Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c17: Chapter XII: Anumāna: Inference
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c17
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- c17.s1 (A) Shabara-Bhāṣya — 31 parts
Chapter XII: Anumāna: Inference
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There are two kinds of Inference—(1) ‘*Svārtha*,’ for one’s own benefit, and (2) ‘*Parārtha*,’ for the benefit of others. In the former, the conclusion is deduced from the premiss or premisses recalled to the mind; in this case all the processes need not be stated; one often deduces a conclusion from a single premiss. In the second, the conclusion is deduced from premisses which are generally fully stated.
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As regards this Statement of the Inference, it consists of three Propositions, technically called ‘*Avayavas*,’ Factors, of the Inferential Statement. These are—(1) Statement of the Proposition, (2) the Statement of the Major Premiss—involving the Statement of the Corroborative Instance, and (3) the Statement of the Minor Premiss—involving the Statement of the Probans or Inferential Indicative.—(1) The Statement of the Proposition serves to point out what is intended to be proved by the Inference; *e.g.*, ‘Word-Sound is eternal;’ it is only when this has been stated that we can intelligently proceed with the Inference.—(2) The Major Premiss states the Corroborative Instance and shows that there is an unfailing relationship between what is sought to be proved (the Probandum) (*Eternality*) and that by means of which it is sought to be proved (the Probans); and this relationship must be indicated as existing in cases that are well known to both parties; for instance, when it is intended to prove the presence of *Fire* by means of the presence of *Smoke*, the Major Premiss is stated thus:—‘Wherever there is *Smoke* there is *Fire*, as in the Kitchen.’ Instances that do not apply to the case in question are regarded as *wrong*—दृष्टान्ताभास .—Lastly, inasmuch as Inferential Cognition follows upon the Perception of one of the two factors between which the permanent relationship subsists,—the perception of one factor becomes a necessary element in all Inferences; and it is as stating this, the presence of the one factor, that the Minor Premiss becomes essential. For instance, when seeking to prove the presence of *Fire* on the Hill by means of the presence of *Smoke*, it is necessary to make the statement that ‘there is *Smoke* on the Hill;’ without which the conclusion—that ‘there is *Fire* on the Hill’—could not be rightly deduced. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 82.)
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There is some difference of opinion regarding the precise order in which the Inferential Argument should state the two premisses.
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According to *Prābhākara*, there need to be no hard and fast rule regarding this order; because the conclusion—‘There is fire on the Hill’—follows all the same, whether we state the reasoning in the form—‘(a) Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire, as in the Kitchen;—and (b) there is Smoke on the Hill,’—or in the form—‘(a) There is Smoke on the Hill, and (b) wherever there is Smoke there is Fire, as in the Kitchen.’ (See *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 85.)
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Some writers have held that the purposes of the Corroborative Instance can be also served by the *Negative Instance*, or an *Instance per contra*; for in corroboration of the reasoning ‘There is Fire because there is Smoke,’ we may put forward the Instance ‘Whenever there is no Fire, there is no Smoke, as in the Tank.’—This view is not accepted by the *Prābhākara*; because, he argues, the *Probans* can prove the conclusion only by force of its relationship to that which is sought to be proved; and this relationship can be asserted only by means of a *positive instance*, not by a *negative* one; even though in some cases, the *Negative Instance* may serve to point out the necessary relationship, yet it can do so only indirectly, the process thereby becoming more involved than in the case where the instance is stated in the positive form. Hence in all cases, it is the positive instance that should be put forward. (See *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 85).
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The defects pertaining to the ‘Subject’, *Pakṣa*, of the inferential Reasoning are of two kinds,—(a) being contrary to well-known facts of experience, and (b) having a qualification that is absolutely unknown.—The defects pertaining to the *Probans* have already been indicated above under ‘Fallacies’. Those pertaining to the Instance are of four kinds,—(1) being not applicable to what is sought to be proved, *i.e.*, the *Probandum*; (2) being not applicable to the *Probans*; (3) being not applicable either to the *Probans* or to the *Probandum*; and (4) failing to establish the desired relationship. The defects pertaining to the Statement of the Proposition are (1) Indefiniteness and Obscurity of Expression and (2) Non-Affirmation. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 87.)
