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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c20: Chapter XV: (C) Verbal Cognition according to Kumārila

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c20

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Chapter XV: (C) Verbal Cognition according to Kumārila

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(C) VERBAL COGNITION

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Kumārila and his followers do not restrict *Shabda-Pramāṇa* to Vedic Injunctions only, as is done by Prabhākara. The former divide the *Shabda-Pramāṇa* into two classes—(1) Pauruṣēya, Personal, and Apauruṣēya, Impersonal. Under the Personal Word are included all words uttered by trustworthy personal beings, and under the Impersonal Word come the words of the Veda. Both of them are valid; and the reason given for this view is that the only ground of the invalidity of a Word lies in the fact of its emanating from an untrustworthy Source, and this ground is as absent in the case of the words of trustworthy persons as in that of the words of the Veda.

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The reason why the author of the *Bhāṣya* has defined *Shabda* under the name of ‘*Shāstra*,’ ‘Scriptural Word,’ is not that he confines valid Verbal Cognition to the Scriptural Word only, but that it is this latter alone that bears upon the subject-matter of study—i.e., *Dharma*,—and it is the Vedic Word alone that bears upon *Dharma*. (*Shlo. Vā., Shabda* 1.10.)

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The *Vaishēṣikas* and the *Bauddhas* have both included Verbal Cognition under *Inference*. But this is denied by Kumārila on the groud that under formal definitions, the two cognitions—Verbal and Inferential—might appear to be the same; but that cannot justify the identification of the two; as the conditions of Inferential Cognition might be fulfilled in the case of Personal Word, they cannot be fulfilled by the Cognition derived from the Vedic Word. (*Shlo. Vā., Shabda* 51.)

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For the same reason the Word, as a means of Valid Cognition, cannot be defined as ‘the teaching of a trustworthy person’; as there is no possibility of any such ‘person’ in the case of the Vedic Word. Hence we conclude that the Cognition that is brought about by Words is Verbal Cognition, and (like all Cognitions) it is self-sufficient in its validity (*Ibid.*, 53); and it is on this point of *Self-validity* alone that Verbal Cognition may be regarded as similar to Inferential Cognition (*Ibid.*, 54). Kumārila (*Ibid.* 54 et. seq.) has entered into a long explanation of the points of difference between the Inferential Probans and the Word as the means, respectively, of Inferential and Verbal Cognitions; and the conclusion arrived at is that Verbal Cognition does not fulfil the three conditions that are essential in all Inference, and hence it is as distinct from Inference as Sense-perception itself (Ibid. 98).

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Kumārila appears to be slightly halting on this point, and he seems to concede that the knowledge derived from Individual Words might be included under ‘Inference’; and goes on to point out that the Cognition provided by the Sentence can never come under Inference (Ibid. 108—110).

What is Word?

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The Word is not anything apart from the component letters, and just as several subsidiary acts in an Elaborate Sacrifice combine to bring about the final result,—so the several letters composing a Word combine to bring about the Cognition of its Denotation (Śāstra-dīpikā, pp. 70-71). The order of sequence too belongs, not to the Letters, but to the Letter-Sounds, and through these latter, it is imposed upon the Letters that are manifested by those Sounds. Hence it is Letters alone that can be expressive of meanings. (Ibid., p. 73.)

What is it that is Denoted by the Word?

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The ground of doubt on this point as put forward in the Bhāṣya (See above) is that—‘While the Cognition pertains to the Universal, the Action enjoined pertains to the Individual.’ This same view has been accepted by Prabhākara, who holds that the Denotation of a Word is cognised only through its connection with a Particular Act, and each Sentence would naturally pertain to some Individual Act. The theory would appear to lend support to the Individualistic Theory of Denotation.

