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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c18: Chapter XIII : Scriptural Injunction

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c18

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Chapter XIII : Scriptural Injunction

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its being mistaken and hence liable to sublation. Further, each time that the word ‘cow’ is heard, if it were only a different Word, only similar to the original Denotative Word, then this would mean that whenever the Word is uttered it produces two things—(1) the use of the new Word and (2) the connection of this new Word with the Denotation; this cannot be right. (*Sū.* 18). As a matter of fact, whenever the word ‘cow’ is pronounced, the idea that it produces is that of all cows simultaneously; this shows that the Word must denote the entire *Class* or *Universal* ‘Cow’; and it is not possible to create the relation of the Word to a ‘Universal,’ because in creating a relation, the creator would have to lay down the relation by pointing to the Universal, and without actually using the word ‘Cow’,—which he could not use until he had created its relation to the Denotation—in what manner could one indicate the distinct ‘Universal’ denoted by the Word? Specially as the *Body* of the Cow, which alone could be pointed out, is the substratum of several ‘Universals’—such as Earth, Substance, etc. If however, the word Cow is *eternal*, it is the same Word that is uttered several times, and has been previously heard several times, as applied to other individual cows; thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance, the Word comes to be recognised as denoting the particular *Universal*. For this reason also, the Word must be *eternal*.

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(*Sū.* 19).—Then again, when people speak of a number in connection with a Word, what they mean is that the Word is pronounced *so many times*; they never mean that the Word itself is *so many* in number; and the use of such expressions shows that people recognise the *same* Word; their process of reasoning is as follows;—“We recognise the Word to be the *same*, our Cognition and our Cognitive organs—are not defective,—other people also recognise the Word to be the *same*; nor can this idea be called a *Delusion*; it could be so recognised only if the difference among the words were actually perceived; as a matter of fact however, the idea that there are *so many different words* is not vouched for by any Means of Right Cognition;—we do not however accept mere *Recognisability* of the Word as proof of its *eternality*; all that we mean by citing the fact of Recognition is to show that the theory of the non-eternality of the Word is contrary to a fact of Perception, in the form of *Recognition*; and we do not mean that eternality is inferred from, proved by, *Recognition*. It may be that the *non-eternality* also of the Word is supported by an Inference only, while Eternity will have the support of Inference in addition to Perception in the form of Recognition. It may be argued that the word ‘cow’ that was pronounced yesterday has ceased to exist, so that what is heard today must be a different word. But the Word that was pronounced yesterday has *not* ceased to exist;

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for the simple reason that we perceive (hear) it again; when people see an object, and after ceasing to see it for a while, see it again, they recognise it to be the *same*, and they never think that the previous object had ceased to exist and a new one had come into existence. A thing can be regarded as having *ceased to exist*,—as being non-existent—only when it is not cognisable by any Means of Cognition. In the case in question however the Word is actually cognised, perceived, through Recognition, as the same. For the *non-existence* of the Word on the other hand, there is no proof at all. Hence the idea of the *Continuous Existence* of the Word cannot be wrong, it must be right. From this it also follows that even in the case of a Word not pronounced and heard, if people do not actually perceive it, they cannot assume that it is *non-existent*; just as, when a man, going out of the house, does not perceive all his family-members, he does not assume that they have ceased to exist, are *non-existent*. The Eternity of Word is not affected by the doctrine of *Universal Flux*; because, in regard to other things, that view has the support of the fact that the things are actually found to be *perishing*, while in the case of the Word, no such perishing is perceived, and it is never found to have perished or ceased to exist. From all this it follows that Word is Eternal.

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(*Sū.* 20.) Even in the case of things whose actual production has not been perceived, some are regarded as *non-eternal*, perishable, when it is found that there are potent causes leading to their destruction. For instance, even though one may not have seen the Cloth being *produced* by the process of weaving, yet seeing that it has been brought about by the conglomeration of the yarns, he concludes that it must *perish*, become non-existent, when that conglomeration comes to an end, or when the yarns themselves are destroyed.—In the case of the Word, there is no such cause or circumstance that could be regarded as bringing about its destruction and non-existence. (*Sū.* 21.) The view “ that the Word is a product of the Air, and hence perishable" is not tenable; if the Word were the product of Air, then it could only be *Air in a particular shape*: as a matter of fact, however, we do not recognise a single particle of Air in the composition of the Word, in the manner in which we recognise the parts of Yarn in the composition of the Cloth. Then again, if the Word were an air-product, it would be perceptible through the organ of *Touch*; as a matter of fact, however, the Word is not *Touched*; hence it cannot be a product of Air. It must be Eternal. (*Sū.* 22)—There are Vedic texts also which speak of the Word as *Eternal*.—From all this we conclude that the Word is eternal. (*Sū.* 23.)

