The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v2.c15.s19: 12. Aviddhakarṇa
The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v2.c15.s19
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12. Aviddhakarṇa
v2.c15.s19.1
We are now well into the dark period in the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, a period between the time of Uddyotakara and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, spanning three centuries. All our information about the development of thought in the school during this time is necessarily inferential, at least until manuscripts at present unknown are discovered. (This is by no means impossible even today, however.)
v2.c15.s19.2
Aviddhakarna is one of the most widely discussed authors of this period. References to him are found in various Buddhist works by such writers as Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Karṇagomin. He is also known from Jain sources written by Abhayadeva and others.¹ It seems clear that he wrote a commentary called *Ṭīkā* on a *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, presumably that of Vātsyāyana.² Kamalaśīla says that Aviddhakarṇa wrote a work called *Tattvaṭīkā*.³ Thakur⁴ thinks this may be the same work, but Mahendra Kumar Jain⁵ has argued that in fact there were two Aviddhakarṇas, one the Naiyāyika who flourished between 620 and 700, the other a Cārvāka who lived in the 8th century. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do attribute to Aviddhakarṇa views about inference which would seem to be extremely skeptical, and Mahendra Kumar cites Jain authority for Aviddhakarṇa’s view that it is impossible to define the *liṅga* (= *hetu*) and that, since a valid instrument must give us information we do not already have, inference, which depends on memory, is not a valid instrument. It is for these reasons that Mahendra Kumar concludes that the *Tattvaṭīkā* is a different work, and by a different author, from the commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. On the other hand, Umesh Miśra⁶ explicitly identifies the works. Oberhammer⁷ also assumes they are the same, giving the name *Ruciṭīkā* to the commentary in question.⁸
v2.c15.s19.3
Thakur, Mahendra Kumar, and Umesh Miśra report other views attributed to Aviddhakarṇa. (1) Abhayadeva reports him as agreeing with Uddyotakara’s arguments refuting momentariness on the basis of pervasion. (2) He is widely quoted as arguing for the existence of God by two arguments. (a) An object, perceptible by two sense organs, or not perceptible at all, is produced by a conscious cause, because it possesses an arrangement among its parts, like pot, etc., or atoms, etc., respectively. (b) The material causes (*upādāna*) of an organism are dependent upon an intelligent Being, because they possess color, etc., like threads, etc.⁹ (3) The destruction of an object occurs a moment after the thing exists, not simultaneously with its existence. Therefore it must have a distinct cause. (4) He agrees with Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara that a substance can be perceived without any qualities. (5) He refutes someone’s thesis that aggregation and continuity are *anirvacanīya*. (6) He distinguishes comparison from verbal testimony on the ground that the former gives us knowledge of objects, the latter of the relation of a name with an object. (7) Since the Buddhists deny the existence of selves, there is no possibility of their knowing invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*). (8) Atoms must be eternal, because it is impossible to suppose that they have a creator. This last is impossible because no valid instrument can give us knowledge of such a creator, and thus the creator is unreal, like a hare’s horn.
v2.c15.s19.4
Aviddhakarṇa must precede Dharmakīrti, but otherwise we have no certain knowledge of his date.