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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v2.c15.s2: Theory of Value

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v2.c15.s2

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Contents

Theory of Value

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Philosophical system building in India is almost invariably connected by its creators with the gaining of perfection, which has various names in Indian thought but which we shall here call regularly "liberation." One topic reviewed below is the extent to which this commitment to liberation is mere windowdressing in the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which some critics view as studying logic and debate for their own sake. We shall have occasion to look at the religious affiliations of our philosophers in this connection, and to attempt to gauge the relevance of their religious convictions to their philosophy. Then, after summarily reviewing the general Hindu lore that lies behind all Indian thought, we shall turn to consider particular Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories about the nature of liberation and the other characteristic topics in the Hindu theory of value such as *karma* and transmigration, the abilities of yogis and sages, the question of human versus divine freedom, and the relative worth of the various paths to liberation.

I. What is the Place of Spiritual Values in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika?

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The answer to this question has implications not only for our understanding of the philosophy of the system but also for assessing its historical origins. Generally speaking, Western scholars have tended to discount the reference in the texts to liberation, while Indian scholars have tended to take them seriously. Thus Faddegon writes that the Vaiśeṣika "owes its origin to a purely theoretical attitude of mind and not to that craze for liberation which dominates nearly all forms of Indian thought"¹; but Gopinath Kaviraj suggests that even for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas "the external world...has only a moral value....Hence, the same moral end...which occasions the rise of subjective phenomena acts also as a motive for the origin of the objective order."² These two quotations represent extreme views;

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most scholars adopt positions somewhere between. Not all Western scholars are as skeptical as Faddegon about the moral import of the system: Ingalls writes, “It has often seemed to me that the teachings of the early Nyāya might better be called a philosophy of man than an exposition of logic.”³ And not all Indians have accepted the claims of the classical writers connecting *mokṣa* with philosophy; e.g., Daya Krishna writes: “...many schools of philosophy have literally nothing to do with *mokṣa*. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā would predominantly come within this group.”⁴

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It is important, I believe, to separate the historical question here from the methodological one. As for the latter, I think there is very little reason to accept either Faddegon’s or Kaviraj’s extreme position. There is no question about the sincerity of moral conviction implicit in the writings of the authors we are concerned with. Doubts on this score might only begin to be raised as we approach the close of the period, where there is a tendency to write short monographs on limited topics in logic and methodology, topics which can be handled without any reference to ultimate purposes. As we shall see below, it is possible that the earliest philosophers of this school were not monotheists, but it is only a Western prejudice which draws from this the conclusion that they were amoral or uninterested in spiritual values. They have a great deal to say about liberation, *karma*, and life, and they quite frequently make rather explicit the connections they assume hold between their epistemological and ontological speculations and the quest for perfection.

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On the other hand, I find nothing to warrant Kaviraj’s view that in some basic sense Nyāya is a kind of idealism. These writers are explicitly concerned to controvert idealism in all quarters. It is only if we view philosophy as subordinate to religion that we might come to a view such as Kaviraj’s. But there is no evidence that these philosophers took such a view of philosophy. The question of just what the relation is between philosophical investigations and the proper way to live is one that we shall raise below, where we shall see that while the Naiyāyikas did not equate the good life with the reflective life, they did feel that one would not find his appropriate path eventually culminating in liberation without understanding the truths about reality enshrined in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine, and without mastering the methods of investigation taught in the system.

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The historical question is much more difficult to settle. The most recent and thorough review of it has been made by Oberhammer.⁵ He traces the origins of Nyāya to an old “*vāda* tradition,” a theory about how to carry on and win in discussion, which he feels probably existed independently of *ātmavidyā*, or theory of the self and its perfection, in the days prior to Vātsyāyana. It was Vātsyāyana, he argues, who made special efforts to wed these two disparate strands which only sit uneasily side by side in the *Nyāyasūtras*. For example, in the old theory of discussion the topic of the proper instruments of true knowledge (*pramāṇa*) has only a secondary importance, since though to win a debate one needs to know which arguments carry weight and which do not, the place to look to decide which arguments are persuasive is to the judge, not to theories about the nature of the world or spiritual values. If one's intent is merely to evaluate the worth of arguments, then one need not worry about whether they are productive of true judgments. Thus Nāgārjuna, engaged in a negative dialectical refutation of all positive philosophies, feels no need to limit his reasoning to arguments involving acceptable instruments of true knowledge. The Naiyāyika, on the other hand, insofar as he does plan to use argument to establish positive propositions about how things are, must appeal to a theory about which kinds of evidence are trustworthy.

