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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c14: Chapter IX: Jati

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c14

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Chapter IX: Jati

(A) Jāti, Sāmānya,—Class, Genus, Community, ‘Universal’

Preliminary Note

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The *Nyāya-Sūtra* and its commentaries have drawn a distinction between the terms ‘ *Jāti* ’ and ‘ *Ākṛti*,’ the former is used in the usual sense of the ‘ Universal,’ but the latter is used in the sense of ‘ Configuration’; and according to them the denotation of the Word consists collectively in *Vyakti* (Individual), *Ākṛti* (Configuration or Figure) and *Jāti* (Universal). (*Nyāya-Sūtra*, 2.2.68.) In later *Nyāya*-literature, however, the distinction appears to have been dropped, and in discussions relating to the denotation of Words, we meet with the two words, ‘ *Vyakti* ’ (Individual) and ‘ *Jāti* ’ (Universal) only.

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There has been no such distinction between ‘ *Jāti* ’ and ‘*Ākṛti*’ in *Mīmāṃsā* literature; in fact the two have been distinctly identified. For instance, *Shabara* says (under Sū. 1.3.33) द्रव्यगु-णाकर्मणां सामान्यमात्रमाकृतिः; *Kumārila* also says (in *Shlokavārtika*, on *Vanavāda* 3) that *Ākṛti* is the same as ‘ *Jāti* ’ or ‘ *Sāmānya* ’; and he distinctly denies the connotation attributed to the term ‘*Ākṛti*’ by the *Naiyāyika*; he says (*Tantravārtika*, Trs. pp. 330-331) that the term, ‘ *Ākṛti* ’ does not stand for Configuration or Shape or Figure.

(B) Shabara’s View of the ‘Universal’

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On the question of the denotation of words, the *Mīmāṃsaka*’s view is that the word denotes the Class, Community, *Jāti*, also called *Ākṛti*. (See below under *Verbal Cognition*.)

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He also holds that the Word, its denotation and the relation between the two,—all this is eternal, having no beginning or end.

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In order to shake this view, his opponent asks—“ When you say that it is the *Universal*, Class or Community that is denoted by the Word,—is this *Universal*, an accomplished entity, or something that is to be brought about, produced?”

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The answer is that, being actually perceived, it cannot be something yet to be accomplished, as what is perceived is only an accomplished entity.

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This notion of *Jāti*, Universal, cannot be a mere illusion. No conception can be regarded as illusory and false unless we find a more reliable conception to the contrary, which negatives and sets aside the conception in question.

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The opponent argues—" We find such conceptions as *Series*, *Group*, *Forest*—all conceived as single entities,—while in reality there are no such single entities apart from the many component individuals. That is, the *Series* is nothing apart from the individual factors, the *Group* is nothing apart from the component members, and the *Forest* is nothing apart from the trees composing it; the comprehensive conception of the *Community* or Universal as an entity, must, therefore, be a misconception and a mere illusion."

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The answer to this is that the *Forest* is actually perceived as a single entity; and the validity of this fact of Sense-perception cannot be denied. If you deny this, you might as well deny the real existence of the trees themselves and reduce yourself to the position of the Buddhist Idealist. . . . Merely because the *Forest* is not perceived apart from the trees, it does not follow that it does not exist as an entity. (*Shabara-Bhāṣya* Trs., p. 21 et seq.)

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In all cases—such, for instance, as the Vedic text to the effect that the ‘Altar should be made like the *Shyēna*,’ the term ‘*Shyēna*’ (Kite) must be taken as denoting the Universal or Community.—In fact terms like ‘Cow’ are always understood in the sense of an Individual belonging to a particular Community; and what is directly denoted by the term is the Community; and this cognition of the *Community* leads to the cognition of the *Individual*. In this way, as the term denotes the *Community*, and through that, the *Individual* also, there would be no dissociation between the *Individual* and the acts prescribed by words denotative of Communities and Individuals. (*Sū.* 1.3.30—35, *Shabara-Bhāṣya*, Trs., pp. 118—124.)

