Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c24: Chapter XIX: Mīmāṁsā Topics Proper

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c24

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XIX: Mīmāṁsā Topics Proper

(A) Introductory—Śāstrārambha

c24.s1.1

We have so far confined our attention to the preliminary study of those topics of philosophical interest that bear upon the consideration of *Mīmāṃsā*-topics proper. Now we turn our attention to the study of these *Mīmāṃsā*-topics themselves. The former study has shown us who is the Moral Agent for whose benefit all this study is carried on,—in what way this study will benefit him, and what is the ultimate Goal to which the proper performance of his duty will lead him,—what are the Sources and Means of Knowledge,—which of these can help the Agent to obtain the Knowledge of what his duty is and in what way it is to be performed. We have seen that the conclusion is that the *Veda* is the only Source and Means of Knowledge which can provide one with the right knowledge of Duty, in both its positive and negative aspects—that is, *What should be done and what should not be done.*

c24.s1.2

The proper study and the understanding of the *Veda*, therefore, becomes necessary for every intelligent and responsible person. Unless he has an intelligent conception of what his duty is, he cannot regulate his action rightly.

c24.s1.3

This study of the *Veda*, according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, is reserved for the three ‘Higher Castes’ only; other people therefore have to depend upon the *Brāhmaṇa* for the exposition of what their Duty is; *teaching* being the function reserved for the *Brāhmaṇa* alone, among the ‘Higher Castes.’

c24.s1.4

Now, this study of the *Veda* itself is a *Dharma*, a duty; and as such it must have been enjoined as such in the *Veda* itself. Hence, the *Mīmāṃsaka* makes it his business to explain that this proper study of the *Veda*—for the special purpose of securing the Knowledge of *what should be done and what should not be done*,—is actually enjoined in the *Veda*. This therefore forms the first Topic of Study, technically ‘Adhikaraṇa,’ of the Mīmāmsā-Shāstra.

c24.s1.5

The method adopted by the Mīmāmsā-Shāstra as embodied in Jaimini’s Sūtra in the study of each topic is to deal with it in five parts—(1) the explanation of the occasion that gives rise to the necessity of investigation of the topic concerned, (2) the subject-matter of the topic, represented in most cases, by a Vedic text, (3) the grounds of doubt or uncertainty which necessitate the investigation, (4) the Prima Facie View called the ‘Pūrvapakṣa,’ on the question and (5) the Finally Established View, called ‘Siddhānta.’

c24.s1.6

In regard to this first Topic, the occasion has been presented by the first Sūtra of Jaimini, which declares—‘Next therefore comes the enquiry into Dharma’; and the question arises—What does the term ‘Next’ exactly mean? It connotes Sequence, we know; but Sequence to what? The Sequence meant is that to the reading of the Veda, and this with reference to that particular kind of inquiry into Dharma which is not possible without the reading of the Veda. But the reason for this lies in the fact that in the course of the Inquiry, there will be various kinds of discussion over Vedic texts, and until we have studied the Vedic texts themselves there can be no discussion over them. It is not meant that there can be no Inquiry into Dharma before the Reading of the Veda, or that the Inquiry is to follow immediately after the Reading of the Veda. In fact, on the completion of the Reading of the Veda, there are two courses open to the Student; he may ‘return’ home from the Teacher’s House immediately after the ‘Final Bath’ (Graduation), or he may continue to remain there even after the ‘Bath’ (Graduation) as a ‘Post-graduate Student’ and carry on investigations and researches into the Subject-matter of the Veda—relating specially to Dharma. And the advice conveyed by the opening Sūtra is that ‘One should continue to remain at the Teacher’s Residence and carry on investigations into Dharma.’ The questions to be investigated are—(1) What is Dharma? (2) By what is Dharma indicated or made known to us? (3) What are the right Means of accomplishing Dharma? (4) What are the wrong Means of accomplishing Dharma? (5) What is the need or purpose of Dharma?—Of these, questions (a) and (b) have been dealt with under Sū. 2 and the remaining questions have been dealt with in the rest of the Sūtras.—(Shabara-Bhāṣya, Trs., pp. 1—3.)

c24.s1.7

We proceed now to put all these ideas into the technical form of the ‘Adhikaraṇa’ described above.

c24.s1.8

(1) The occasion is presented by the completion by the Student of the Reading of the Vedic Texts.

c24.s1.9

(2) The Viṣaya, or Subject-matter, of the Topic is provided by the Vedic text—‘Svādhyāyaḥ adhyētavyaḥ.’ (‘The Veda should be studied,’ according to Kumārila),—or ‘Aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam upanayīta tam adhyāpayīta’ (‘One should initiate the eight-year-old Brāhmaṇa and teach him’, according to Prabhākara). [For a full statement and discussion of this difference of opinion, between Kumārila and Prabhākara, see below.]

