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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c9: Chapter IV: Body, Sense-Organs and Mind

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c9

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Chapter IV: Body, Sense-Organs and Mind

(A) According to Prabhākara

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The Body, as we have seen above, is the abode of the Sense-organs. There are three kinds of Body—(1) Womb-born, (2) Egg-born and (3) Sweat-born. The *Prabhākara* does not admit of the *Vegetable Body*, on the ground that we have no proof for the view that vegetable organisms are endowed with the six sense-organs; nor does he admit of any bodies not made up of Earth. According to him two organs—the Mind and the Tactile organ—are present in all bodies.

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The following questions have been discussed in *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 52 *et. seq.*)—(a) How is the existence of the Sense-organs proved? (*b*) What reasons are there for postulating the number as *six* only?

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The answer provided to these questions contains an analytic account of the whole process of Perception. Hence it will be found under “Perception” (below).

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The Mind is a *Substance*; otherwise there could be no contact between Mind and Soul or of Mind with Objects of Cognition. The Mind is not all-pervading; if it were, Mind-Soul contact would be perpetual; Mind therefore must be *atomic*, and hence eternal; it is extremely mobile. Without the aid of the Mind, no Cognition is possible. Mind-Soul contacts are the result of Merit and Demerit attaching to the Soul. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 52, *et seq.*)

(B) According to Kumārila

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The Sense-organ is the *Instrument* of Cognition. (*Shlokavārtika, Perception* 121). The organ of Perception cannot be *one* only (*Ibid.*, 159 *et seq.*)

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There are only five Sense-organs, not endless (*Ibid.*, 169).

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As regards Sense-organs, the *Nyāyaratnākara* has the following remarks on *Shlo. Vā. Perception* 51:—

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" The Sense-organs are all material and operative by contact. For instance, (*a*) The Visual Organ, which brings about the perception of colour, is of the Essence of Fire, like Light; hence the phenomena of its rendering visible larger and larger things becomes easily explicable, on the analogy of Lamp-light; the reasoning being—the Visual Organ is ‘Fir’ in its Essence, because it renders perceptible colour, which is the specific quality of ‘Fire.’ (*b*) Similarly, the Olfactory Organ renders odour perceptible, and hence is of the Essence of Earth because odour is the specific quality of Earth; this organ operates through contact; as what happens is that the fine particles of the pollen of flowers become wafted by air and reach the inner surface of the nostrils and there the odour subsisting in those particles becomes apprehended and perceived. (*c*) Similarly, the Gestatory Organ apprehends Taste and is of the Essence of Water; that this is so is indicated by the fact that Taste is felt when the tongue is wet, not dry; (*d*) when after bath a man emerges from water, he feels cold when his wet skin comes into contact with Air; so that it is the Air-Element in the body which renders touch perceptible, which shows that the Tactile Organ is of the Essence of Air; (*e*) the Auditory Organ is of the Essence of *Dik*, Space."

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We learn the following from *Shāstradīpikā* (*Sū*. 1.1.4, page 21) regarding Kumārila's view of *Mind*:—

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The opponent has raised the question—" Sense-perception cannot be regarded as *Cognition* brought about by the contact of the Object and the Sense-organ,—because Pleasure, Pain, etc., are Sense-perception and yet, there is no sense-contact in this case." The answer is that there is *Sense-contact* in this case also, *viz*., the contact of the *Mind*, which is a ‘Sense-organ.’ Evidence of the existence of the *Mind* is afforded by our own experiencing of Pleasure and Pain. The *Cognition* of Pleasure is of the Nature of immediate, *Direct, Perception*; and this leads to the inference of *Mind* as the instrument of that Direct-Perception; because the Visual and other organs are unable to account for such perception. Some people have regarded *Mind* as an independent substance by itself. But the *Mind* is never operative apart from the Body; hence it cannot be regarded as an independent substance apart from the Body. *Question*—" What is the definition of the Sense-organ, which is applicable to the Mind and also to the other well-known Sense-organs? ” Answer—That is called Sense-organ whose contact with the Object brings about the direct clear perception of the object. This Sense-organ is of two kinds—*External* and *Internal*. The *External* is of five kinds—*Olfactory*, *Gestatory*, *Visual*, *Tactile* and *Auditory*; the *Internal* is one only, the Mind. The first four respectively have their material source in Earth, Water, Fire and Air. As regards the Auditory Organ, the Vaiśeṣikas regard it as of the Essence of Ākāsha. But we take our stand upon the Vedic text ‘*Dishaḥ shrotraṇi*,’ which speaks of the Auditory Organ as ‘*Dik*,’ Space; and hence regard the Auditory Organ as that part of Space which is enclosed in the tympanum. Lastly, as regards the *Mind*, it may either be of the Essence of any one of the five, Earth and the rest, or of something apart from these. But this Mind, *by itself alone*, is operative only on the Soul and its qualities, not upon any thing wholly *External*; that is why it has been called an *Internal organ*. In regard to *external* things, Mind is operative only through one or the other of the five *External Organs*. In regard to Inferential Cognition also, the Mind operates through the knowledge of the Probans and the Inferential Indicative; and in regard to Remembrance, it operates through Impressions left by previous Cognitions. But it operates independently by itself only in regard to the Soul and its qualities of Pleasure, Pain, Cognition and so forth (*Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 21-22).

