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Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c17: Chapter XI. The Theory of Action and Buddhology

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c17

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Chapter XI. The Theory of Action and Buddhology

1. The Mechanism of the Act

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To the *Abhidharmakoça* we are indebted for a full development of the theory of the mechanism of the act and its fruition, which unites into a more or less coherent whole the vaguer hints of the earlier texts. Insistence is laid on the necessity of volition for action; the accidental destruction of a human being when aiming at a pumpkin is no murder, and issue on this point is taken with the Jain view, which curiously enough is repeated in the *Milindapañha*. The Jain argument is that the man who slays, however unwittingly, is guilty of murder, just as the man who touches fire, however unknowingly, is burned. But this is rejected as absurd; the mother and the embryo would each be guilty of injuring the other; a murdered man would be guilty as the cause and origin of the slaying; if the analogy of fire is pressed, it results in holding that a man who induces another to kill is no murderer, since he did not strike the blow, while unconscious sin would be graver than conscious sin, just as the man who incautiously touches fire suffers more than he who does so knowingly.¹

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¹ MKV., pp. 306 f. ; AK. iv ; Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, p. 69 ; cf. Mil., p. 158.

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The element of intention is differentiated from bodily or verbal action by its effects; it leaves only an impression (*vāsanā*) on the mental series, while bodily and verbal actions as material create something also quasi-material styled by the scholastics Avijñapti, which persists and develops without consciousness on the part of the individual. This curious doctrine contains in itself the recognition of a real fact; the taking of a religious vow impresses on a man's character a peculiar bent, which is not consciously present but none the less must definitely affect the trend of his actions.¹

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¹ Poussin, op. cit., pp. 71 f. The gift does not, however, exist in intention alone, as the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold; KV. vii. 4.

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The criterion of action remains dubious, for the doctrine that a good act is one that benefits a neighbour is incidental only, and the general rule is merely that a good act is one which matures into a pleasurable existence in future, while a bad act leads to pain. Or again, an act is good if it aims at pleasure in a future existence, but not if it seeks happiness in this, a doctrine which has obvious limitations, since it may lead, as in the case of Nanda, a kinsman of Çākyamuni, to acceptance of the tonsure and separation from his wife, merely to gain the delights of celestial brides in the world of heaven.² The system allows also excessive room to the inculcation of the virtue of generosity; even if a man sins not, and thus secures rebirth as a man, he will be poor if he has failed in generosity; if he sins, but is generous, he will pay for the sin by rebirth in hell or as an animal or ghost, but thereafter he will reap the reward of birth on earth as a rich man or as a god in heaven. It accords with this that the casuistry of the gift is elaborated. A gift depends for its value on such factors as the faith, learning, morality, and intention of the giver; the manner and moment of donation; the qualities of the object given; and, last not least, the qualities of the recipient or field (kṣetra) of donation. A man, however wicked, is a more worthy object of favour than an animal; gifts to the poor and sick are especially fruitful; gifts in return for services are laudable, and gifts to a virtuous and enlightened saint are best of all. In every case of course desire of immediate reward in this life is excluded.

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² Poussin, op. cit., p. 76, n. 2; Saundarananda Kāvya (JA. 1912, i. 79): aihikasukhārtham karmāpunyam, AKV. (Paris MS.) f. 236b. That Buddhism is hedonistic is admitted in Psych. Ethics, pp. lxxxiii ff.; the attainment, or even the seeking after, enlightenment is pleasant beyond other pleasures; Buddhism, pp. 230 ff.

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The mechanism of transmigration, vaguely conceived earlier, is now brought into effective connexion with action. Normally a being, god, man or animal, lives its life without essential physical change, though occasionally punishment for crime may change a man into a woman or transfer him into a hell being without the intervention of death. But death is normally the portal to the next existence and the last consciousness of life is determined in form by appropriateness to the new birth to be achieved, which in its turn depends on the action to be rewarded or punished. If the fate of the man on death is to be hell, he hears the cries of the tormented, and his rebirth or conception consciousness (*pratisamdhi-vijñāna*) is a continuation of this last consciousness before death. An animal is incapable of action proper; but an ancient deed may reward it with rebirth as a man, and its dying consciousness takes the form of ideas, desires or images which are continued in an infant birth. The process is complex, since each individual series extends indefinitely into the past, and the future rebirth cannot be predicted, though a meritorious person may often secure the kind of rebirth he desires by intense thought of it before death.¹

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¹ Poussin, *Nirvāna*, pp. 85 ff. Cf. the mediaeval Ceylonese doctrine, *Compendium*, pp. 73 ff.