c24.s1.10

(3) The doubt or question that arises in regard to the said text is—Does it enjoin the reading of the Verbal Text only, of the Veda? Or does the Injunction include the Investigation of the Meaning of those Vedic Texts also?

c24.s1.11

(4) The Prima Facie View (Pūrvapakṣa) is that the Injunction does not include the Investigation of the Meaning of the Vedic texts; whence it follows that there is no justification for the propounding of the Mīmāṁsā-Shāstra, which deals entirely with that Investigation.

c24.s1.12

(5) The Finally Established View, Siddhānta, is that Investigation is included in the Injunction of ‘Vedic Study’; and hence the Investigation of the meaning of the Vedic texts is as much enjoined as the Reading of the Vedic Texts themselves.

c24.s1.13

We shall digress a little to discuss at some length the difference of opinion between Prabhākara and Kumārila in regard to the particular text that enjoins and prompts the said Investigation,—i.e., the Viṣaya-vākya, the basic text, on which the whole Adhikaraṇa rests.

c24.s1.14

Shabara does not quote any particular text, he only speaks in a general way of ‘Vedādhyayana,’ ‘Vedic Study,’ under Sū. 1; but from what he says under Sū. 6.1.35 (p. 625, Bib. Ind. text), his words seem to favour the Prabhākara view.—With reference to the question of the Shūdra’s title to the performance of Vedic Sacrifices, he says—“What is laid down in the text referring to Upanayana is the acquiring of the title of ‘Āchārya,’ by the Investigator; that this is so, follows from the *Ātmanēpada* ending in the Injunctive word ‘*Upanayīta*,’ which clearly shows that the root ‘*nī*’ here denotes the acquiring of the title of ‘*Āchārya*’; and from this it follows that what prompts the act of Initiation (*Upanayana*) is the desire to acquire the title of ‘*Āchārya*’; from this it is clear that it is only the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaiśya* who are connected with the learning of the Veda (as *Upanayana* is prescribed for these three castes only). (*Shabara Bhā.*, Trs., p. 1000.)

The Prābhākara View

c24.s1.t1.1

The *Prābhākara* takes for his basic text the injunction—‘*Aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam upanayīta tamadhyāpayīta*’ (‘One should initiate the eight-year-old *Brāhmaṇa* and should teach him’); where the two injunctive words ‘*Upanayīta*’ and ‘*Adhyāpayīta*’ have the *Ātmanēpada*-ending, which indicates that the fruit of the action enjoined accrues to the Nominative Agent; so that the result that follows from the acts of *initiating* and *teaching* should accrue to the man who does the Initiating and Teaching. The only result that can accrue to him is the acquiring of the title of ‘*Āchārya*’ (Teacher). This is made clear from the words of *Manu* (2. 140).

c24.s1.t1.2

उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयेद् द्विजः ।
सकल्पं सरहस्यं च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥

c24.s1.t1.3

‘The *Brāhmaṇa* who, having initiated the Disciple, teaches him the Veda along with the Ritualistic Details and the Esoteric Explanations,—him they call the *Āchārya*.’ (See above, from *Shabara* on 6.1.35. Trs., p. 1009.) Thus the motive desire leading to the *Study* and *Investigation* is on the part of the *Teacher*—not on the part of the Disciple. The *Teacher teaches*, for the purpose of obtaining for himself the title and honours of the *Āchārya*, Teacher; and as there can be no *teaching* and no *teacher* without some one to be taught, he has to *take to himself* (Upa-ni) a Disciple; but the latter cannot be a true *Disciple* or Student unless he is made to ‘Study;’ this act of *Studying* by the Disciple becomes implied by the above two texts; and as Study cannot be carried on without the help of a *Teacher*, the one implies the other. The Injunction of Vedic Study is thus implied in the Injunction of taking a pupil (*Upanayana*)—for the purpose of obtaining the title and honours of the Teacher'—so that it becomes necessary to find out a motive for this *Study* on the part of the Pupil; for whom the purpose of the Teacher cannot supply the requisite motive. This motive, for the Pupil, lies in the comprehending of what is taught in the Vedic texts studied; and as this comprehension cannot be secured without due reflection and pondering of the Vedic texts,—the Investigation embodied in the *Mīmāṁsā-Śāstra* becomes justified. (*Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, pp. 5-12, See also *Bṛhatī*, p. 7.)

c24.s1.t1.4

The above explanation of the initial motive for Vedic Study carried on by the Teacher and his pupil provides a perceptible motive,—in the shape of the Title and Honours—and thus avoids the necessity of having to assume an imperceptible transcendental result following (to the Student) from the said Vedic Study,—says *Bṛhatī* (p. 13).

c24.s1.t1.5

One other reason that lies behind the *Prābhākara* view is that it is only thus that, like the work of *Teaching*, the work of *Investigation* also becomes restricted to the *Brāhmaṇa* only; as it is the *Brāhmaṇa* alone who can *teach* and hence can aspire to the title and honours of the *Āchārya*.

