Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c15: Chapter X: Pramāṇa

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c15

Language
English

Contents

Chapter X: Pramāṇa

(A) Pramāṇa : (1) Valid Cognition and (2) The Means of Valid Cognition

c15.s1.1

We have cleared the ground by setting forth the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s view relating to things, the proper understanding of which is incidental to the study of the main subject of *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, which has been declared to be the Knowledge of Duty, *Dharma* (*Jaimini-Sūtra* 1.1.1.).

c15.s1.2

The understanding of the true nature of *Dharma* or Duty thus being the avowed aim of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, he takes care to examine in detail the exact nature of the Means of Cognition or Knowledge, as a necessary preliminary to determining the right means of securing the knowledge of the true nature of Duty.

c15.s1.3

The first point to be considered is the nature of Cognition itself.

(B) Prabhākara's View regarding Cognition and its Validity

c15.s2.1

Cognition is divided into two broad classes, of Valid and Invalid Cognition—Under *Valid Cognition* are included all those cognitions that bear directly upon their object; and under *Invalid Cognition*, those that bear upon their object only indirectly. At the outset this classification corresponds to the two broad divisions of (1) *Anubhūti*, Apprehension, and (2) *Smṛti*, Remembrance. *Prabhākara* thus regards all Remembrances as invalid (agreeing in this with the *Naiyāyika*) and all Apprehension as valid (differing in this from the *Naiyāyika*).

c15.s2.2

The *Prabhākara* has provided a full account of his views regarding the whole cognitive process—(vide *Prakaraṇa-Pañchikā*, p. 42 *et seq.*).

c15.s2.3

The starting point of the enquiry is—What is *Pramāṇa*? In philosophical literature, this term ‘*Pramāṇa*’ has been used somewhat promiscuously: sometimes in the sense of the Means of Cognition, the etymology of the word being explained as, ‘ *pramīyatē jñāyatē anēna*,’—while sometimes it is used in the sense of Valid Cognition itself—with the etymology ‘ *pramīyatē yat*.’ In the present context, the term is used in the latter sense of Valid Cognition.

c15.s2.4

What then is this Valid Cognition? The answer is, Valid Cognition is Apprehension and it is something different from Remembrance; which latter cannot be valid, inasmuch as it stands in need of a previous cognition. This Siddhānta has been summed up thus—

c15.s2.5

प्रमाणमनुभूतिः सा। स्मृतरन्या-न सा। स्मृतिः।
न प्रमाणं स्मृतिः पूर्वप्रतिपन्नव्यपेक्षत्वात् ॥ (Pra.-Pañchikā, p. 42.)

c15.s2.6

This exclusion of Remembrance and its definition does not exclude Recognition entirely; as this latter does not consist entirely of Remembrance, there being an element of direct Cognition in it; and to that extent it is valid. Recognition appears in the form ‘ This is the same as that,’ where the factor represented by ‘ this ’ is directly perceived and hence to that extent it bears upon its object directly: while Remembrance bears upon its object wholly indirectly, through the agency of impressions left by previous cognitions.

c15.s2.7

Even though Valid Cognition has been defined as Apprehension, any wrong cognition cannot be regarded as valid,—not indeed because there is anything invalid in it *per se*,—it would not be a cognition if it were so,—but because the judgment or idea resulting from that cognition,—*e.g.*, the cognition of ‘ Silver ’ in the Shell, ‘ this is silver,’—represents not one but two cognitions—one pertaining to ‘silver’ and the other to ‘this’; and of these two, the idea of *silver* is pure Remembrance, as there is no silver before the eye which could be reached by the sense-organ; and as such not being Apprehension, it cannot be valid; the other factor in the judgment—the factor of ‘this’—is of the nature of pure Apprehension and as such must be regarded as valid. Thus we find that the wrongness of the judgment ‘this is silver’ lies in the idea of *silver* which is Remembrance,—and this also is regarded as wrong simply because it is not found, later on, to agree with the real state of things, when the Agent proceeds to act up to the judgment and picks up the thing perceived. Even those who regard the entire judgment ‘ this is silver ’ as wrong, base this wrongness upon the fact that it is subsequently sublated, set aside, denied,—and not because there is anything inherently wrong in the nature of the Cognition itself. But in reality, even those people cannot deny the validity of the cognition in so far as the element of ‘ This ’ is concerned; as this is not found to be sublated, as it is present in the subsequent sublating judgment also which appears in the form—‘ this is not silver, this is shell.’ Other instances of wrong cognition are similarly explained. (See below.)