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CHAPTER V

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GOD

(A) According to Shabara

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*Shabara-Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 22), discussing the question of the relationship between the Word and its meaning, has the following remarks:—‘There can be no Creator of this relation, because no Soul is cognised as such by any of the means of cognition. If there had been such a Creator, he could not have been forgotten; just as in the case of Himālaya mountains and such things, it would be impossible to forget the Creator if there had been one. In fact, persons making use of the Veda would certainly have some idea of the Creator of the relation between the words and their meanings . . . Even if the possibility of the said Creator being forgotten were there, we could not admit of the Creator unless there were proofs for it . . . Presumption (*Arthāpatti*) cannot lead us to cognise a Creator; if it were a fact that in the absence of a Creator of word-relations, the meaning of words could never be comprehended,—then alone could we be justified in deducing the Creator from Presumption. In reality, however, Words are taught as accomplished entities, having the inherent power of expressing their meaning. What actually happens is that, when older people are making use of words for their own purposes, the younger men who happen to hear these words are found to comprehend them; these older people also, when they were young, comprehended the meanings of words as used by the older people of the time; and so on the process of comprehension has gone on, without any beginning in time . . . So long as this explanation of the comprehension of word-meanings is available, it cannot be right to presume a Creator. From all this it follows that there has been no Creator of word-relations.’

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Under Sutra 1.1.27 et seq. it has been established that there is no *Composer* of the Veda.

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Sūtra 1.1.5 declares that “the relation between the Word and its Meaning is innate”—which also denies the said Creator.

(B) According to Prabhākara

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The ‘Creator’ of Word-relations has been denied, in the manner of Shabara, in *Bṛhatī* (pp. 174 et seq. also *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 52).

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*Prakaraṇa-pañchikā* (p. 133 et seq.) supplies the following explanation:—The *Mīmāṃsaka* lays great stress upon the denotativeness of Words being independent of personal agency, and inhering in the Words themselves, because, if it were not so, the validity of words and Verbal cognition would be based entirely upon the trustworthy character of the person pronouncing the words;—and as the *Mīmāṃsaka* denies any personal agency in the composing of the Veda, it would mean that no validity can be attached to the Veda itself.—Nor can the *Mīmāṃsaka* accept the *Naiyāyika’s* point of view, by which the denotativeness of words is created and fixed by Conventions among people who introduce and make use of words for the first time—*i.e.*, by God Himself in the first instance. This *Nyāya* view necessitates the postulating of a ‘God,’ ‘Creator,’ as the originator of words and verbal usages and hence also of the Veda. This militates against the *Mīmāṃsaka’s* doctrine of the *self-sufficiency* of the Veda, which must be independent of all personal agency. In fact, if the denotativeness of words depended entirely upon Conventions made by personal agencies, the Veda would be reduced to the position of a meaningless jumble of words; however, according to the *Mīmāṃsaka* the pre-eminent function of the Veda lies in the enjoining of certain acts accomplishing an *Apūrva*—invisible subtle potency—leading up to certain results; and as this *Apūrva* is something beyond the ken of any person, independently of the Veda, how could the denotativeness of those words of the Veda be fixed by any convention made by any person? As no connection would be possible in regard to those words, all the Vedic texts containing those words would be meaningless. If a Creator-God were admitted, then as this God, being omniscient, would be possessed of the knowledge of all things, including the *Apūrva*, He would be in a position to lay down the necessary conventions. But for reasons stated above,—specially in view of the self-sufficiency of the Veda—the *Mīmāṃsaka* does not admit of such a God. Hence for the sake of the Veda—his all in all—he finds it necessary to stick to the view that all words and their denotations are beginningless and everlasting, independent of all conventions and Agencies.