The Bhātta View

c24.s1.t2.1

This *Prābhākara* view has been contested in *Parāshara-mādhava*, pp. 36—39, where it is pointed out that *Teaching* and *Officiating at Sacrifices* have been prescribed for the *Brāhmaṇa*, only as a means of livelihood, and hence are purely voluntary; while *Study* and *Sacrifice* are compulsory duties; the Injunctions of these latter therefore occupy a much higher position than, and must be distinct from, the Injunction of what is to be done for the acquiring of the title and honours of the ‘*Āchārya*.’

c24.s1.t2.2

In view of this and other reasons, the *Bhaṭṭa* takes as his basic text the words ‘*Svādhyāyo’dhyetavyaḥ*’—(‘The Veda should be studied’). Though later writers like *Mādhavāchārya* object to this text on the ground that it occurs in the Injunction of the five *Mahāyajñas* necessary for he Householder, and hence cannot be taken as the basis for the Initial Study (by the Regligious Student on his *Upanayana*—Initiation). They therefore propose a basic Vedic text inferred from the *Smṛti* Injunction of Vedic Study. (*Śāstradīpikā*, p. 4.)

c24.s1.t2.3

The *Bhaṭṭa* position is thus set forth in the *Shāstradīpikā* (pp. 2—8):

c24.s1.t2.4

The basic text is ‘*Svādhyāyo ’dhyētavyah*’ (‘The Veda should be studied’). The question is—Does this text lay down the *Study* of the Veda as a Duty, the performance of which brings about a transcendental result, in the shape of Heaven or some such thing? Or does it lay down the *Study* for the purpose of reading and understanding the Veda? In the former case, the Injunction would have been fulfilled by the getting up of the mere Verbal Text of the Veda, and there would be no need for proceeding with it any further, and investigating the meaning of the texts; while under the latter case, as the said Investigation would be necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the Vedic texts,—such Investigation also would be included under the Injunction, which would thus be an Injunction of the said Investigation also.

c24.s1.t2.5

The *Prima Facie View* is that—“The necessity for understanding the meaning would be felt and recognised even without the Injunction of it; hence, the Investigation into the Meaning need not be sought to be included under the Injunction of *Vedic Study*; as the said *Investigation* would be serving a perceptible purpose it would not need to be enjoined. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Injunction of *Vedic Study* enjoins the learning of the verbal *text* only, as leading to a transcendental result; and the Injunction having been carried out by such study alone, the Student should leave the Teacher’s Residence forthwith, and he need not prolong his pupilage for the purpose of carrying on the Investigation into the meaning of the Vedic texts.”

c24.s1.t2.6

The *Final Conclusion* is as follows:—The purpose served by the Injunction of *Vedic Study* is to restrict such Study to the three higher castes alone. That is, if this Injunction of ‘Reading the Veda’ were not there the texts dealing with the ‘*Agnihotra*’ and other acts would come to pertain to any one who had the requisite knowledge of the texts,—irrespectively of his caste; when, however, the Injunction of ‘*Vedic Study*’ is there, the title to the performance of the said acts becomes restricted to the three higher castes; because it is only the three castes for whom Initiation has been enjoined in such texts as—‘The *Brāhmaṇa* is to be initiated during the Spring, the *Kṣattriya* during the Summer and the *Vaiśya* during the Autumn;’ as persons thus initiated are not told what they should do after being thus initiated, there comes the Injunction of ‘Vedic Study’, which however does not specify the person who is to do it;—now these two sets of texts, taken together, supply us with the idea that—‘the boys of the three higher castes who have been initiated should study and get up the verbal text of the Veda and then carrying on its study, should proceed with the work of Research and Investigation and thereby obtain the idea of what is taught in the Veda.’ Thus it is that the Initiation becomes a part and parcel of ‘Vedic Study,’ by preparing the Person who is to carry on the fruitful Study of the Veda. Thus Vedic Study serves the perceptible purpose of comprehending the meaning of the Veda, and this comprehension leads on to the useful purpose of the due performance of the acts prescribed in the Veda; hence, the entire process becomes fruitful.—From all this it follows that after *Vedic Study*, one should proceed with the Investigation into the meaning of the Vedic texts.