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(C) JĀTI, ‘UNIVERSAL’—ACCORDING TO PRABHĀKARA.

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We have a full account of the *Prābhākara’s* view of *Jāti*, *Community*, ‘Universal’ in the *Bṛhati-Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 163—173;

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and it has been clearly set forth in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 17—32).

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There is a difference of opinion among philosophers regarding the exact character of *Jāti*:—(1) according to some the notion of *Jāti* is purely imaginary, illusory; (2) according to others it is a real entity, but not apart from the individuals wherein it subsists, and as such is cognisable only along with these latter; (3) others again hold that it has a real existence of its own, apart from the individuals comprising it, and its existence can be cognised through Inference; (4) lastly, according to some, it is different as well as non-different from the individuals comprising it, and is apprehended by Perception. According to *Prabhākara* the *Jāti* is something real, distinct from the Individuals which are its substrata, receptacle, and is perceptible by the senses. Says the *Kārikā*—

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जातिराश्रयतो भिन्ना प्रत्यक्षज्ञानगोचरा

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When we properly analyse the notion of *Jāti*, we find that the only basis that we have for accepting any such thing lies in our Conception of some sort of *Non-difference* among a number of things which are known to be different individually.

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The Buddhist Idealist, consistently with the doctrine of *Universal, Perpetual Flux*, denies all aggregates, and hence the *Jāti* also, which is only an aggregate of Individuals.

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The Idealist's conclusion is that,—"the *Jāti* has no real existence, nor are there any substances which could be the substratum of *Jāti*."

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For a detailed discussion, from the Buddhist point of view, the reader is referred to *Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha* (Translated in the *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, Vol. 80, pp. 402—445).

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*Prabhākara's* answer to the Idealist position against *Jāti* is as follows:—

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The proof of the existence of anything must ultimately rest in our own consciousness, and it cannot be denied that there are present, in our consciousness, distinct cognitions of the *gross* or aggregated forms of things and what is thus distinctly cognised should not have its existence denied. As regards the constitution of the gross or aggregated substance, it must exist as we actually perceive it; that it is made up of subtle constituent particles is implied by its very nature; in fact, without this, our conception of it would be impossible. Such being the indisputable fact, it becomes necessary to find an explanation for the fact of a number of subtle particles combining to make up a gross and aggregated object. The only explanation possible is that a number of particles, coming into conjunction among themselves, tend to bring into existence a single object, which being perceptible, (while the particles themselves may be imperceptible), is called *gross* or *aggregate*; a single conjunction subsisting over all the component particles, and that same Conjunction tending to combine all the said particles into one aggregated *whole*. Thus in bringing about one aggregated whole, the constituent particles are the material or constituent cause, and their conjunction is the immaterial cause.

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This *aggregate* subsists in all the component particles collectively, and not in each of the particles severally. It is not necessary for all the particles to be perceived before the *whole* is perceived, because the *whole* is something different from the parts; and as in every case the ‘cause’ that we are justified in assuming is only that which is sufficient to account for a certain given effect,—for the perception of the *whole*, we must regard as its necessary cause, the perception of only those parts without which the perception of the *whole* would not be possible; as a matter of fact, if only a few of the parts are perceived, it is enough to bring about the perception of the *whole*. Then, again, the fact of the *whole* being always found together with the parts is due to one being the cause of the other. That the *whole* is yet something different from the parts is shown by the fact that the two give rise to entirely different effects in our consciousness; *e.g.*, the *whole* gives rise to the notion of something that is *one* and *extensive*: while the parts produce the notion of things *many* in number and small.

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The existence of the aggregated *whole* having been proved, the existence of the *Jāti* cannot be denied, merely on the ground that there can be no *whole* made of the parts.