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The *Prābhākara* view regarding God is set forth in great detail in *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 137 et seq. It is as follows:—

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The *Prābhākara* denies a Creator for the universe; even though he admits that the universe is made up of component parts, and as such it must have had a beginning and an end in time,—yet he finds no reason for believing that the universe, as a whole, has had a beginning at any one point of time, or that it would all come to an end at any one point of time; hence if the constituent factors of the Universe have a beginning, they must each individually have their beginnings, one after the other; and they should also cease one after the other; in fact, that is what is actually found to be the case in every-day experience. Thus then, even if it were true that certain factors of the Universe are brought into existence by an Ultra-mundane Supervisor—operating through *Dharma-Adharma*—this could not be true of the Universe as a whole. There are some things—for instance, the bodies of men and animals,—which are actually brought into existence by the operation of their parents, and not by any external supervising Agency. Nor is there any force in the *Naiyāyika’s* argument that the *Dharma-Adharma* of man must have a supervisor, possessed of intelligence and faculties higher than those of ordinary men. (Because the *Dharma-Adharma* of the Body,—which itself is the product of *Dharma-Adharma*—must always belong to the same intelligent being to whom the body itself belongs; any other being, howsoever intelligent, can never have any knowledge of the *Dharma-Adharma* of another being; hence the ultra-mundane God could have no knowledge of the *Dharma-Adharma* of the being that is born as *man* or animal, etc.; and without such knowledge, He could not exercise any intelligent and effective control over it. Then again, let us examine the character of the ‘Supervision’ that God is said to exercise over *Dharma-Adharma*.—(a) This ‘Supervision’ cannot be of the nature of *Contact* or *Conjunction*: because *Dharma* and *Adharma* are qualities and hence not capable of *conjunction*, which (according to the *Naiyāyika* himself) is possible for *Substances* only;—(b) nor can the ‘Supervision’ be of the nature of *Inherence*; as the *Dharma-Adharma* inhering in other Souls could not inhere in ‘God.’ And as these two—

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Conjunction and Inherence—are the only possible forms of relationship, no other kind of ‘ Supervision ’ is possible. In the case of ordinary Agents,—e.g., the carpenter—the ‘ Supervision ’ exercised consists in their contact with the tools and instruments, which again are brought into contact with the wood-pieces upon which the man works. This is not possible in the case of God. Nor is it possible for the operations of God to have any effect upon the *Dharma-Adharma* of Beings; because *Dharma-Adharma* are qualities, and hence they could not come into contact with any *operation* of things.—Nor can the action bringing about the creation of the Universe be held to lie in the Atoms which operate under the will of God. Because in all our experience we never come across any such supervision or guidance as would be implied in such a process; all ‘ Supervision ’ or ‘ guidance ’ in fact is found to be done by Soul over that Body alone which it ensouls by virtue of the Soul’s *Dharma-Adharma*; and the Atoms cannot be said to be such a ‘ body ’ of God; hence He could not guide the activity of the Atom. Even if we grant such a ‘ body ’ for God, the activity of such a body could not be due to His mere wish; it must be due to an effort put forth by Him. Nor could these *Wishes* and *Efforts* be everlasting; as that would make the activity of the Atoms also everlasting; which would lead to the absurdity of an unceasing Creative Process. The argument as generally put forward by the Naiyāyika in proof of the Creator-God is that—“The Body of man must have a Supervisor, because it is itself non-intelligent.” To this his opponent offers the counter-argument—that God cannot be such a Supervisor, because He cannot have any motive in exercising this supervision. We cannot deny the truth of the proposition that there is intelligent supervision only in cases where some purpose of the supervisor is served by the supervision. Then again, the same argument that would prove the existence of the intelligent Supervisor would also prove that Supervisor to be an embodied or corporeal Being; as the *Naiyāyika* bases his argument upon the analogy of the carpenter supervising and guiding the making of wooden articles,—and as this carpenter, is also a corporeal being,—the analogy, extended further, would prove the supervising God also to be a corporeal Being. But, at the same time, we know that no corporeal being can exercise any effective and intelligent control over such subtle things as Atoms, *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Even if He did exercise such control, He himself, as a Corporeal Being, would have to be the creation of another supervisor or creator, and so on and on *ad infinitum*. Thus then, the ‘ supervision ’ of the work of creation being impossible, it has to be regarded as a never-ending process of things coming into existence and passing out of it, under the influence of the *Dharma-Adharma* of the Souls ensouling those things; and there is no reason for the assumption of an Ultra-Cosmic ‘ God-Creator.’—(*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 137 et. seq.)

