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Some Jaina Canonical Sutras c11: Chapter VI: Vyākhyā-Prajñapti (Bhagavatī-Viyāha-Pannatti)

Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras c11

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Chapter VI: Vyākhyā-Prajñapti (Bhagavatī-Viyāha-Pannatti)

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The fifth Jain *Aṅga*, popularly known as the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, is rightly judged by Winternitz as a Jain canonical mosaic of various texts integrated into a single explanatory treatise on Jainism. It is accordingly entitled *Viyāhapannatti*. It is also known as *Bhagavatīviyāhapannatti*, *Bhagavatī*, *Vivāhapannatti*, and *Pannatti*. The old name of *Viyāhapannatti* is often corrupted to *Vivāhapannatti*. The title *Bhagavai*, which arose later, is originally only an adjective (Schubring, *Die Lehre Der Jainas*, 1935, p. 63). This text has not yet been translated into English. It has been edited with Abhayadeva’s commentary and published in three volumes by the Āgamodaya Samiti of Bombay (1918–1921). Weber and Schubring have made much use of this text (*Über ein Fragment der Bhagavatī*, in *Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1865; *Worte Mahāvīras*). Some portions of this text have been translated into German by Schubring. A Gujratī translation (1–6) has appeared (Ahmedabad, 1927). Dr. A. Weber’s *Fraugment der Bhagavatī* (Berlin, 1866) is worthy of notice. This text contains questions and answers, Mahāvīra replying to the questions of his chief disciple, Indrabhūti, and partly in the form of dialogue-legend (*Itihāsa-samvāda*). This text gives a very good account of the life and work of Mahāvīra whose dissertations on *samsāra* and *karma* are worth noticing. There are two works of this name which is not the original title of either. The fourth *upāṅga*, *Paṇṇavaṇā* often has the epithet *Bhagavai*.

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The *Bhagavatī* is one of the most important and sacred texts of the Jaina *Siddhānta*. *Bhagavatī*, translated by ‘holy’ is just an honorific to signify its great importance as a work of exposition of the tenets and legends connected with the life of Mahāvīra. This text contains 41 sections, each is called a *śataka* (century). Every section has 10 chapters, each of which is called an *uddesaka* or concise presentation of subject-matters. It appears to have followed the *uddesa* and *niddesa* methods, the first implying the presentation of theses and the second their elucidation. Its contents are ‘a motley mixture of ancient doctrines and traditions with numerous later additions containing frequent allusions to other works more especially the *Pannavaṇā*, the *Jīvājīvābhigama*, the *Uvavāiya*, the *Rāyaposeṇaijja*, the *Nandi* and the *Āyaradasāo*.¹

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¹ Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol II (Cal Univ Pub), pp. 442-443

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The 15th section which contains the legendary or semi-historical matters relating to the life of Mahāvīra and his relationship with some of his predecessors and contemporaries is not unreasonably regarded as an independent text which was subsequently taken into the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*.

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The expositions are introduced in the form of dialogues between Mahāvīra and his disciples including Gautama (Goyama Indabhūti). In some of the *uddesakas* they assume the form of catechisms or questions and answers. Abhayadevasūri wrote a commentary on this *sūtra*, which was known to him under two titles, *Vīhāpannatti* (*Vyākhyā-prajñapti*) and *Vivāhapannatti* (*Vivādha-prajñapti*) both of which he explains and justifies. Abhayadeva rightly points out that in some places the tenets are explained by Sudharman to Jambusvāmī. Each section begins with an introduction stating the time, the place, the occasion of the dialogue or discourse and mentioning the persons taking part in it. It may be pointed out that each section stands as a typical *sūtra* of the Jaina or Buddhist canon. Accordingly the component chapters generally appear without any such introduction. In the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* we have the following *khaṇḍas* or topical divisions: *sādhana*, *cāritra*, *siddhānta*, *anyatīrthika*, *vijñāna*, *gaṇita*, *kutūhala*, *deva*, *nāraka* and *anyajīva*.