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Kumārila naturally does not admit of this ground of doubt; and his dissatisfaction is based upon the fact that the Cognition is often found to pertain to the Individual also, not always to the Universal, as asserted by Shabara. Kumārila bases his doubt regarding the true denotation of words upon the fact that both Usage and Cognition are found severally to apply to the Universal and the Individual, while works on Grammar lend support to the view that it is the Individual that is denoted. The practical purpose of the present enquiry lies in the fact that if all.

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words denoted only Individuals, then there could be no differentiation of Rules into *General* and *Special* (the General Law and its Exception), and thus it would not be possible for the former to be set aside by the latter, and this would give rise to much confusion.

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According to Murāri Mishra also, what is denoted by the Word is the *Ākṛti*; as it is only with this that the relationship of the Word can be apprehended. What is comprehended through the Word is the *Individual* as qualified by the *Ākṛti*; because the qualified cannot be conceived of without an idea of a qualifying factor; the expressive potency of the Word however rests in the *Ākṛti*; but mere *Ākṛti* or *Jāti* is never apprehended by itself alone; it is always apprehended along with the Individual. (*MS.*, p. 60.)

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He goes on to say—Mere *Jāti* by itself is incapable of being manifested, it is always dependent on something else, hence it becomes manifested only when this something else is manifested (p. 62).

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Kumārila also accepts the view that it is the *Universal* that is denoted. But he is not satisfied with the presentation of the case by *Shabara*, and sets it forth in his own words, as follows:—(*Tantravārtika* on 1.1.33, *Translation*, pp. 363—365).

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It is the Universal that is denoted by the Word. Why? (1) Because it is the Universal that is cognised before the Individual; (2) because a Word is not found to give rise to a mixed conception; and (3) because when the order ‘bring a cow’ is given, the person ordered brings any cow that he likes.

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To explain these arguments—(1) When the Word ‘cow’ is uttered, before we have an idea of any *individuals*, it is the Universal that we have an idea of; and when the form of this Universal has been duly comprehended, then alone are the Individuals cognised. Thus, in as much as for the Cognition of the Universal there is no other means save the Word, while the Cognition of the Individuals is actually brought about by the Cognition of the Universal, we conclude that the Word denotes the Universal.

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(2) If the Individuals were denoted by the Word, then, in as much as the *individual* cows are found to have various characters—such as the variegated colour, absence of horns, etc.,—the idea brought about by the Word would be a mixed one (partaking of all these characters), while as a matter of fact, we find the word giving rise to a single uniform conception (of the common *Universal* ‘cow’), and thus too we conclude that it is the *Universal* that is denoted by the Word.

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(3) When a person is ordered to ‘bring a cow’, if no *particular* cow happens to be specially indicated, either by the character of the work in hand, or by the other concurrent circumstances, the person ordered is found to bring in any common cow and not any particularly specified cow, or all the cows in the world. If, however, the *individual* cow were denoted by the word, then the mention of the word ‘cow’ would have indicated all the *individual* cows in the world, which would have to be brought in by the person ordered, or he could bring in only that one particular cow which would be denoted by the word. But, as a matter of fact, we find that he brings in any common cow, with the only restriction that it should possess the common character of the ‘cow.’ And hence too we conclude that the ‘*Universal*’ is denoted by the Word.

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If, however, the *individual* be held to be denoted by the Word, there could only be the three following alternatives:—(1) That *all Individuals* should be denoted independently by themselves; (2) or that the *aggregate* of all Individuals as qualified by a particular individual should be denoted; (3) or that *one particular Individual* be denoted.

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(1) Now, it is not possible for all Individuals to be denoted; (a) because that would necessitate the assumption of manifold denotative potencies in the Word; (b) because the *Individuals* being transient, the relationship between the Word and its Denotation would be transient; (c) because the conception of all the *Individuals* being absolutely impossible, the full relationship of the Word with the Denotation would never be comprehended, and as such there could be no using of the word or any business carried on (such as the following of one-another’s directions etc.); (d) as referring to many *Individuals* the word ‘cow’ would be always used in the plural, like the word ‘eight’; and as such it would never be possible to apply to it either the dual or the singular number; (e) as the white colour cannot subsist in all the individual cows denoted by the word ‘cow’, there could be no coextensiveness (of the qualification and the qualified) in the expression ‘ white cow ’; and (f) because in the case of the Vedic Injunction ‘ One should sacrifice with the animals,’ as it would be impossible to perform a sacrifice with all individual animals, such Injunctions, and hence the entire Veda, would lose authority.

