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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c7: Chapter II: Philosophical Topics: Soul

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c7

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Chapter II: Philosophical Topics: Soul

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Before plunging into the question of the *Means of Cognition*, which as we shall see later on, leads on directly to the special content of the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā Shāstra*,—we shall deal briefly with some of the more important Philosophical Topics which, as remarked above, have been incidently dealt with by writers on the *Shāstra*.

Ātman—Soul

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It becomes necessary for the *Mīmāmsaka* to posit the *Ātman*, Soul, as something distinct from the Body; because without some such entity ensouling the Body there would be no sense in the Vedic texts that speak of the performer of a certain act ‘going to Heaven,’ or ‘becoming liberated,’ and so forth.

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We shall see what (1) *Shabara*, (2) *Prabhākara* and (3) *Kumārila* have said in regard to this *Soul*.

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We have selected these three writers as representing the three main schools of *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā*—(1) The ‘*Bhāṣya*,’ (2) the ‘*Bhaṭṭa*’ and (3) the ‘*Prābhākara*.’ For the school generally known as the ‘Third Path’ ‘तृतीयः पन्था’ associated with the name of *Murāri Mishra*, and hence called ‘*Mishra-mata*,’ material is not yet available for a full account.

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In addition to these, wheresoever we have been able to ascertain the ‘*Mishra-mata*’ from fragments of *Murāri-Mishra’s* work, we have inserted a few notes here and there.

(A) ‘Ātman,’ ‘Soul,’ according to Shabara

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The Vedic text has spoken of ‘the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeding to heaven’; and the opponent has argued that here we find the Veda making an absurd statement; hence the Veda cannot be a valid source of knowledge. It is argued that what is ‘equipped with sacrificial implements’ is the physical body, and as the body is entirely burnt up by cremation, it cannot ‘proceed to heaven.’—Our answer to this is that what is spoken of here as ‘equipped with the implements’

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is not only the physical body, but also that entity which ensouls the body and to whom the body belongs . . . The presence of such an Ensouling Entity is inferred from the phenomena of breathing, winking of the eyes and the like, which cannot belong to the body, as they are not found after death,—though the body is there all right. Secondly, such phenomena as the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like are cognised by the person himself only, while the qualities of colour and the rest which belong to the physical body are cognised and perceived by others also, who have no direct cognition of the feelings of the other person. This shows that there are certain qualities in the person which are directly cognisable by himself only.—From the fact of there being certain qualities of the person which differ radically from the qualities that belong to the physical body, we conclude that the entity spoken of as ‘equipped with the sacrificial implements’ and as ‘going to heaven’ is other than the physical body.

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This argument is met by the opponent by the statement that the mere presence of the feelings and cognitions of pleasure cannot justify the conclusion that there is a distinct Entity to whom these belong, in which these subsist; in fact these feelings and cognitions do not necessarily presuppose a feeler or cogniser; the Cognition itself may be regarded as all-in-all.

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The answer to this is that the Act of Cognising presupposes an Agent who does that act; and an Agent must be an Entity distinct from the Act itself. And it is this Agent of the act of Cognising, Desiring and the like which we call ‘Soul,’ Atman.

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Similarly with Remembrance; it is only when one sees a thing on one day that he has the remembrance of it on a later day; and the recognition appears only in an Entity that has continued to exist all the time; and this can only be the Soul.

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This Soul, the Cogniser, the Agent of the acts of Cognising, Desiring, Feeling and the like can be directly cognised by each man for himself; it is in this sense that the Soul is regarded as ‘Sva-samvedya,’ ‘self-cognised’; and no Soul can be directly cognised by another. And yet it can be expounded to another, in the manner described in the Upanisads—‘Neti-Neti,’ ‘This Soul is not this, not that.’ Thus it is that the existence of the Soul is taught by this pointing out that it is not-desire, not-feeling and so forth. And when one becomes cognisant of his own self-luminous Soul, he infers the presence of similar souls in other persons also.

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This Soul is everlasting,—a Person or Personality apart from Pleasure etc. and the Cognitions. It is, in terms of the Brāhmaṇa, ‘indestructible, not liable to disruption; but it comes into contact with perishable things, like Sense-organs, Merit, Demerit and so forth ’—(Shatapatha Brā. 14.7.3.15).—(Shabara-Bhāṣya—Tr. pp. 26—31.)

(B) Prabhākara’s Views of the ‘Soul’

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[The references are to the Madras Edition of the Bṛhatī.]