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The standpoint of Jainism as presented in the *Bhagavatī* is in no way different from that in other texts of the Jain Āgama. The fundamental principle of Jainism is *ahiṃsā* and the attainment of *nirvāṇa* is the highest goal. The practice of *tapas* or austerities marks and characterizes all the prescriptions, practices, and disciplines in Jainism. The plurality of souls is a point in Jain philosophy which is the same as in the Sāṅkhya system. The main point of difference between the two is that in Jainism the souls with consciousness as their fundamental attribute are vitally concerned with our actions, moral and immoral, virtuous and wicked, in which sense they are active principles; while in the Sāṅkhya system the *puruṣas* with consciousness as their fundamental attribute are passive principles inasmuch as their nature is not affected by any and all of the activities relegated to Prakṛti or evolvent. In Jainism too the souls and substances do not undergo any change. They are liable to changes due to changes in circumstances. Both the systems necessitate a careful consideration of the cosmical, biological, embryological, physical, mental and moral positions of the jīvas or living individuals of the world as a whole. These constitute the scientific background of the two systems of thought. One can say that these constitute also the scientific background of Vedānta and Buddhism. The Jainas developed a cosmographical gradation of beings more or less in agreement with those adopted in other systems. But the Jainas followed a tradition of Indian thought which took a hylozoistic view of nature that there is nothing formed even in the world of matter, nothing which exists in space and time, which does not represent some kind or form or type of jīva. And it is assumed that all of them are in the process of development or evolution in the physical structures, modes of generation, foods and drinks, deportments, behaviours, actions, thoughts, ideas, knowledge, intelligence and the like. So we need not be astonished that Jainism speaks of earth-lives, water-lives, fire-lives, and wind-lives, each with its numerous sub-divisions. The plants with their numerous sub-species stand above the material lives. From the plants we pass on to the animal world consisting of an infinite variety of species and from that to the world of men. Above and below man we are led to think of the celestial and infernal beings, the devas and nairayikas.

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Along with the cosmical situation, the cyclical envelopment and development of the earth through the successive periods of time, the geographical position of the living beings is considered, inasmuch as the conditions of their pleasure and pain, happiness and misery are partially determined by it. Accordingly the Bhagavatī Sūtra discusses in agreement with the Jambudvīpaprajñapti and other texts, the geographical situation of Jambudīpa and Bhāratavarṣa, the latter denoting India. Their physical and natural environments too are relevantly taken into consideration. Jainism attributes just one sense to the material beings and the plants. The higher organic beings evolve out of the stage in which they are possessed of one sense, the sense of touch, into the stages in which they become gradually endowed with greater and greater number of senses, the maximum number being six. The nature and quality of their nutriments, the modes of eating, drinking, assimilation, etc., also differ according to the diversity of the species of flora and fauna. Similar differences are also made out with regard to the celestial and infernal beings The study of the lives of mythical beings such as the gods, the demons, and the like is on the whole anthropomorphic The moral ideas of right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice, restraint and unrestraint, bondage and salvation, really appertain to the world of men

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The expositions and discussions of the salient doctrinal points of Jainism are full of logical niceties and disproportionate details The sūtra points out that the organic world is characterized by six constant and opposed phenomena, namely, gain and loss, pleasure and pain, life and death (XV, 1) The sūtra clearly presupposes the development of atomic theory (paramāṇuvāda) in Indian philosophy. Some of the current theories are quoted and criticized (I, 10; II, 1; V, 7) According to the Jain theory as in our Sūtra, each atom is the smallest unitary whole of matter (pudgala). Each of them is characterized by its internal cohesion (sineha). We cannot speak of a half atom (arddha) since an atom is an indivisible unit of matter. With the division it ceases to be an atom (paramāṇoh ardhīkaraṇe paramāṇutvābhāva-prasaṅgāt). A molecule (aṇu) is a combination of atoms more than one. An aggregate of matter (skandha) results from an organic combination of five molecules. Disintegration of a corporeal aggregate results from the separation of the molecules and atoms. Here one may realize the force of the Jain argument for regarding even the material beings, the earth-lives, water-lives, etc., as distinct forms of life, each appearing as an individual with its internal cohesion so long as it exists as such. So through the process of organic development or evolution we pass through the different degrees and forms of internal cohesion.