(B) What is Dharma?

c24.s2.1

It has been established that it is necessary to study the Verbal text of the Veda and to carry on researches and investigations for the purpose of learning what is taught in the Veda.

c24.s2.2

The question might arise—“The *Sūtra* started with the statement of its purpose as *Investigation of Dharma*; while the *Bhāṣya* and all other commentators have gone into the question as to whether the Student is to retire after the getting up of the Verbal text of the Veda, or he is to continue to reside with the Teacher and proceed with the work of Investigation as to the meaning of the Veda. What is the connection between the ‘*The Investigation into Dharma*’ and the ‘*Study and investigation of Veda and its meaning*’?”

c24.s2.3

The *first* point to be considered is—What is the *Dharma* which has to be investigated; and the *second* point—What is the Means whereby the Right Knowledge of *Dharma* can be obtained?

c24.s2.4

(1) The above is the ‘*Occasion*’ for the question arising;—(2) the Subject-matter is the Definition of *Dharma* and the Means of Knowing it; (3) The *doubt* is—Is it possible to define *Dharma* and to know what it is?

c24.s2.5

(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that “*Dharma*, being something beyond the ken of men, cannot be defined and for the same reason there can be no valid *means of knowing it*.”

c24.s2.6

(5) The Final Established View is—Even though *Dharma* is something beyond the ken of men, yet it is possible to define it and also to find a means of knowing it. This right definition has been provided by *Jaimini* in *Sūtra* (2) as—‘That which is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to welfare’,—i.e., it is what is enjoined in the Veda and is conducive to desirable results. ‘*Dharma*’ thus, in this context, does not stand for the *merit* that is obtained by the doing of good deed, by right conduct (which is the ordinary connotation of the term); it is used in the much wider sense of *what should be done*, i.e., *Duty*. This same definition of *Dharma* also supplies the answer to the second question, regarding the Means of Knowing *Dharma*, on which point the conclusion is that the *Vedic Injunction* is the only Means of knowing *Dharma*; that is, a right knowledge of *Dharma* can be obtained only from the Veda. This also implies that the Veda is a valid means of the knowledge of *Dharma*. Thus there are three conclusions involved—(1) *Dharma* is what is enjoined in the Veda as conducive to welfare, (2) the Veda is the *only* source of the knowledge of *Dharma*, and (3) the Veda is a reliable source of knowledge.

c24.s2.7

This is Kumārila’s presentation of the Topic. According to *Prabhākara*, it is as follows:—

c24.s2.8

(1) It has been established that the Investigation into *Dharma* should come after the Study of the whole Veda; now, when the said Investigation proceeds, the question presents itself—How much of the ‘meaning of the Veda’ is to be investigated?—(2) The Subject-matter of this Topic is the ‘meaning of the Veda’ as providing the right knowledge of *Dharma*.—(3) The doubt on this question is—Is the meaning of the *entire Veda*—all Vedic texts, including Injunctions enjoining actions, as well as the descriptions of things, *Mantras* and Descriptive Passages, to be investigated as the Means of knowing *Dharma*? Or only the Injunctive texts, laying down something to be done?—(4) The *Prima facie* view is that the meaning of the entire body of Vedic texts should be investigated.—(5) The Finally Established View is that the meaning of only those Vedic texts has to be investigated which are *injunctive*; because it is only the Sentence laying down *something to be done* that is really directly expressive; and as such it is only such a Sentence that can be the Means of a valid Verbal Cognition. This is what has led the *Prābhākara* to deviate from the ordinary presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa*. This is in accordance with the *Anvitābhidhāna* Theory of Verbal Expression, of which *Prabhākara* is the propounder (see above),—according to which we can construe a Sentence and find out its meaning only when it contains some sort of an Injunction of *Something to be Done*.

c24.s2.9

It may be noted that the actual words used in the *Sūtra* lend support to Prabhākara's view. It speaks of ‘*Chodanā*’ as the Means of knowing *Dharma*; and ‘*Chodanā*’ is *Injunction*. The *Bhāṣya* also has clearly declared that the word, ‘*Chodanā*’ stands for the Sentence that enjoins an act क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम् and *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*, p. 20) at once fastens upon this declaration of the *Bhāṣya* and remarks that ‘this clearly asserts that the validity of the Veda as the Means of right knowledge pertains to *something to be done*.’ Says the *Ṛjuvimalā*—‘What is made known by the *Chodanā* is only an *act*, something to be done,—or things connected with that act; but not any *accomplished thing*? (P. 20.) *Kumārila* (*Ślo. Vā.*, *Sū.* 2, 7) asserts that ‘the term *Chodanā* has been used in the sense of all Words in general; and on this the *Nyāyaratnākara* adds—‘The *Chodanā* is the means of knowing *Dharma*; as a matter of fact *all Words* are the means of valid verbal Cognition, and the *Chodanā* is a *Word*; hence, it can certainly provide the right knowledge of even supersensuous things like *Dharma*.’

