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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c16: Chapter XI: Perception

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c16

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Chapter XI: Perception

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cannot be anything subsisting in the Cause of the Soul, as the Soul, being eternal, can have no Cause; hence the *Immaterial* Cause sought after must be something subsisting in the Soul itself; further, as it is only a quality that can subsist in a Substance, it follow that the *Immaterial* Cause of Perception must be a quality;—then again, we know that Perception which is a particular kind of Cognition, is a " specific " quality of the Soul, and also that for such a quality belonging to an eternal Substance, the *Immaterial* Cause must be in the form of contact with some other substance; for example, the colour produced in the Earth-atom has, for its *Immaterial* Cause, the contact with Fire; from this it follows that Cognition must have for its *Immaterial* Cause, its contact with some other substance; and inasmuch as we have nothing to show that the other substance is something subsisting in yet another substance, we conclude that the Substance whose contact would be the *Immaterial* cause of Cognition must be one that has an existence independent of other Substances. Of such independent substances, there are two kinds—(1) Those that are all-pervading in character,—as Time, Space, etc., and (2) Atoms. It is a well-known fact that no contact (which, by its very nature, must be ephemeral) with an all-pervading substance can be brought about by any Cause, as an all-pervading substance is in permanent contact with all things; hence it cannot be said to come or be brought into contact with anything. Nor can their eternal contact be the Cause of anything; as being eternal, it could bring about only eternal effects, which is a contradiction in terms.—From all this it follows that the Contact which is the *Immaterial* Cause of Perception must be one that subsists in something *atomic*; the contact of atomic substances is brought about by the action—movement—of the Atoms themselves; Atoms can move up to one or more substances, thereby creating so many contacts for themselves, one after the other.—This Atomic Substance again must reside in the body ensouled by the perceiving Soul; as none other could contain the substratum of the *Immaterial* cause of the Perception of which that Soul is the Material or Constituent cause. The action of the Atomic Substance in the body,—tending to bring about the contact—is due to its coming into contact with the Soul which (in every act of Cognition) puts forth an effort towards the act of cognising. The only Atomic Substance that fulfils these conditions is the *Manas*, the Internal Organ. This *Manas* alone by itself, brings about such effects as Cognitions, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort and so forth; it also brings about Remembrance when aided by Impressions left by past Cognitions.

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Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the *Manas* or Mind, by itself, is found to be devoid of any such qualities as Colour, Odour and the rest, and, as such, it cannot lead the Soul to experience or cognise these qualities; hence for this, it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterised by these qualities; for the perception of Colour, for instance, the Mind will need the aid of an organ of which Colour is the distinctive quality; for the perception of Odour, the help of an Odorous Organ; and so on, with the perceptions of Touch, Sound, and Taste. Now we know that the organ of which Colour is the distinctive quality must be one constituted by *Tejas* or Light; as Colour is a feature of Light; and this proves the existence of the *Luminous Organ*, the Organ of Vision, as leading to the perception of Colour. Similarly the Organ with Odour as its distinctive quality must be one composed of *Earth*; as it is to Earth alone that Odour belongs; and this proves the existence of the *Earthly Organ*, the Olfactory Organ, which leads to the perception of Odour. The organ with Taste as its distinctive quality must be composed of Water, as it is to Water that Taste belongs; this proves the existence of the *Aqueous Organ*, the Gestatory Organ, which leads to the perception of Taste. The Organ with Sound as its distinguishing feature must be composed of *Ākāsha*, as it is to Ākāsha that Sound belongs; this proves the existence of the *Ākāshic Organ*, the *Auditory Organ*; which leads to the perception of Sound. Lastly, the Organ having Touch for its distinguishing quality must be composed by Air, as it is to Air that Touch belongs; and this proves the existence of the *Airy Organ*, the Tactile Organ, which leads to the perception of Touch.

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Contact of the Mind is regarded as a necessary factor in the Perceptions by means of all the Sense-Organs; because of the fact that, even when the object to be perceived is in close contact with the Sense-Organs concerned, it fails to be perceived, if at the same time the said Organ also is not in contact with the Mind; that is, if the man is Absent-Minded. Thus in the case of all perceptions there are four contacts necessary:—

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(1) Contact of the object with the Sense-Organ; (2) that of the distinctive qualities of the object with the Sense-Organ; (3) that of the Sense-Organ with the Mind; (4) that of the Mind with the Soul.