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(C) BHĀṬṬA VIEW OF INFERENCE.
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*Shabara* (Trs., p. 8) has declared that Inference (along with the other forms of Cognition) presupposes, and is based upon, Perception.—This has been objected to in *Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa*, 87—94; and explained in 95-96 *et. seq.* The objection emanates from the Buddhist, who holds the view that ‘Perception is always *Non-Conceptual*’ and as such, it cannot form the basis of Inference or any other form of Cognition, as all these latter relate to the relationship of things, while no relationship can figure in Perception which is always *Non-Conceptual*.
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Kumārila’s answer to this is that all that the *Bhāṣya* means is that the Inferential and other cognitive processes can proceed only after one or the other factors that figure therein have been previously perceived.
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To the stock objection that the Major Premiss already implies the Conclusion;—hence (in the words of J. S. Mill)—“Every syllogism involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*,”—the answer given by the *Bhaṭṭa* is bolder than that given by *Prabhākara*, who, as we have seen, had to give up the idea that ‘every valid cognition must apprehend something not already known.’ The *Bhaṭṭa* accepts the permanent relationship between the Probandum (Fire) and Probans (Smoke), and yet holds to the view that Inferential Cognition, like every valid cognition, apprehends something that *is not already known*. He argues that, even though it is true that the Probans—*Smoke*—is seen, and also that the said perception of *Smoke* carries with it the vague general idea of the *Fire* as a permanant concomitant of the *Smoke*,—yet the final Object apprehended by the resultant Inferential Cognition is, not one that is already known by other means of Cognition; because the said perception of *Smoke*, though implying the vague notion of *Fire* as its relative, does not imply the notion of the presence of the Fire in the mountain; and it is this *qualified* Fire that forms the object of the Inferential Cognition. Thus Inferential Cognition also has to be regarded as apprehending something *not already known* by other means. The vague notion of Fire in general is already there; but the Cognition of the *Fire* as related to a particular time and place,—the mountain for instance,—is not implied in the perception of Smoke. The smoke is seen,—the idea of *Fire* in general is also there, implied in the perception of *Smoke*,—the perception of th mountain is also there; but there is no idea yet of the *Fire* as present in the Mountain, and it is this that forms the objective of the Inferential Cognition. (*Shāstra-dīpikā*, pp. 41—44).
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When a man as got the Inferential Cognition through his knowledge of the permanent relationship between the Probans and the probandum,—he may wish to convey the same to another person; but for doing so, and for convincing him of the validity of his conclusion, he will have to state the Inferential reasoning in full; this Statement is called the ‘*Sādhana*’, ‘proof’, of the conclusion The Statement of the proof consists, according to the *Bhaṭṭa*, of three Statements:—(1) Statement of the Conclusion (‘Word-Sound is transitory’), (2) Statement of the Probans or the Reason (‘Because it is an Effect’), (3) Statement of the Major Premiss along with Corroborative Instance (‘All Effects are transient, e.g., the Jar’). The order of these Statements is immaterial; the reasoning may be stated as—(1) ‘The Effects are transient—*e.g.*, the Jar’, (2) ‘The Word-Sound is an Effect,’ and (3) ‘Therefore Word-Sound is transient.’—(*Shastradīpikā*, p. 44.)
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The following are the defects in the Inferential Process:—
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(1) Defects of the Statement of the Conclusion—(*a*) Contrary to perceptible facts, (*b*) Unknown qualification and so forth (See *Shlo. Vā., Anumāna*).