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(2) Similarly too, it is not possible to admit the Aggregate of *Individuals* to be denoted by the Word; (a) because in this case also all the Individuals will have to be taken as denoted, as forming the Aggregate, and hence this theory would be open to all the aforesaid six objections; (b) because such a theory would necessitate the assumption of an *Aggregate* apart from the *Individuals*; (c) and as no usage is found to appertain to any such Aggregate, the Denotation of the Word would be absolutely useless as the sole use of the Denotation lies in the accomplishment of Usage; (d) the units forming the Aggregate being all perishable, their Aggregate would also be perishable, and hence the relationship of the Word with its Denotation would become transient; (e) the Aggregate being one only, there could be no plural or dual number in Nouns; (f) nor could there be any co-extensiveness between the *qualification* and the *qualified*, in expressions like ‘ white cow ’; because the Aggregate of all cows cannot be said to be white; (g) the Aggregate being shapeless, no sacrifice could be performed with it and that would shake the authority of all Vedic Injunctions.

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(3) If a *single* individual be held to be denoted by the Word, then too—(a) there would be non-eternality of the relationship of the Word and its Denotation; (b) as it could not be ascertained which one particular individual is denoted, no business would be possible; (c) there could be no idea of Community or common character; (d) Nouns could never have the Plural or the Dual Number; (e) no use of the word ‘ cow ’ could be possible, prior to the birth, and after the death, of the particular *cow* denoted; (f) the word ‘ cow ’ giving rise to an idea of the ‘ cow ’ in general, there can be no particular reason for asserting that it is only *this* particular cow, and not that, which is denoted by the word.

Relationship between Word and its Denotation—according to Kumārila

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The main thesis of the *Mīmāṁsaka* is that what the Veda says must be true, never false, because it is not dependent upon a speaker or personal author,—being as independent and eternal as the Word and its Denotation; and the Cognition or knowledge derived from the Veda must be true,—because it is eternal, because it is provided by the Sentence.

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It has been shown above that the Word, as composed by Letters, is eternal; so also what is denoted by the Word,—viz., the *Class* or *Universal*: and the logical corollary to all this must be that the Relation between the Word and its Denotation also must be eternal. (*Shlo. Vā., Sambandhākṣēpa*, 1—4.)

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The existence of this Relation is proved by positive and negative concomitance; and this is learnt by experience. This relation of Denotations is deduced from the fact that until the relation has been grasped the Word does not provide the idea of the denoted ‘*Universal*’, and when the Relation is grasped, the ‘*Universal*’ becomes cognised. And all this indicates the Denotative Potency of the Word.

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The other party argues—“We admit that there is this Relation between the Word and its Denotation. But you must admit that this Relation is dependent upon the experience of men, something evanescent, not Eternal.” (*Ibid.*, 45).

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The answer to this is given by Kumārila (in *Shlo. Vā., Sambandhākṣēpaparihāra*, 13 et. seq.) as follows:—If the Denotativeness of words is something created by some sort of Convention among men, then there are only three ways in which this Convention could function,—(1) A Convention would be set up for the benefit of each man—each one being told that ‘Such is the meaning of this Word,’ or (2) this Convention would be set up each time the Word is pronounced; or (3) the Convention would be set up by God Himself for all time, at the time of creating the Word.—(1) Under the first alternative,—that the Convention is set up for the benefit of each person,—would the Relationship fixed by such Convention be one and the same for all men, or would it be different with each individual? If it is one and the same for all, then it cannot be artificial; and the idea of its being diverse and different would be contrary to all experience.—(2) The Second view,—that “a Convention is set up each time that the Word is pronounced”—is impossible, because a single utterance and the Convention based thereupon can never fix *for all time* the Convention between the Word and its Denotation; nor could it account for the usage of the same for all time.—(3) As regards the third alternative—that “the Convention was set up by God at the beginning of the World,”—in the first place there is no such thing as ‘beginning of the World’ (*Ibid.*, 42); and secondly there is no ‘God or Creator of the World’ (see above) who could set up the Convention (*Ibid.*, 44).