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In the perception of Pleasure and Pain and such other purely mental or subjective states, only two contacts are required,—that of the Pleasure with the Mind and that of the Mind with the Soul.

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(B) As regards the *Object Apprehended by Perception*, it has been classed under three heads:—

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(1) Substances, (2) Universal (Class or Community) and (3) Qualities.

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To the first category belong such substances as are tangible and of sufficiently large dimensions (substances other than these being *imperceptible*) partaking of the nature of Earth, Water, Air and Fire. To the third category of *Qualities*, belong such qualities as Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimensions, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effot,—all which are perceptible. How the second category of ‘Universal’ or ‘Class’ is perceptible has been already explained above.

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(B) As regards the third factor in Perception,—*viz.*, the *Apprehension itself*—it has been divided into two classes:—

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(1) *Savikalpaka*, Determinate, Conceptual, (2) *Nirvikalpaka*, Non-Determinate, ‘Non-Conceptual.’

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In regard to the *Nirvikalpaka*, ‘Non-Conceptual,’ Perception, the view of Prabhākara is the golden mean between two extreme views. He does not accept the *Bauddha* view that what forms the object of Perception is the mere ‘*Svalakṣaṇa*,’ the ‘Specific Individuality,’ of the thing apprehended by it; and his reason for rejecting this view is that, as a matter of fact, the Non-Conceptual Perception does apprehend the class-character, the Universal, also, of the thing: Nor does he accept the *Bhaṭṭa* view that ‘in Non-Conceptual Perception, neither the Class-character nor the Specific Individuality is presented to Consciousness, all that is presented is the Object by itself, pure and simple, wherein these two subsist’ (*Shlo.-Vā.-Sū.* 4, 113). Nor does Prabhākara accept the view that it is only the Class-Character that is apprehended, because he finds that after all, the Object is apprehended as an *individual*, and not merely as belonging to a *class*. Having rejected these views, Prabhākara accepts the view that what is apprehended in the first, or non-conceptual, state of Perception is both the Class-Character (the *Universal*) and the Specific Individuality; but with this difference that, inasmuch as no other object has as yet entered into the Apprehension, the thing is not apprehended as actually being an *individual belonging to a definite class*; because a thing can be cognised as an *Individual* only in comparison to, or in relation with, other things,—and cognised as an ‘Individual’ only in comparison with *other things*; and so it follows that so long as no other thing has presented itself to consciousness, even though what is apprehended is actually an *Individual belonging to a Class*, this mixed character of the thing cannot be fully comprehended until some other things have entered into consciousness, until which time the Perception remains *non-determinate, non-conceptual*. (See *Bṛhatī*, pp. 50 *et seq.*)

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As regards the other, the *Savikalpaka* or *Conceptual, Determinate, Perception*,—it follows in the wake of the *Non-Conceptual Perception*, and apprehends the same object as actually being an Individual possessed of some well-defined specific features peculiar to itself and also certain class-characteristics in common with other things, and thus belonging to that ‘Universal,’ ‘Class’ or ‘Community.’ (See *Bṛhatī*, p. 50.) The object in contact with the organ of Perception is one, only one *Individual thing, and no other things*; and hence it may be questioned how the Perception can apprehend it as an *Individual* possessed of the said *class-characteristics*, etc.,—which presupposes the apprehension of things other than the one in contact with the Sense-organ concerned. But the fact of the matter is that what really apprehends the object is neither the Perception, nor the Sense-organ, but the *Soul* which, by its very nature, apprehends all that can be apprehended; hence what happens is that, just after the Soul has had the *Non-Conceptual Perception* of the thing, there come to the Mind those other things also—those from which it differs and also those with whom it has certain characteristics in common; and this accounts for the aforesaid mixed character of *Conceptual Perception*.