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According to Prabhākara,—the Soul is of the nature of the (A) Doer and Experiencer (p. 235—7); (B) it is something entirely different from the Body, the Sense-organs and Buddhi (p. 231); (C) it becomes manifest in all Cognitions,—(D) it is eternal (p. 235); (E) omnipresent (p. 235); and (F) many, one in each body; (G) it rests upon the notion of ‘I,’ entirely free from any notion of ‘this’ or ‘that’ (p. 239); its existence is proved by the universally admitted and udenied and undeniable notion of ‘I,’ which is self-luminous (p. 245), in the sense that it is realisable or cognisable by each man for himself.

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The following systematic account of the Prabhākara view we gather from Prakaraṇapañchikā:—

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That the Cogniser is something different from Buddhi (Mind) is proved by the fact, among others, that Buddhi is inert and absent during sleep, and yet there are Cognitions during sleep. [Buddhi is the same as Manas, Mind, says Ṛjuvimālā on Bṛhatī, p. 75.]

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The Sense-organs cannot be regarded as the Soul; because we often perceive a single object by more than one Sense-organ,—e.g., touching the same object that is seen; which shows that the factor that perceives—i.e., the perceiver—which is common to the two perceptions,—is different from the two organs concerned. Then again, it is found that the blind man remembers the things he had seen in the past when he was not blind; which proves that the perceiver is different from the organ concerned. Lastly, the Body can never be accepted as the Cogniser; because it consists of the Earth and there is no cognition or consciousness in particles of Earth. The term ‘ Soul ’ too can be applied to that only which is endowed with intelligence, and the Body is not endowed with intelligence; the sole criterion for this lies in our own consciousness; as a matter of fact we actually have the consciousness of things past and future also; hence it cannot belong to any objects that are perceptible by the senses.

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If the Soul were the only source of all cognition, then as the Soul is everlasting, cognitions also would have to be regarded as everlasting; which is absurd. Hence philosophers have held that while the Soul is the *basic* (according to some, the *material* or *constituent*) cause of Cognition, it needs the help of other auxiliary causes; and as such an auxiliary, Prabhākara posits the *Contact of the Soul with the Mind*; this contact being brought about by a certain action of the mind, due either to the effort of the Soul or to the Unseen Force of the previous activities (*Karma*) of the Soul; these efforts and Unseen Forces also being the effects of previous Mind-Soul contacts; and so the infinite cycle goes on. This Mind-Soul contact is not the only cause of our cognitions; if that were so, then the perception of colour would be possible for the Blind also. Hence the operation of the Sense-organs also has to be admitted. Even so, it is the Mind-Soul Contact that is the cause common to all Cognitions.

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Thus then, the Soul is the Agent, *enjoyer*, (*bhoktā*) of experience (p. 232); the Body is the abode or receptacle of experience; the organs are the *instruments* of experience; and the objects of experience are of two kinds—*internal*, in the shape of Pleasure, Pain and the like,—and *external*, in the shape of the Earth and other things;—the *Experiencer* consists of pure Consciousness. It is in these five that all truth is centred; there is nothing beyond these five; they comprise the Universe.

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Though the Soul, the Agent, enters as a necessary factor into every act of Cognition, it is not itself amenable to any of the ordinary means by which things are cognised. The Soul is self-luminous; in this sense it is cognisable by each man for himself.

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The existence of the Mind is proved by the manifestation of the qualities of the Soul itself. These qualities are—*Buddhi* (Intellection, Cognition), Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Destiny and Faculty. The existence of *Buddhi* is self-manifest, in the form of Cognition and *Remembrances*; Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are apprehended by mental Perception. By ‘Faculty’ (*Saṃskāra*-Impression) is meant a certain power or capacity imparted to the Soul by its Cognitions; its existence is proved by the fact that unless we have some such force intervening between the Cognition of an object and its *Remembrance*, we cannot account for this latter. As for *Destiny*, it always takes the form of Merit and Demerit; whose real character can be known only from the scriptures, which alone are the safe guide as to what is *Right* and what is *Wrong*. As pointed out above, all our Cognitions are not due to Mind-Soul contact only; if it were so, then the Blind man would also cognise colour; the function of the Sense-organs comes in here; and as all perceptible things fall within five well-defined classes, we posite five Sense-organs. These five, along with the Mind, which may be regarded as the *Universal* or *Common* perceptive organ, form the six Sense-organs, of which the Body is the abode. These organs are—the Visual Organ (Eye), the Gestatory Organ (of taste), the Auditory Organ (Ear), the Tactile Organ (of touch), the Olfactory Organ (of smell). (Prā. Mī., pp. 76-77).