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This Community, ‘Universal,’ *Jāti*, is eternal, and when a new Individual comes into existence, which belongs to that *Jāti*, what is born is not the *Jāti*, but the relation of the existing *Jāti* to that particular individual. This relation, which is *Inherence*, is not *eternal* (according to the *Mīmāmsaka*). Similarly when a certain individual ceases to exist, what ceases is only its relation to the ‘Universal,’ which continues to exist in other individuals.

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The Universal resides in its entirety in every Individual; as is clear from the fact that we recognise the same Universal in every Individual. Nor is the Universal ever perceived apart from the Individuals. It is perceptible by the senses, as is shown by the fact that its cognition is brought about by its coming into contact with the organs of perception, though it is the Individual in which it subsists which is in direct contact with the sense-organs.

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While admitting such *Jātis*, Universals, as ‘Substance,’ ‘Quality’ and the like, the *Prābhākara* does not admit of the *summum genus* ‘*Sattā*,’ ‘Being,’ as including all that *exists*; and this for the simple reason that we have to accept such a *Jāti* as ‘Substance’ because we actually perceive a number of individual things as having certain characters in common: and on the basis of this perception we postulate the *Jāti*, ‘Substance.’ We have no such cognition of a number of individual things merely as *existing*, and in the absence of such a conception, we have no basis for the postulating of such a *Jāti* as ‘Being.’ The term ‘*Sattā*,’ ‘Being,’ in fact denotes only the individual existence of the thing and it does not denote any *Jāti* like ‘*Sattā*.’ All that it means is that the thing has an individual existence of its own (not necessarily, forming part of an Aggregated Whole).

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Nor does Prabhākara admit of such *Jātis* as ‘*Brāhmaṇa*’, ‘*Kṣattriya*’ and the like; as such *Jātis* cannot be perceived by the senses. All that is meant by calling a man ‘*Brāhmaṇa*’ is, not that he belongs to a certain *Jāti*, but only that he is descended from a particular line of ancestors. This also is the view of Kumārila— ‘ब्राह्मणत्वादि योनितः’ (*Shlo. Vā. Vana-Vāda*, 29.) This purity of descent is to be accepted until there is sufficient evidence to the contrary. (Vide *Tantravārtika* under 1.2.2.)

(D) Kumārila’s View of Jāti, ‘Universal’

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As Jaimini in his *Sūtra* 1.3.33 has declared the ‘*Akṛti*’ to be what is denoted by the Word,—and the *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* have recognised *Akṛti* as something different from what is commonly known as *Jāti*, ‘Class,’ ‘Community,’ ‘Genus,’ ‘Universal,’—Kumārila, at the very outset, points out that it is *Jāti* itself which has been called *Akṛti*; so the *Jāti* is called *Akṛti* in the sense that it is what serves to define the Individual. *Sāmānya* also is another name given to *Jāti*, on the ground that it provides the basis for the common *comprehensive* notion of all individuals included under the Universal. Thus ‘*Jāti*,’ ‘*Akṛti*’ and ‘*Sāmānya*’ are all synonyms. (*Shlo. Vā. Akṛti* 3-4.) In regard to all things, there are two kinds of ideas—*inclusive* and *exclusive*. If it were not so, and if things were only *exclusive*, then they could never be conceived of as *inclusive*; and *vice versa*. Thus there is a permanent and inseparable relationship between the Individual and the Class or Universal; all individuals being included in the Universal; and the Universal pervading over, embracing, all individuals (9). The *Class* or *Universal* is something that is distinct from the Individuals, and yet it embraces the Individuals and subsists in each one of them. It is through this that we come to have a single comprehensive unitary conception of several individuals under one head,—of all individual cows as ‘cow,’ for instance. It is to this something that people apply several names, such as ‘*Sāmānya*,’ ‘*Jāti*,’ ‘*Akṛti*’ (17-18). The relationship between the Individuals and the Universal is natural, inherent in themselves—and not adventitious, brought about by any causes (31).—*Question*—“Why should the Universal ‘Cow’ reside only in the animals with the develop, etc.?” *Answer*—Because it is the same as—consists of—these animals. *Question*—“To what is the identity due?” *Answer*—To the very nature of the things concerned; i.e., several individuals come into existence only as identical with a particular Class or Community (47-48).—The difference therefore that is perceived between the Class or Universal and the Individual is due to their very nature (50).—*Question*—“The Universal comprehends many Individuals, while the Individual does not extend beyond itself,—how can then the two be the same?”—(53).—*Answer*—There is no incongruity in this; as there would be an incongruity only if the Universal subsisted in the *many* only, and the Individuals subsisted in each of themselves, to the exclusion of all else; as a matter of fact, however, Individuals also,—in the form of the *Universal*—subsist in the *many*, also, and the Universal in the form of the *Individual*, subsists exclusively in *one* only; hence there is no incongruity in the notion of the two being *not-different* (54-55).—The Universal and the Individual being identical, what happens in actual experience is that when the Universal character is cognised as non-different from the Individual, the object becomes cognised as an Individual, the *Universal* lying latent in it, and helping its existence; and through these, the Universal does not present itself to our consciousness; and conversely, when the Individuals are cognised as non-different from the Universal, what is cognised is the Universal, and the Individuals remain latent; lastly, when the object is cognised in its mixed character,—as an individual belonging to a particular *Universal* or Community—then all notions of difference and non-difference between the two (Individual and the Universal) disappear (59—62).—*Jāti*, Universal, is not the same as *Sārūpya*, Similarity of Forms among individual things (65).