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(2) Defects of the Probans—(*a*) Unknown, not admitted, Inadmissable, (*b*) Fallible, Inconclusive, (*c*) Contradictory. (*a*) The Unknown or the Inadmissible is of five kinds:—(1) Inadmissible by itself, (2) Inadmissible in Qualification, (3) Inadmissible Negation, (4) Inadmissible Spbstratum, (5) Inadmissible Concomitance. (*b*) The Inconclusive is of two kinds—(1) Fallible, Untrue, and (2) Neutralised. In the case of the Neutralised Probans, the two contradictory reasons are not equally valid; what is meant is that the parties are unable to notice any difference in their comparative validity.—The *Too-Wide* Probans also is defective; so also is the *Too-Narrow* Probans.—(*c*) The Contradictory Probans is what is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum.
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The Corroborative Instance is of two kinds:—Instance of Similarity and Instance of Dissimilarity. An example of the former we have in the *Kitchen*—whic provides an instance of the concomitance of Smoke with Fire; an example of the Instance of Dissimilarity we have in the *Tank*, which provides an instance of the concomitance of No-Fire and No-Smoke. But it is seldom necessary to state the second kind of Instance. (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 45.)
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What is meant by the Bhāṣya declaring that there are two kinds of Inference is only that there are Inferences pertaining to *Particulars* as well as to *Universals*. (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 50.)
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CHAPTER XIII
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‘ VERBAL COGNITION ’ : ‘ SCRIPTURAL INJUNCTION ’
(A) Shabara-Bhāṣya
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‘ *Shāstra* ’, ‘ Scriptural Injunction ’, is that means of cognising super-sensuous things (i.e., *Dharma* and *Adharma*) which proceeds from Verbal Cognition.—(*Bhāṣya* Trs., p. 15.)
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The *Bhāṣya* does not think it necessary to provide a definition of ‘ Word ’ or ‘ Verbal Cognition ’ in general; it defines only the particular form of Word, *Injunction*, which is what bears upon the subject-matter of Mīmāṃsā, viz., *Dharma-Adharma*. Hence the term ‘ *Shabda* ’ here stands for the Vedic or Scriptural Word, and ‘ *Artha* ’ for *Dharma-Adharma*, which forms the subject-matter of ‘ Scripture ’—says Kumārila. (*Shlo. Vārtika, Shabda*, 8—13.)
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According to Prabhākara (*Bṛhatī*, p. 104) also, the term ‘ *Shāstra* ’ (in the Definition) stands for *Injunction*; and the term ‘ *Shabdavijñāna* ’ stands for the Cognition of something to be done, derived through Word. Hence ‘ *Shāstra*,’ Injunction, is the means of cognising what should be done, through Words. (*Sū.* 1.1.5, *Bhāṣya*—Trs., p. 9.)
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In course of discussion, the general question relating to Verbal Cognition in general and its validity and reliability, also comes in for full treatment. (*Shabara-Bhāṣya* Trs., pp. 16—25) as below.
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The validity and reliability of the cognition derived from Scriptural Injunction is assailed on the ground of the Veda (Scripture) being full of absurd and incoherent assertions: which fact vitiates its validity as a guide to the right knowledge of *Dharma*. (*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, pp. 16-17.)
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The answer to this is provided in *Sū.* 5.—*The relation of the Word with its denotation is inborn*; ‘ *Injunction* ’ is the means of knowing *Dharma*,—and it is infallible in regard to all that is imperceptible; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent. That is, (*a*) the relation between the Word and its Denotation is inseparable; (*b*) it becomes the means of knowing *Dharma*, which is not cognisable by any other Means of Cognition;—(*c*) it is Word in the form of *Injunction* that provides this knowledge;—(d) this means of knowing *Dharma* is infallible; (e) hence it is a valid means of knowledge; as it is independent. That is, when a cognition has been brought about by the said Word, there is no need for any other corroborating Cognition or Person. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., pp. 8-9.)
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What is meant by the relation between the Word and its Denotation being ‘inborn’ is that it does not owe its origin to any person, it is primordial, original, self-sufficient, not dependent upon any other Means of Cognition. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 17.)
