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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c10: Chapter V: God

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c10

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English

Chapter V: God

c10.1

it has been made by Him, like his assertion regarding the heat of Light,"—this is invalidated by the counter-argument—"My assertion that Buddha and other persons were *not* omniscient must be true, because it has been made by me, just like the assertion that Fire is hot and bright." In fact this argument of mine is more reliable than yours, because the fact of the assertion being made by me is directly perceived, while the fact of Buddha having made the assertion regarding his own omniscience can, at best, be proved only by means of inferences.—Nor can the idea of there having been an omniscient Person be based upon an unbroken 'memory' (tradition)—because there is an equally strong tradition to the contrary, that Buddha was a hypocrite,—because the idea of omniscience itself is inherently impossible,—and because the idea has been accepted by very few men. That the very idea is absurd is clear from the fact that whether or not a certain person is omniscient—*i.e.*, possesses the right knowledge of all things—cannot be ascertained by men who do not themselves know, and hence can verify, His knowledge of all things; so that unless one is himself omniscient, he cannot recognise another person to be omniscient; hence there should be, not one, but many omniscient persons (135).—There is another theory—that "all Persons—*i.e.*, their Souls—are inherently omniscient; and the fact of all men, in actual life, not knowing all things is due to the Soul being fettered and disabled by the limitations of the body and the sense-organs" (141).—The objection against this theory is that this idea of the omniscience of all persons could be derived only from the words of some persons, and the reliability of these words would be dependent entirely upon the fact of those persons being omniscient. This is also against common experience, by which it is found that men are more untruthful than truthful.—The case of the Vedic tradition is different from the Buddhist tradition, in so far as the former is not based on the omniscience of any single person,—it is inherent in the Veda, the reliability of which is perfect and discernible by men of the present, as it has been in the past (151).—The untruthful character of men does not affect the reliability of the Veda, because it is not the work of a personal author.

c10.2

God, as world-creator, is denied by *Kumārila*; but as to whether this denial applies also to the *Parama-Ātman*, the Super-Soul, has been felt to be doubtful. On the authority of a comparatively recent work, the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, it seems that Kumārila was a believer in a multiplicity of *Jīva-Souls* and in the identity of these with the *Super-Soul*; this *Super-Soul* is one and eternal and is present in all *Jīva-Souls*. This is the teaching of the *Vedānta* also; and the *Shlokavārtika* ends its treaties on ‘Soul’ with the declaration that sound knowledge of the Soul is to be obtained from the ‘*Vedānta*.’ From this it would seem that Kumārila was a believer in the *Super-Soul*, *Paramātman*, in its impersonal aspect, though opposed to the idea of one *Personal-World-Creator*. But if he had really believed in the *Super-Soul*, it seems impossible that he should not have asserted that belief and should have left it to be inferred from his reference to the ‘*Vedānta*,’ which too does not necessarily indicate his belief in the *Super-Soul*.

c10.3

It is true that the benedictory opening verse of the *Shlokavārtika* invokes ‘God,’ in the shape of Shiva. But it is open to a different explanation also; as pointed out by the *Nyāyaratnākara*. Nor does it necessarily imply belief in the *Super-Soul*, one, indivisible, permeating all Souls and all things.

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