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Vātsyāyana identifies what he calls "the science of argument" (*nyāyavidyā*) with an ancient science called *ānvīkṣikī*, referred to by Kauṭilya in the *Arthaśāstra*, a famous tract of perhaps the 2nd century B.C. apparently written by a royal minister for the edification of princes. In this work *ānvīkṣikī* is mentioned as an essential part of the curriculum of the young ruler, and scholars have speculated as to what the term means and what sort of an intellectual climate its mention implies. The term may be translated, perhaps, as "investigation"; it occurs elsewhere in Sanskrit literature, where it sometimes means the study of the Vedas. Hacker⁶ thinks it is misleading to construe it as referring to philosophy, and suspects that Kauṭilya had in mind that princes should be trained to argue intelligently, and that by referring to the logical aspects of what was taught by philosophers at that time they would find a guide for what they needed. It is possible that the reference is to a form of the Nyāya school, or Vaiśeṣika, but more likely it refers primarily to some form of that early Sāṃkhya logic which we had occasion to mention above. In any case, Vātsyāyana tries to identify this *ānvīkṣikī* with the logical side of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and according to Oberhammer⁷ he is the first to make extended efforts to show that Nyāya is also a science of the self, that is, a means to that self-knowledge which is propaedeutic to liberation. Vātsyāyana does seem to make extended efforts to apply notions probably drawn from the yoga system of Patañjali to the topic of the things one must know (*prameya*). But D. N. Shastri⁸ sees no evidence that *ānvīkṣikī* did not always include the science of the self, despite the analyses of Oberhammer and of Jacobi⁹ before him.

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These matters bear upon several others: one is the makeup of the *Nyāyasūtras*. Another is the attitude of early Indians toward logic. Vidyabhusana was of the opinion that logicians were looked on with disfavor in early times because then "Nyāya was pure logic" and "had no relation with the topics of the Vedic Saṃhitā and Brāhmaṇa."¹⁰ However, there were other branches of learning which were unconnected with the Vedas—e.g., grammar—and which so far as we can tell flourished in the same period.

II. Religious Affiliations of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

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The connection of this question with the previous one is probably more apparent to a Westerner than to an Indian. One does not have to believe in one God to accept moral and spiritual values in India, though not all Indians in later times would assent to this statement.

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Tradition has it that Naiyāyikas are Śaivite and Vaiśeṣikas are Pāśupatas. The *Yuktidīpikā*, a Sāṃkhya treatise written around A.D. 550, tells us that the Pāśupatas introduced God into the Vaiśeṣika system, going on to suggest that God has no business being there.¹¹ Pāśupata is a sect of Śaivas (worshippers of Śiva) who worship him as "Lord of Beasts" (*paśupati*). They are usually traced back to the teacher Lakulīśa (A.D. 100), reputedly a native of Gujarat, who established a line of teachers who taught around Mathurā in the Ganges plain. It was an extraordinary sect, whose practices included bathing in ashes, honoring the god by dancing, laughing, and lowing like a bull, and it advised its more advanced devotees to go about behaving like madmen and to perform acts which the populace generally looked upon as improper. Ingalls has compared them with the Greek Cynics.¹²

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However, as is the way with some of the Indian traditions, it is difficult to find much evidence that the Vaiśeṣika philosophers were Pāśupatas, though there is evidence that some of the Naiyāyikas were, all of which may tell once again in favor of the essential identity of the two schools. Uddyotakara is sometimes referred to as Pāśupatācārya, and Bhāsarvajña (whose version of Nyāya is closer to Sāṃkhya than to Vaiśeṣika) wrote a work called *Gaṇakārikā* expounding Pāśupata tenets.

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There is plenty of evidence, on the other hand, that Naiyāyikas are generally worshippers of Śiva rather than Viṣṇu. As far as I know there is no evidence to suggest that any of our philosophers up to near the end of our period were Vaiṣṇavites. And several writers are of the opinion that the religious sources of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were more or less the same. Kaviraj writes that the source of bondage between the schools is through "the original Śivāgama or its philosophical counterpart, the so-called Īśvaravāda, out of which not only the present form of Yoga and Nyāya, but the later Śaiva philosophies also may have well arisen and gradually crystallized themselves into independent systems."¹³ This īśvaravāda or doctrine of a supreme God Kaviraj takes as referring to Śaivism rather than Vaiṣṇavism: Īśvara is originally a name of Śiva, while the name for Viṣṇu would be Puruṣottama, he explains. Bhandarkar¹⁴ has found an inscription at Kedāreśvara temple at Belgami in Mysore State which suggests that Nyāya was looked upon as a specific Maheśvara sect. He also reminds us of a passage in the Vāyupurāṇa, probably dating from the 4th century, in which it is said that Lakulīśa had three pupils: Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, and Vatsa. This leads Bhandarkar to suggest that the schools were the same from the start.