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The process of rebirth may be immediate; thus gods and beings of hell are not conceived, but the last consciousness of the dying man creates in some fashion for itself the necessary divine or infernal body out of unorganized matter. In the case of men, animals or ghosts there may be delays in rebirth if circumstances are not propitious, and in the meantime it may exist as a Gandharva, for seven or forty-nine days, before it finds its way to fashion with the aid of the conceptional elements the necessary embryo, and errors are possible in detail at least; the consciousness may be born in jackal, not dog shape.

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There is obviously a difficulty in determining the time of the reward or punishment of action, which the scholastic states without explaining. We must distinguish between acts which are supernatural (*lokottara*), leading to release, neither born of desire nor leading to it, and destructive of the reward of earlier deeds, and those acts which, born of desire, lead to rebirth or reward. Some of those acts need not be rewarded; a saint may obtain release without the tedium of enjoying in heaven the reward of his good deeds, and he who has won the position of a non-returner (*anāgāmin*) has not to suffer in hell or on earth or in an inferior heaven the fruits of past deeds. Of those deeds that bear reward some may be requited in this life; a good man if he commits some minor sin will pay the penalty ere his death, while a bad man who committed the same fault would suffer torment in hell. On the other hand such grave crimes as parricide receive inevitably punishment in the next life. But most serious sins may be punished then or their retribution may be delayed to permit the retribution of other acts, or in rare cases by the attainment of sanctity they are turned into deeds to be requited in this life.

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Artificial as the theory is, it serves to explain the whole nature of existence of sentient beings. An evil deed results in birth as a hell being, and if wicked enough the sin may compel long periods of rebirth in such a state. The birth and the sufferings undergone are the fruit of ripening of the sin (*vipākaphala*). But at last the force of birth projection by the sin is lessened; an animal existence or existences follows, whose sufferings are again the fruit of ripening, while the character of the birth is the fruit similar to the action (*niṣyanda-phala*) as when the murderer is reborn as a tiger. The power of birth projection is at last exhausted, and the way is open for some deed done in a former birth which had merit, and which now projects a human birth, but the life that follows will be coloured by a fruit similar to the ancient sin; the murderer will be crushed to death,¹ the thief poor. Moreover, he will have a character tinged by the nature of his son; the murderer will be evil disposed.²

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¹ A thorn which pricks the Buddha's foot is the fruit of a slaying of a man in the 91st Aeon hence; TRD., p. 26.

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² Can one in hell do good? KV. xiii. 2 does not deal with this, but with good done by one who has already committed a crime dooming him for a Kappa.

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But it is not merely each organism which is brought into being by the effect of action. The world in which the organism is to exist owes its existence to the same cause; it is material indeed, but its actual condition is not due to any nature of its own; it is the fruit of mastery (*adhipati-phala*) of the acts of beings. This is seen most clearly at the beginning of a cosmic age;³ the whole material universe is the fruit of mastery of all the deeds of the world of living beings. The rule is universal, and applies to the divine sphere with a completeness and boldness unknown to Brahmanical thought. In the cosmic evolution the acts of the being whose merits are to secure his appearance as the Brahmā of the age produce his divine palace, in which the god comes into being, to delude himself into the belief that he is self created (*svayam-bhū*). By a similar delusion he imagines that the other beings who come into existence as his companions in his heaven are creatures of his desire for companionship, instead of being produced by the merits of ancient days, and hence is derived the worship of Brahmā as creator and overlord, ideas merely idle;¹ Brahmā in truth like gods of inferior rank has come into being as the reward of noble actions and deep meditations, the Brahma-vihāras, in previous existences, but power he has none, and he differs from the monk set on release in that his acts in the past have aimed at wordly motives.

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³ On this topic, see AKB., pp. 99 ff.

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¹ DN. i. 17 ff., 220 ff.

