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Indian Logic and Atomism: An Exposition of the Nyaya and Vaiceshika Systems c19.s1: 1. The Theism of the System

Indian Logic and Atomism: An Exposition of the Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika Systems c19.s1

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English

1. The Theism of the System

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THE Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika in the syncretist texts ¹ is frankly theistic; those which follow the tradition of the Vaiçeṣika and adopt its order of exposition, find place for the conception of God under the category of substance, as one great subdivision of the self, with which on their theory God has eight qualities in common, the five common to all beings, number, as one, dimension, as all-pervading, individuality, conjunction and disjunction, which are necessary in creation, and cognition, desire and action. But they admit that his cognition differs essentially from that of man in that it is eternal, universal, and absolute, while that of man is transient, particular, and relative. On the other hand, the Nyāya tradition as seen in the *Tarkabhāṣā*, not being confined within the strict system of categories of the Vaiçeṣika, is free to treat God as a being of quite exceptional character, not to be regarded as in any sense on a par with the human soul.

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¹ TK., p. 4; TS., § 17.

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It is of interest also that there is clear evidence in the fourteenth century of the very definitely religious tinge of the votaries who professed one or other of the systems. Rājaçekhara, in his *Ṣaḍdarçanasamuccaya* ² expressly applies the term Yoga to the Nyāya and makes the followers of the Vaiçeṣika also in their religious aspect similar to those of the Nyāya; the only difference between the two on his view is that the adherents of the Nyāya are called, Çaivas, those of the Vaiçeṣika Pāçupatas. He described the ascetic practices of these sectarians, which equate them to the ordinary votaries of Çiva. His evidence is supported by that of Guṇaratna in his commentary on Haribhadra’s Ṣaḍdarçanasamuccaya¹ of slightly later date, though it is possible that he draws from the same source as Rājaçekhara; he gives four main divisions of the Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika sectaries, the Çaivas, Pāçupatas, Mahāvratadharas, and Kālamukhas, with various subdivisions, including the Bharaṭas, who are mentioned also by Rājaçekhara, and whose characteristic trait was the fact that they accepted a man of any caste, provided he was a devotee of Çiva. Jinadatta in his *Vivekavilāsa*,² about the middle of the thirteenth century, states that the texts of the Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika were used in the Çaiva system, and that these systems had Çiva for their deity. It is impossible to discredit the value of this testimony, which is the more valuable in that the normal source whence to seek the inspiration of the Çaiva systems is the Sāṃkhya which has admittedly close relations with the development of Çaiva philosophy. The antiquity of the connexion is attested by the tradition which is preserved by Praçastapāda³ that it was Çiva in the shape of an owl who revealed to Kaṇāda the Vaiçeṣika system. Praçastapāda⁴ also in his exposition of creation uses as the name of the creator Maheçvara, a choice in which we can hardly fail to see a deliberate preference for the view that the true God is Çiva. Of Uddyotakara we have the express evidence of the *Nyāyavārttika* that he was a Pāçupata, and it is interesting to note that in his *Nyāyavārttika*¹ he adopts theism and quotes a verse which is given by Mādhava in the *Sarvadarçanasaṃgraha*² as one in which the supporters of the Çaiva system maintain the existence of God. Theism in the Nyāya is shown to be recognized by Vātsyāyana³ not so much because he declares that the self sees all, feels all, knows all, and perceives all, a description which would hardly be true if he did not in the term self include God as the self *par excellence* as because of his defence of the activity of God in the fruition of deeds. An express proof of the connexion of Nyāya with Çaivism is seen in Bhāsarvajña’s *Nyāyasāra*,⁴ which may date before Udayana and in which it is expressly said that final release is produced in the Çaiva system, and stress is laid on the necessity of the practice of the recognized kinds of mental concentration which at last will yield the direct vision of Maheçvara. Similarly Udayana,⁵ who is the classical exponent of the theism of the two systems treats the God whom he demonstrates as equivalent to Çiva.

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² vv. 94, 113, 129-31; Suali, *Intr.*, pp. 127 ff.

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¹ pp. 49 ff.

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² viii. 285-303. Cf. SSS. vi. 13, 19.

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³ p. 329.

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⁴ pp. 48, 49; at p. 7 īçvara is used.

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¹ iv. 1. 21.

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² p. 67.

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³ NBh. i. 1. 9 ; iv. 1. 21.

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⁴ p. 39.

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⁵ Kus. ii. 4.

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Can we therefore assert that the silence of Kaṇāda and Gautama, unless in the latter case we believe that the self for him included God, means that the authors of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiçeṣika Sūtras* were not believers in God? It has been contended not only that this is the case,⁶ but that the atheism of the schools was borrowed from the Sāṃkhya, but for this theory there is no positive evidence forthcoming, and it must be judged merely on the probabilities of the case. On the whole there is so little sign of Sāṃkhya affinity that it would be as easy to attribute the atheism of the systems to the influence of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā whose importance as discrediting the idea of God must not be underestimated. A different explanation is suggested by the later and modern Indian doctrine¹ that the systems are not to be deemed as fundamentally opposed, but as aspects or standpoints whence so much of truth is revealed as may be adapted to the minds which are to receive it. In this sense the doctrine is pressed too far; it is the result of a philosophic mind reviewing from the standpoint of wide knowledge of the systems their points of community and seeking to find a comprehensive formula to fuse them in one. This can be accomplished by treating the Sāṃkhya as a further advance in analysis on the Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika, and then finding in the Vedānta the final truth. But to convert a theory of reconciliation into sober history is unwise, and unconvincing.

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⁶ Garbe, *Sāṃkhya*, p. 119 ; *Phil. of Anc. India*, p. 23. He ignores the early evidence entirely.

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¹ Max Müller, *Six Systems*, p. xvii; Chatterji, *Hindu Realism*, pp. 5–17; Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *NL.*, pp. 6–8. Müller’s denial (pp. 276–81) of Jaimini’s atheism is an error; PSPM., pp. 85–8.

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On the other hand the actual condition of the two Sūtras provides ground for the belief that they cannot be deemed to cover the whole field. Neither gives the impression of a well-thought-out and ordered whole; Praçastapāda, indeed, had to restate the Vaiçeṣika before it could be deemed a systematic treatize in any sense, and the Nyāya is so predominantly dialectical in interest that its excursions into metaphysics have an air of divagation from the work in hand, which forbids us to assume that silence on any topic means its exclusion. One thing at least is certain; if we assume that Kaṇāda² or Gautama intended the theory to stand by itself without the introduction of a creator we fall into the difficulties pressed relentlessly by Çaṅkara who assumes a Vaiçeṣika without a Supreme Lord, and establishes beyond a peradventure that on this theory there never could be any creation or destruction of the world or beginning of activity. It may be that early criticisms of the system in the period between Kaṇāda and Praçastapāda resulted in the recognition of this defect and that the creator was assumed to fill the lacuna; it may equally well be that Kaṇāda himself would have accepted this doctrine as part of his system; what is clear is that, given the Vaiçeṣika tenets, a creator becomes a necessity, as is assumed by Praçastapāda, demonstrated by Çrīdhara, and expounded in classical form by Udayana.¹

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² The comm. find references to God in VS. i. 1. 3 (= x. 2. 9); vi. 1. 1–4; ii. 1. 18, 19 as author of the Veda, of names, &c.; above, ch. v, § 2. Faddegon (p. 354) favours, without proving, atheism.

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¹ Īçvara is denied to be a cause in fruition of action in NS. iv. 1. 19–21, interpreted otherwise by the commentary as implying theism; see Max Müller, *Six Systems*, p. 554.

Cites (8)