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The Dewlap, etc., which have been spoken of as the characteristics of the Universal ‘Cow,’ are only its indicatives, and serve to distinguish that particular Universal from other Universals (*Vanavāda* 2 et. seq.). The notion of ‘Universal’ or ‘Community’ is universally admitted—by all parties (14-15).—When *Ākṛti* is spoken of as *‘Jāti,’* it is not the Configuration or Shape that is meant. Because no such ‘configuration’ is possible in the case of ‘Fire,’ ‘Air’ and such *shapeless* things (16).—In fact the *‘Jāti’* is quite distinct from the configurative shape (19). This Universal is eternal (23); it is perceptible by the senses (24). There are various indications whereby one Universal is distinguished from another; these indicatives consisting of specialities of time, place and other things. For instance, Gold is distinguished from Copper and other metals by its colour; Clarified Butter is distinguished from Oil by its taste and also by smell; the *Brāhmaṇa* and other castes are distinguished by parentage (26—29). No exception can be taken to the subsistence of the Universal in each individual comprised within it, as it is a perceptible fact, and yet it is *one* only (30). The all-pervading character, and the absence of constituent parts are to be accepted, as in the case of Sound (31). The questions also as to whether the Universal subsists in its entirety, or only in part, in each Individual, does not arise when the Universal is something indivisible, impartible, whole (33). So we have to accept the fact as we perceive it—that the Universal subsists in the Individuals. And as there is nothing incongruous in this notion, it cannot be sublated or rejected (42). Hence the conclusion put in the form of an Inferential Argument is—“The idea of Cow in regard to several cows must be due to a single entity in the shape of the *Universal* ‘cow.’—Because they are all cognised in the same form as *Cow*, like any single cow” (44). The notion of ‘cow’ in regard to several cows is analogous to the notion of ‘forest’ in regard to several trees (72), but it is not exactly alike (96).

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Though the Universal is one, it is regarded as *many* when viewed in relation to the Individuals, and though the Individuals are *many*, they are regarded as *one*, when viewed in relation to the Universal (85-86).