2. The Mode of Transmigration

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On one point in special in the process of the working of action, we find an interesting divergence in the schools, on the precise mode of transmigration. Popular ideas attributed birth to the co-operation with the parents of an entity, the Gandharva,² representing in some vague way the soul which was to be born. Acting on this doctrine the Sammitiyas and Pubbaseliyas held that after death there was an intermediate state before rebirth, a view with which we may connect the opinion of both the Pubba- and Apara-seliyas that the embryo was immediately provided with a full sense apparatus.³ The Sarvāstivādins adhered to the view as regards all those to be reborn in the worlds of desire and matter as contrasted with those to be reborn in the world of non-matter, a distinction suggesting that the intermediate being must be treated as quasi-material, with a transporting (*ativāhika*) body, analogous to the subtle body of the Sāṃkhya. The Vaibhāṣikas seem to have accepted the intermediate being, supporting the view by the consideration that it is not always possible for the suitable rebirth to be obtained immediately on death.

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² Cf. MN. ii. 137 ; Mil., p. 123 ; J. v. 330 ; Divyāv., pp. 1, 440 ; AK. iii. 12 (pp. 18, 23, 25, 65, 234). For the Vedic idea see Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*², pp. 252 ff.

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³ KV. viii. 2; xiv. 2; Wassilieff, *Bouddhisme*, pp. 242, 249, 255 ; Poussin, JA. 1902, ii. 296 ff. ; BCAP. ix. 73 ; *Çlokavārttika*, p. 704 ; SS. iii. 10 with comm. ; Keith, SS., pp. 36, 82 ; KM., pp. 59, 65.

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On the other hand the idea is rejected by the Mahāsāṅghikas, the Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins, and Kukkuṭikas, and the *Milindapañha*¹ clearly has no belief in any body to transport the consciousness from one destiny to another; the difficulties of the king are resolved by the reflection that one can as rapidly send one's thought to Kashmir as to Kalasi, 200 leagues as against twelve. We learn also from Caṅkara that the passage of the soul into a new life was conceived as taking place without any body by the Buddhists whose views he combats. If for soul we say series of consciousness, this may stand for the Sautrāntika view, but it is possible that, realists as they were, they were willing to accept some subtle matter as accompanying consciousness; the important fact, however, is that their doctrine of continuity enables them to meet adequately the difficulty of continued existence. In any case from their standpoint it is clear that the consciousness is the essential element which determines the new life; whether or not it takes a body with it, it is the seed of consciousness, which through the physiological apparatus of the union of the parents produces the shoot of name and form, the concrete individual.

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¹ p. 83; Caṅkara, BS. iii. 1. 1.

3. The Nature of the Buddha

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Whatever the element of divinity asserted for himself or accorded to the Buddha by his early disciples, the Pali Canon undoubtedly is sincere in emphasizing the humanity of the Buddha; his epithet of ‘superior to the world (*lokuttara*)’ denotes him merely as one who has attained a perfection of enlightenment and release from the cycle of rebirth. But we learn from the *Kathāvatthu* that other philosophical schools took a distinctive view of the nature of the Buddha, and were supernaturalists in the sense that they did not admit the true or complete humanity of the teacher. There was, indeed, an obvious difficulty in the orthodox view; the attainment by the Buddha of enlightenment is accomplished by the same processes as that by which he enters into the state in which he absolutely passes away. It becomes, therefore, obviously not a little difficult to accept the ordinary version of the life of the Buddha; how can a person who has attained in becoming a Buddha the same state as is attained on the final Nirvāṇa be supposed to have been accessible to mere mundane emotions like pity, and the Uttarāpathakas¹ are recorded as denying that the Buddha felt pity. There is the same difficulty regarding the preaching of the law; the older tradition asserts that from the night of the illumination to his passing away the Buddha said nothing false; for this, is substituted the idea that he said nothing at all.² But some explanation of the teaching of the law is required, more satisfactory than picturesque conceptions of the enlightenment being imparted by the bright hairs on the Buddha’s forehead, or the eloquence of the walls of the place of instruction, and a solution for the difficulties is found by the Vetulyakas, a mysterious school, in the doctrine that the Buddha never lived in the world of sense but displayed himself on earth in a specially created form, while the doctrine was preached by the disciple Ānanda.³ This is to carry the matter further than is necessary, and we find among the Lokottaravādins of the Mahāsāṅghikas a more modified concept.⁴ Ṣākyamuni there is represented as having taken, long ages ago in the presence of a Buddha of the same name, the vow to become a Buddha and to have followed up his purpose through the elaborate process of the acquisition of the ten perfections. Then incarnating himself for the last time he enters into the womb of the virgin Māyā, in a mental or spiritual (manomaya)⁵ form in which he is able to give instruction to mankind. A difficulty for the school obviously here presents itself; the traditional account of the Buddha gave him one—or three¹—wives, and in order to enhance the glory of his self-sacrifice in becoming a Buddha, insists on the pleasures of sense which he enjoyed in the harem; a son Rāhula is also attributed to him; he is converted to a sense of the futility of life by the spectacle of a sick man, a corpse, and a monk, but performs vain and prolonged austerities before he attains the desired end. Clearly it is impossible to attribute such actions even to the spiritual form; complaisance with the world (*lokānuvartana*) may be carried too far, and therefore these matters are treated as mere edifying stories, or, at any rate, if they represent fact, the acts were done merely for our edification. Certainly, however, the Buddha in his earthly life was wholly exempt from physical desires and his wife, whose existence is admitted, was a virgin. On the other hand, it is clear that the Nirvāṇa of this spiritual Buddha cannot be treated as imaginary, nor are we to regard his form as merely spiritual. This view asserted by Udāyin is expressly contradicted; the body, if subtle, belongs to the world of matter; it is visible because it is material, spiritual because it is not generated according to the law of physical desire but comes into being spontaneously; indeed, it appears that from the eighth state of their advance in the perfections, future Buddhas possess a body of this kind.