c15.s2.8

Prabhākara says (*Bṛhati*, p. 24)—‘ It is strange indeed how a Cognition can apprehend an object and yet be invalid.’ This idea has the support of Kumārila also, who has described ‘ the validity of the cognition ’ as consisting in its being an apprehension ’—(*Shlo. Vā. Sū. 2.53).

c15.s2.9

According to Prabhākara it is not a necessary condition of ‘ Validity ’ of Cognition that its object should be one that is not already known.

c15.s2.10

The above definition of *Pramāṇa*, ‘ Valid Cognition’, presupposes the self-validity of Cognition, which must be inherently valid by itself. Valid Cognition can be defined as *Apprehension* only if each and every Apprehension were inherently right and valid. This ‘self-validity’ of Cognition forms the very key-stone of *Mīmāṃsā*. The reasons why the *Mīmāṃsaka* lays stress upon this doctrine lies in the fact that if this were not so, then Cognitions derived from the *Vēda* would not be valid or reliable, as the reliability of all Verbal Cognition is dependent upon the veracity of the person using the word and the *Mīmāṃsaka* does not admit of an author or speaker for the *Vēda*; hence the *Vēda* could not be reliable. This would strike at the very foundation of the structure of *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. Then again, if all cognitions were not inherently valid, whence could we have confidence in our own cognitions? Even when the Cognition may be one which is found subsequently to be not in consonance with reality, the Cognition as Cognition remains valid. If it were always necessary for the Cognition to be in consonance with the Object, then it would have to be regarded as having the form of that Object, and this is an absurdity. Because, if the Cognition had the form of the Object it would mean that the two are identical; and in that case, how could one be the *apprehender* and the other the apprehended? Nor is it difficult to distinguish one Cognition from another, when they are formless. Because what is meant by ‘*Saṃvēdana*’ (Cognition or knowledge) that a man has is that there is the manifestation of a special factor of the man’s *Dharma* or Merit which focusses his active cooperation in connection with a certain object, and even though this ‘Manifestation’ is self-illumined, that does not render its differentiation impossible, as a Cognition is regarded as appertaining to that particular object with regard to which it favours the activity of the cogniser; and as each Cognition tends to active cooperation in connection with a distinct Object, this would afford all the basis that is necessary for its differentiation from other Cognitions. This formlessness too does not imply the absence of all characteristic features. In regard to every entity, it has to be admitted that it possesses that form in which it is actually manifested; no other criterion is possible; and as all Cognitions are manifested simply as ‘Cognition,’ Cognition can be the only character, or even form, that can belong to it. The form that is cognised belongs always to the Object.

c15.s2.11

We have found that Cognition is self-valid, and also self-illumined; which disposes of the view that “Cognition is perceived through the operation of the Mind, in the same way as Pleasure and Pain are.”