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This is all very well, but we must consider also the fact that both sets of sūtras are very chary of reference to God. The author of the Yuktidīpikā can only find one passage in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras that might conceivably be construed as referring to God, and it seems certain that it was not intended to.¹⁵ And there has been considerable speculation about the section in the fourth book of the Nyāyasūtras which refers to God—it is as possible that it attacks as that it defends monotheism.¹⁶ By the time of Praśastapāda, however, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was thoroughly monotheistic: the Yuktidīpikā thinks it was worked over by Pāśupatas and molded into the form Praśastapāda presents.¹⁷

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Whatever the truth be about the view of the authors of the two sets of sūtras on God, it is likely that they accepted, along with the rest of the Hindus, the belief in the gods which was second nature to everyone in those times. There is no reason why a philosopher should refer to the gods, except perhaps in his invocation, unless he has particular roles in mind which the gods, or God, must play in his philosophy. In the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika God's role turns out to be that of a general condition of all action, and in particular the agent who sets the world in motion at the beginning of each cycle by bringing about the first collisions of atoms. The technical aspects of God's functioning presumably did not occur to the earliest formulators of these theories, engaged in developing the fundamentals of the mechanics of atomism and causation, and it is only when they discovered that they needed additional agents besides humans that they were moved to postulate a super-self, God, who can fulfill the requirements.

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So special is the role that God plays in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that other monotheistically minded philosophers in India find the Nyāya conception of Him a thin one indeed. Yet, the origins of other systematic philosophies of the same period show more or less the same phenomenon. The Sāṃkhyakārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, a 4th-century work, shows no monotheistic inclinations, and Pūrvamīmāṃsā explicitly denied to God the role of creator of the Vedas. Mahāyāna Buddhism had its Bodhisattvas, but their importance increases in much later stages of the Buddhist religion, paralleling similar developments in Hinduism and extending into the form it takes in Tibet, China, and Japan. The Jains also had their sages, the Tīrthaṃkaras, but believed in no supreme deity. Monotheists represented only one philosophical theory among many at that time, as far as evidence shows.

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It is, then, a later prejudice which connects belief in one supreme God with sincerity of spiritual convictions, or in the case of Western critics it reflects an imposition of foreign assumptions.

III. The Connection between Philosophy and Liberation

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There are nevertheless those who doubt that Indian philosophy, and notably Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, really has anything to do with the search for liberation, despite the many statements of the philosophers themselves that there is a connection. Part of the difficulty here lies in conceiving accurately what the connection can be between theoretical pursuits and practical ones. Daya Krishna¹⁸ notes rightly that speculation is rarely viewed as constituting the path to freedom, and concludes that it therefore has nothing to do with freedom. He also points out that writers in all sorts of fields, not only philosophers, attempt to link their writings to the search for liberation, but concludes that, although it is fashionable to pay lipservice to this goal, in fact this is one of those traditions that live by common assent but have no substance whatever. I think it is not necessary to answer these doubts in detail immediately; we may allow the true picture to emerge from the writings themselves and the summary of them which I shall attempt in the remainder of this chapter. The first part of Daya’s argument must be met by showing what the path to liberation is according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and how theoretical speculation gets involved in the life of the freedom seeker. This is the burden of what is immediately to follow. As for the charge that belief in mokṣa is a matter of lip service without sincere conviction, I think it will become apparent from the nature of the arguments used by Naiyāyikas, if not from the proportional attention they pay to the topic, that liberation is always on their minds even if not always uppermost in the question of the moment.

IV. The Hindu Theory of Value: Important Concepts

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The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of value must be considered as a version of the more general theory which is accepted in a general way by all varieties of "Hinduism"—a term which is difficult to define but serves to distinguish the vast majority of Indian religious sects and cults from—especially—Buddhism, Jainism, and foreign religions such as Islam and Christianity. Since any number of works set forth the fundamental tenets of Hinduism in considerable detail¹⁹ it will not be necessary to spend much time here on this, but merely to remind the reader that in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika he is dealing with a system squarely within traditional assumptions.