c24.s2.10

(C) RELIABILITY OF THE VEDA.

c24.s2.11

(1) That the Veda alone is the source of knowledge of *Dharma* has been established; (2) what is to be considered now is the necessity or otherwise of the examination of the trustworthy character of the *Veda*—(3) The doubt or question that has to be solved is—Should the reliability of the Veda be examined or not?—(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that there is no need for any such examination of the character of the Means of Cognition; all that is necessary to know is that is is a Means of Cognition that does bring about the knowledge of *Dharma*; and this has been already learnt under the preceding Topic.—(5) The *Finally Established View* is that the said examination is essential; specially for the *Mīmāṃsā-Śāstra*, which makes it its business to enquire into all matters relating to *Dharma*; and the trustworthy characetr of the Veda as the declared Means of Knowledge,—and how far and why reliance is to be placed upon it—has to be fully examined before full reliance can be reposed upon it.

c24.s2.12

According to *Prabhākara* the question dealt with under Sū. 3 (embodying *Topic 2*) is whether it would not be the right order of procedure,—after having established the fact of the Veda being the means of knowing *Dharma*—to ascertain what is contained in the Veda, (which has been done under *Discourse II* et seq.)—rather than proceed with an enquiry as to the validity and reliability of the Veda. The former of these alternatives is the *Prima Facie View*. The *Final Conclusion* is that, when it comes to *Action*, then certainly what is declared in the Veda as to be done becomes of prime importance; but when we are carrying on an enquiry into the nature of *Dharma* and the *Means of knowing it*, our first business is to ascertain how far our source of knowledge is valid and can be relied upon; as it is only when this has been done that we can be sure as to what it is that is actually mentioned in the Veda and *should be done*. Another reason for taking up this point first lies in the fact that the validity of a Means of knowledge is inherent in itself, and as such independent of everything else; whereas, whether a certain *act* is, or is not, enjoined by a certain text, depends upon the trustworthy character of that text itself. (*Rjuvimalā*)

c24.s2.13

(D) SENSE-PERCEPTION, INFERENCE, ETC., DISCUSSED.

c24.s2.14

(1) Before dealing with the *Veda* as the reliable Means of knowing *Dharma*, it is found necessary to dispose of the other well-recognised Means of Knowledge,—such as Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy, Verbal Cognition, Presumption and Non-apprehension—which might be regarded, in some quarters, as affording all the Means that is necessary for the knowledge of *Dharma*.—(2) The Subject-matter of this Topic then is the reliability of Sense-perception and the rest as reliable means of knowing *Dharma*.—(3) The doubt or question is—Is the knowledge of *Dharma* brought about by the Vedic Injunction *only*? Or also by Sense-perception and the other well-known Means of Cognition?—(4) The *Prima facie View* is that Sense-perception and the rest are as good Means of Knowledge as the Vedic Injunction; hence, Sense-perception and the rest also can bring about the requisite knowledge of *Dharma*.—(5) The Finally Established View is as follows:—As a matter of fact, Sense-perception is operative only in regard to such things as are present and in contact with the Sense-organs; *Dharma* however is not anything existing at present, nor is it possible for it to be in contact with any Sense-organ; hence, though *Dharma* is an object of Cognition, it is incapable of being cognised through Sense-perception. And when it is entirely beyond the reach of Sense-perception, the other Means of Cognition—Inference, Analogy and Presumption,—cannot be applicable to it; as these latter are more or less based upon Sense-perception.—“As for Inference, Analogy and Presumption—these also presuppose and are based upon Sense-perception, hence, these also cannot be the Means of knowing *Dharma*,”—says *Shabara* (Trs., p. 8). All those other Means of Knowledge are based upon facts and factors cognised through Sense-perception. Hence, the conclusion is that *Dharma* cannot be known through Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy or Presumption.

c24.s2.15

(E) VEDIC INJUNCTION THE ONLY RELIABLE MEANS OF KNOWING DHARMA.