c15.s2.12

This Idealist view has been answered as follows. (In *Bṛhatī Rjuvimalā* and *Prakaraṇa-Pañchikā*, p. 63)—Cognition can never be *perceptible*; this has been declared by the Bhāṣya (Text, p. 9) अर्थविषया हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः, न बुद्धिविषया —that is, ‘what forms the objective of Sense-perception is the Object, not the Cognition’—This does not mean, however, that the Cognition is never knwn as *apprehended*; it is certainly *apprehended*, but only as Cognition, not as *something* cognised.—*संवित्त्यैवहि संवित् संवेद्या न संवेद्यतया*—says Prabhākara. If it were cognisable as *something* cognised, then for every Cognition, it would be necessary to postulate an endless series of Cognitions. What is meant by this distinction is that the Cognition, even though cognised, cannot itself form the object (*phala*) of another act of Cognition—*तस्यां कर्मभावो न युक्तः* | If it were the object of another Cognition, it would not be *self-luminous*, and yet we cannot regard the Cognition as entirely unknown or unapprehended; because it is only when the Cognition is apprehended that the Cognition of things becomes possible. The right conclusion thus is that the Cognition is self-apprehended, and its presence is known by means of Inference. What we apprehend by means of this Inference is not the object, but only the presence of the object: नाप्यनुमानाद् रूपग्रहणं सन्मात्रमाहिन्नमनुमानं भवति—says the Bṛhati. So in the case in question, all the information provided by Inference is that the Cognition is there, the Inference being thus formally stated—‘The Cognition exists, because we have the apprehension of its Object.’ In this way Cognition falls within the purview of Inference, which is one of the Means of Cognition; and it is in this sense that Cognition is held to be Pramēya, Cognisable; but this does not make it Saṃvēdya—i.e., Cognisable as an Object.—Prabhākara draws a subtle distinction between (Pramēya) (Cognisable) and ‘Saṃvēdya’ (object of Cognition)—Saṃvēdana is that Cognition where the form of the object is apprehended, and this can occur only in the case of objects apprehended through the senses—In the case of the ‘Pramēya,’ on the other hand, it is not necessary for any form or figure to be present in consciousness. Thus Cognition cannot be Saṃvēdya, and hence also not perceptible; but as having its presence, or existence, apprehended by means of Inference,—which is one of the Pramāṇas,—it has to be regarded as Pramēya.

c15.s2.13

“If every Apprehension is valid, then how about Doubtful and Wrong Cognitions? These certainly are not valid, and yet they are Cognitions.”

c15.s2.14

In answer to the above it is pointed out that the Object of a Cognition is that same thing which is presented to consciousness by it. Thus in the stock-example of Wrong Cognition—“This is silver”—in reference to a piece of shell—what is presented to consciousness is Silver, which thus is the object of cognition,—and not the Shell, which does not enter into the consciousness at all. For this reason, the Judgment in question is not found to fulfil the conditions of the Wrong Cognition, which has been defined as ‘the Cognition of a thing as something which is not that thing.’ Because in the Cognition in question, we find that it is not the Shell that is cognised as Silver; what happens is that the Shell is not cognised, it does not enter into consciousness at all; but what does enter the consciousness is the Silver, Though the object present before the eye is the Shell, yet, inasmuch as the perceiver fails to notice the distinctive features peculiar to the Shell, and notices only those features that are common to the Shell and the Silver, he fails to apprehend the difference between these two things; this brings to his mind, presents to his consciousness, the Silver. This cognition of Silver thus is due to the non-perception of the difference between Silver and the object before the eye, that is of the distinctive features of any one of the two. The idea of Silver also comes to the mind by the force of memory, which has been aroused by the perception of the properties common to the two things; thus the Silver is remembered; but it is not remembered as (that)—something perceived in the past,—which would have sufficed to differentiate the ‘ that silver ’ of the past from ‘ this silver ’ before the eyes;—this non-perception of the ‘ that ’-factor is due to a certain weakness of the Mind. Thus the apprehension of the Silver represented in the Judgment ‘ this is Silver ’ has to be regarded as an act of Memory, a mere Remembrance. The Silver, which has entered into consciousness, not being present before the eyes, could not be regarded as perceived; nor are there any factors available that could bring about the inferential or other kinds of valid Cognition of the Silver in the case. Though the Judgment in question is thus found to partake of the dual character of Remembrance and Direct Apprehension,—and as such differs from the ordinary Valid Cognition of Silver, which is wholly ‘ Direct Apprehension,’—yet in actual experience, it is not known to be so different; and this for the simple reason that, just as in the case of real Silver, the thing perceived is not cognised as different from Silver,—so also in the case in question. Thus in actual experience, there is found to be no difference between the right and the wrong Cognition of Silver: specially as both equally give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the cogniser, in both cases he stoops to pick up the thing.