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¹ KV. xviii. 3; see Mil., p. 110.

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² KV. ii. 3; xviii. 8 (Poussin, Buddhisme, p. 253); AN. ii. 24; BCAP. ix. 36; MKV., p. 366.

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³ Ṣlokavārttika, p. 86; KV. xviii. 1; Kashgar frag. of Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, JRAS. 1907, p. 434. Cf. Ṣ., p. 284.

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⁴ Mahāvastu; Poussin, Buddhisme, pp. 248 ff. See also Oltramare, Muséon, 1916, pp. 3 ff.

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⁵ Or, ‘mind made’ possibly; Mhv. i. 218, but this lacks plausibility in view of the regular use, DN. i. 34, 77, 187. Cf. ERE. viii. 329; above, p. 129, n. 4.

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¹ Péri, BEFEO. 1918, no. 2. ² The Vaibhāṣikas treated the Buddha as essentially human; the Sautrāntikas seem to have recognized a large number of Buddhas and the doctrine of the Dharmakāya, body of the law, of each; Wassilieff, *Bouddhisme*, pp. 272, 285 f. ³ pp. 95 ff., 177 f.; KV. xvi. 1-3. Gifts to the dead are approved, Mil., pp. 294 ff.; disapproved as a Rājagirika and Siddhatthika heresy; KV. vii. 6.

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There is obviously much confusion of thought apparent even in the scant sources available. The evidence, however, is interesting as suggesting that the Mahāsānghikas represent a strong and early belief in the divinity of the Buddha, although it is only in a fragmentary and late form that their views are preserved to us.²

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A question of importance is presented by the attitude of the *Milindapañha*³ to the difficult problem of the efficacy of gifts to the Buddha. The issue is clear; the Buddha is absolutely departed; neither in life, nor yet more in death can he accept gifts; if there be no recipient, how can homage to him avail? But Nāgasena insists on the merit of acts of homage and seeks to explain this quality by similes; if a great fire goes out, men kindle one for themselves; so men by erecting a shrine do homage to the supreme god under the form of the jewel treasure of his wisdom and win rebirth as a man, or god, as even release. Seed sown on the earth grows into trees, though the earth is unconscious. Diseases come to men without their consent from former evil deeds; hence, it follows that a good deed must bear fruit apart from consent, just as ill deeds done to a saint bring retribution without his desire. But we have also in the text a reference to the beautiful doctrine that a man may transfer his merit, instead of keeping it to himself alone; if a man were to keep on transferring the merit of his good deeds to others, still he would only increase himself in merit; the stress laid is on the latter part of the proposition but the existence of the former conception is clearly indicated. It is, however, clearly unorthodox, for the *Kathāvatthu* delivers a polemic against the Mahāsānghika doctrine that the attainment of power in this world must include the control of the consciousness of others, so that what one man does another may enjoy. It condemns also the kindred topic that one can help the mind of another, and the Hetuvādin doctrine that one can cause happiness to another, except in the indirect sense of promoting conditions—as did the Buddha by his teaching—whence happiness may be produced, each for himself, by every one.