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If the connection between the Word and its Denotation were dependent upon other Means of Cognition, then all those Words and Expressions which speak of super-sensuous things might be regarded as of doubtful validity; when however the said connection is inborn, inherent, self-sufficient, then there is nothing to shake the inherent validity of what is learnt from the words of the Veda. (*Bṛhatī-Ṛjuvimālā.*)
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Thus then the knowledge provided by the Scriptural Injunction must be right and reliable. In the case of Words emanating from human sources, there may be doubts regarding their validity or truth; as in this case it would all be dependent for its validity upon things extraneous to themselves,—such as the validity of those sources from which the speaker may have derived his knowledge of what he is speaking of and so forth. On the other hand, in the case of the Word not emanating from a human source,—why should there be any doubt regarding its truth? Certainly, we do not require any corroboration of what we learn from the said Word; when the Word speaks of something, what is meant is that it makes that thing *known*, *i.e.*, it becomes the means of that thing becoming *known*; so that as soon as the *Means*, in the shape of the Word, is there, what is expressed by it becomes known *by itself*, without any extraneous help. Under the circumstances, how could one call it “*false*”? As a matter of fact, the notion derived from an Injunction is not of a doubtful character; nor does there appear any notion to the contrary at any other time or place, or under any other circumstances. (*Shabara*—Trs., pp. 17-18.)
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This leads on to the general question of Words and their Denotation. It is argued that all that has been said above may be true; but there can be no relationship between the Word and what is denoted by it; none of the several kinds of Relationship—Conjunction, Inherence, Cause-Effect, Container-contained—is possible between the Word and what it denotes.
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The answer to the above is that the Relationship between the Word and what it denotes is that of the *Denoter-Denoted*, i.e., of the *Name* and the *Named*.—This is objected to on the ground that no such Relationship is cognised when one hears a Word uttered for the first time.—The answer to this is that in all such things our experience is the only guide. It is only when we find a Word actually expressing a certain thing that we regard it as the *Denoter* of that thing; this is not found possible in the case of a Word heard for the first time; in fact, the denotation of a Word is understood only when it has been heard used as many times as makes it definitely recognised that ‘this Word denotes this thing’.—Says the opponent—“If the Word does not express any meaning when it is heard for the first time, then the relation between the Word and its Denotation cannot be inborn, it must be something created, artificial.” (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 18.) The answer to this is that the said relation cannot be artificial; it cannot be regarded as created by any person—not even by God. No such creator of Word-relationship can be vouched for by any Means of Cognition.
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The *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 19) takes up the three questions—(1) What is a Word? (2) What is its *Denotation*? and (3) Wat is the relation between the Word and its Denotation?
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I. What is a Word? The Word is a verbal unit composed of a number of letters. For instance, in the case of the word ‘*Gauḥ*’ (as denoting the Cow), the Word is the unit composed of the component letters *g*, *au* and *ḥ*. Such is the declaration of the revered *Upavarṣa*. Among people the term ‘Word’ is applied to what is apprehended by the Ear; and in the case of the Word ‘*gauḥ*’ what is apprehended by the Ear is the unit composed of the said letters (p. 19).
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The *Bhāṣya* brings forward, in this connection, the view of the Grammarian regarding the nature of the ‘Word.’ The Grammarian holds what has been called the ‘*Doctrine of the Sphoṭa*.’ He argues as follows (against the view propounded by *Upavarṣa*):—“If it is as declared by *Upavarṣa*, then there can be no cognition of the meaning of a word. Because, as a matter of fact, the cognition of what the Word denotes does not appear on the hearing of the component letters, directly; and apart from the component letters, there is no single entity in the shape of the composite whole (under the above theory), from which the cognition of the Denotation could follow. For instance, at the moment that we hear the letter ‘ga,’ we do not hear the letter ‘au’, and so forth. From all this it follows that the word ‘ *gauḥ* ’ as a composite unit, must be something different from the component letters; and it is from this composite unit that the cognition of the Denotation follows [and to this composite unit we give the name *Sphota*].”
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Shabara’s answer to this is as follows:—What happens is that each component letter, as it is uttered, leaves an impression behind, and what brings about the cognition of the Denotation of the Word is the last component letter along with the Impressions of each of the preceeding component letters. In actual experience, the composite Word-unit is never found to be anything entirely different from the component letters; hence there can be no ‘Word’ apart from the component letters.—This is a much simpler hypothesis than that of the Grammarian who has to postulate a ‘*Sphota*’ as entirely distinct from the component letters; while our doctrine requires no such postulate. (*Shabara*, Trs., pp. 19-20.)