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This *Conceptual Perception*, even though apprehending the same thing as that apprehended by the preceding *Non-Conceptual Perception*, is yet a valid Cognition; inasmuch as it also apprehends certain such factors as had not figured in the *Non-Conceptual Perception*. Though there is a certain element of Remembrance in this *Conceptual Perception*, that appertains to the other things in relation to the Object perceived,—not to this Object itself, hence so far as the Object is concerned, that Element of Remembrance does not vitiate the validity of the Perception.

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The second factor entering into Perception is the ‘*Apprehender*.’ In all Cognitions—be they either *Direct Apprehension* or *Remembrance*,—the *Apprehender* always figures as an essential factor; so long as the apprehending Soul does not become manifest, there is no Apprehension at all; because all Cognitions are in the form ‘*I know*.’ It must be admitted therefore that whenever anything is cognised, it is cognised along with the *Cogniser*; and the Cognition of the Cognising Soul is always of the nature of *Direct Apprehension*. Even when the Cognition of the object is Inferential or Verbal, the cognition of the Cognising Soul is, in every act of Cognition, purely *Direct* or *Perceptional*, obtained through the agency and contact of the Mind.

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The factor of ‘*Apprehension*’ also is always self-cognised by *Direct Apprehension* (see above),—even the Inferential or the Verbal Cognition is apprehended by itself directly.

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Though all these three factors—Apprehension, Apprehended and Apprehender—figure in every act of Perception, yet there is this difference that, so far as the Apprehender—Soul—and the Apprehended Object—are concerned, these are something different from the Apprehension itself, while the Apprehension is not different from itself. The reason for this lies in the very nature of things. The Apprehension being of the nature of Light, Illumination or Manifestation, does not stand in need of any other thing to manifest it or make it apprehended; it is therefore *Self-apprehended*; the Apprehender—Soul—and the Apprehended Object,—on the other hand, are not of the nature of Light or Illumination; hence for the manifestation of these they require something different from themselves, which is of the nature of Light. That the Apprehender—Soul—and the Apprehended—

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Object—are not of the nature of Light is proved in the following manner:—

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We know, as a matter of fact, that in the waking state, both the Apprehender and the Object figure in the Apprehension; but neither of these really figures in the Apprehension during deep sleep; and yet it cannot be denied that they are there all the time. The fact of their being there, and yet not appearing in Consciousness, proves that they are not of the nature of Light. The case of the Apprehension on the other hand is totally different; whenever and wherever it exists, it is self-manifest and self-apprehended; it is thus neither like the Apprehender nor like the Apprehended Object, both of which are never apprehended except through the Apprehension.

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As regards the question of Pramāṇa and Phala, Prabhākara holds that if the term ‘Pramāṇa’ be taken to mean that which is cognised,—i.e., the Cognition itself,—then it is this Cognition itself that is the Pramāṇa, Valid Cognition; and in this case the Phala—the Resultant, Effect,—would consist in either the acceptance or the rejection by the Cognising Agent, of the object Cognised, or his indifference towards it;—these three being the attitudes taken by the Cogniser towards the things that he cognises. If, on the other hand, the term ‘Pramāṇa’ is taken as ‘that by which something is cognised,’—i.e., the Means of Cognition;—then the name ‘Pramāṇa’ would apply to the Mind-Soul Contact (which is the element common to all cognitions); and in this case, the Cognition itself would be the ‘Phala,’ the Resultant.—So also in the case of the name ‘Pramāṇa’ being applied either to the cognising Sense-Organ or to the Contact with the Mind,—the Cognition itself would be the Phala, as it is towards this result that all the said agencies are operative.

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(C) BHĀṬṬA VIEW OF PERCEPTION.

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There are six Sense-Organs (as according to Prabhākara) (Śāstradīpikā, p. 21). The contact of these and the process of ‘perception’ have been described under ‘Sense-Organs’ above.