(C) According to Kumārila

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This is what we learn from the *Shlokavārtika* (Chapter on *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 41 et. seq.).

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The question of the Creator, God, is raised in connection with the eternality of Word and its meaning and the relation between the two. The view has been held that the entire verbal process rests upon the will of God who set up, at the time of Creation, the convention upon which the entire process is based.

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*Kumārila* denies the beginning of any such Convention relating to the relation of Word and Meaning.

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We do not admit of any ‘ beginning of Creation,’—says *Kumārila*. The idea that “ God created the world, as also *Dharma* and *Adharma* along with their means of accomplishment, also Words, their Meanings and the relations between them, and also the Veda ” cannot be proved; it is as impossible to prove as the existence of the Omniscient Person (God) Himself. This is the reason why this view has not been accepted. If there was any point of time when all this world did not exist—i.e., prior to its creation by God—then what would have been the condition of things at the time? Where and in what form would the Creator Himself exist at the time? Who too was the person who would know the Creator at the time and describe Him to the people later on? How too could there come about the initial impulse to the activity of the Creator? As God could have no body etc., at the time, how could He have a desire to create things? If He had a body then, that body could not have been created by Himself. Earth, Water etc. being non-existent at the time, of what would God’s body consist? As the world is found to be full of pain and suffering, it cannot be right to attribute its creation to God; specially because at the beginning of Creation, the Merit or Demerit of men could not exist to which their sufferings could be due.—No Agent can create anything without some material to work upon and implements to work with.—Nor can Creation be attributed to God's compassion towards beings; for, at the outset, there would be no beings towards whom the compassion would be directed; secondly, if Creation were due to compassion, the world would be made entirely happy, specially as the Creator being all-powerful, nothing could hamper His compassionate activity. If any such extraneous agency did hamper God's activity, then He could not be omnipotent.—What too could have been His purpose in creating the world? No sane person undertakes any activity without some purpose. If His activity is purposeless, then how can He be an intelligent person? If the activity of God be attributed to His desire for ‘Sport,’ ‘Līlā,’—then, He cannot be regarded as one who has all his desires fulfilled. If He had to carry out all the operations necessary to create and carry on the world, then He would be too busy to be happy over it, and regard it as ‘Sport’ (56).—If the desire to create was prompted by ‘compassion,’ or ‘Sport,’ then why should there be a consequent desire to dissolve the world? Even if such a Creator existed, He could not be known by any means of knowledge; even if He were perceptible in some divine form (as is claimed for certain men) no one could ever perceive Him as actually creating the world. We of the present day can have no knowledge, either of the world at the time of Creation or of the Creator himself. The mere assertion by the Creator himself (as stated in the Upanishads regarding Prajāpati's declaration about His desire to ‘multiply’ and so forth) is not enough to bring conviction to us.—If the whole worldly process were dependent upon the whim of the Creator, there would be no reasonable basis for the doctrine of Karma (72).—The wish or whim of God also could not arise without some cause to arouse it; and the cause that would arouse God's desire might very well be regarded as bringing about the things of the world themselves (73).—If all that the Theist is keen about is the theory that there must be some cause, some agency, that controls the world-process, then we are all agreed that the necessary controlling agency is provided by the ‘Karma’

