Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c11: Chapter VI: Reality of the External World
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c11
- Language
- English
Contents
- c11.s1 (A) According to Shabara — 11 parts
- c11.s2 (B) Prabhākara’s View of the Reality of the External World — 7 parts
- c11.s3 (C) Reality of the External World according to Kumārila — 6 parts
Chapter VI: Reality of the External World
(A) According to Shabara
c11.s1.1
As regards the things of the world, the *Mīmāṃsaka* is a confirmed Realist. He believes in the reality of the External World, and every writer on the system, from the earliest times, has tried his best to refute the several forms of Idealism that have held ground in the field of Indian Philosophy.
c11.s1.2
*Shabara-Bhāṣya* (Trans., p. 12)—In attacking the validity of Sense-Cognition, the Idealist says,—" All Cognition is baseless,—*i.e.*, without a real substratum in the external world,—as is clear from the case of Dream-Cognition. In the case of Dreams, we have found that Cognition has no real objective substratum.—Waking Cognition is also a Cognition;—hence Waking Cognition also can have no real objective substratum.—It is true that the Cognition that one has in the waking stage is perfectly definite and determinate. But the same may be said of Dream-Cognition also, which is quite definite and determinate till the time of waking.—It may be argued that the Dream-Cognition becomes sublated, rejected as false, as soon as the man wakes up.—But from the fact of both being of the nature of *Cognition*, it can be presumed that the Waking Cognition also will, in due course of time, become sublated and rejected."
c11.s1.3
Such a presumption, however, would be justifiable only if the falsity of Dream-Cognition were due to its being a *Cognition*. But, if the falsity of Dream-Cognition were due to the fact that it cognises, apprehends, things,—then, inasmuch as Waking Cognition also apprehends things and is a *Cognition* in that sense, this also would be equally false. As a matter of fact, however, the falsity of Dream-Cognition is inferred from other reasons; for instance, that it becomes sublated, on waking, by a Cognition to the contrary. As a matter of fact, Dream appears only while one is sleepy—only half asleep, when the mind is not quite alert, just before and after deep sleep—during which no dreams appear,—while the man is drowsy and his mind is not really perceptive. It is this *sleepiness* that is the cause of the falsity of Dream-Cognition, and as there is no *sleepiness* when the man wakes up and the Mind is quite alert, there is no reason why the Cognition during this state should be false. It is possible that during the waking state also there may be some defect in the cognitive process and organs; but whenever there is such a defect, it becomes detected sooner or later and the Cognition is declared to be false.—(Shabara-Bhāṣya. Trs., p. 12.)
c11.s1.4
“ But ”—says the opponent—“ as a matter of fact, Cognition is an empty void, *i.e.*, devoid of any foundation in the external world; because we do not perceive any difference in form between the Cognition and its object; what is apprehended by the senses is only the Cognition; from which we conclude that there is no form or shape of any object apart from that Cognition itself.”
c11.s1.5
*Shabara’s* answer to this is as follows:—This would be so if the Cognition had the form of the Object; as a matter of fact, however, Cognition has no form; it is only the external object that has form, and is actually apprehended as existing in external space. Then again, the objective of the *Sense-Cognition* is the *Object*, not another *Cognition*; and thus for the simple reason that Cognition, having only a momentary existence, (especially according to the Buddhist Idealist), could never continue to exist till the appearance of the other Cognition of which it could form the objective. Further, it is only after the Object becomes cognised that the person comes to cognise the Cognition, which he does through a subsequent Inference; the existence of the Cognition being only inferred from the fact of the Object having been cognised. Thus there can be no simultaneity between the *Cognition of the Object* and the *Cognition of that Cognition*. It may be true that it is the Cognition of the object that appears first, but it is not the first to become cognised; it sometimes happens that even a *cognised object* is spoken of as *not-cognised*; when, for instance, one is speaking of the past, he says, ‘ I never knew this thing;’ though in reality he really knew it. Further, the form of the Cognition is never apprehended except in terms of the Object; which could not be the case if they were cognised simultaneously. Hence the Cognition can never be regarded as the objective of Sense-perception.
c11.s1.6
Even if the Cognition and the Object were identical in form, it is the Cognition that should have to be denied separate existence, not the *Object*, which is actually perceived. In reality, however, the two are not identical in form; when we cognise a Cognition,—
c11.s1.7
and this is always through Inference from the fact of the Object being cognised,—we infer it without a form, simply as ‘Cognition,’ not as the cognition of a particular object.