c24.s2.16

(1) It having been decided what is *not* the Means of knowing *Dharma*, it becomes necessary to consider what *is* such Means.—(2) Of the five well-known Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Analogy, Presumption and Scriptural Word,—the first four have been rejected; as regards the *fifth*, it has been shown that the knowledge of *Dharma* can be derived from *Word* only in the form of the Vedic Injunction.—The reliability of the Vedic Injunction thus is what we are to consider now.—(3) The question is—Is the Vedic Injunction reliable as a Means of knowing *Dharma*?—(4) The *Prima Facie* view is that *Word* cannot be a reliable Means of knowing *Dharma*; because the reliability and expressiveness of the *Word* is dependent upon the knowledge of its expressive potency, which is obtainable only from Convention, and this Convention can be learnt only from popular usage;—while *Dharma* is beyond the range of ordinary popular conception;—hence, it is impossible to conceive of any Convention bearing upon *Dharma*;—hence, *Word* cannot be the Means of knowing what *Dharma* is:—and what is true regarding *Word* in general is truer still in regard to the Veda and the Vedic Injunction.—(5) The Finally Established Conclusion is that the Expessiveness of the Word is not dependent upon Convention, as the relationship between the Word and what it denotes is inborn, eternal, without beginning or end; hence, in expressing its meaning the *Word* is self-sufficient; it is infalliable also,—in the form of the Vedic Injunction, in which case there is no possibility of any source of mistake. *(See above, Section on Verbal or Scriptural Cognition)*

(F) The Vedic Injunction Always Reliable

c24.s3.1

(1) It has been proved that the Veda is the only Means of knowing *Dharma*; it becomes necessary to show that the validity and the reliability of the Veda is free from all defects and deficiencies; and to this end, it has been shown that the relation between the Word and its meaning is eternal, not artificial or created by Conventions. For this purpose it is essential that the eternality of the *Word* also should be considered. (2) The Word, as the Means of Knowing *Dharma*, is thus the subject-matter of this Topic.—(3) The question is—Is the *Word*, in the form of Injunction, eternal or non-eternal?—(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that Word-Sounds are found to be evanescent, hence, *Word* must be evanescent, non-eternal.—(5) The Finally Established View is that Letters as well as Words are Eternal, as is vouched for by Recognition, which is never found to be sublated; what is regarded as the production of the Word, is only its manifestation. This View is insisted upon because unless this is accepted there can be no confidence in the Word. *(See above—Section on Verbal Cognition.)*

(G) The ‘Sentence’ is as Reliable as the ‘Word’

c24.s4.1

(1) It has been established that the Word and its Relation to its Meaning are both eternal; the *Vedic Injunction* however—which has been declared to be the means of knowing *Dharma*,—is not a *Word*, it is a *Sentence*, an aggregate of several words; hence, it has to be considered if the *Sentence* is expressive in the same way as the *Word*,—and if the relation of the Injunctive *Sentence* with its meaning is also eternal. (2) The reliability of the Injunctive Sentence thus is the subject-matter of Inquiry.—(3) The question is—Is the *Vedic Injunction*—which is a *Sentence*—a reliable means of knowledge or not?—(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that the Injunctive Sentence cannot be reliable; because it is not independent in its expressiveness—being dependent upon the connection among its component factors.—(5) The Finally Established View is that the Sentence expresses nothing more than what is expressed by the component Words; hence, the Expressiveness of the Sentence is as independent and self-sufficient as that of the Words; so that there is no room for any doubt regarding the reliability of the Vedic Sentence as a right means of knowing Dharma. (See Section on Verbal Cognition.)

(H) Veda, Not the Work of a Personal Author

c24.s5.1

(1) It has been established that the Veda is a reliable Means of knowing Dharma; but if the Veda is the work of a personal author,—like other literary documents—then it is as liable to error, on account of the imperfections of that author, as the words of common people; so that no reliance could be placed upon the words of the Veda; it becomes necessary to prove, therefore, that the Veda is not the work of any author, it is eternal and self-sufficient, and hence, there is no possibility of any unreliability in it due to the defects of the Author.—(2) The reliability of the Veda is the subject-matter here also,—(3) The question is—Is, or, is not, the Veda the work of an Author?—(4) The Prima Facie View is that portions of the Veda are named after certain persons,—such names are found for instance, ‘Kāṭhaka’, ‘Kālāpaka’ and so forth; from which it is clear that, like these sections, the entire Veda is the work of certain persons.—(5) The Finally Established Conclusion is as follows:—The names cited indicate, not authorship but mere expounding; so that the persons indicated are those who have been specially expert expounders of those sections of the Veda. As a matter of fact, we do not know of any author of the Veda; there is no tradition on the point; if there had been any author, he would have been surely known. Hence, the Veda cannot be regarded as the work of an author; and being free from such authorship, it must be free from unreliability due to such authorship;—hence, it becomes established that the Vedic Injunction is a reliable means of knowing Dharma.