c15.s2.15

In the other instance of Wrong Cognition—‘ the Conch-shell is yellow ’—what happens is this: The yellowness that is perceived is quite real, present in the bile that has affected the eyes,—the whiteness of the conch-shell fails to be perceived on account of the same bile which has beset the eyes; . . . thus what is perceived is the conch-shell without any colour,—and the yellowness that is perceived is perceived without the object to which it belongs, as the bile in the eye cannot be seen; thus a colourless object (conch-shell) and an objectless colour (yellowness) being perceived at the same time,—both these cognitions being quite valid so far—what more natural than that the two perceptions should coalesce, and present to consciousness the yellow conch-shell? Even when picked up, the conch is found to be yellow; so that in this cognition of the yellow conch we do not find anything that would make it wrong: in fact the man comes to regard the Cognition as wrong only when he comes to know of the disease (Bile) in the eye.

c15.s2.16

In the same manner in the perception of two Moons, the rays of light issue from the two eyes . . . not simultaneously, but at slightly different points of time; hence it is only natural that the two images of the Moon are produced and imprinted on the retina, and as such presented to the man's consciousness. Thus in this case also, there are two distinct perceptions of the same Moon; but the interval of time between the appearance of the two images on the retina being very subtle, the two coalesce and give rise to the single cognition of ‘two moons.’

c15.s2.17

In Dream-Cognition also, even though things are only remembered—and not directly perceived,—yet they appear in consciousness as actually apprehended at the time: and what occurs is that the factor of having been apprehended at some previous time is lost sight of, under the effects of sleep; and it is this factor only that differentiates what is remembered from what is apprehended. Then as regard the agencies that energise or excite the impressions that bring about the Remembrance,—this is supplied by some Unseen Force which guides the percipient or dreaming souls in their earthly sojourn. If the time during which the man sleeps is one at which he is destined to experience pleasure, the Unseen Agency of his Karma energises the impressions that bring to his mind pleasant memories,—and consequently pleasant Dreams; similarly with painful Dreams. This accounts for the fact that Dreams are sometimes pleasant, sometimes painful. This feeling of pleasure or pain,—so far as the actual feeling is concerned,—is as real as any that is experienced during waking consciousness.

c15.s2.18

Thus it is found that whenever there is actual Apprehension or Cognition, there is nothing wrong in it; and that the wrongness comes in only when an element of *Remembrance* creeps into the Cognition, through some cause or the other. Thus none of the instances of so-called ‘Wrong Cognition’ militate against the self-validity of Cognitions.

c15.s2.19

As regards *Doubtful Cognitions*,—“Is this a pillar or a man?”—what is actually perceived, and enters the consciousness, is only some object endowed with the quality of *tallness*; and this is quite valid so far:—this perception of *tallness* then reminds the man of a number of tall things—the pillar, the man, the tree and so forth. Then it is that there comes the doubt as to whether it is this or that particular *tall thing*. Thus in all doubtful cognitions there are two remembrances involved—and not only one act of Apprehension. Hence this also leaves the self-validity of cognitions untouched.