The Sentence and its Meaning

Śābara-Bhāṣya

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It has been established that Words, their Meanings and the Relation between Words and their Meanings, are all Eternal. But so far nothing has been said regarding *Sentences*. And as the Vedic Injunction, which is the sole means of knowing *Dharma*, is always in the form of a *Sentence*,—until the same facts have been established in regard to *Sentences*, the validity of the Injunction as a means of knowing *Dharma* remains doubtful. Hence it is that all writers on *Mīmāṃsā* have devoted their attention to the *Sentence* and its Meaning.

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*Sūtra* 24 sets forth the arguments in support of the view that Eternality cannot belong to the *Sentence* or its Meaning, or to the Relation between the two. The Sentence is a group of words; each Word has its own Denotation; and even though each individual Word and its Denotation is eternal, the Sentence or its Meaning cannot be eternal.

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The *Mīmāṃsaka’s* own view is set forth under *Sū.* 25:—*In the Sentence, there is only a mention of words with definite Denotations along with a Word denoting Action, and the meaning of the Sentence is based upon that.*—On this the *Bhāṣya* proceeds (Trs., p. 44) :—In the *Sentence*, we have a few words that are tied down to their respective Denotations, along with a word denoting Action. Hence the Sentence cannot have any separate meaning, entirely apart from the meanings of words composing it. In fact, there is no valid means of knowledge whereby we could have a Cognition of the independent meaning of the Sentence. Even the last letter of the Sentence, along with the Impressions left by the preceding letters, has no power, independently of the meaning of the words, to express any meaning totally different from what is expressed by the words. In the case of the Sentence, what happens is that each of the words composing it ceases from activity after having expressed its own meaning,—and the meanings of words thus comprehended bring about the comprehension of the meaning of the Sentence as a whole. What is brought about by the meaning of a word is the notion of a qualified thing—the white object, the black object and so forth; and as what is expressed by the Sentence is only a qualified thing,—viz., the meanings of words as qualified by one another,—it follows that the comprehension of the meaning of the Sentence is derived from the meanings of the Words; and no separate power of expression need be postulated for the Sentence as a whole. Then again, whether a certain thing is different or not-different from another is always ascertained through positive and negative concomitance; and in the case in question it is found that sometimes, by reason of some mental derangement,—as loss of memory—the meanings of the Words uttered are not comprehended; at such a time the meaning of the Sentence composed of those Words would never be comprehended,—only if the meaning of the Sentence were not different from that of the Words; and as matter of fact, the meaning of the Sentence is never comprehended in such cases. It follows, therefore, that the meaning of the Sentence is not entirely different from that of the Words.—From all this it follows that the meaning of the Sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component Words; and it has no connection with, and does not follow from, a distinct unit in the shape of the Group of Words (Sentence, conceived as something distinct from Words). It is true that the direct Denotation of each word,—which consists of the Universal—becomes somewhat restricted in its scope when the Word appears in a Sentence; it is for that reason that we regard the Meaning of the Sentence as consistig in a qualified Denotation of the component Words; but only when we find that the meaning of the Word as used by itself serves no useful purpose. Our idea is that if it can serve no useful purpose in its isolated form, it may serve some purpose by being taken as a qualified idea expressed by the Sentence. Further, the Accusative and other Endings appearing at the end of Words clearly indicate the rule that the Denotation of the Words qualifies and restricts the signification of those Endings; so that the general rule—that the Accusative Ending signifies the objective character of things.—e.g., the idea of the cow as denoted by the term ‘Gām’ with the Accusative Ending,—becomes set aside by the special rule that the Accusative Ending at the end of the particular word ‘go’ (Cow) denotes, not objectivity in general, but the objectivity of the Cow; that is, the objective character as restricted, and qualified by, the Cow.