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A. *Aspects of the Good Life*: Hindu texts set forth several "aims of life" (*artha*) the relationships among which are variously explained by different authorities. The aims of life are usually said to be four: *artha* or material prosperity, *kāma* or affective gratification, *dharma* or right conduct, and *mokṣa* or liberation. The order in which these four are listed varies; however, liberation is universally accepted as the highest end by those who accept it at all. In ancient times Pūrvamīmāṃsā did not accept liberation as an end, preaching that the ultimate purpose in life was to attain heaven through performance of acts prescribed in Vedic injunctions and avoidance of those acts proscribed by the same sacred scriptures. In later times virtually all Hindus accepted the supremacy of liberation to *dharma*. Each of the four "aims" has a literature which is traditionally attached to it : for *artha*, the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (referred to above); for *kāma*, the *Kāmasūtras* of Vātsyāyana (probably not our Pakṣilasvāmin) and other handbooks of erotics and aestheticism; for *dharma*, the various *Dharmaśāstras*, notably that entitled "The Laws of Manu"; and for *mokṣa*, the philosophical literature, particularly that part of it which advises methods for seeking and gaining liberation. Many handbooks devoted to one of the other "aims" indicate that attention to their teachings will aid one in achieving liberation; this suggests that the general Hindu view is that liberation transcends the others without implying that commitment to them will work against eventual self-perfection.

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B. *Karma* and *Saṃsāra*; Preexistence and Transmigration: *Mokṣa*, the supreme end of life, is liberation from the bondage of *karma*, from the circle of birth and rebirth (*saṃsāra*). This is the minimal meaning of *mokṣa*; we shall see below how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools further interpret it. Here we are interested in the view of life presupposed by all the Indian theories, including Buddhism and Jainism.

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Most Indians who reflect on the matter are of the opinion that they existed prior to the birth of their present body, and that they have existed "beginninglessly." Just what is referred to by the "they" is a matter of philosophical controversy. Nevertheless, the only important opposition to the doctrine of preexistence comes from the Cārvākas. As for beginninglessness, this is also generally accepted, although there is disagreement about some of the details, for example, about whether there is a period of rest (*pralaya*) between cosmic cycles. All these matters are subjects of discussion and argumentation, contrary to what some scholars suppose; we shall see the kinds of arguments used by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars.

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As for the manner in which human beings exist, this requires a somewhat different mode of speech when we are considering Buddhism than when we are considering Hindu theory, since the Buddhists do not believe there is any continuing self or soul underlying the series of momentary states called the person. Keeping this difference in mind, we can nevertheless assert that Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains alike held that one's actions influence subsequent events in one's history; and that this happens in a perfectly mechanical manner—what one sows, one will eventually reap. To be sure, we need to qualify this somewhat for later stages of Indian thought, particularly certain types of later Vedānta, where God is granted the ability to save individuals regardless of their *karma*. However, this qualification hardly affects the period under study in this volume.

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In particular, the "weight" of an individual's *karma* was held to be passed from embodiment to embodiment and to determine the particular form of rebirth the person suffered. It is important to realize that both "good" and "bad" deeds create *karma*; even refraining from performing an action may add to the weight of one's *karma*. Thus one cannot gain liberation by good deeds alone, though the performance of good works constitutes an important element in most accounts of the path to liberation. Nor can one gain liberation by inaction, though at a certain stage in life it is thought appropriate to retire from worldly activities in favor of more spiritually directed ones.

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As one lives out each embodied lifetime, he works off the karma that has accrued from his past actions, but accretes more of it in the course of his present activities. The problem of liberation, then, is to bring it about that karma no longer "clings" to one. The achievement of this stage is frequently termed "enlightenment," an appropriate term in its literal meaning as well as in its more usual sense of self-understanding. Since the karmic machinery is a natural fact, it is usually understood that an enlightened person will still have to work off the karma which clings to him from deeds prior to his enlightenment. Thus, for example, the Buddha is held to have achieved enlightenment (bodhi) after several weeks of reflection under a tree, but he lived on to spread his wisdom throughout the Ganges plain before he passed on several decades later. In his post-enlightenment stage, then, Gautama the Buddha corresponds with the type of person Hindus call jivanmukta, "liberated while living." Not all Hindus accept the doctrine of liberation while alive, but it is a very common notion.