(B) The Bhāṭṭa View regarding Cognition and its Validity

c15.s3.1

The question that arises next is in regard to the validity of Cognitions. Is this Validity inherent in the Cognition itself or something extraneous to itself?—There are four alternative views that have been held on this question.

c15.s3.2

These have been thus set forth in the *Ślokavārtika* (Sū. 2, 33 *et seq.*):—In regard to all Cognitions we have to consider this—(a) Are *Validity* and *Invalidity* both inherent in the Cognition? or (b) are both these extraneous? or (c) is *Invalidity* inherent and *Validity* is extraneous? or (d) is *Validity* inherent and *Invalidity* extraneous? *Validity* is held to be extraneous when it is held to be due to, and brought about by, the defectless efficiency of the agency that brought about the Cognition: and similarly *Invalidity* is held to be extraneous when it is held to be due to defects in the agency that brought about the Cognition.

c15.s3.3

(a) The view that both Validity and Invalidity are inherent in Cognition cannot be accepted, because the two are naturally contradictory and as such cannot belong to the same Cognition. (b) Nor can both Validity and Invalidity be wholly extraneous; as, if they went so, the Cognition by itself would be neither valid nor invalid; it would bear no character at all. Whenever a Cognition appears, until the cogniser has had time to find out if it has been due to true and efficient causes or to false and defective causes, —the Cognition would be regarded as neither valid nor invalid; if it is neither, then it is as good as non-existent. (c) The third view is that by its nature, Cognition by itself must be regarded as invalid, its Validity alone being due to extraneous circumstances; the argument in support of this view is that Invalidity, being negative in character, cannot be due to, and brought about by, any extraneous causes,—while Validity, being positive, can be brought about by efficient causes. On the other hand, if Cognitions were inherently valid and their Invalidity were due to extraneous causes,—then even Dream-Cognition would have to be regarded as valid. Under our view, there can be no Validity in Dream-Cognitions, because there are not efficient causes present which could bring about the Validity. Hence the conclusion is that the Validity of Cognitions is due to the efficiency of the causes, while by themselves, Cognitions are inherently invalid.—The point of this third view is that the Validity of valid cognitions also should depend upon the efficiency and consequent reliability of the person who spoke the word—and as, in the case of the Veda, there is no author or speaker according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, there could be no reliability and hence the Veda could ont be a reliable source of knowledge regarding Duty, *Dharma*.

c15.s3.4

(d) It is on this account that the *Mīmāṃsaka* has insisted upon the *fourth* view, that all Cognitions are inherently valid, and it is only *Invalidity* that is imposed upon them from without, when it is found that its source has been defective. It is agreed that if *Validity* were wholly non-existent in the Cognition, it could not be produced therein by anything else. Under the view that the *Validity* of the Cognition is due to the efficiency of its source,—to what could the *Validity* of the Cognition of this efficiency be due? It could only be due to another Cognition of the efficiency of the source of this second Cognition; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress. On the other hand, if *Validity* belongs to the Cognition by itself, then there would be no need of any other Cognitions; specially as any idea of its *Invalidity* could not appear, for the simple reason that there would be no Cognition of any defect in the source of the initial Cognition. The conclusion therefore is that the Cognition is valid *qua* Cognition, and this *Validity* can be set aside only when one comes to perceive a defect in its source (*Shlo. Vā. Sū.* 2, 53 *et. seq.*).

c15.s3.5

The *Shāstradīpikā* (pp. 37-38) makes the following remarks:—(1) The perception of an object leads, not to a further cognition of that perception, but to the *Aparokṣya*, the *prakaṭatā*, i.e., *direct apprehensibility*—of that object, and (2) every act of Perception involves a certain relationship between the Perceiver and the Perceived,—the former being the active agent and the latter the objective of that act of Perception; this agent-object relationship is not possible without some activity on the part of the agent; hence the presence of this relationship leads to the inference of its invariable concomitant, the action of the agent; and it is this action which, in the case of knowledge, is known as ‘Cognising;’ the mentally perceived relationship between the cognising Soul and the cognised *Object* leads to the inference of the act of knowing or cognising.

c15.s3.6

This Cognition is a *Vikriyā*, Modification, of the Soul,—and this is not inconsistent with the *Eternity of the Soul*,—says Kumārila (*Shlo. Vā.* Perception, 52-53).