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As a matter of common experience, when an Object is first perceived—be it a Substance or Quality or a ‘Universal’—it is perceived in its own pure form, free from all distinctive features; our own experience is the sole criterion and authority for the view that whenever the Object comes within the range of our Sense-Organs, and our Mind is not ‘absent,’ we perceive the Object by itself:—the Cognition that appears of it is a mere *Alochana* or Simple Perception, called ‘*nirvikalpaka*,’ Non-conceptual—appertaining to the Object itself pure and simple, resembling the cognition by a new-born infant. (*Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa* 112.)—This has been called *Nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, Non-conceptual Perception. This is followed by a fuller perception of the thing as having certain distinctive features—such as belonging to a certain Community or ‘*Universal*,’ bearing a certain name and so forth. The former is somewhat indistinct and the latter quite distinct; the latter is called ‘*Savikalpaka-Pratyakṣa*,’ Conceptual Perception. Some people have held that this latter is the only Perception and there is no Non-conceptual Perception. But this is contrary to all experience. What is apprehended by the Non-conceptual Perception is a vague undefined sort of ‘something’ which might embrace any number of things; while what is apprehended by the Conceptual Perception is a definite thing with its own individual characteristics.—(*Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 22—24.) (See *Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa*, pp. 112, 120 *et seq.*) Both are ‘Perception’ because Sense-born (*Nyā. Ratnā*, p. 175).

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On the question of what is ‘*Pramāṇa*’ and what its *Phala*, *Kumārila* is not very particular. (*Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa*, p. 59.) He apparently accepts the view of *Prabhākara*, which appears to be the commonsense view. (See *Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa*, p. 70 *et. seq.*)

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Pleasure etc. are amenable to Sense-Perception, through the instrumentality of the *Mind*, which is a ‘Sense-Organ.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 83.)

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As regards ‘*Yogic*’ (Mystic) Perception, some people have held that these apprehend even past and future things,—also those that are too subtle or are hidden from view and too remote and so forth. They argue that in view of this fact, Perception cannot be regarded as restricted to things *present* only. The answer to this is that the Perception of the Mystic also cannot differ from the Perception of the ordinary man; and so long as it is *Perception*, it must appertain to things *present* only; and what does not pertain to *present* things cannot be regarded as Perception. Such Cognitions may be regarded as ‘*Intuitional*,’ due to *Pratibhā*, Intuition; but such intuitional Cognition cannot be always free from doubt. (*Ibid.*, pp. 26—37.)

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CHAPTER XII

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ANUMĀNA: INFERENCE

(A) Shabara's View

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[*Shabara-Bhāṣya*—Trs., p. 15]—When the Perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship (of Invariable Concomitance) leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,—which latter is not in contact with the person's Sense-Organs,—this second Cognition is what is called ‘*Anumāna*,’ ‘Inference,’ (Inferential Cognition). Inference and the other forms of Cognition also presuppose, and are based upon, Sense-Perception. (Trs., p. 8.)

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What is meant is that the cognition of the permanent relationship between two things helps in the Inferential Cognition by providing to the Agent the idea of the other factor of the relationship when one factor is cognised; when the observer perceives a certain thing, and recalls to his mind the permanent relationship that that thing has been known to bear to another thing,—this recalled idea of the relationship presents to his mind the apprehension of the other factor of that relationship, and to this apprehension is given the name ‘Inferential Cognition.’—(*Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 74.)

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[*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, p. 15]—This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds: (1) That based upon the *Directly-perceived* relationship, and (2) that based upon a *generalised* relationship; as an instance of the former, we have the Inferential Cognition of Fire following from the Cognition of Smoke (which is based upon the invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire, which has been directly perceived in the Kitchen);—and as an example of the *second* kind of Inferential Cognition, we have the case where, finding that the Sun changes its position, we infer that ‘the Sun is moving,’—on the ground of our experience that, in the case of the person Devadatta, we have found that it is only after he moves that he changes his position; which experience has led us to the *generalised* Premiss that ‘whenever an object changes its position, it moves;’ and it is on this *generalised* premiss that the Inference of the Sun's movement is based.

(B) Prābhākara View of Inference

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[*Rjuvimalā*, p. 49]—The relationship upon which Inference is based must be one that is *Unfailing*, ever true and permanent; *e.g.*, that which subsists between Cause and Effect, between Whole and Part, between Substance and Quality, between Qualities subsisting in the same Substance, and so forth: for instance, the relationship between Fire (Cause) and Smoke (Effect).

