammarians and the philosophers were concerned with the problems of meaning and important works were written on this subject Long before this happened in the West, 'semantics' became a fundamental part of the Indian philosophical discipline Thus, in addition to a careful historical consideration of the semantic theories, only a meticulous textual analysis, on an extensive comparative basis, can produce valid interpretations of Indian philosophical ideas in European languages which are both comprehensible and 'intrinsic'. Moreover, to give adequate meaningful renderings of the difficult texts, even a thorough grounding in modern philosophical analysis is nowadays an indispensable prerequisite

c2.2

¹ Cf P. Tuxen, Zur Darstellung der indischen Philosophie, A.O, vol. IV, p 118 f; Th Stcherbatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leningrad 1927, p. 1; id. Madhyānta-Vibhaṅga, Leningrad, 1936, p. IV; H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India, London 1951, p 27 f, K Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Madras-Adyar, 1963. B. Faddegon, The Vaiçeṣika-System, Amsterdam 1918, p 12.

c2.3

A further problem which has engaged the attention of scholars is the exact position which early Buddhism occupied in the development of Indian thought, the more so as it was regarded by some of them as a 'foreign body' in Indian philosophy. Moreover, they were of the opinion that the purely philosophical quality of the Pali canon was surprisingly deficient Again, Stcherbatsky stated that the Pali-school of Buddhologists entirely overlooked the system of philosophy which is present on every page of the Pali canon In his opinion, Buddhist authors played a leading part in the development of Indian epistemology This is certainly established for the later school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and their followers. Stcherbatsky's views are largely confirmed by the present work which is primarily concerned with the earlier period Dr Jayatilleke, who had the privilege of being admitted to Wittgenstein's classes, is that rare combination of accomplished philologist, historian and methodic philosopher His book goes far beyond the indication of its title. On the basis of a profound analysis of the relevant earlier and later texts as well as a critical re-examination of the works of his predecessors in the field, he traces with great ingenuity and scholarly thoroughness the epistemological foundations of Pali canonical thought, from the Vedic period onwards. His fully connected account sheds new light, not only on the problems of the earlier period which have engaged the attention of scholars during the past forty years, but also on those of the later developments. Moreover, with regard to the present day conflict of metaphysics versus logical and linguistic analysis, the book contains valuable material which elucidates from the Indian point of view some of the basic problems of this conflict.

c2.4

D. Friedman This page contains only negligible marginal stray marks / scan artifacts and has no text to transcribe.