c15.s3.7

As regards Wrong Cognitions, the *Bhāṭṭa* view is as follows:—In so far as the judgment ‘this is silver’ involves a Cognition *per se*, it is quite valid; it is quite valid for the cogniser at the time that he has the Cognition; that it is sublated or rejected by subsequent experience is another matter; the subsequent experience must be regarded as destroying the Validity that belonged to the Cognition as *cognised*—तस्मात् स्वतःप्रामाण्यं प्राप्तम् अर्थान्यथात्वकारणादोषज्ञानाभ्यामपोयते इत्यवश्यमङ्गीकरणीयम्। (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 15, line 15.) And again—यत्र प्रयत्नलेनान्विष्यमाणोऽपि कारणदोषो बाधकज्ञानं वा नोपलभ्यते तत् प्रमाणम्--इतरत्राप्रमाणम्। (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 31, line 5.)

c15.s3.8

As regards Dream-Cognition, says the *Shāstradīpikā* (p. 39, line 10)—

c15.s3.9

‘In Dreams also, what is cognised is the external object as perceived elsewhere and presented to consciousness during sleep by an Unseen Agency; the Cognition is quite valid so far as the object is concerned, the *wrongness* or Invalidity comes in only when it is regarded as something actually apprehended at the time, and not as only remembered. And the cause of this lies in such

c15.s3.10

discrepancies as are due to sleep. Thus the Invalidity pertains only to the accessory details, not to the Cognition as Cognition.

c15.s3.11

According to Kumārila, it is a necessary condition in the Validity of a Cognition that its object should be one that is *not already known*.

c15.s3.12

Kumārila appears to have been much misunderstood in regard to his views on the Self-Validity of Cognition. Nearly all later writers have declared that he is not an upholder of the inherent Self-Validity of Cognition. Without entering into a lengthy discussion on this point, we shall only quote the words of Kumārila himself:—

c15.s3.13

On p. 54 of the *Shlokavārtika* (Chodanā-Sūtra, 33) the question to be discussed is thus propounded,

c15.s3.14

सर्वविज्ञानविषयमिदं तावत् परीक्ष्यताम् ।
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः किं परतोऽथवा ॥

c15.s3.15

“In regard to all Cognitions, this has to be considered,—Are Validity and Invalidity inherent in them or extraneous?”

c15.s3.16

The conclusion is in no unmistakable terms as under on p. 59,

c15.s3.17

स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमवधार्यताम् ।

c15.s3.18

‘It should be understood that the Validity of all Means (or Forms) of Cognition is inherent in them.”

c15.s3.19

And on p. 61

c15.s3.20

तस्माद् बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता ।
अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूतथदोषज्ञानादपोह्यते ॥

c15.s3.21

“Thus it follows that every Cognition, *as Cognition*, must be valid; this validity may be set aside if subsequently it is found that it has had its source in some defect in the Cognitive Process as evidenced by the object cognised being in reality otherwise than as apprehended by the Cognition in question.”

c15.s3.22

In this discussion people have confounded the issues by mixing up the question of what is *Pramāṇa*, the *Means of Cognition*, and what its *Phala*, ‘Resultant’; though on this point Kumārila is not at all particular—He says (*Shlo. Vā.*, Pratyakṣa, 51)

c15.s3.23

प्रमाणफलमावश्यं यथेष्टं परिकल्प्यताम् ।

c15.s3.24

“As regards what is the *Means* and what the *Resultant* it might be assumed just as one chooses.”

c15.s3.25

But even on this point of प्रमाणफलभाव he sets forth his view clearly as follows—

c15.s3.26

विशेषणे तु बोद्धव्ये यदालोचनमात्रकम् ।
प्रसूते निश्चययं पश्चात् तस्य प्रामाण्यकल्पना ॥
निश्चयस्तु फलं तत्र . . . . .
हानादिबुद्धिफलता प्रमाणं चेद् विशेष्यधीः ॥ (*Ibid.*, p. 71—73.)