c24.s5.2

Thus the whole of Discourse I is taken up in the establishing of the two main propositions propounded in Sū. 2—viz., that (1) the Veda is the only Means of Knowing Dharma, and (2) that the Veda is entirely reliable and authoritative.

c24.s5.3

CHAPTER XX

c24.s5.4

EXTENT AND CONTENT OF THE ‘VEDA’

c24.s5.5

MANTRA AND BRĀHMAṆA.

c24.s5.6

We have seen that the Veda is the only reliable Source of knowledge regarding *Dharma*. The work known as the ‘Veda’ is an unequal work,—it is ‘a collection of *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*.’

c24.s5.7

The question to be considered now is—Are all these many Vedic texts—‘*Mantras*’ as well as ‘*Brāhmaṇas*’—to be regarded as a reliable source of knowledge regarding *Dharma*? Or are we to pick and choose among them?—(*Shabara-Bhā., Trs.*, p. 24.)

c24.s5.8

(A) MANTRAS.

c24.s5.9

Before taking up the main question however we have to see what ‘*Mantras*’ and ‘*Brāhmaṇas*’ are.

c24.s5.10

Of ‘*Mantras*’ no formal definition has been attempted by the earlier writers. Later writers, however, have defined it as the ‘*Karaṇa*, Instrument, of offering’; but this definition is too wide; as the Substances offered, the Implements used and such other sacrificial accessories are all as much ‘instruments of offering’ as the *Mantras*. It is for this reason that the more logical writers on *Mīmāṃsā* have contented themselves with explaining *Mantra* as a name applied to ‘those Vedic texts that are expressive of mere *Assertion* (as distinguished from *Injunction*)’ (*Mī. Sū.*, 2.1.32); that is,—those texts which express mere *assertion*,—which only assert, and do not enjoin any act; nor do they serve the purpose of *commending* acts;—it is only to such texts that learned men apply the name of ‘*Mantra*.’—This definition, however, is only illustrative; as there are certain well-recognised *Mantras* which do not make an assertion; e.g., ‘*Vasantāya kapiñjalānālabhēta*’ (*Vāja. Sam.*, 24.20), which has been accepted as a *Mantra*. Even so, some sort of a general definition has been propounded here, in order to avoid having to point to every individual *Mantra-text*. (*Shabara, Trs.*, 202.)

c24.s5.11

This is what has led Kumārila to remark that—‘ This definition has been provided here for the sake of its terseness, specially because it is in this sense that the name is used among teachers and students and other experienced people, and also because it is applicable to almost all *Mantras*.’—(*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 570.)

c24.s5.12

This has been still further simplified by the *Shāstradīpikā* (p. 207)—‘ What is meant is that that is a *Mantra* to which the name is applied by the learned.’

c24.s5.13

Prabhākara has offered the following explanation (*Bṛhatī*, MS., p. 50B)—In the Veda some Sentences are *Mantras* and some *Brāhmaṇas*; those to which the learned apply the name ‘ *Mantra* ’ are *Mantras*; while all the rest of the Veda are *Brāhmaṇas*, to which they apply the name ‘ *Vidhi* ’ also;—the *Arthavādas* (Declamatory Sentences) and *Nāmadhēyas* (Names) are also included under the ‘ *Brāhmaṇas* ’; though this name ‘ *Brāhmaṇa* ’ is applied strictly to the *Vidhi* or Injunctive texts only, the Declamatory texts and the Names are also included under that name by reason of their always subserving, in some way or the other, the Injunction along with which they are construed.

c24.s5.14

(B) CLASSIFICATION OF MANTRAS.

c24.s5.15

*Mantras* have been classified under three heads:—(1) *Ṛk*, (2) *Sāman* and (3) *Yajuṣ*. On these three names the *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 50B) remarks as follows:—‘ The words *Ṛk*, *Sāman* and *Yajuṣ* are found to be used in connection with the Vedas; hence, it becomes necessary to ascertain what part of the *Veda* is *Ṛk*, what part *Yajuṣ* and what part *Sāman*; on this point our conclusion is that the name *Ṛk* is applied to those texts that are divided into ‘ feet,’ *i.e.*, into certain well-defined parts, each part containing a definite number of syllables—and are called on that account by such prosodial names as *Gāyatrī*, *Triṣṭubh*, etc.

