Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c21.s1: 1. The Doctrine of Knowledge
Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c21.s1
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1. The Doctrine of Knowledge
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THE Vijñānavāda formally, as in practice the Madhyamaka, recognizes the existence of three distinct forms of knowledge.¹ Absolute or perfect knowledge (*pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*) admits only the final purification of thought which means the disappearance of consciousness, the complete destruction of the last thought element on which ensues Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa, the cessation of activity, and the ether are the sole realities to be admitted from the point of view of absolute truth, so that there is little real distinction between the view of the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka on this score.
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¹ MSA. vi. 1; xi. 13 ff.; *Madhyāntavibhāga* in MKV., p. 445 (cf. p. 553), 274 f.; Mvy. 87; *Wassilieff, Bouddhisme*, pp. 292 ff.; Poussin, JA. 1903, ii. 380.
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Below absolute truth is the realm of relative knowledge (*paratantralakṣaṇa*), which embraces the whole series of intellectual states into which the school resolves all the world of experience. But the extent of the reality of this knowledge is a matter of dispute;² in one view it is to be regarded as having absolute reality in the sense that it does exist and not as illusion, but disappears absolutely when the thought is purified and Nirvāṇa is attained. The other, and more prevalent view, seems to tend to a much lower estimate; the subject of knowledge, the object, and knowledge itself should not be regarded as real in any sense; there is no distinction in actual truth, but merely an illusion. Thought, in itself absolutely pure (*vyavadāta*), by an inveterate error imagines itself to be infected or defiled (*kliṣṭa*), and thus conceives itself under the three forms of subject, object, and knowledge. The distinction between these views is obviously parallel to that between the orthodox interpretation of Buddhapālita of the Madhyamaka and the realistic preferences of Bhāvaviveka, who admits the the existence of phenomena as such.
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² BCA. ix. 12, 17, 18 assumes reality; but see MSA. vi. 1 where the two lower forms are sharply opposed to the higher; Dharmakīrti in *Upadeçasahasrī*, p. 308; SDS., p. 13; JBRAS. xviii. 94 f.; *Wassilieff, Bouddhisme*, pp. 309 ff., whose account gives many unintelligible distinctions of view, 289 f. (Dignāga as a realist).
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Accepting, as they do, the sole existence of thought even in the modified sense of relative knowledge, it is not at first apparent what room there is in the system for a third class of knowledge, which can be called imaginary (*parikalpita*). But in deference to the demands of common sense the Vijñānavāda¹ admits that there is a clear distinction between the rope which is mistaken for a snake and the animal, the water of a mirage and real water, and the visions of a dream and ordinary reality. Things again are all internal, and there is no external being, but things do appear as if external (*bāhyavat*), and such imaginations fall within the third class of knowledge, as do also such beliefs as the conception of a permanent self. But a strict criterion between the relative and the imaginary is not available; in the case of sense perceptions, however, we can correct one by the other; the water of the mirage cannot be drunk or touched; the visions of a dream cannot be realized. But the Vijñānavāda, as little as the Madhyamaka, faces the problem of the fact that these imaginary experiences are caused, and have effects, so that in reality it is impossible to dismiss them as imaginary on the ground that they do not possess causal activity (*arthakriyākāritva*), though this activity is of a different kind from the normal. In both schools in fact the classification of knowledge is essentially based on metaphysical conclusions, and is not derived from any serious epistemological investigation. The fact is illustrated by the development in the Vijñānavāda of Dignāga, and probably also of Dharmakīrti, of a doctrine of logic, which is not epistemological, but which for its own purpose treats the topic as if the existence of an external reality (paramārthasat) were admitted, and develops an interesting doctrine of inference on the basis of the metaphysical assumptions of the school.¹
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¹ Or Yogācāra. The Chinese adopt a form equivalent to Yogācārya but also style it Vijñānamātra the Japanese Dharmalakṣaṇa; see Lévi, MSA. ii. 16, n. 1. On the older use of Yogācāra, magician, see Mhv. i. 120; Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, p. 356; Cf. *Yogācāra*, Mil., pp. 43, 366.
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¹ See below, ch. xviii. §§ 2, 3.
Cites (9)
- Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra — Maitreyanātha & Asaṅga, Sanskrit
- Mahāvastu — Sanskrit
- Milindapañha — Pāli
- Mahāvyutpatti — Sanskrit
- Bodhicaryāvatāra — Śāntideva, Sanskrit
- Prasannapadā — Candrakīrti, Sanskrit
- Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit
- Upadeśasāhasrī — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit
- Madhyāntavibhāga — Maitreyanātha, Sanskrit