c15.s3.27

“When we come to examine the details, we find that the mere vague indeterminate Cognition which brings about the definite Cognition is the Means, and the Definite Cognition is the Resultant. In case this latter is regarded as the Means, then the notion of the acceptability or rejectability of the cognised thing is to be regarded as its Resultant.”

c15.s3.28

There has been a confusion in people’s minds regarding this point between (*a*) *Svataḥpramāṇa* “Self-valid” and (*b*) ‘*Svaprakāśa*,’ “Self-illumined.” In regard to (*a*) all Mīmāṃsakas are agreed; it is only in regard to (*b*) that there is some difference of opinion as shown later on.

(c) Murāri Mishra’s View

c15.s4.1

According to Murāri Mishra, Cognition is *perceived*, *pratyakṣa*—says the *Nyāyakustubha*; and the validity of the Cognition is also made known by those same circumstances and implements that bring about the Cognition itself; it is not due to anything extraneous to the Cognition. He is as much the upholder of “*Svataḥ-prāmāṇya*” as Kumārila. According to Murāri, the validity of the Cognition is apprehended by the Representative Cognition that follows in the wake of every Cognition; *e.g.*, the idea “I see the jar” which follows after the seeing of the Jar.—Says Vardhamāna in his gloss on the *Kusumāñjali*.—According to Murāri Mishra, like the Cognition itself, the Validity of the Cognition also is apprehended through the Mind.

c15.s4.2

These three views of the three Mīmāṃsakas—Prabhākara, Kumārila, and Murāri Mishra—are found summed up by Pakṣadhara Mishra in his *Aloka*, with the remark that—" There is this factor common in the views of all the three *Mīmāṃsakas*—that the validity of Cognition is apprehended through precisely those conditions that bring about the Cognition itself; (*a*) under *Gurumata*, it is apprehended through its self-luminous character, (*b*) under *Bhāṭṭamata*, through Inference based on its being apprehended, and (*c*) under *Murārimata*, through the Representative Cognition." (Palm leaf Ms., Benares Sanskrit College, 15a-15b).

c15.s4.3

Herein may lie the clue to the saying— मुरारेस्मृतीयः पन्थाः ।

c15.s4.4

CHAPTER XI

c15.s4.5

DIFFERENT KINDS OF VALID COGNITION : PERCEPTION

c15.s4.6

Valid Cognition has been classed by the *Mīmāṃsaka* under six (by Prabhākara, only five) heads, *viz.* :—

c15.s4.7

(1) Perceptional,

c15.s4.8

(2) Inferential,

c15.s4.9

(3) Scriptural (Vedic),

c15.s4.10

(4) Analogical,

c15.s4.11

(5) Presumptive, and

c15.s4.12

(6) Negational.

(A) Shabara's Views

c15.s5.1

That Cognition by men which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs is " Sense-perception,"—says the Sūtra (1.1.4).

c15.s5.2

The following explanations are provided by Shabara (Translation, page 8 *et seq.*).—What is meant is, that Perception is Cognition which a man has when his Sense-organs are in contact with the Object cognised;—it is the cognition of an Object which is actually present at the time. Hence it cannot be the Means of Knowing Dharma.—The only factor meant to be stressed is the fact of its being such as is possible only when there is contact between the Sense-organ and the Object.

c15.s5.3

(P. 10)—What is real Perception is never wrong, and what is wrong is not Perception. What is real Perception has been shown in the Sūtra (1.1.4), the meaning of which is that—" That Cognition is real Perception which appears when there is contact of the Sense-organs with the object perceived;" that is to say, when the Sense-organ are in contact with the Object actually perceived, the resultant Cognition of the man is real Perception,—and it is not real Perception when the Object perceived is different from that with which the Sense-organ is in contact. (Therefore, in a case where the Shell is cognised as Silver, what is cognised is the Silver, while what is in contact with the sense-organ is the Shell; hence this is not a case of real Perception at all.)

