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Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c26.s1: 1. Logic in the Hīnayāna

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c26.s1

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1. Logic in the Hīnayāna

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Of logical theory the earlier Canon has not a trace; the Buddha is a reasoner whose interlocutors are not his match; his weapons against them, beside his authority, are analogy, simile, parable, and an occasional trace of induction by simple enumeration of cases; definition and division are prominent by their absence. We hear of men skilled in logic or sophistry and reasoning, but there is nothing to show that they had a science of any sort. Exception must, however, be made for Sañjaya of the Belaṭṭha clan; he seems as an agnostic to have been the first to formulate the four possibilities of existence, non-existence, both, and neither, and Buddha in the indeterminates makes lavish use of this device. But of conscious consideration of this principle we have nothing, nor was anything to be expected from a teacher whose aim was to steer a middle path between affirmation and negation, and was therefore by no means likely to develop a logic of non-contradiction.

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The later texts were doubtless contemporaneous with the beginnings of logical study; the *Milindapañha* may allude to logicians, though the reference is but vague; it records the traditional mode of discussion, distinction and counter-distinction being drawn and errors unravelled, but in method it differs not at all from the Canon.¹ A difference appears in the late *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. In the *Kathāvatthu* we find the technical terms, Upanaya, for minor premiss in an argument, Niggamana for the conclusion Pariññā for the proposition, and we may suppose a contemporary logic, but nothing of it is said.¹ The method, followed however, is interesting; it runs: Q. Is A B? A. Yes. Q. Is C D? A. No. Q. But if A be B, then C is D. That B can be affirmed of A, but not D of C, is false. Hence your first answer is refuted. In the inverse (paṭiloma) method we have: If D be denied of C, then B should have been denied of A. (But you affirmed B of A.) Therefore that B can be affirmed of A but not D of C is wrong. There are further developments, but of the same type; the logical clearness is not at all adequate.² In the Yamaka again the distribution of terms is known and the process of conversion is elaborately illustrated, but without trace of appreciation of logical theory. The Paṭisambhidāmagga³ deals with analytical insight into words and things, grammatical analysis, and insight into those processes, but it is quite valueless as logical theory. But, what is far more important, the Abhidhamma has not, despite the intention of the work to contain definitions of conceptions, any theory or effective practice of definition. The Nettipakaraṇa shows some advance in this regard, but it is only in Buddhaghosa that we find the fourfold style of definition as essential mark, property, resulting phenomenon, and proximate antecedent.⁴ Thus mind is defined as following the sense impression, as having the essential mark of cognizing sights, sounds, &c., as the property of receiving the same, the resulting phenomenon of truth, and as its proximate antecedent the vanishing of the sense impression. Buddhaghosa shows also some understanding of the principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle.

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¹ Keith, ILA., pp. 13 f. ; Mil., pp. 28 ff.

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¹ Points of Controversy, pp. xlviii f., 377 f.; Vibhaṅga, pp. 293 ff.

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² e. g. KV. i. 6. 55, ‘past is existent’ is converted to ‘all existent is past’.

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³ cf. Geiger, PD., p. 62.

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⁴ That Buddhist logic knew in Asoka’s time the terms and forms of syllogism (Dasgupta, Ind. Phil. i. 157) is a misreading of Aung’s statement in Points of Controversy, p. 1. On definition cf. Compendium, pp. 2, 7.

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In northern India Buddhism must have grown up amid an eager logical activity, but we have scanty available records; the forms of reasoning employed by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu are recorded on Chinese authority, but it would be premature to draw any definite conclusion from them as to their logical competence. With Maitreya, at any rate, argument does not seem to have advanced beyond the simple procedure from example, e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot, but not like ether.¹

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¹ ILA., p. 108. The name is usually a pious fraud for Asaṅga; Lévi, MSA. ii. 7 f.

Cites (8)