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The *Kathāvatthu*¹ also is strictly orthodox regarding the career of a Bodhisattva. The idea encouraged by the Jātaka literature that the Buddha adopted deliberately in the past for the benefit of men such evil dooms as existence in hell, rebirth, the performance of hard tasks, and of penance under alien masters, is emphatically rebuked as a heresy of the Andhakas. The reality of the experiences of the Bodhisattva could not, of course, be denied without repudiating the tradition, but to claim that these experiences were voluntarily undergone implies a doctrine which is wholly unacceptable to the Vibhajyavādins. The school denies also the belief of the Andhakas founded on a Sutta that Çākyamuni entered on the path of assurance under the dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa; if this were true, then he must have been a disciple of Kassapa, and this contradicts the essential nature of a Buddha which is to be self-developed.

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¹ xxiii. 3 (J. no. 514); iv. 8 (MN. ii. 46 f.). An anticipation of the later doctrine may be seen in the legends of Piṇḍola and Kācyapa, which contemplate Arhants awaiting Maitreya’s advent; JA. 1916, ii. 196, 270.

4. The Perfections of the Saint

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Especial stress was laid in the schools on the development of the view of the character of the Arhant, which assumed in the opinion of the Vibhajyavādins a rigidity, excluding human weaknesses and imperfections. Thus they deny strenuously the possibility of the falling away of an emancipated one, even in the case of one who attains only occasionally in meditation full emancipation, against the view of the Sammitiya, Vajjiputtiyas, Sabbatthivādins and some Mahāsaṅghikas that the Arhant is liable to fall away. They deny also the doctrine of the Pubba- and Apara-seliyas that the gods of the Māra group can impose physical impurities on saints.¹ As against the Andhakas it is maintained that the saint has complete knowledge, that he cannot doubt, and that he cannot be surpassed in knowledge by others, while against Mahāsaṅghika and Andhaka views it is claimed that he casts aside every fetter of ignorance and doubt in attaining his end.² But the saint is human; the Uttarāpathakas, who hold that he is entirely free in every regard from any connexion with the four intoxicants, desire, lust for rebirth, false opinion, and ignorance, are reminded that his body and his sense organs cannot be deemed uncontaminated by these intoxicants, and that only the path, its fruits, Nirvāṇa, and the factors leading to insight are really free from connexion with the intoxicants. Similarly, though the saint is indifferent as to sense impressions as part of his character, his indifference is manifested under human conditions; he cannot attend to more than one sense impression or idea at the same time, for his consciousness is essentially momentary, as also is that of a god.¹ The gods also are forced into human mould; it is a mistake to hold, as the Sammitiyas do, that there is no self culture among the gods of the higher heavens of the worlds of desire and matter, save, of course, in the realm of the unconscious gods, for the Andhaka doctrine that consciousness really exists there is absolutely rejected.² Again, the progress to sainthood must be carried out in strict accordance with the stages marked out; the Andhakas are wrong in defining saintship, so as to cover the simultaneous putting aside of all the fetters; in the first three stages five of the fetters are removed; in the last the aspirant rids himself of the desire for rebirth either in the world of matter or of non-matter (rūpa-, arūpa-, rāga), conceit, distraction, and ignorance. The Uttarāpathakas are also wrong in ascribing to a learner the insight of a saint.³

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¹ KV. i. 2; ii. 2; possibly one of Mahādeva’s five points, JRAS. 1910, p. 418; Wassilieff, *Bouddhisme*, pp. 223 ff.

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² KV. ii, 2-4; iv. 10; xxii. 1.

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¹ KV. iv. 3, 5; doubt and ignorance of Arhatship are two of Mahādeva's points; contrast MN. iii. 110; AN. v. 155, 162; ERE. i. 744.

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² KV. i. 3; iii. 11; they do not practise moral control, iii. 10.

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³ KV. iv. 10; v. 2.

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The saint by his actions, gifts to the order, saluting shrines and so forth does not accumulate any action to continue to bear fruit; if he could win merit he could also win demerit, which is impossible.⁴ Nor is it necessary that he should experience the results of all his former action before his death, so that he cannot die an untimely death, as asserted by the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, in accordance with their general doctrine that all is derived from action. Still less can a saint fall away from sainthood because, as held by the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas, in a previous birth he has calumniated a saint.