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Even granting that there has been Creation,—the Veda and its component Words and their Denotations must have been in existence even before that (*Ibid.*, 116); and the said Relation between those Words and their meanings could have had no beginning in time (*Ibid.*, 123 and 137).

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In fact in connection with all *Verbal Expression*, what happens is that when the inexperienced boy hears the use of certain words for the first time by people more experienced,—he perceives the Word-Sound, the experienced person and the material objets handled by them as the result of their conversation,—and the fact, that the person addressed has understood the meaning of the Words used by the other man, he infers from the resultant activity of the person addressed;—and then he presumes the fact of the Words used having the *potency*, the power, the capacity, to express what has been comprehended by the person addressed, as without such potency, the phenomenon noticed could not be accounted for. Thus the presence of the Relationship between the Word and its Denotation is got at and comprehended through three means of Cognition, Perception, Inference and Presumption. (*Ibid.*, 141.)

Eternality of the Word

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The Mīmāṁsaka holds the Word to be Eternal; it is there always; we do not perceive (hear) it always, because its being perceived is dependent upon its being manifested by the manifestation of the Word-Sound brought about by certain manifesting agencies, and as the functioning of these manifesting Word-Sounds varies with varying distance and other circumstances, this accounts for the variations of time and place in the perception of the Word-Sound, and hence of the Word. There is no good reason therefore for regarding the Word as non-eternal.

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On the other hand, in support of its Eternality, we have the Presumption based upon the fact that the meaning of the Word cannot be comprehended except on the hypothesis of its *eternality*. If at each utterance of it, the Word were a distinct unit, just produced, then its meaning could never be comprehended; because this comprehension depends upon the comprehension of the relation of concomitance between the Word and its meaning; and no such concomitance could be perceived if at each utterance, the Word were a different unit, just produced, and not the same. Mere similarity of the Word-Sound could not account for the said notion of the concomitance. As all the Word-units would be of equal importance, which unit would it be whose similarity to the others could be the determining factor? In fact, in order to explain the phenomenon of the comprehension of the meaning of a Word, the Word must be regarded as one and the same in all cases. Nor can this requisite *unity* be obtained by the postulating of such comprehensive ‘Classes’ as the ‘Letter—*ga*,’ for instance; because all such comprehensive notions presuppose diversity, not unity, of what is included under those notions.

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Nor can the fact of the Word being actually *recognised* as the same in all cases be explained on the basis of mere *Similarity*. Hence, on the ground of this *Recognition*, Word should be regarded as *Eternal*. The Recognition is a form of ‘Perception,’—being *brought about* by the Sense-organ as aided by the Impression left by a previous impression; what it perceives and apprehends is the *present* object as qualified by the identity of the same object as *remembered*. For these reasons the Word must be regarded as *Eternal*. And the reason for this lies in the fact that the Word heard today is actually *recognised* as the same that was heard yesterday; and that when there is utterance, it only serves to *manifest* the existing Word, it does not *create* or *produce* it. Hence Word cannot be a product or Effect. Not being an Effect, it cannot be perishable. And, continuing to exist in its own form, and not being perishable, it must be *Eternal*.—(*Shāstra-dīpikā*, p. 112—125.)

Sentence and its Meaning

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Words are Eternal; what is denoted by them is Eternal, the relation between these two is Eternal. But the question remains—How does the Sentence express its meaning? This is the most important question; because the only right knowledge of *Dharma* that we can obtain is from the Vedic text, and this text is always in the form of a *Sentence*.