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[*Rjuvimalā*, p. 95]—*Question*—“What is that Means of Knowledge by which we obtain the right knowledge of the permanent and unfailing character of the said relationship? It cannot be known through Perception, which is operative only in regard to the things in the *present* and in contact with the Sense-Organs. Nor could it be known through Inference or Presumption, as both of these also would, in their turn, depend upon like relationships, which would thus involve an infinite regress.—Nor lastly could it be known through Perception obtained through the instrumentality of the Mind alone (irrespectively of Sense-Contact); because if the Mind alone by itself were to bring about such Cognitions, then men would become omniscient; and there would be no limitation upon the reach and functioning of the Mind.”

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This difficulty has been met in the following manner:—The relationship is cognised through that same Means of Cognition by which the members of the relationship are cognised; *e.g.*, between Fire and Smoke, all relationships are cognised by means of Perception through the Senses; the relationships being apprehended as qualifications belonging to the two things (Fire and Smoke), which latter are *perceived* by themselves. The particular time and place also are perceived as qualifying adjuncts of those same things. Thus it is that Fire and Smoke become *perceived* as qualified by a qualifying Relationship and by certain specifications of Time and Place. The next stage in the process is the recognition of the fact that while, in some cases, Fire is found to be concomitant with Smoke, there are instances where it is not so; *e.g.*, in the case of the Red-hot Iron; this gives rise to the conviction that the Relationship (of concomitance) of Fire with Smoke is *not constant*, but qualified by variations of Time and Place;—as for Smoke, on the other hand, it is never found apart from Fire; and this gives rise to the conviction that Smoke is always, invariably, concomitant with Fire; that is, the said Relationship of *Smoke* and *Fire* is contant. After this conviction has dawned upon the mind, all that is needed for the forthcoming Inferential Cognition (of Fire) is the apprehension of the mere existence of Smoke; for which apprehension alone there is need for the operation of a Means of Cognition; and when once this existence has been apprehended, the idea of the connection and presence of Fire follows naturally from the pre-conceived notion of the said relationship between Fire and Smoke. Thus then all that is needed for the apprehension of the Inferential Cognition is supplied by *Sense-Perception* itself. This view may be open to the objection that, under the above explanation, the Cognition of *Smoke* would include within itself the Cognition of *Fire* also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown which would be cognised by the resultant Inferential Cognition; and this last would therefore cease to be *Valid Cognition, Pramāṇa*. This objection would have had some force against the *Prābhākara*, only if *Pramāṇa*, Valid Cognition, had been defined as that which affords the cognition of something not already cognised. As a matter of fact however *Prabhākara* does not make this a necessary condition in the *Validity of a Cognition*; he defines it simply as *Apprehension*, and certainly the Cognition of Fire following upon the Cognition of *Smoke* is ‘Apprehension.’ Then again, in all cases of Inferential Cognition, the previous knowledge of the relationship between the ‘Subject’ and the ‘Probans’ is absolutely necessary; and hence Inferential Cognition must always pertain to things already known. The reason why Inferential Cognition does not appear in regard to each and every thing known to us lies in the fact that there can be no Cognition of any sort unless the Agent wishes it (i.e., has his mind turned towards it); and in a case where all that we wish to know regarding a certain thing is already known by other and simpler means of knowledge, there is no occasion for us to recall to our minds the various relationships borne by the thing concerned; and hence the idea of the relationship not being before the Mind, no Inferential Cognition ensues.—(*Vide Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 76.)