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⁴ KV. xvii. 1; 2; viii. 11. The Prajñaptivādins deny untimely death; Wassilieff, p. 244.

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The state of the saint in passing away raises difficulty; it is denied that he possesses an ethical consciousness at such a moment, which is contrary to the extinction of ethical considerations for the sage, though asserted by the Andhakas. Nor is the Uttarāpathaka doctrine right, under which the saint attains the completion of existence in imperturbable absorption of meditation; on the contrary in accordance with the Canon we must recognize that he passes out of meditation before death, and that therefore he dies with possession of that sub-consciousness (*bhavanga-citta*) which is the normal characteristic of life, and which is non-ethical and purely resultant.¹

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¹ KV. xxii. 2, 3.

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No person may become a saint unless he has laid aside the life of a layman, canonical texts to the contrary and the views of the Uttarāpathakas notwithstanding; it is impossible also for any embryo to become a saint at the moment of rebirth nor can a dreamer attain this state.²

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² KV. iv. 1, 2; xxii. 5; xxiii. 1 may sanction married life according to the Andhakas and Vetulyakas.

5. Nirvāṇa as the Unconditioned

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There is comparatively little development in the schools of the conception of release. The *Milindapañha*³ in the older portion insists on the conception of release as cessation of birth, old age, death, and the attendant woes of life; it is held that he who has overcome the tendencies to rebirth is aware of his success in producing cessation of craving leading to it, while those, who have not, still know the excellence of release by hearing of it from those who have experience of it, precisely as the pains of mutilation are known by listening to the moans of the sufferers. In the later portions we have, after an assertion of the non-existence of any true being in the world, a discussion of space and Nirvāṇa as uncaused by any of the recognized causes; there is a cause of the realization of Nirvāṇa, but not of its origin, just as one can go to the Himālayas, but cannot bring them to oneself. Nirvāṇa is uncompounded; it cannot be said to have been produced, or not to have been produced, or to be possible of production, to be past, future, or present, or perceptible by any sense organ. Nirvāṇa exists and is perceptible by the mind; with a pure heart, free from obstacles and cravings the disciple can see Nirvāṇa. Its nature can be explained only by similes, just as wind cannot be grasped, though it most assuredly exists.

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³ pp. 50, 69; 268, 271 f., 313 ff.

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Nirvāṇa is utter bliss, without pain; though its form, figure, duration, or size cannot be explained, yet something may be said of its qualities. It is untarnished by evil dispositions; it cools the fever arising thence; it is boundless, full of saints; it blossoms with the flowers of purity, knowledge, and emancipation. It is infinite, is satisfying to all desires, it is very exalted, and immovable. It can be realized by freedom from distress and danger, by peace, calm, bliss, delicacy, and purity. There is no place where Nirvāṇa is stored up, save only right living.

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The Dhammasaṅgaṇi almost ignores the term Nibbāna, but in the ancient supplementary exposition or comment (atthuddhāra) Nibbāna is invariably substituted for the term uncompounded element. Yet it is noteworthy that in the text itself the uncompounded element is never identified with the fruit of sainthood which is certainly one aspect of Nirvāṇa. This uncompounded element is described by a long series of negatives; it is not connected with thought in any form, nor with the fetters, the contagions, the ties, corruption, grasping, joy, ease, disinterestedness; it is, however, positively described as supra-mundane; it is invisible, non-impinging, without material form; uncaused; it cannot be affected by insight or culture; it is indeterminate and produces no result.¹

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¹ Psych. Eth., pp. 359, 361, 367 ff. There is nothing new in ADS. vi. 14; ix. 9.

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In the Kathāvatthu we meet the Andhaka conception of Nirvāṇa as morally good, but this view is rejected, since morally good means positively that which will produce a good rebirth, and this is inappropriate to Nirvāṇa. An interesting discussion arises on the dictum in the Majjhima Nikāya that the enlightened man does not think about Nirvāṇa. This leads to the Pubbaseliya doctrine that Nirvāṇa as an object of thought is really a hindrance, a view very imperfectly refuted by the Theravādin, while Buddhaghosa is so perplexed by the issue—the Pubbaseliya being accorded the last word in the discussion—that he falls back on the quite impossible solution that Nirvāṇa here is simply temporal well being, a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires only.²

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² xix. 6; ix. 2; MN. i. 4. On Nirvāṇa as void, see ch. xiii, § 1.

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