Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c7.41

Language: English

c7.41.1

Purandaras tv āha, lokaprasiddham anumānam Cārvākairapīṣyata eva yattu kaiścillaukikam mārgamatikramya anumānamucyate tannisiddhyate, i.e. Purandara says that it is well known that even the Materialists accept inference although they object to people (kaiścit) employing inference beyond the limits of sense-perception (*lit.* beyond the path of this world). This view attributed to Purandara is confirmed by the references made to him by the Jain commentator Vādideva Sūri who, as Das Gupta has pointed out,¹ quotes in his commentary Syādvādaratnākara (II.131) on his Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra a sūtra of Purandara, viz. pramāṇasya gaunatvād anumānādarthaniścayadurlabhāt, i.e. from the very nature of this means of knowledge, it is difficult to determine (the existence of transcendent) objects by means of inference(?). The sense of this sūtra is however made clear by Vādideva's comment, laukikahetūnām anumeyāvagame nimittaṁ sa nāsti tantrasiddheṣv iti na tebhyaḥ parokṣārthāvagamo nyāyyo 'ta idamuktam anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ. Das Gupta's translation of this passage appears to be more of the nature of a commentary than a translation.² We may translate it more or less literally as follows: 'since in transcendent proofs (tantrasiddheṣu, *lit.* what is proved in religious texts) the basis for inference is absent unlike in the case of perceptual inferences, a knowledge of transcendent objects cannot be had (nyāyyo, *lit.* inferred) by them;

c7.41.2

therefore has it been said that "it is difficult to determine (the existence of transcendent) objects by means of inference".' This shows the existence of a school of Materialists who admitted perception and empirical inference but discarded metaphysical inference on the grounds that what was in principle unperceivable was unknowable. For a valid inference to be possible, it is necessary to establish the truth of a universal proposition (vyāpti), which reveals a concomitance between a hetu and an anumeya (==sādhya-, cp. laukikahetūnām anumeyāvagame) and this is not possible unless both are in principle observables. It is difficult to say whether this school asserted that there was a necessary connection between cause and effect or merely held that the concomitance or sequence was only probable and therefore the inference was only probable. It is worth noting that one of the objections against inference brought out by group (1) was that there was no necessity in the concomitance, despite our repeated observation of several instances.

c7.41.3

As Jayanta says in elucidating the theories of the Materialists, 'universality (vyāpti) is not established even by the observation of several instances (bhūyodarśanagamyā'pi) since there is the possibility of error even after observing a thousand instances though we come to the conclusion that smoke and fire are concomitant (sahacārī, *lit.* go together) by observing several instances we cannot know that there is no smoke in the absence of fire despite this repeated observation'.¹ But whether they made this latter qualification (which, incidentally, is the same as the objection that Hume raised against causation and inference²) or not, it is clear that in limiting the inferable to the sphere of the verifiable, they were tacitly assuming the truth of the Verification Principle³ and it is therefore this group rather than group (3) (*v. supra*, 89) which deserves to be called a positivist⁴ school of thought Purandara's statement that it is well known (lokaprasiddham, *lit* known the world over) that the materialists accepted inference does not make sense unless they or the majority of them had in fact accepted the validity of both perception and inference in the above sense up to that time.

c7.41.4

That the reference to this school is not confined to Purandara's statements and their exposition is evident from the reference made to it by the Jain commentator Gunaratna who in his Tarkarahasyadīpikā commenting on the phrase, mānaṁ tvakṣajameva hi, in verse 83 of the Saddarśanasamuccaya says that 'the particle "hi" in this phrase is added to denote a distinction, the distinction being that at times (kvacana) the Cārvākas welcome inferences such as "smoke" (implies fire) which are limited to stating what is within the reach of the world but not transcendent inferences (alaukikamanumānam) which (claim to) establish (the existence of) heaven, what is unseen (adṛṣṭa), etc.'¹ The fact that Vāsideva Sūri and Guṇaratna are Jains and the other reference was in a Buddhist work shows that at least the Buddhist and Jain tradition was well aware of the existence of this school. When we consider this in the light of what we know of the Materialists from the Early Buddhist and Jain sources it seems probable that these early Materialists or at least one school among them believed in the validity of *both* perception and inference while giving priority to perception and restricting inference within the limits of the verifiable.