c24.s5.16

The clear line of distinction between the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa* is that the *Mantra* is that Vedic text which merely makes an assertion (*Sū*., 2.1.32), while all the rest of the Veda comes under the name ‘ *Brāhmaṇa* ’—says *Sū*., 2.1.33. The Veda consisting of ‘ *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas* ’, and *Mantras* being those texts that are merely *assertive*, it follows that all the rest of the Veda falls under the head ‘*Brāhmaṇa*’; hence, no definition of the ‘*Brāhmaṇa*’ has been provided. (*Shabara, Trs.*, p. 204.)

c24.s5.17

(C) MANTRAS ARE NOT INJUNCTIVE.

c24.s5.18

That *Mantras* are not injunctive has been declared under *Sū*., 2.1.31. The Established Conclusion set forth under the Sūtra is that ‘the Mantra can be expressive of mere assertion, as it functions only *during* the performance of an act’; that is, it is only while the Sacrifice is being performed that the *Mantra* functions; if it enjoined the act, its functioning would come before the commencement of the performance. (*Shabara-Bhā., Trs.*, pp. 200-201.)

c24.s5.19

*Kumārila* has demurred to this conclusion. According to him these *Sūtras*, 2.1.31 and 30 do not bear upon *Mantras* at all, all that they mean to point out is that the functioning of the verb lies not only in Enjoining, but in asserting also. His argument is that it is not true to say that the verb, when it occurs in a *Brāhmaṇa*-text, serves to *enjoin* an act, while the same verb when occurring in the *Mantra*-text, ceases to be injunctive. Nor is there any reason to regard the *Mantra* is subsidiary to the *Brāhmaṇa*, and not *vice-versa*. That is, there is no special reason whereby it could be ascertained that it is the *Mantra* which has its injunctive potency suppressed by reason of the act in question having been already enjoined in the *Brāhmaṇa*-text,—and not *vice-versa*. Both the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa* therefore should be regarded as equally injunctive; and the *Non-injunctiveness* of *Mantras* cannot be regarded as well-established. Nor is there any incongruity in the *Mantra* serving both the purposes—of enjoining acts and of recalling things enjoined elsewhere . . . (*Tantravārtika, Trs.*, pp. 566-567.)

c24.s5.20

*Kumārila* (*Tantravārtika, Trs.*, pp. 568-569) has drawn the following distinction between the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa*:—In the case of the *Brāhmaṇa*-text, if its injunctiveness is found to be suppressed by some such reason as the requisite *Enjoining* having been already done elsewhere, and such other grounds, then the verb is taken as pointing out something else which affords the occasion for another action; and in this case the mere verbal form of the text is not regarded as capable of being used at the performance. In the case of the *Mantra*, on the other hand, as soon as we learn its form, we at once realise that even the merely verbal form serves the useful purpose of recalling things; and hence we come to the conclusion that it is the actual words of the *Mantra* that are to be used at the performance, specially because at performances it is necessary that there should be such recalling of certain things. This *recalling* can be done only by such *Mantra-texts* as perform no other function. Consequently, when in a certain context, it is found that there are certain *Mantra-texts* mentioned which do not serve this purpose,—and which are taken along with an Injunctive-text with the vague notion that some useful purpose might be served by them,—we conclude that these *Mantras* are to be used as serving the purpose of merely asserting things.

c24.s5.21

*Prabhākara's* view is more in keeping with the *Bhāṣya*:—From the very nature of the *Mantras* it is clear that they cannot be injunctive; because as a rule, they are devoid of the Injunctive Word; also all *Mantras* are found to be construable,—either by direct syntactical connection or by indirect implication—with other texts which are clearly injunctive. Nor are *Mantras* found to contain any *Commendation* or *Condemnation*; hence, they cannot be regarded as *Arthavāda*, Declamatory. With all this, however, *Mantras* cannot be regarded as entirely meaningless or baseless; forming an integral part of the Veda, they must serve some useful purpose; they must have some meaning, expressing something that is needful in the acts prescribed by the Injunctive texts.

c24.s5.22

This question of *Mantras* being *expressive*, and not entirely meaningless has been dealt with by *Jaimini* under *Sū.*, 1.2.31—53. (*Shabara*—Trs., pp. 74—86). It has been shown that they are not *injunctive* and they are not *Commendatory* or *Condemnatory*. It has been shown that they serve the only purpose of *asserting* things and *recalling* them to the Mind.—But before this can be admitted, it has to be seen if the *Mantra-texts* are meant to be expressive, to convey a meaning at all. Because they could do the *asserting* or the *recalling* only if they expressed any meaning at all. It is necessary to discuss this because, if the *Mantra-texts* of the Veda are not meant to be expressive, they cannot convey any information regarding *Dharma*, and this would vitiate

Linked texts (7)