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That the Mind is a *substance* is indicated by the fact of its having contacts with the Soul and with the Objects of Cognition. It cannot be regarded as made up of many component particles; as that would involve many unnecessary assumptions. Then again as the Soul is omnipresent and without parts, if the Mind also were of the same character, then, either there would be no contact between the Soul and the Mind, or such contact would be everlasting. Hence the Mind is regarded as of *Atomic Dimension*. And as it exists, and yet has no cause, it must be *eternal*. It is extremely mobile, as is proved by the very swift contacts formed by it, at the time that we have one perception following another in quick succession, which must be due to the Mind coming into contact with one perceptive organ after another. Unless aided by the Mind, no organ can apprehend its object, as is found in the case of the absent-minded man who fails to see things before his eyes. The contact of the Mind with the conscious Soul is due to the endless series of Merit-Demerit,—the accumulated effects of the past acts of the individual Soul concerned.—(Prābhā. Mī., pp. 77-78.)

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The Cognition of the Soul itself proceeds from the same source as the Cognition of any other object. But here a distinction is drawn. Though the Soul is manifested in every act of *Cognition*, it is not the *object* of that Cognition; it appears only as the Nominative Agent, namely, the *Cogniser*, the *bhoktā*, the *Experiencer*; it is not the *object* of the act of Cognition, because the operation of that act does not fall upon it. The Soul thus is the substratum of the Cognition which is self-luminous, and into which the Soul enters as the *Cognitive Agent*, the ‘I,’ the *Bhoktā*, *Experiencer*, which is inseparable from all Cognitions; and hence like *Cognition*, the Soul also is self-luminous. Each man cognises his own Soul for *himself*—this is its स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्व ‘self-luminousness.’ This is made clear by *Kumārila* also in *Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 145.—The Cognition of other Souls is obtained by means of Inference.

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The Cognition of the Soul being thus obtainable only as a factor in the Cognition of things,—it is natural that during deep sleep, when there is no Cognition of things, there should be no idea of the Soul. During the *Turīya*—Fourth, highest,—state of consciousness, however, the Soul is cognised, but only as pure *Esse* or *Being*, the substratum of the comprehensive cognition of all things, but free from and beyond all perceptible things. This is how it continues to exist after Liberation—a mere *Esse*.

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Not having been produced by a cause, the Soul must be *imperishable*, *eternal*; appearing during worldly existence, in every act of *Cognition*, as the *Cogniser* and *Experiencer*,—and after Liberation, as pure *Esse*, *Being*.

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The Soul again is omnipresent—all-pervading, like *Ākāsha*; but its properties—Pleasure, Pain and the rest—cannot become manifest except in a body; as such manifestation requires Mind-contact, and the Mind subsists in the Body. Even though omnipresent, the Soul cannot experience what is occurring in the Body of another personality, because experience is always due to the *Karma* of the particular Personality; hence the experience of one personality cannot form the experience of another.

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This Soul is distinct in each body; hence there are many Souls; as many Souls as there are conscious bodies. There are two reasons propounded in support of this view. (*a*) In the case of other personalities, we infer the presence of the Soul from certain activities manifested therein, which cannot be otherwise accountable, and we always feel that this Soul in the other personality is not-my-soul; what we feel is that just as certain activities of my body are rendered possible only by the presence of the Soul, so also similar activities in the other body must indicate the presence of a Soul there. The activities of another personality are never recognised as one's own activities. (b) We always find a clear difference between Merit-Demerit and the resultant pleasure and pain of different personalities; and all these are qualities of the Soul; consequently, if there were only one Soul,—the same in all persons,—its qualities also would be the same in all the bodies ensouled by it; and then the Merit-Demerit and Pleasure and Pain of one person would be the same as those of another.

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Prabhākara has an interesting note towards the end of the section of Bṛhatī dealing with Soul (p. 256). It is true, he says, that the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ imply a misconception,—an idea, as Soul, of what is really ‘not-Soul’;—but this assertion of this fact can come only from persons who have shaken off all impurity— मुदितकषाय, and not from those who are still addicted to Action; that is why the Blessed Lord has declared (in (Bhagvad-Gītā)—‘One should not divert the notions of the ignorant who are addicted to Action’;—that is the reason why the Bhāṣyakāra (Shabara) has not dealt with this question; as it was not his business to deal with people who have transcended Action.