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The very definition of *Inferential Cognition* serves to indicate all the more important defects in the Inferential process,—which defects have been called ‘*Hētvābhāsa*,’ Defective or Fallacious Reason. For instance, (a) the condition that ‘the relationship between the two factors must be one that has been previously known ’ precludes the *Asādhāraṇa* or Too Specific Reason (*Probans*). As a matter of fact, the character that belongs specifically to the ‘Subject’ cannot form the basis of any valid Inference; because such a character could not have been perceived anywhere else, and thus this character along wtih the Subject could never be known as related to any third object, and yet it is the relationship to this third object that forms the essence of an Inferential conclusion. For example, the Earth is related to Odorousness by such a peculiar relationship that that relationship cannot indicate the Earth as being related to anything other than the said *Odorousness*.—(b) The condition that ‘ there must be a clear relationship between the two factors ’ precludes the ‘ *Bādhita* ’ Anulled *Probans*; e.g., when the eternality of Word-Sound is sought to be established on the basis of its being an *Effect*, it is found that no positive relationship is possible between the character of ‘ *Eternality* ’ and that of being an *Effect*,—the two being naturally contradictory; for this reason the said Inference cannot be valid.—(c) The condition that ‘ the relationship should be infallible, permanent ’ precludes the *Sādhāraṇa*, Too Wide *Probans*; e.g., when the ‘ *Eternality* ’ of Word-Sound is sought to be proved on the basis of its being cognisable, it is found that the relationship between ‘ *Eternality* ’ and ‘ *Cognisability* ’ is not permanent, inasmuch as there are many things that are cognisable without being eternal; and hence the said relationship cannot lead to a valid Inference of *Eternality*.—(d) The condition that ‘ one factor of the relationship (which is to be the *Probans*) must be perceived or well known in order to bring about the Inferential Cognition ’ precludes the ‘ *Asiddha*,’ Impossible or Unknown *Probans*; e.g., when the fact of things like Merit and Demerit being perceptible to *Buddha* is sought to be proved on the ground of His Omniscience,—it is found that, inasmuch as this ‘ *Omniscience* has never been perceived or well known at all ’ it cannot lead to a valid Inference.

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Apart from these *Fallacies*, the *Prābhākara* does not accept any other. For instance, he does not admit of the *Neutralised Probans* (‘ *Satparatiprakṣa* ’). His reason for this is that it is impossible for two contradictory characters to be predicated of the same ‘ Subject,’ as is persupposed by the Fallacy of ‘ Neutralisation ’; as under the circumstances, the two Inferences cannot be equally valid, as is implied by this fallacy; such contradictory Inferences would be possible only when the real character of the ‘Subject’ would be unknown. (See Prakaraṇapañchikā, p. 77.)

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The Object of Inferential Cognition is of two kinds:—(1) Dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa, that of which the specific individuality or feature is perceived, and (2) the Adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa, that of which the said feature is not perceived. To the former category belong all such things as Fire and the like; and to the second category, such super-sensuous things as the ‘Capacity’ of things,—the specific feature of which cannot be perceived, and yet it is possible for us to cognise its permanent and infallible relationship to get at its Inferential Cognition. For instance, we cannot perceive the burning capacity of Fire, and yet we can infer its existence from noting its Effect produced upon things. (See Prakaraṇapañchikā, p. 78.)

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As to what is the ‘Pramāṇa’ and what the Resultant, in the case of Inference, the conclusion is the same as in the case of Perception. That is to say, if we regard ‘Pramāṇa’ as synonymous with ‘Valid’ Cognition (Pramiti),—and hence ‘Anumāna’ as synonymous with ‘Inferential Cognition,’—then what is ‘Anumāna,’ Inference, is the Cognition of the Subject, Fire, proceeding from the Mind-Soul contact, as influenced by the perception of the Inferential Indicative (Smoke); and the ‘Resultant’ in this case would consist of the acceptance or rejection of the cognised object by the cognising Agent.—If, on the other hand, ‘Pramāṇa’ is regarded as the Means by which valid cognition is obtained,—and ‘Anumāna’ as that by means of which the valid Inferential Cognition is obtained,—then, in that case, the Anumāna-Pramāṇa would be the Mind-Soul contact; and the relation between the several factors would form the ‘Cognitive Process’; and the Resultant in this case would be the Inferential Cognition itself. If, lastly, the Means (of the Cognition) be taken as that which is the most effective (Sādhakatama) in the bringing about of the Result, then the Perception of the Inferential Indicative or Probans (e.g., Smoke) would have to be regarded as the Anumāna-Pramāṇa (Means of Inferential Cognition); as it is this that is most directly and immediately effective in bringing about the Inferential Cognition (of Fire). (See Prakaraṇapañchikā, p. 82.)

Cites (2)