Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.129

Language: English

c8.129.1

(199) Now the main argument for niyati seems to have been based on the same *a priori* premiss of Uddālaka (*v. supra*, 25), which led to Metaphysical Materialism on the one hand (*v. supra*, 85, 115) and to the proto-Vaiśeṣika Realism of another Ājīvika thinker, Pakudha Kaccāyana (*v. infra*, 428). As Dr Basham has shown, the Jain commentators Śīlāṅka, Jñānavimala and Abhayadeva quote a verse ascribed to the niyativādins, which has the significant statement 'na "bhavyam bhavati na bhāvino" sti nāśaḥ' (*op cit*, p. 221, fn.¹) which means 'that which is not to be will not be, nor does that which is to be perish'. This is very similar to the *a priori* premiss, sato natthi vināso asato natthi sambhavo (*v. supra*, 85), the only difference being that what is conceived to be *Being* is not ‘what is’ but ‘what will be’ and what is *Non-being* is not ‘what is not’ but ‘that which is not to be’. Now Being cannot be destroyed nor Non-Being come to be. Therefore ‘what will be’ cannot be destroyed, i.e. cannot be otherwise and ‘that which is not to be’ cannot come into being, i.e. will not be. The apparent self-evidence of the proposition that ‘what will be cannot be otherwise’ is based on the misconception that the future event which actually comes to pass in the course of time, ‘exists’ or has Being. Once this is accepted, the determinist conclusion follows; the same argument can be used to show that the past could not have been different from what in fact it was.

c8.129.2

So everything, past, present and future is unalterable and fixed. It is probably this very argument of the niyativādin, which provoked the Buddha to draw attention to the past, present and future usages of the verb ‘to be’ (ahosi, atthi, bhavissati) and enjoin the desirability of keeping ‘these three linguistic conventions’ (tayo’me niruttipathā) apart without confusing them, so that one may see that one cannot argue that ‘what will be’ (bhavissati) has existence (atthi) for the future that has not come into being and manifested itself has to be reckoned as ‘what will be’ (bhavissati) and cannot be reckoned as ‘what is’ (atthi)¹. It is significant that it is said at the end of this section that even ‘the ahetuvādins, the akiriyavādins and the natthikavādins cannot afford to condemn or reject these three linguistic conventions for otherwise they would be liable to censure’.² Here the akiriyavādin is a reference to Pūraṇa Kassapa, whose doctrine is called akiriyam at D. I.53, while a doctrine stated in identical language is called akiriyavāda- at M. I 404–5 (*v. supra*, 121). He seems to have been an outright niyativādin as his later reputation³ shows. Ahetuvādin on the other hand is probably a reference to Makkhali Gosāla, but his doctrine is called saṃsāra-suddhi (salvation by transmigration) at D. I.53 though at M. II.408, the same stated in identical language minus the cosmology is called ahetuvāda-.

c8.129.3

His ahetuvāda- is evident from his language in that he denied a cause (*hetu*) for moral degeneration or salvation¹ but at the same time it may be noted that it was Pūrana who was called a ahetu-vādin in the Mahābodhi Jātaka (J. V., pp. 237, 246, cp. Basham, *op. cit.*, p. 18). Makkhali seems to have been a syncretist thinker whose doctrine was highly eclectic in character. He appears to have believed in *niyati*- as well as *svabhāva* (=*bhāva*) and *yadṛcchā* (=*saṅgati*) and possibly even in *parināma*. This is probably the reason why these central concepts of different schools are welded together in his doctrines. According to him all beings (*sabbe sattā* . . . *bhūtā* . . . *jīvā*) undergo development (*parināma*). This culminates in the course of time (*saṃsārasuddhi*) in final salvation to which all beings are destined under the impact of the factors of *niyati*, *bhāva* and *saṅgati* (*niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā*). It is probably this eclecticism which helped him to bring together the scattered forces of the Ājīvikas differing among themselves and earn their leadership.² It was probably this same eclecticism which made it difficult for others to specify exactly what his doctrine was. Hence he has been called (in addition to ahetuvādin) a Vainayikavādin (*v.* Basham, *op cit*, p. 176) and an Ajñānavādin (*v. supra*, 147) by Śīlāṅka, while the Mahābodhi Jātaka calls him a Theist (Issarakāranavādin, *v.* Basham, *op. cit*, p. 18).

c8.129.4

His belief in 'sixty two ways of life'³ to be lived out in saṃsāra shows that he believed that all doctrines had their part to play in man's development, though man himself had no contribution to make.