Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c22.s1: 1. Suchness as the Absolute

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c22.s1

Language
English

1. Suchness as the Absolute

c22.s1.1

THE realistic implications of both the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka must doubtless not be exaggerated; these schools have both specific doctrines which they fully accepted, and it is only as tendencies that we can see a movement to substitute for the negativism of the void or of empty thought, which is hardly more than the void, an absolute comparable to the absolute of the Vedānta. The further development of this tendency is seen in the *Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda* which tradition, as we have seen, ascribes to Açvaghoṣa, but which cannot be attributed to him with any confidence. It centres in the doctrine of suchness (*tathatā*), as the expression for the reality which must be held to remain when we discount al illusory appearances and leave the realm of relativity and contingency for that of absolute truth.¹

c22.s1.2

¹ In addition to his translation, see Suzuki, BM. ch. v; vi.

c22.s1.3

It follows from the fact that we are not concerned with relative knowledge that any definition of suchness is utterly impossible; to apply to it empirical determinations is wholly misleading; to say that it is void is to ascribe to it the character which belongs to the phenomena of this world; to say that it exists is to suggest something individual like ourselves which, however, leads an eternal existence. It is necessary, then, to content ourselves either with silence or to choose the simple term suchness or suchness of being, an idea which in a simple form is known to the Hīnayāna. Suchness is above existence or non-existence or both or neither; similarly also it is neither unity nor plurality nor again both or neither.² It can, therefore, most easily be expressed by negations like the ‘Not so, not so’ of the Upaniṣads, and hence it is natural to treat it as the void. But we must not make the error of thinking this a real definition; the void is as void as anything positive.

c22.s1.4

² Trans. p. 59; cf. MK. i. 1; xxv. 17 f.

c22.s1.5

Suchness in its ineffable absoluteness is thus beyond all comprehension and expression. Its real importance for us is that it comes into contact with empirical reality; by some mysterious act of self-determination, no better defined than as spontaneous, the absolute self affirms itself in the form of the receptacle intelligence (*ālaya-vijñāna*), which presents the two aspects of enlightenment and non-enlightenment. These, it must be remembered, have no separate and independent existence, but have being merely as relative to each other, and neither has any absolute existence, so that from the standpoint of absolute truth they can be identified. The origin of ignorance in the receptacle intelligence results in that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes, the entity which performs these functions being styled mind (*manas*). Five different aspects of its operations are distinguished. The first is activity intelligence (*karma-vijñāna*), when the unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed by the agency of ignorance; the second is intelligence as particular or evolving (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), for, when the mind is disturbed, there arises the vision of an external world; the third is representation intelligence, when the mind reflects an external world as presented by the means of the senses; the fourth is particularization intelligence, which discriminates between things pure and infected; the fifth is succession intelligence: the mind directed by attention retains all experiences, securing the retribution of action, providing for the possibility of memory, and of the anticipation by imagination of the future. We see thus that from the absolute under the influence of ignorance we have the production of the self as a perceiver; of an external world, which exists for him and has no independent being as in the view of the Vijñānavāda; and of the constant round of births which mean misery. The unreal external world is the source of the origin of six phenomena on which misery depends. In the first place the mind, affected by the external world, becomes conscious of the distinction between what is agreeable and what is disagreeable. Secondly, it retains these feelings in a constant succession of changing states. Thirdly, from the retention and succession of feelings arises the desire of clinging. By clinging there is attachment to names and ideas which are ascribed to reality; from attachment to these concepts action is produced, and from action arises suffering. Every form of existence, the worlds of desire, of matter, and of non-matter, is merely a mental creation due to ignorance, precisely as in the Vijñānavāda.

c22.s1.6

We are, however, not condemned for ever to suffer from non-enlightenment, for suchness does not stand absolutely apart from the empiric world. The relation between it and ignorance is that of mutual perfuming (vāsanā) or impression. Ignorance affects suchness and produces those impressions (smṛti) which persist and maintain ignorance in being, creating an external world, and various modes of individuation, leading to action and misery. But suchness also affects ignorance; it thus induces in the mind of the individual in transmigration the hatred of the round of birth and death, and inspires in him the longing for release. Hence arises in the individual the conviction that he is really in possession of the pure nature of suchness, and that phenomena are merely the illusory manifestations of intelligence and have no absolute reality. The way is now open to practise with success the means of liberation, refraining absolutely from particularization, and from clinging to objects of desire. Ignorance can be overcome, because it is not absolutely distinct from enlightenment. The waves of the sea of consciousness which have been disturbed into motion by the wind of ignorance can be stilled, so that there remains only suchness in itself, unassociated with the mysterious disturbance which produces the manifestation of the individual and the world. It is freed from the coverings or obscuration of infections or ignorance (kleçāvaraṇa, jñeyāvaraṇa) and is immutable, calm, pure, and eternal.

c22.s1.7

The attainment of enlightenment and release is open to all beings, since there is always the perfuming of ignorance by suchness, but the intensity of ignorance with the principle of individuation accompanying it varies enormously, and thus accounts for the very diverse spiritual attainments of beings in the world. The inherent tendency of each mind to seek suchness is supported and promoted by the love and compassion of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, who are higher embodiments of suchness; by hearing or seeing the Bodhisattvas man is enabled to acquire spiritual benefits, to win purity, to lay aside all hindrances, and to attain that clear insight which enables them to recognize the oneness of the universe and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. There are stages in the degree of perfuming: adherents of the Hīnayāna or Śrāvakas, solitary Buddhas, and novice Bodhisattvas do not attain the state of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness, but Buddhas win this eminence. At this stage an end is put to the perfuming of ignorance, but the perfuming of suchness works on for ever and ever. Suchness is the effulgence of great wisdom, the illumination of the universe (*dharmadhātu*), true knowledge, the mind pure in its nature, eternal, calm, free, the womb of the Tathāgata, where the essence of Tathāgataship dwells, or the body of the law (*dharmakāya*). We have thus attained a more positive conception of suchness, but we are warned not to misunderstand the doctrine. The epithets of the idea are possible because there is in truth one reality only, so that there can be no question of particularizing or distinction which is utterly inapplicable to suchness; if it is said to be wisdom or knowledge, we must not suppose it has any object; if it is called universal illumination, we must not suppose there is anything to illumine.

c22.s1.8

Here we have, it is clear, something comparable with the absolute of the Vedānta, but at the same time there is much more reality in the new conception, and for all practical purposes a fundamentally novel mode of presenting the operation of the divine essence is revealed. We have in the conception of the activity of suchness as realized in the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, unfolding itself in order to induce all beings to bring their store of merit to maturity, a much more effective version of the suggestion of the *Katha Upaniṣad*¹ that the attainment of deliverance is due to the grace of the Lord; the absolute itself is ever co-operating with the individual to secure him attainment of itself both directly and through the means of others.

c22.s1.9

¹ ii. 20; Çvet. Up. iii. 20; Taitt. Ār. x. 10. 1; Oldenberg, LUAB., pp. 245, 273 ff.; Suzuki's trs., pp. 62, 70.

Linked texts (4)