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II. What is it that *denoted* by the Word? What is denoted by the Word—‘Cow,’ for instance,—is the ‘*Universal*’ (Class or Community) ‘Cow’—marked by certain characteristic features—the dewlap, for instance. This Universal is an accomplished entity and is actually perceived as such. (*Shabara*, Trs., pp. 21-22.)
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That it is the ‘*Universal*’ that is denoted by the Word has been declared by Jaimini himself under 1.3.33; and *Shabara*’s comments on this Sūtra are found under *Adhikaraṇa* 10 B of *Adhyāya* I, *Pāda* 3—Sūtras 30 to 35. (Trs., pp. 118—124.)
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Under this *Adhikaraṇa*, the question is pointedly raised—Is it the ‘*Universal*’ or the ‘*Individual*’ that is denoted by the Word? That factor which is *common* to several particular things is the Class or Universal; while that which possesses certain specific uncommon characteristics is the Individual. The question as to which of these two is denoted by the Word—‘Cow’ for instance—arises from the fact that whenever the Word ‘cow’ is pronounced in common parlance, it brings about the idea of the *Universal*—the *class-character*—common to all cows,—and yet in all actions resulting from the use of the Word, it is the *individual* cow that comes in.
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The Individual-Theory has been thus set forth (in *Sū.* 30 and *Bhāṣya*):—“(A) If Words denoted Universals or Classes, no Injunctions of Action would be possible; i.e., if Words denoted ‘Universals,’ there could be no injunction of actions like killing, washing, chopping and so forth, as none of these actions could be done to any ‘Universal.’ As regards the notion of Class or *Universal* that appears on the utterance of the Word, the right view is that the ‘Universal’ figures only as the distinguishing feature of the *Individual* denoted by the Word,—the idea being that of ‘that particular animal which has the *class-character* Cow’; just as when the word ‘Lancer’ is uttered, though the resultant idea is that of the man with the *Lance*, yet the *Lance* is not what is denoted by the Word, it comes only as the characterising feature of the man.—(B) Another argument favouring the Individual-Theory is that, if the Word denoted ‘*Universals*’, then *there would be no words expressive of qualities as subsisting in Substances*. (*Sū.* 31); that is, if Words denoted the ‘Universal’, there would be no Word expressive of *qualities*, such as we have in the expression ‘*Six cows are to be given as the Sacrificial Fee*’.—(C) The third argument (*Sū.* 32) is that we meet with such Vedic texts as—‘If the animal consecrated has run away, one should secure another animal of the same colour and of the same age’; if words denoted the ‘Universal’ then there could be no securing of ‘*another animal*’: as the other animal also would belong to the same ‘Universal’ as the one that has run away. From all this it follows that what is denoted by the Word is the *Individual*.”