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The view of the opposite party is that there can be no reasonable basis for the expression of its meaning by the *Sentence*,—or that it must be based entirely upon Convention; and as, according to the *Mīmāṁsaka*, there can be no maker of Convention in regard to Vedic Sentences, the Veda must be regarded as unreliable: or, in the last resort, the Veda should be regarded as the work of a trustworthy author, and its validity must be dependent upon the reliability of that author. That this is the most reasonable view is shown by the fact that in all our experience *Sentences* always emanate from human beings. It might be that in matters relating to *Dharma*, no Person can be regarded as an infallible source of knowledge. But in that case the only reasonable conclusion is that no reliability can belong to the Sentences found in the Veda, and the Veda, therefore, cannot be regarded as an infallible guide.—(*Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 126-127.)

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The *Mīmāṁsaka’s* answer to the above is that the basis of the meaning of the *Sentence* lies in the meanings of the *Words* composing that *Sentence*; each of these words denotes its own meanings,—and these Word-meanings indicate the meaning of the *Sentence*. For example, in the Sentence ‘Bring the cow,’ the Word ‘bring’ directly denotes the *act* of bringing in general; and it indirectly indicates the particular act of bringnig pertaining to the time. The word ‘cow’ also directly denotes Universal ‘Cow’; and it indirectly indicates the individual Cow as the objective related to the act of bringing. Thus in every *Sentence*, each of the component words directly denotes its own meaning in the general form and indirectly indicates it as related to the meaning of the other words. (This is what is called the *Abhihitānvaya-vāda*,—the Theory of the Verbal Expression of Connection between what is denoted).

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Thus the meaning of the *Sentence* is based upon the meanings of its component words; it is not baseless; nor is it based upon Convention. Hence the Vedic Injunction cannot be an unreliable source of knowledge regarding *Dharma*.

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Then there remains the alternative view that the Veda may be the work of a trustworthy Person. In support of this view there is the following argument—" The *Vedas* must be the work of a Person, because it consists of Sentences, like all such works, *e.g.*, the *Mahābhārata*." This same conclusion is supported by the presence of such designations as '*Kaṭhaka*' and the rest, which are applied to the Veda. The *Author* of a work is that person who of his own free choice brings together words in the form of Sentences."

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The *Mīmāṃsaka*'s answer to the above is as follows:—If there were an Author, the Composer, of the Veda, he should certainly have been remembered through the long line of tradition; as we find in the case of *Buddha* who is known as the author and propagater of the Buddhist Scriptures. There could be no chance of such an Author being forgotten; because the religious performances of all men would be based upon the authority of his name; specially as the Effectiveness of those performances could not be known from any other source. As a matter of fact, however, we find that people have no idea of any such Author of the *Veda*. Hence the non-rememberance of one who should have been remembered if he had existed leads to the conclusion that such an Author should be regarded to be as *non-existent*,—just like the Horns of the Hare. Even those persons who believe in the idea of the Veda being the work of an Author are not able to point definitely to any such person as being such an Author; they have very vague ideas about the matter; for instance, some of them regard the Veda to be the work of 'God'; others attribute it to '*Hiraṇyagarbha*'; others again to '*Prajāpati*.' All these divergent notions could not be correct if people had a definite idea of the Person who composed the *Veda*; as they have in regard to the *Mahābhārata* or the *Smṛtis* of *Manu* and others. As regards the persoal names—'*Kaṭhaka*' and the like—being applied to the Vedas,—there is the simple explanation that these names are based upon the fact of such Vedas or portions of the Veda having had such persons as their most efficient Expounders. From all this we conclude that the *Vedas* are *not* the work of a Personal Author; and being thus free from any defects due to such authorship, the *Vedas* must be regarded as the only source of knowledge (relating to *Dharma*) which is infallible in its Self-Sufficient Validity. (*Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 131-132.)

Cites (3)