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The story of conversion of the Brāhmin wanderer named Khandaka (Skandhaka) by Mahāvīra in the Bhagavatī Sūtra (II, 1) is very interesting. The name of the wanderer sounds like the wanderer Sandaka in the Pāli Majjhima Nikāya (Vol. I, p 513) Like other Brāhmin wanderers Khandaka is said to have been well versed in the four Vedas, the six Vedāngas, and the Itihāsa-purāṇa regarded as the fifth Veda Here the list also includes mathematics (gaṇita) and the sastṛ-tantra of the Sāṅkhya philosophy The difficult austerities practised by the wanderer since his conversion to the Jain faith are in substance and detail like those described in the Antagadadasāo and Ovavāra suttas and in the Pāli Mahādukkhakkhandha¹ and Mahāsīhanāda suttas ² The dialogue contained in this uddesa throws some light on the doctrine of infinity and finiteness, endlessness and limitedness discussed in the Pāli Brahmajāla Sutta (Dīgha, I).

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¹ Majjhima Nikāya, I, pp 83-90

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² Ibid, I, pp 68-83

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In the Brahmajāla Sutta the Buddha refers to the four different propositions maintained by the contemporary and earlier recluses and Brāhmaṇas on four different grounds (Dīgha, I, pp. 22ff.). These are: (1) that this world is limited and circumscribed (antavā ayam loko parivatumo); (2) that it is limitless and without an end (ananto ayam loko apari-yanto); (3) that it is both limited and unlimited (antavā ca ayam loko ananto ca), meaning that the world is limited above and below and unlimited crosswise; (4) that it is neither limited nor unlimited. The explanation given by Buddhaghosa in his commentary, the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, is not very illuminating. As he suggests, the limited or unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited view taken by the contemplative in his mental perception or vision (I, p. 115). Here we miss the philosophical aspect of the propositions. It appears that the third proposition referred to the view upheld by Mahāvīra and his disciples. According to Mahāvīra the world may be construed in some respects as limited and in some respects as unlimited (sa-ante loe aṇante loe). Here he considers the position of the world from the four points of view, from the point of view of substance (davvao), from that of field of existence (khettao), from that of time (kālao) and from that of phenomena (bhāvao). It is maintained that considered from first two points of view the world is limited and considered from the remaining points of view, it is unlimited (II, 1). It may be observed that with regard to all contradictory views the Bhagavatī Sūtra assigns to Mahāvīra a kind of synthetic position seeking to justify both of them, each from its own point of view. This was undoubtedly consistent with the ‘It may be’ doctrine (syātvāda of Jainism).

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The Jaina ideas regarding the advent of different living beings in different states or forms of existence are on the whole the same as those in other Indian systems. The main difference lies only in some unimportant details. The Jains too believe in the possibility of bodily advent without the help of any sex union. The Jaina belief, however, is a belief in the transmigration of soul, a point in which it differs from the Buddhist conception of rebirth without any transmigration of soul from embodiment to embodiment. The soul in Jainism as in most of the Indian systems is the factor which polarizes the field of matter and brings about the organic combination of the elements of existence. If the position be that death means an event which takes place when the soul leaves the body, the question arises whether it passes off in some form of corporeality (sasarīrī) or without any such corporeality (asarīrī). Here too the traditional Jain position is, it may be that it goes out in some form of corporeality and it may equally be that it does so without any form of corporeality (Siya sarīrī vakkamai, siya asarīrī vakkamai). With reference to the gross body characterized as audārika, vaikriya and āhāraka, the soul goes out without any corporeality, while with reference to the subtle body characterized as taijasa and kārmana (karmic), it departs in its subtle body (I, 7). Deaths and destinies are broadly distinguished as those undergone by fools and those by the wise. The deaths on the part of fools that take place due to different causes or under different circumstances serve to lengthen the course of gliding in the cycle of births and deaths and those on the part of the wise go to shorten it This too is a commonplace in the popular Indian belief.