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The *Siddhānta* view is that it is the *Class*, the *Universal*, that is denoted, as it is that which serves the purpose of Actions. (*Sū.* 33). For instance, we have the Injunction ‘One should erect the Altar like the ‘*Shyēna*’; such an injunction would have sense only if the word ‘*Shyēna*’ denoted the ‘Universal’ If it denoted an *individual* Shyēna-bird, then, inasmuch as it would be impossible for the performer to make or produce any such individualdual bird,—the Injunction would be laying down something impossible and hence meaningless and futile. The word therefore must stand for the *Class*, the *Universal*, the factor common to all individuals, and as such representable and producible in the shape of the *figure of the Bird* . . . If the Word denoted any *one* Individual, then it could not be used for any other Individual . . . and if the Word ‘Cow’ could be used for other Individual cows also, then why could it not be used for other Individual animals—Horses, Asses, etc.? . . . If again, a Word were to denote that Individual alone to which it has been actually applied in usage, then the Word ‘cow’ could not be used in reference to the newborn calf. Nor, in this case, would it be possible to have any such comprehensive idea of the *Cow* as is met with in such expressions as—‘this is a cow, that is a cow.’ As a matter of fact, too, no Word is ever found to be applied to any *one* Individual only, and not to another. It may be held that—“the word *Cow* is applied to and denotes all those Individuals wherein the common class-character—‘Cowness’—subsists.” If that were so, then what would be cognised as denoted by the Word would be a *qualified* Individual, *i.e.*, the Individual qualified by the Universal ‘Cow’;—in that case the qualifying factor—the *Universal* ‘Cow’—should be one that has been already cognised before.—It may be held that “the Word may be taken as denoting the *Universal* as the qualifying factor and the *Individual* as the qualified factor; and in any particular case, which of these two is the *primary* and which the *secondary* will be determined by the intention of the Speaker.”—This however cannot be so; such determination of the *Primary* or the *Secondary* character would be possible or necessary only if both, *Universal* as well as *Individual*, were denoted by the Word; as a matter of fact, however, by positive and negative concommitance we know that what is invariably expressed by the Word is the *Universal*, not the *Individual*, the idea of which latter only follows upon the wake of the notion of the *Universal*.—Nor can the Word be taken as denoting the *Universal* as qualified by the *Individual*; as, if that were so, then the Word denoting the *Universal* as qualified by any *one* Individual, could not be applied to any other Individual. From all this it follows that it is the *Universal* that is denoted by the Word, and it is this Cognition of the *Universal* or *Class* that brings about the notion of the *Individual* subsequently.
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[Sū. 34, Bhā., Trs., P., 123] It has been argued by the Individualist that (1) “no action would be possible, if the Word denoted the Universal.” (Sū. 30)—and (2) that “there would be no Word expressive of Qualities subsisting in Substances” (Sū. 31),—and (3) “that there could be no Injunction of another, such as we have in the text another animal should be brought in.’ (Sū. 32.)
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The answer to all this is that—As Words denote Universals or classes, and through these, also Individuals, there would be no dissociation from Action, etc. (Sū. 35.) That is, (a) inasmuch as the Word denotes the Universal, the Action enjoined would pertain to that Individual which is related to that Universal. For instance, in the case of the Injunction ‘Sprinkle water on the Vrīhi-Corn,’—what is enjoined is the sprinkling of water over paddy—over that Substance which is helpful in the sacrificial performance; as the sprinkling could not be enjoined as to be done over the ‘Universal’ because no sprinkling over a ‘Universal’ is possible; so what happens in this case is that the word ‘Vrīhi-Corn’, which really denotes the ‘Universal,’ is used for the purpose of qualifying and indicating the receptacle of the action of sprinkling water; so that the ‘Universal’, when cognised as denoted by the Word, would qualify that receptacle of the action. Thus there would be no incongruity at all. (b) Similarly as regards Words expressive of qualities—in the case of the text speaking of ‘Six Cows,’ what is intended to be declared is the number of that substance which is to be given as the Fee, and the word ‘cows,’ as denoting the ‘Universal,’ serves to qualify and indicate that Substance. (c) As regards the Injunction regarding ‘another animal’, what is meant to be spoken of as ‘another’ is the substitute for what has been lost; and hence the word ‘animal’, which denotes the ‘Universal,’ serves to qualify and indicate the real substitute.
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Thus it is established that all Words like ‘Cow’, ‘Horse’ and so forth denote Classes or Universals. (Shabara, Trs., p. 124.)
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III. The third questoin is—What is the relation between the Word and its Denotation?
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The relation between the Word and its Denotation is that—on the Word being cognised, what is denoted by it becomes cognised. That is, the relation is that of the *Name* and the *Named*. (*Shabara*, Trs., p. 22.)
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All these three—(1) the *Word*, (2) its *Denotation*, i.e., the Universal, and (3) the relation between these,—are eternal. That the ‘*Universal*’ (or Class) is eternal has been shown above (Section on *Jāti*).
