Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c23: Chapter XVIII: Abhāva—Non-Apprehension

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c23

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XVIII: Abhāva—Non-Apprehension

(According to Shabara)

c23.s1.1

‘*Abhāva*,’ ‘Non-apprehension,’ stands for the non-existence—absence—of all the five Means of Cognition described above; and this brings about the Cognition in the form—‘It does not exist’—in regard to things not in contact with the senses. That is, (explains *Kumārila*, (in *Shlo. Vā. Abhāva* 1) in a case where Sense-perception and the other Means of Cognition are not found to be effectively operative towards bringing about the notion of the Existence of a certain thing, we have the notion of the non-existence of that thing; and the means by which this notion of non-existence is got at is called *Abhāva*, ‘Non-apprehension.’—(*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 16.)

c23.s1.2

NON-APPREHENSION

c23.s1.3

ACCORDING TO PRABHĀKARA.

c23.s1.4

Having quoted the words of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Bṛhatī* puts the question—“Is this the definition of a Means of Cognition?”—The answer from the *Mīmāṃsaka* (other than *Prabhākara*) is—Yes; and what is cognised through it is that a certain thing *does not exist* (as declared in the *Bhāṣya*). This answer is rejected by the ‘*Āchāryo*’ (says the *Ṛjurimalā*, p. 119) in the following words:—What is said to be cognised is *not actually cognised*. The Definition too is given in the words—‘*Pramāṇābhāva*,’ ‘the absence of Means of Cognition’;—and this definition clearly implies that what is proposed to be defined is not a Means of Cognition.—It is true that the idea current among *Mīmāṃsakas* is that this, ‘*Abhāva*,’ is the sixth Means of Cognition. But there is no reasonable basis for this idea. There is nothing that can form the *objective* of this Means of Cognition; nor can it have the Character of a real Means of Cognition.—And yet, with all this, it has been introduced here in the present context; the reason for which lies in the fact that, treating of the subject of the Means of Cognition, and having dealt with the five Means of Cognition, we add that what is not cognised by any of these five Means is what is cognised through this Sixth Means, called ‘Abhāva.’ But this does not make this Abhāva a regular Means of Cognition, because a Means of Cognition can be regarded as really so only when it brings about its Effect, in the shape of the definite Cognition of its objective; and this definite Cognition is always in the form of ‘this,’ which implies exclusion of all other things. Hence, when no such Effect appears—as the Effect of the Means of Cognition—people have the idea ‘this does not exist.’ This being sufficient to account for the idea of the ‘Non-Existence’ of things,—and it being wrong to regard as Means of Cognition what does not bring about a definite Cognition,—any defining of such a source of knowledge as a ‘Means of Cognition’ must be regarded as childish prattle. As regards the idea being current among Mīmāṁsakas, it has to be rejected as an idea without sufficient basis. Thus we conclude that what the Bhāṣya says is only by way of Supplement to the definition of the other Means of Cognition, and it is not meant to be the definition of a distinct Means of Cognition in the shape of Abhāva.

c23.s1.5

Thus the view held by Prabhākara and his followers may be summed up as follows:—Cognitions of things are of two kinds—in one kind we cognise the thing as along with some other thing, and in another kind, we cognise the thing by itself alone; and this latter Cognition is apprehended in terms of things that are not there, and which, if present, would have been cognised. What we really have, in the latter case, is only the non-apprehension of something that would have been apprehended if it had been there; hence, the Negative Cognition can be nothing more than the Cognition of the one thing in terms of those other things which are not apprehended, and which, if present, would have been apprehended. Thus in the case of the conception ‘The Jar is not here,’ all that is meant is that—‘Even though the Jar would have been perceived if it had been here, what we perceive is the bare place’; and this is an ordinary positive Cognition, pure Perception in this case. In this way it can be shown that there is nothing that could be cognised through Abhāva,’ Non-Apprehension, which therefore cannot be regarded as a Means of Cognition.—(Bṛhati—Rjuvimālā, p. 118 et seq.)