c15.s5.4

(P. 11)—When it is found that, at the time of Perception there is no contact of the Sense-organ concerned with any Object other than the one perceived, it follows that the perception has appeared on the actual contact of the Object actually perceived; and when the contrary is the case, the Perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the Object perceived. In cases where a Perception is subsequently followed by a sublative Cognition to the contrary,—such as “in reality it is not as I have perceived it, this Perception has been wrong,”—it is understood that the Perception in question had appeared on the contact of the Sense-organ with something other than the Object perceived; while in cases where no such sublative Cognition appears it is understood that the Perception had appeared on actual contact with the object perceived.

c15.s5.5

Q. “How can this distinction be made before the sublating Cognition appears? At the time that a certain Perception comes, there is nothing to differentiate a right Cognition from a wrong one, until the subsequent appearance or otherwise of the sublative Cognition.”

c15.s5.6

A. A Cognition is wrong,—(a) when the Mind is affected by some sort of derangement,—or (b) when the Sense-organ concerned is beset by disabilities,—or (c) when the object itself suffers from such disabilities as being too small for perception and so forth. In cases where none of these three,—Mind, Sense-organ and Object,—suffers from these defects, the Cognition is right. What brings about a right Cognition is the contact of the Sense-organ, the Mind and the Object; when there is no such contact, the Cognition is wrong. Hence what leads to wrong Cognition is a defect in one or the other of the three factors concerned—Mind, Sense-organ and Object. That this is so is learnt from the fact that on the disappearance of the defects, there appears that Cognition which is recognised by all persons as right. Whether or not any of the three factors is defective is ascertained when, even on careful scrutiny, a defect not being detected, it is concluded that there is no defect,—simply because there is nothing to show that there is a defect. From all this it follows that only that Cognition is wrong the means whereof are defective, or with regard to which there is a sublative Cognition that ‘it is wrong;’ and no other Cognition can be regarded as wrong.

c15.s5.7

(Pp. 12—15)—Perception is not devoid of real basis in the external world;—nor is it a void; it has a real substratum in the external world . . . Thus the conclusion is that Perception is never false or wrong.

(B) Prabhākara’s Views on Perception

c15.s6.1

(Prakaraṇa-Pañchikā—p. 52 et seq.)—Perception is direct apprehension—“*Sākṣāt pratītiḥ;*” it envisages the Apprehended Object, the Apprehended Person, and the Apprehension itself. In each act of Perception therefore the idea of each of these factors enters as its constituent factor. [This distinctive view of Perception has been called the “*Tripuṭī-pratyakṣa-vāda,*” i.e., the Doctrine of Tripartite Perception.] Direct Perception envisaging the apprehended Object proceeds directly from Sense-contact. The number of Sense-organs is six,—1. Olfactory, for the perceiving of odour; 2. Visual, for the perceiving of colour and form; 3. Gestatory, for the perceiving of taste; 4. Tactile, for the perceiving of touch; 5. Auditory, for the perceiving of sound; and 6. the Internal Organ or Mind, for the perceiving of such purely mental states as those of pleasure, pain and the like.

c15.s6.2

As a matter of ordinary experience, it is found that our Cognitions of things are not ever-lasting; they appear at only certain times. Thus, being ephemeral, they must have some Cause. Every Effect has two kinds of Causes,—the *Material* or *Constituent Cause*, to which it owes its material composition, and the *Immaterial* cause, which, in most cases, takes the form of certain qualities, conditions or circumstances which, in proximity with, and through, the Material Cause, help in the bringing about of the effect. For instance, the *Material Cause* of the Jar is the clay-particles that compose it, and the conjunction of those particles is its *Immaterial Cause*. The *Immaterial Cause* of an effect may subsist either in its *Material Cause*, or in the *Material Cause* of that *Material Cause*. In the case of Perceptions, we have the Percipient Soul as the *Constituent Cause*, and when we seek for its *Immaterial Cause*, we find that there

Cites (3)