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Then there is the argument that Sentences, as Groups of Words, are composed by human beings, and hence cannot be Eternal, like the Word. This may be true in regard to Sentences composed by human beings; it cannot be true regarding Sentences in the Veda; and it is the latter that the Mīmāṃsaka cares for; indeed according to him, it is only the Vedic Sentence—which is entirely free from defects—that can be valid by itself and hence a reliable means or source of knowledge—specially that relating to Super-sensuous things. In regard to the ordinary things of the world, it is possible for Sentences to be composed in actual usage (Sū. 26)—by men, after they have actually perceived the things spoken of in those Sentences. The conclusion thus is that the comprehension of the Meaning of the Sentence is obtained from that of the Meanings of the component Words. (Shabara-Bhā., Trs., pp. 42—47.)

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From what has been said under Sū. 25—to the effect that the Sentence contains only the mention of Words with definite Denotations along with a Word denoting action,—and from what the Bhāṣya says on that Sūtra,—it is clear that these old authorities lend tacit support to the Prābhākara view of Verbal Expression, the implication of which is that it is only the Injunction of an action that is really expressive and hence valid. (See below, under Prābhākara.)

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The same support is also lent by Sū. 1.1.32 and the Bhāṣya thereon (Trs., p. 50)—where we read—On account of passages being related to Actions etc. (Sū. 32); on which the Bhāṣya—‘The Sentences occuring in the Veda are laid down as mutually related, and they always collectively bear upon an Action.’ (Trs., p. 50.)

Veda not the Work of a Personal Being

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(Shabara, Sū. 27 to 32, Trs., pp. 48—50)

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The Mīmāṁsaka’s main thesis is that Dharma can be known only from the Vedic Injunction; and in order to establish the infallibility and utter reliability of the Vedic Injunction, he has had to prove that—(1) Words are Eternal, (2) the Denotations of Words are Eternal, (3) the Relationship between Words and their Denotations is Eternal, (4) the meaning of the Sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component Words, and the Sentence has no meaning apart by itself. As regards the Eternality of the Sentence, however, that Eternality cannot belong to the Sentence composed by human beings, and as such it cannot be Eternal; and for the same reason it cannot have an inherent validity, as it is open to the suspicion of having been vitiated at its source by the defects of the man pronouncing the Sentence. But this does not perturb the Mīmāṁsaka; as the only Sentence upon whose eternality and validity he is keen is the Vedic Injunction, which alone is the valid source of our knowledge of Dharma. And as all human or personal associations are open to the suspicion of being vitiated at its source, it becomes necessary for the Mīmāṁsaka to show that the Vedic Sentence is not the work of any person,—that the Veda is not the work of any author,—that it is Eternal, self-sufficient.

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The opposite position has been thus set forth in Sū. 1.1.27-28:—" The Veda is the work of a personal author; it belongs to recent times; this is shown by the following facts;—(1) Sections of the Veda are named after human beings such as ‘Kāṭhaka’ ‘Kālāpaka’ and the like; Kaṭha and Kalāpa are well-known names of certain sages; such naming of the Vedic sections, therefore, could not be possible except on the basis of the assumption that these persons are the authors of the sections named after them; (2) in the Veda we find the mention of such ephemeral things and names of men, etc.—as ‘Babara, the son of Pravahaṇa’ and so forth." (Shabara-Bhāṣya, Trs., pp. 48-49.)

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The Mīmāṁsaka’s answer to the above is as follows:—We have already explained above (under Sū. 5,—Bhā., Trs., p. 17) that there is an unbroken tradition of the Vedic text among Vedic Scholars of which no beginnings can be traced. This proves that

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CHAPTER XIII: SCRIPTURAL INJUNCTION

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the Vedic text, the Vedic Injunction, is Eternal. The names ‘ *Kāṭhaka* ’ and the like are due to the fact of the particular person having been a specially efficient teacher of that section of the Veda. As for the words that appear to be proper names and met with in the Veda, these are not the names of any persons at all; they are common words, not names, and it is only a chance coincidence that they resemble some proper names of modern times.

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As for certain sentences in the Veda that appear to be incoherent and meaningless, which might discredit the reliability of the Veda, it is not right to take any Vedic text out of its context, and treat it as an isolated assertion. The sentences have to be taken as correlated to, and collectively bearing upon, some *action* which is enjoined as to be done. Thus interpreted, no sentence in the Veda can be found to be meaningless or incoherent. (*Bhā., Tr., pp. 49-50.*)

Cites (2)