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Attention may be drawn to another interesting point. The account given in our sūtra of the doctrinal position of Mankhaliputta Gosāla, the leader of the Ājīvika thought, seeks to make out this point of difference and distinction between Jainism and Ājīvikism. Gosāla’s position is an unqualified fatalism or determinism while Mahāvīra’s position is not so, inasmuch as it distinctly leaves scope for freedom. According to Gosāla death signifies a suspended animation while periodical reanimation as in plant-life is the order of nature. The Jainas seem to construe that if we accept Gosāla’s position, we cannot think of death as a phenomenon, but death in the case of all things formed or compounded is inevitable.

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It is interesting to note that our sūtra (I, 76) speaks of a dispute between Kālāsavesiyaputta, a follower of Pārśva and a disciple of Mahāvīra. It ends with the former’s begging permission to stay with him after having changed the law of the four vows for the law of the five vows enjoining compulsory confession. This is surely a supplement to the Uttarādhyayana dialogue between Kesin and Gautama as representatives of the two Nirgrantha orders, old and new. The date of Gosāla’s death taking place sixteen years before Mahāvīra’s death was coincident with the great war fought between king Kūniya (Ajātaśatru) and king Cedaga of Vaiśālī for the possession of an extraordinary elephant (Bhagavatī Sūtra, Āgamodaya Samiti edition, p. 316) On the death of Mahāvīra the confederacy of nine Mallas and nine Licchavi clans and the kings of Kāśī and Kośala instituted a festival in honour of that event (Bhagavatī Sūtra, p. 316). It may be remarked that the *Bhagavatī* like other Jaina canonical *sūtras* is unaware of the position of Kūṇiya as the king of Magadha. Kuniya is represented as the king, better viceroy of Aṅga, in his father's time. Aṅga was governed as a separate province under Kūṇiya with Campā as its capital (*Ibid.*, p. 316).

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Udāyana of Sauvīradeśa was succeeded by his nephew Keśi in whose reign Vītahavya was completely ruined (*Bhagavatī Sūtra*, p. 619). He went to the extent of renouncing the world but when the question of the succession of his son Abhi came before him, he said to himself: ‘If I renounce the world after appointing Abhi to royal power, then Abhi will be addicted to it and to the enjoyment of human pleasures. He will go on wandering in this world.’ This led him to renounce the world appointing his sister's son Keśi to royal power (*Bhagavatī Sūtra*, pp. 619-20). Is it not a case of the matriarchal system in vogue?

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King Śatānīka's sister Jayantī was a staunch follower of Mahāvīra (*Ibid.*, p. 558). The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* informs us that in the war with Vaiśālī, Kūṇiya is said to have made use of *mahāśilākaṇṭaka* and *rathamusala*. The first seems to have been some engine of war of the nature of a catapult which threw big stones, and the second was a chariot to which a mace was attached to kill men as the chariot moved about (pp. 316, 319). We have also the mention of Tāmali, apparently a citizen of Tāmalitti or Tāmralipti (Tamluk), who is described as a Moriyaputta. It is difficult to make out whether Tāmali of our *sūtra* was in any way connected with the Mauryas of Magadha. He is introduced rather as a rich merchant (III, 1). The *Uvāsagadasāo* and the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* mention a few rich lay disciples of Maṅkhaliputta Gosāla belonging to the Vaiśya class, *e.g.*, Kuṇḍakuliya, a citizen of Kampillapura, Saddālaputta, a rich potter of Polāsapura, Hālāhalā and Ayampula of Śrāvastī, which was the main centre of the Ājīvika activity according to the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*.

Cites (15)