(C) Kumārila’s Views of the ‘Soul’

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The Veda speaks of the ‘Sacrificer’ going to heaven after death; the body perishes after death; hence the Entity that is spoken of as ‘proceeding to Heaven’ must be something other than the perishable body. This entity is the Soul. If there is no such entity, then the Veda has made an absurd statement; this strikes at the reliability of Veda; and hence at the very root of all ‘orthodox’ philosophy.—(Shlokavārtika-Ātmavāda, 1—5.) This Soul is something distinct from the Body, the Sense-organs and Buddhi; it is eternal (7), imperishable (147);—it is the real doer of action, agent of acts, and the experiencer of their results and reactions (8);—it is also all-pervading (20); we regard it so, because we find it functioning everywhere; that is, the notion of ‘ I ’ which is all the notion that we have of the Soul, always indicates the notion of the Soul, *which is of the nature of pure Consciousness*, and is not qualified by any limitations of time and place. (*Tantravārtika-Trans.*, p. 516). It is the Soul that passes through the experiences of Pleasure, Pain, etc. (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 26; *Tantravārtika*, p. 516); and yet it never renounces its own character of *consciousness*; it forms the constant factor in all those variable and varying experiences. (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 26. 28); the Soul experiences the reactions of all acts (290). If the Soul consisted of Consciousness, not in its eternal form, but in the form of fleeting cognitions, then it would not be possible to account for the activities of man, or even the phenomenon of *rebirth* (34). It is necessary, therefore, to regard the Soul as being of the nature of *Consciousness*, eternal, omnipresent, capable of ensouling several bodies (73); it is itself *conscious*, as otherwise, it would not be the experiencer; it is *omnipresent*, as otherwise, it could not occupy one body after another, which it does even without any locomotion (*Nyāyaratnākara*). Though in the performance of the ordinary acts in the world, the Soul is the *doer*, Agent, only indirectly through the body, there are certain acts such as those being (existing), knowing and the like, of which it is the doer or Agent, directly by itself (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 76). The Soul is (*Aham-pratyaya-gamya*), i.e., apprehensible by the notion of ‘ I ’ (107); that is, the notion of ‘ I ’ that we have in such ideas as ‘ I know ’ indicates the *Knower*, the *Cogniser*; who, therefore, forms either the *object* or the substratum of that notion (110); the cogniser is always cognisable by—*i.e.*, the object of—the notion of ‘ I ’ (126), which enters into all acts of Cognition. The idea that ‘ there is no Soul ’ is thus contrary to, and is set aside by, the universally recognised notion of ‘ I.’ The positive arguments in support of the notion have been set forth in the *Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 136—139.

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The question arising—“ if words are incapable of bringing about the cognition of the Soul, by what means is it cognised? ”—the answer given by the *Bhāṣya* is that it is ‘ illumined ’—made cognisable,—‘ by itself ’; and what is meant by ‘ self-luminosity ’ is that one Soul cannot be directly cognised by another Soul (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 142-143),—it is cognised by another only through Inference, drawn from the perception of such activities in the other personality as have been found, in one’s own Soul, to be invariably concomitant with the Soul. It is clear, therefore, that for such person, his own Soul is Self-luminous, Self-cognised; but for other persons, it is cognised through Inference.—(Shlo. Vār. Ātma., 145.)

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The Tantravārtika (Trs., pp. 518—522) deals at length with the question of the omnipresence of the Soul. (a) The Soul being itself immaterial, cannot move from place to place; when therefore a man moves from one place to another, his Soul would be left behind; and the body would become soul-less and hence inanimate. But if the Soul is omnipresent, wherever the body goes, it finds itself ensouled by the Soul; the connection of one Soul with one body at a time being determined by the past Karma of the Soul which is always equipped with a body that is capable of bringing about the experiences resulting from that past Karma of the Personality. This continuous connection of the Body with the Soul is exactly like the continuous connection of the Body with Space or Time, which latter also are omnipresent. (b) If the Soul were not omnipresent, it would be either atomic in size or of the size of the body. It cannot be the former; as, if it were so, the person could be conscious of only those sensations that would appear in that small part of the body which would be occupied by the atomic Soul; which is absurd. If, on the other hand, the Soul were regarded as being of the same size as the Body, this would involve many gratuitous assumptions; such as that the Soul has parts, those parts are immovable, there is a conglomeration of such parts, and even though with parts, the Soul is eternal (which is admitted by the protagonists of this view), that the Soul moves from one body to another after death, and that there is some internal connection between its departure from one body and entrance into another.

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Even though omnipresent, one Soul cannot serve the purpose for all personalities, as that would mean that one and the same Soul undergoes the experiences of all persons. The Soul, therefore, must be regarded as many and existing simultaneously. Being immaterial, they would not come in each other's way. In fact it is on account of this immateriality and consequent indivisibility of Souls and their omnipresence,—and on account of all being of the same nature of pure Consciousness,—that the Upaniṣad-texts have spoken of all Souls as one. (Tantra Vā., pp. 518—523). Though *Jñāna*, Cognition, involves some sort of विक्त्रिया, *modification*, for the Soul, this does not militate against the *eternality* of the Soul itself. (*Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa.*, 52-53.)

Cites (2)