c11.s1.8
As a matter of fact, whenever the perception of cloth appears, it does so only when the yarns composing the cloth are there, which establishes a permanent connection between the Cognition and the Object cognised, in the shape of the cloth, whose existence therefore cannot be denied. If there were no such connection between the Cognition and the Object cognised, it might be possible to have the cognition of the colth, when the object before the eye is the jar.
c11.s1.9
All this goes to prove that the Cognition has a real substratum in the extenal world.—(*Shabara-Bhāṣya*. Trs., pp. 12—15.)
c11.s1.10
In the above account, *Shabara* has disposed of Idealism in both its forms—in the common form where the reality of the External Object alone is denied, while that of the *Idea* or *Cognition* is admitted,—as *momentary*, by the Buddhist, and as *permanent* by the Vedāntin,—and also in the extreme form of the Buddhist Nihilism, *Shūnyavāda*, according to which all is ‘*Shūnya*,’ mere ‘Void.’—This latter extreme view, however, has been confuted by implication only; the direct confutation has been directed entirely to the proving of the reailty of the external object; the idea being that when the reality of the Object has been established, that of the *Idea* or *Cognition* cannot be denied.
c11.s1.11
According to the interpretation of the *Bṛhatī*, there is no reference to the extreme Nihilism in the *Bhāṣya*, when it speaks of ‘*Shūnya*,’ ‘Void;’ all that it means is that the Cognition is ‘VOID’—*i.e.*, devoid of all external background.—This same interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* has the support of *Kumārila* also, according to whom the question considered by the *Bhāṣya* with the words ‘*Shūnyastu*, etc.’ is—Is it a fact that Cognition is able to function only when Objects like the Pillar have a real existence in the external world?—or is it that Cognition rests in itself, and not in any object extraneous to itself?
(B) Prabhākara’s View of the Reality of the External World
c11.s2.1
The Idealist having put forward the view that “there is no real Object in the external world; whenever we have the cognition of things,—like the wall, for instance,—it is baseless, being due entirely to the *Vāsanā*, Predisposition, present in the mind of the cogniser,"—the answer of *Prabhākara* is as follows:—(*Bṛhatī*, p. 69 et. seq.)—Whenever we have to find out the cause of a certain effect, we always assume a cause which accounts for the appearance of the effect,—and not one which would be destructive of the effect. In the case of Dreams and other Cognitions, the Cognition that appears clearly manifests external things; this effect in the form of such a Cognition cannot be explained except on the basis of the *real existence* of the external things; and when one thing is not possible without another, the latter is regarded as its cause. Hence the only right view is that it is the *external thing* which is the cause, the *basis*, of the said Cognition. In fact, no Cognition is ever apprehended as being without an external basis. For these reasons, the Perception brought about by the senses cannot be due merely to the Predisposition present in the mind of the observer. Some dreams may certainly be accounted for on the basis of this Predisposition due to the thoughts and anxieties in the mind of the man when going to sleep, but it is not so in all cases. In any case it is not so in the case of our *Waking Cognition*, which is perfectly well-defined. In cases of *Wrong Cognition* of things, what happens is that there is no Cognition of the things at all, not that the thing cognised has no existence in the external world.
c11.s2.2
Says the Idealist,—"Cognition is the property of the Soul, or of the Mind, or of Consciousness itself.—What is meant is that *Saṁvit* (Objective Ideation, or Perception) is actually perceived; if it were not perceived then there could be no perception of things at all; and yet what is formless cannot be perceived. There is only one form, in the shape of what is perceived;—*e.g.*, a particular odour; this is the form therefore which must belong to the Percepion; this *Saṁvit* (Perception) is not in the form of the Soul, or of the Mind; as these two exist even without the Cognition; hence Perception (*Saṁvit*) cannot be identified with the Soul or with the Mind. It is only right to identify it with Consciousness (*Jñāna*); so that what is perceived is only the *Saṁvit*, Objective Ideation, not any *external object* in the shape of Sound and the rest."