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The relation between the Word and its Denotation is also eternal. It cannot be regarded as brought about by any Person (in the shape of God); as there is no proof of the existence of such a Person.—Words are always taught as accomplished entities having the inherent power of denoting things. If it were impossible for us to comprehend the meaning of words without presuming a Creator of this relationship, then alone could there be justification for presuming such a Creator. As a matter of fact, however, we find that when older people are making use of words for their own purposes, the younger men who happen to hear those words actually come to understand them; those older people too, when they were young, understood the words in the same way, when uttered by their Elders; those later again understood them as used by still older people; and so on the process has gone on without beginning in time.—The other explanation provided by the other party is in the shape of the doctrine that the meaning is comprehended because the relation between that Meaning and the Word was created, laid down, by some Person. As between these two explanations, so long as the explanation based upon common usage is available, it cannot be right to presume a Creator of the relation. (*Shabara*, Trs., p. 24.)
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This relationship is infallible also; it is always found to be true. There is no point of time when the *Word-relation* was not there. (P. 24). Then again, in regard to such super-sensuous things as the Deity and the like, the creating of a Name would be not only useless, but also impossible. When a thing is known in its general form, and its particular forms are not known,—then alone is the *Name* propounded in connection with these particular forms; and in the case of such words as ‘Deity’ and the like, no general or particular forms can be perceived. For this reason also there can be no creation of the relation in question by any Person. (*Shabara*, Trs., pp. 24-25.)
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It has been shown that what is denoted by the Word is the ‘Universal,’ and this is eternal;—also that the *relationship* between the Word and what is denoted by it is eternal. As a necessary corollary to these, it follows that the *Word* itself is eternal. This has been dealt with in detail under *Sūtras* I. i. 6 to 23. (*Shabara, Trs.*, pp. 32—41.)
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The opposite view has been set forth under *Sū.* 6—11; it is as follows:—“It has been asserted that the relation between the Word and its Denotation is eternal. But this is not possible; because the Word itself is not eternal. As a matter of fact, Word is often found to be destroyed, so that when it comes to be produced (uttered) again, its relation to its Denotation cannot but be artificial, ephemeral, newly made. Then again, no one ever comprehends the meaning of a Word heard for the first time. —The Word itself must be something ephemeral, (*a*) because it is *always found to follow after an Effort*; finding that there is an invariable concommitance between the appearance of the Word and Human Effort,—the Word appearing only when there is Human Effort,—we infer that the Word is *produced* by the Effort; nor is there anything to show that the Word existed before that Effort. (*Sū.* 6).—(*b*) Another reason why the Word should be regarded as ephemeral is that it *does not persist*. (*Sū.* 7); that is, when the Word is uttered, it is not found to persist even for one moment; it is not perceived at all; from which we conclude that it must have been destroyed.—(*c*) Another reason: —Because the term ‘*Karoti*’, ‘makes’, ‘produces’, is heard in connection with words. (*Sū.* 8). In common parlance people make use of such expressions as ‘*Kuru shabdam*’ (make the word-sound), which shows that the Word is something *made*, *produced*.—(*d*) Another reason:—We hear the same Word uttered in several places at the same time; this would not be possible if the Word were one and eternal. Unless there is something very special about it, there can be no plurality in what is eternal; it is only in the case of non-eternal products, which are many, that, on their being produced in several places, they become connected with the several points in space. (*Sū.* 9)—(*e*) Another reason for regarding Word as non-eternal:—Because there are original forms and their Modifications (*Sū.* 10). In the case of such expressions as ‘*dadhyatra*’, the original form was ‘*dadhi-atra*’, and the ‘*i*’ of ‘*dadhi*’ because modified into ‘*y*’; such is the teaching of the Grammarians; and as a rule whatever is liable to Modification is *not eternal*. (*Sū.* 10).—(*f*) Another reason:—There is an Augmentation of the Word-Sound due to the multiplicity of its producers (speakers) (*Sū.* 11). As a matter of fact, we find that when a Word is pronounced by several persons, the Word-Sound produced is very loud. If the Word were only *manifested*, and *not produced*, then the Word-Sound heard would always be the *same*, whether pronounced by one or by many persons. From this we conclude that some portion of the Word is *produced* by each of the speakers, and it is on account of the consequent augmentation of the sound that it is perceived as louder. (*Sū.* 11).”