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*Ākṛti* is cognisable by Sense-perception, and what is meant by *Ākṛti* is commonality, community,—not the configuration or shape of things. If it meant the latter, it could not belong to such immaterial and incorporeal things as the Soul, Space, Time, Mind, Action, Quality,—all which have no shape at all. Then, again, the *Ākṛti* to which Substances, Qualities and Actions belong are overlapping, these classes varying in their extension, *e.g.*, ‘Thing’ is the largest class we can think of to which Substance belongs; and under ‘Substance’ come Earth, Water, etc. . . . This would not be possible if *Shape* were meant. Then, again, the material *shape* of things is destructible and varies with each individual. The idea of *Ākṛti* standing for shape or configuration has been held by the followers of Gautama (Nyāya). It is with a view to remove this misconception that *Shabara* has made it clear that *Ākṛti* stands for the *Universal*, the *Class* and the *Community* or *Commonality* (*Tantravārtika* Trs., pp. 330-331).

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This ‘Universal’ is not totally different from the Individuals. And when something is said in regard to something being done to a thing what is meant is the *Universal* as subsisting in a particular *Individual*. Though the Class or *Universal* is affected by the Individual and *vice versa*, yet that does not make the Universal transitory, it is only the Individual aspect of it that is so. Particular Individuals vanish; but other Individuals remain; hence the Universal never vanishes. And yet there is some difference between the two, as we speak of the Individual as belonging to, comprised in, the *Universal* (*Tantravārtika* Trs., pp. 345—347).

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Though the Universal is not perceived as anything totally different from the Individuals, yet, at the time that we perceive certain individual cows, we are cognisant of a certain character that is common to all the cows perceived and it is this commonality that constitutes their Jāti or ‘ Universal ’; and the character that is peculiar to such individual constitutes its Individuality, Vyakti.—This is where lies the difference between the Universal and the Individual . . . The Universal, however, is not anything totally different from the Individual . . . This Universal may be taken as standing for the Summum Genus, Being, which is a Universal that is common to all Substances, Qualities and Actions;—or it may stand for each of the three Universals (named in the Bhāṣya)—Substance, Quality and Action; or it may stand for all Universals in the world—from the Summum Genus of Being down to the smallest Universal conceivable. In contradistinction to this Universal, the Individual is that which has a specific peculiarity; it does not consist of the peculiarities themselves; ‘ as the Bhāṣya has distinctly spoken of the Individual as the receptacle of, and hence different from, these peculiarities (Tantravā. Trs., pp. 357—359).

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As regards Atoms, the Mīmāṃsaka is not keen on postulating them. Kumārila has distinctly declared that—‘the Mīmāṃsakas do not necessarily admit of Atoms’—(Shlokavārtika-Anumāna, 183—185). On this the Nyāyaratnākara remarks as follows:—We can admit of the Atom only if we find it necessary for explaining and justifying the aggregated objects that we see; so that if the postulating of the Atom tends to do away with the Gross or Aggregated objects that we perceive, then, we shall unhesitatingly reject it. The fact of the matter is that we accept each thing as we actually perceive it in our experience,—in the form of the Universal or the Individual, the gross or the subtle, the large or the small. This position is thus explained by the Nyāyaratnākara:—

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सिद्धे स्थूले तदनुपपत्त्या परमाणवो ऽपि कल्प्यन्ते । स्थूलस्यहि परिमितत्व मसत्सु परमाणुषु नोपपद्यते । अनन्तावयवत्वेहि मूर्त्तैरवयवैरन्योन्यावकाश-मप्रयच्छद्भिः अनन्ततदेशव्यापिरेकेनैव सर्षपेण सर्वं जगत् पूर्य्येत । अतो-ऽन्ततोऽपिगत्वा केचिन्निरवयवा एवाङ्गीकर्त्तव्याः इति स्थूलसिद्धौ तदनुपपत्त्या सिध्यन्त्येव परमाणवः ॥ तस्माद् यदेव किञ्चिदवयवि द्रव्यं गोत्वादि सामान्यं वा साक्षात् प्रतीतया गम्यते तत्सर्वं परमार्थत एव तथाभूतं प्रत्यद्धं चेत्यभ्यु-पगन्तव्यम् ॥ (न्या० २०)

Cites (6)