c11.s2.3
What is meant by the Idealist (says the *Ṛjuvimālā*, p. 78) is as follows:—"What is perceived is the *Saṁvit* (Objective Ideation); if there were two distinct factors in the Perception—in the shape of Cognition (*Jñāna*) and Object, then there would be three forms in the Perception—(1. of the Perception, *Saṃvit* itself, 2. of Consciousness and 3. of the Object). While what is actually manifested is only one form, the *Blue*, for instance If this *Blue* colour belonged to the Object or to Consciousness, then the Perception (*Saṃvit*, the Objective Ideation) itself would be formless, and hence imperceptible; and if the Perception is imperceptible, the Object and Consciousness also would be imperceptible. Hence, Cognition must be regarded as devoid of any corresponding real external object.”
c11.s2.4
*Prabhākara’s Siddhānta* on this matter is as follows:—(*Bṛhatī-Rjuvimālā*, pp. 80 *et. seq.*)—The *Saṃvit* (Perception, Objective Ideation) and the Object—both are perceived; not so Consciousness (*Jñāna*);—though the form perceived is one only, yet the Perception (*Saṃvit*) is not the only entity involved, because both—Perception as well as the Object—are both equally manifested in every act of Perception. Though the *Saṃvit* (Perception) by itself is formless, yet it is perceptible, because the form in which it appears is only that of the resultant of the act of Perception; and this Resultant does not stand in need of another form. The *Jñāna* has to be admitted as the direct cause of the said *Saṃvit*, which could not come about without cause. The question arising as to what is *Jñāna* (Cognition)—the answer is that it is the cause leading to the effect in the form of the said Objective-Ideation or Perception. This effect, in the form of Objective-Ideation, must have a cause; the permanent Soul cannot be that cause; for were it so, then the Ideation also would have to be eternal; but the Cognition that is inferred is a fleeting one; and when this Cognition is inferred as the cause of Perception or Objective Ideation, it is so only in the form of *Blue* and such external things. Thus all Cognitions must be based upon real objects.
c11.s2.5
The next question is—“If the *Blue* Object is what is perceived, how about the Perception itself? Is it perceived or not? If it is not perceived, its existence should not be admitted.”—The answer to this is as follows:—(*Bṛ.*, pp. 82 *et. seq.*) The Perception (or Objective Ideation) is certainly perceived, but it is perceived as Perception, not as a perceptible object; *i.e.*, the Perception is perceived by itself, not as the *object* of another Perception; even without being an *object*, it manifests itself; it is not necessary that everything that is perceived should be percieved as an *object*. When therefore the term ‘perceptible’ is applied to Perception, it is only in the sense of its being perceived directly, by itself, not in the sense of its forming the *object* of sensuous cognition. The said Perception cannot be regared as *unperceived*, because it is on the basis of Perception itself being perceptible that things *perceived* are regarded as such. This Perception (*Saṁvit*) however leads on to Cognition (*Jñāna*), which is puely *inferred* as the cause of the said Perception or Objective Ideation. The inference is this:—This Objective Ideation (Perception) is an effect;—it must therefore have a cause; this cause is the *Jñāna* (Cognition). As a matter of fact, all men are cognisant of this two-fold form—one the *effect* in the form of the *Saṁvit*, Perception, the Objective Ideation, and the other the *causa*, in the form of the *Jñāna*, Cognition. Thus then apart from the Objective Ideation or Perception, there is the Cognition and also the Object.—(*Bṛ.*, p. 83.)
c11.s2.6
Prabhākara (*Bṛ.*, p. 84) has also drawn a distinction between the terms ‘*Saṁvēdya*’ (Perceptible) and ‘*Pramēya*’ (Cognisable). It is *Perception* where the form of the object is clearly manifested as a factor; while in Pramiti or Cognition there is no *Objective Ideation*, hence no other form; consequently Cognition cannot be regarded as *perceptible*; also because Cognition is fleeting, momentary; hence at the time that the Cognition of that Cognition appears it will have ceased to exist; hence it could not be perceived.—Hence it follows that—‘Until the Object has been cognised, no one apprehends the Cognition; it is only after the Object has been cognised that the Cognition comes to be *inferred*’ (*Shabara*).
c11.s2.7
From all this we conclude that the entire cognitive phenomenon is not based wholly upon *Vāsanās*, *Predispositions*, it is, based upon *real* objects in the external world.