Abhāva—Non-Apprehension according to Kumārila

c23.s2.2

When the first five Means of Cognition do not function towards bringing about the Cognition of the Existence of a certain object,—then there comes to function that (Sixth) Means of Cognition which is known as ‘*Abhāva*’ ‘Non-Apprehension,’ ‘Negation.’—(*Shlo. Vā., Abhāva*, 1.) It is through this Means of Cognition that the *non-existence* of things becomes cognised.—(*Ibid.*, 2.)

c23.s2.3

*Abhāva* is of four kinds: (1) the *previous* Non-Existence; e.g., the Non-Existence of the Curd and other milk-products in the (fresh) milk, (2) Non-Existence by *Destruction*; e.g., the Non-Existence of the milk in milk-products, (3) *Mutual* Non-Existence; e.g., the negation of the Cow in the Horse and vice versa and (4) *Absolute* Non-Existence; e.g., the Non-Existence of horns on the head of the ass, which is found to be devoid of any hard and enlarged protuberances on the head.—Under the circumstances, if *Abhāva* were not a Means of Cognition, then, there might be cognition—(1) of Curd in *Milk*, (2) of *Milk* in Curd, (3) of *Cloth* in the Jar, (4) of *Horns* in the Ass, of *Intelligence* in *Earth* and other material Substances,—of bodily shape in the *Soul*, of *Odour* in *Water*,—of *Taste* in *Fire*,—of *Colour*, *Taste* and *Odour* in *Air*—of *Tangibility* in *Ākāsha*.—All this Diversity could not be a mere non-entity, mere Negation. Hence, they must be regarded as real Entities, ‘*Vastu*.’ Another reason why all this *Abhāva* should be regarded as Entity lies in the fact that it is capable of being apprehended by inclusive as well as *exclusive* Cognitions, which means that it is an object of Cognition, *Pramēya*, (*Ibid.*, 2—9). The notion that a certain thing ‘*does not exist*’ is not possible without some sort of a comprehensive notion of ‘things’ (16).

c23.s2.4

The ‘Non-functioning of the Means of Cognition’ stands for the non-appearance of Sense-perception and the other Means of Cognition (11)—For instance, the said notion, that a certain thing ‘*does not exist*,’ cannot be brought about by Sense-organs, because the Sense-organ can have contact only with a *positive* factor. What happens in the cases of Cognition that ‘the Jar *does not exist*’—is that the observer perceives the positive entity in the shape of the Place, and then remembers the counter-entity which would have been seen (the Jar for instance, if it were there),—and there follows the Cognition of its being *non-existent*; and this latter is a purely *mental* Cognition, which comes independently of the functioning of the Sense-organs. What brings about the Cognition of *Non-Existence* is not the mere *non-perception* of the Object, but that non-perception of the object which *should have been perceived*, had it existed. (27.) Nor can the Cognition of *Non-Existence* be brought about by Inference; because there is no perception of the Inferential Indicative and the other factors necessary for Inference (29). Thus the *Non-Existence* (Negation, *Abhāva*) being what is cognised, the *Means* by which this *Non-Existence* is cognised—its *Pramāṇa*—also consists in *Abhāva*, Negation; and this negative Means of Cognition is not operative towards positive Entities,—in the same manner as the positive Means of Cognition (Perception and the rest) are not operative towards *Negative* Entities. Nor is there any Royal Command that the Means of Cognition must be positive (45—47).

c23.s2.5

The purpose of postulating this as a distinct Means of Cognition lies in the fact that the mixing up of things can be avoided only by the Cognition of the fact of one thing not being *another*, and this Cognition can be obtained only through the instrumentality of *Abhāva*; so in matters relating to Sacrificial Performances, that the details laid down in connection with one set of Sacrifices *are not the same* as those laid down in connection with another set, can be *known* only through *Abhāva*, Negation; so also the fact that a certain detail does not belong to a particular sacrifice can be known only by the *Absence* or *Negation* of the Vedic Injunction to that effect.

Other Means of Cognition

c23.s3.1

*Shabara* does not mention any other Means of Cognition apart from the above Six—Perception, Inference, Word, Analogy, Presumption and Negation (Non-Apprehension).

c23.s3.2

*Prabhākara* also does not mention any other.

c23.s3.3

*Kumārila* notices a few others; but adds that these are not independent Means of Cognition. He mentions (1) ‘*Sambhava*,’ *Probability*,—whereby, it has been held, we cognise the presence of a *Hundred in a Thousand*; he explains, however, that it is included under ‘Inference,’ being based upon the inseparable relationship (Invariable Concomitance) between 100 and 1000. (2) Similarly, ‘*Aitihyā*’, Rumour or Tradition, which has been regarded as a distinct Means of Cognition by some people,—is in most cases, not true; and when it is true, it comes under ‘Word,’ Trustworthy Assertion.—(*Shlo. Vā., Abhāva*, 57-58.)

c23.s3.4

Some people have postulated ‘*Pratibhā*,’ Intuition, as a distinct Means of Cognition; but Intuitional Cognition—such as that appearing in the form of the premonition of certain events,—does not always turn out to be true. Hence, no reliance can be placed on the assertion of the *Vaiśeṣikas* that Sages and Mystics have the Intuitional Cognition of *Dharma-Adharma*. (*Shāstra-dīpikā*, p. 65.)