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CHAPTER V: GOD

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of living beings; and on this point there need be no difference of opinion (75).—The argument that “the bodies of men must have been created by God, because they are bodies”—would apply with equal force to the *Body* of God Himself, which is as much a ‘body’ as our own (77).—If God’s body be held to be inhabited and controlled by God Himself,—then the controller himself would be without a body. On the same analogy, if the Potter were regarded as the ‘controller’ of the Jar, then the Jar would not be something ‘controlled’ by the Potter (79).—The idea of a God *with a body* having been rejected, the controlling and supervising will have to be regarded as done by a bodiless God; and yet no effort is possible for a bodiless being; how can any supervision be exercised without effort? Mere desire or wish cannot be enough. Even if such effort on the part of a bodiless being were possible, how could the unconscious *Atoms* become active by the mere wish of the intelligent Person? It is only the conscious or intelligent servant who acts in accordance with the wish of the conscious or intelligent master (82).—Then, there is the other theistic view that before the beginning of Creation the Supreme Self alone exists, and this Supreme Self, by His own wish, evolves out of Himself the Earth, Water and other things of the world. But that Supreme Self being all-pure, how could he evolve out of Himself things that are not pure (82)?—The impurities in the shape of suffering and pain have been regarded as the effect of *Dharma-Adharma*: and these would not be there in the case of the Supreme Self, who is self-sufficient and pure; so that He would not be the source of any evolution that can proceed only from Ignorance and Illusion (84).—If those ‘impurities’ are attributed to some other cause, then the theory of ‘One Cause’ becomes abandoned (85).—If the Ignorance or Illusion to which the impurities and imperfections are due are inherent in the Supreme Self, then it must be irrevocable; as it would be entering into the very Essence of the One Cause (86).—So much for the Vedāntic conception of the cause of Creation.

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As regards the Sāṅkhya view that Creation is due, not to the action of an intelligent Soul or Personality, but to the action and reaction of the *Guṇas*, it has to be explained how the first and initial activity of the *Guṇas* began. Before the Creation, there could not be any ‘*Karma*’ of past Personalities, to which the activity could be due;—nor could there be any wrong notions:—nor Hatred and Love etc.; nor any mental operations of any kind (87-88).—It has been sought to be explained that the source of all trouble lies in the ‘*Karma*’ that are still there in their latent state.—But, as a matter of fact, no effect is ever found to proceed from causes in the latent stage (89).—If *Karma* in the latent stage were to be cause of the world and all attendant troubles, then there could be no freedom from those, as, in its latent stage, the *Karma* would always be there (94).—It may be that the *Karma* themselves are the product of Ignorance; but even so, they could not be set aside by mere *knowledge*: as there is nothing to prove that it is so (98).—If, then the view is that “Bondage is due to *Karma* and *Karma* is due to Ignorance,—and when one has attained the knowledge of difference between Soul and Matter,—then the Cause, in the shape of Ignorance, having ceased, the effect, in the shape of *Karma* ceases to appear, whence Bondage ceases and Liberation comes about,”—then, the difficulty is that the cessation of Ignorance might stop the appearance of more *Karma* and the consequent Bondage;—but it cannot stop the reaction and fruition of all past *Karma* (101).—There is no basis for the assumption that “there is Creation and Evolution of the World, consisting in the birth and destruction of all things” (113).

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The fact of there being no Omniscient Person is proved by the following arguments set forth in *Shlokavārtika* (under *Su*. 1. 1. 2, verses 117 to 151):—

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As a matter of fact no one ever meets with anyone who knows everything, who is omniscient; nor can there be any reliable inference of there having been one in the past; nor is there again any verbal authority for believing in any Omniscient Person. How too could reliance be placed on the verbal assertion of another person? There can be no Eternal Scripture speaking of any omniscient person; in case any passage were found in the eternal scripture, it could only be an *Arthavāda*; for if it did really speak of a real person, it could not be eternal; and it has been proved beyond doubt that the Veda is eternal. So no other means of knowledge can apply to that self-sufficient authority that belongs to the Veda.—As for the argument set up by the Buddhist (who believes in the omniscience of Buddha) that—“Buddha has declared ‘I am omniscient,’ and this assertion must be true, because

Cites (3)