(C) Reality of the External World according to Kumārila
c11.s3.1
The *Mīmāṁsaka* lays stress upon the reality of the external world, because, if Cognition had no real basis in the external world, all that has been declared in the Veda in regard to the worldly and supernatural results following from actions would be meaningless. (Shlo. Vā.—*Nirālambanavāda*, 3).—The needs of the situation cannot be met by postulating the ‘Illusory Reality’ of things; because what is real cannot be illusory, and what is illusory cannot be real (6).—Whatever is is real, whatever is not is *unreal*; and there can be no two kinds of reality—true reality and untrue (illusory) reality (10).—The opposite view is represented by (1) the *Yogāchāra*—Buddhist Idealist—who postulates the Cognition, Idea, *Vijñāna*, but without a real substratum in the external world; and (2) by the *Mādhyamika*—Buddhist,—the *Nihilist*—who does not admit even the Idea. Both are agreed as to the *unreality* of the external world (14-15).
c11.s3.2
This is the reason why the *Mīmāmsaka* makes it his business to demolish the arguments set forth by the Idealists and Nihilists and seeks to establish, by his own arguments, the reality of the external world. *Kumārila* has done this in geat detail in the two chapters of his *Shlokavārtika* where he shows that the reasonings set forth by the other party are entirely fallacious, even on technical logical grounds.—The main positive argument that *Kumārila* has put forward in support of the Reality of things is this—“The idea that Cognitions have a real basis in the external world must be true,—because it is an idea that is never sublated,—just as the idea of Dreams being false is never sublated” (79).—He goes a step further, and declares (107-108) that even Dream-Cognition is not entirely devoid of an external basis; even there we have the cognition of external things; with this difference that the things cognised are cognised as things related to place and time other than the real ones.—Similarly in all cases of Wrong Cognition, there is always some sort of external basis.—Nor can we admit of the Idealist’s explanation that all cognitions are the products of *Vāsanā*, Predisposition—and hence they need not presuppose an external hasis. Because mere verbal jugglery—the using of the word ‘*Vāsanā*’—cannot explain away the real state of things.—(*Nirālambanavāda*, 107 *et. seq.*)
c11.s3.3
It is a universally recognised fact that what is apprehended by a cognition is something which is endowed with a definite colour, size and shape.—The question that has to be considered is—To what does all this colour, etc., belong? To the Cognition itself? or to something exterior to it? (*Shūnyavāda*, 8-9.)
c11.s3.4
The Idealist view is that the colour, etc., that are apprehended belong to the Cognition or the Idea itself, so that there is no need for postulating an external object,—especially because all parties are agreed that the colour, etc., are manifested in the Cognition (19);—there is no proof of the fact that the Cognition has any connection with an external object (49).—That the form belongs to the Cognition is proved by the fact that it is apprehended when the Cognition is there, and not apprehended when the Cognition is not there (53).
c11.s3.5
Kumārila's answer to this is as follows:—According to the Idealist's view the Cognition itself would be both *what apprehends* and *what is apprehended*; which is absurd (64). Cognition cannot be both *apprehender* and the *apprehended*; both parties are agreed that it is the *apprehender*; so that the *apprehended* must be something other than the Cognition (147-148).—In as much as a Cognition cannot apprehend itself, what is apprehended by it must be something exterior to itself; and on account of the diversity of the causes of Cognition,—such causes consisting of the Sense-organs, etc.—it is only one object that is apprehended by one Cognition, not all objects by all Cognitions. Whatever object is presented to us in whatever form by the Cognition as *apprehended* by itself is naturally accepted by us to be of that form (225—227).
c11.s3.6
The *Śāstradīpikā* (p. 37) explains that the Perception of an object ends, *not* in a further cognition of that Perception, but in the *Āparokṣya* or *Pratyakṣatā*;—*i.e.*, *Direct Apprehendedness*—of that object,—and that every act of Perception involves a certain relationship between the perceiver and the perceived,—the former being the *Agent* and the latter the *Object*. This Agent-Object relationsrip is not possible without some activity on the part of the Agent; hence the presence of this Relationship leads to the Inference of its invariable concomitant,—*viz.*, the action of the Agent; and it is this action, which, in the case of knowledge, is known as *Cognition*; and it has been shown to be inferable from the relationship between the *cognising* Soul and the *cognised* Object.
Cites (3)
- Śāstradīpikā — Pārthasārathi Miśra, Sanskrit
- Ślokavārttika (Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika) — Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit
- Śābarabhāṣya (Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya) — Śabarasvāmin, Sanskrit