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Shabara’s answer to the above is as follows:—As regards the reason (*a*) that “Word is found to appear after human Effort”,—if we can establish, by sound reasoning, that Word is eternal, then the fact put forward admits of the explanation that what is brought about by the Effort is only the *manifestation* of the already-existing Word. (*Sū.* 12.) When the Word ceases to be heard, what happens is that there is no perception of the Word which is still there,—on account of the *non-reaching* (non-contact) of the perceptive agency; and it is not due to the *Destruction* of the Word. If we can establish the fact of Word being eternal, the phenomena brought forward can be explained on the ground that of the causes that bring about the perception of the Word-Sound, there are some which are not operative when we do not hear it. The said perception of the Word-Sound is brought about by certain Conjunctions and Disjunctions which serve to *manifest*, *not produce*, the Word-Sound. What happens is that the Air-particles disturbed by the Sound-provoking stroke strike against the surrounding stagnant Air-particles, and produce certain Conjunctions and Disjunctions (in the shape of *waves*) on all sides, which go on spreading as long and as far as the momentum lasts; these Conjunctions and Disjunctions—Air-Waves—are not perceived because Air is imperceptible, invisible;
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and as for the Word-Sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the waves do not cease, and after these have ceased, it is not heard. It is for this same reason that Sound is heard at a greater distance when the Wind is favourable. (*Sū.* 13).—(*b*) As regards the next argument—based upon the use of the word ‘*Karoti*’ ‘*makes*’ in relation to the Word-Sound (urged in *Sū.* 8),—the answer to this is that when Word has been definitely proved to be eternal, the expression ‘Karoti’ is to be explained as meaning ‘making use of.’ (Sū. 14).—(c) As regards the next argument (urged in Sū. 9)—that the Word is heard simultaneously in several places;—the answer is that what is urged is not right. The Sun, though one, is actually seen at the same time in several places. When the form of the Word is one only, if there are several places where the Word is heard, the diversity lies in the places, not in the Word. (d) As regards the ‘Modification’ urged in Sū. 10, the case of the expression ‘dadhyatra’ is not one of Modification of the original letter ‘i’; in fact the resultant ‘y’ is a letter totally different from the original ‘i’. That there is no Modification in this case is proved by the fact that people going to use the letter ‘y’ do not take up the letter ‘i’,—in the way in which one going to make curds takes up milk, of which the curd is a Modification.
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Merely because we perceive some sort of a similarity between the two letters ‘i’ and ‘y’ we cannot regard one as the Modification of the other.—(f) As regards the ‘Augmentation’ (urged in Sū. 11)),—what has been urged is not quite accurate; as a matter of fact the Word-Sound has no parts,—no such parts are perceived; and being without parts, it cannot undergo Augmentation. What happens in the case urged is that when the Word is uttered by one man, its sound is soft, but when it is pronounced by many men, those letters which had sounded soft come to be heard as loud, on account of having been taken up by several Conjunctions and Disjunctions due to the utterances. Hence the ‘Augmentation’ spoken of is of the Noise, not of the Word. (Sū. 17). From all this we are led to the final conclusion that Word is eternal, as its utterance is for the purpose of another (Sū. 18),—i.e., for the purpose of making the meaning known to another person. If the Word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of anything to another person. On the other hand, if the Word does not cease, but continues to exist, then it is only right and natural that when the Word is uttered and heard repeatedly, its meaning becomes comprehended by other persons; specially as it would not be possible to establish the necessary relationship between each succeeding Word and its Denotation. (See above).
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If then, the Cognition of the meaning of the succeeding Word were based merely upon its similarity to a previous Denotative Word, then there would always be a chance of
Linked texts (2)
- Mīmāṃsāsūtra — Jaimini, Sanskrit
- Prakaraṇapañcikā — Śālikanātha Miśra, Sanskrit