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C. Yoga—the Path to Liberation: How to achieve the good life? This practical issue is the topic of a vast literature, including the types of tracts mentioned earlier pertaining to the four "aims of life" but essentially involving all serious pursuits, which are regularly connected to ultimate values just as they are in Western thought. Thus, for example, the Laws of Manu treats many types of practical problems, and one seeking to perfect himself cannot afford to ignore its sort of advice. Different types of living are enjoined for different sorts of personality, and for individuals of differing occupations and roles in society. The Vedas, the ancient sacred scriptures, speak especially to the Brahmins, for whom they prescribe many rites and duties. In ancient times it was apparently accepted that Brahmins were the main authority on spiritual matters and that this suggested their superior spiritual attainments. In later times this assumption was brought into question; indeed, the introduction of the notion of liberation to replace the Vedic view of dharma as the final aim is taken by some scholars to be an important early episode in this revolt against Brahminical pretensions.

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Thus, the teachings about how to perfect oneself are exceedingly various; it is impossible to catalogue them in any succinct fashion. Western readers may have been exposed to one classification of paths if they have read the Bhagavadgītā; though the account of paths expounded there has been influential, it should by no means be mistaken for the only Indian account. Nevertheless, it is a handy place to begin.

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The *Gītā* teaches that there are three kinds of path to liberation: the way of *karma*, the way of knowledge, and the way of devotion. It is rather vague as to which of these is the preferable way, if any; perhaps it means to suggest that there are different ways for different sorts of people. It is also not clear whether they are to be viewed as mutually exclusive. The *Gītā* places great importance on the attitude of nonattachment (*vairāgya*) to the fruits of one’s actions, which is developed early in the poem in particular connection with the way of *karma*. Here we are taught to participate in worldly activity in performing appropriate actions, but to do them without thought of personal advantage. A bit later we are shown the ideal of the man of stable insight (*sthitaprajña*), who sits meditating apart from ordinary men. He is the one who seeks true knowledge and liberation through it. Some commentators think the *Gītā* means us to understand that the way of *karma* is preparatory to the way of Knowledge; others think these two paths are to be combined. This controversy bulks large in the writings of Vedāntists.

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The *Gītā* further specifies a way which it at one point characterizes as the “easy” way to liberation, which is to devote oneself to God and think of nothing but him. This has certainly tended to be most popular path in the past few hundred years, and numerous methods of devotion have been developed, such as the continuous chanting of God’s name, community sings, and various odd and antinomian practices such as were apparently practiced by the Pāśupatas.

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The general term for a path is *mārga*, but the *Gītā* uses the term yoga in this connection. A yoga is a discipline. A classical form of yoga is that set forth in the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali (4th c.?); it consists of seven stages of discipline beginning with the performance of righteous acts, going on to breath-control and resulting control of the mind (and as a sidelight control of the body), and culminating in a state called *samādhi*, divided into a higher and a lower type: the lower type is the mystic’s trance, the higher is liberation itself, the difference being that once one gains the higher he never loses it. An adept of such a method is known as a yogi, and yogis are generally credited with exceptional powers of concentration and control, abilities which are viewed by most Westerners with a modicum of incredulity. Naiyāyikas, who as we shall see are as scientifically minded as any Indians are, credit yogis with exceptional abilities (see below), though one may sometimes discern qualms.

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V. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Conception of Liberation

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Mokṣa, meaning freedom, is not the only term used by Indian philosophers to characterize the ultimate end of life. The Buddhist term nirvāṇa is probably better known to most readers. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika two other terms appear: niḥśreyasa, literally “having no better,” and apavarga, meaning an end or completion.

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1. The Developed Doctrine: As we shall see during our survey of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika topics, there is a tendency in maturer stages of the system to formulate increasingly technical definitions of key items. Liberation likewise receives this treatment. As an example, we may consider Śivāditya’s definition of liberation as the absence of sorrow together with the posterior absence of false knowledge which is the cause of sorrow, which posterior absence is produced by true knowledge. This definition uses the technical notion of “posterior absence” (dhvaṃsa; the absence of something after it has existed and come to an end) and is otherwise built according to a pattern which becomes standard in Navya-nyāya.

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Śivāditya’s definition as it stands accords with the account of liberation usually credited to Vaiśeṣika, but not to Nyāya. It is completely negative; it does not attribute any consciousness or feelings whatsoever to the liberated self. This negative conception has called forth the gibe that freedom for the Vaiśeṣikas is being like a stone.²⁰ The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, are supposed to credit the freed self with an experience of everlasting bliss. Just how far this tradition can be substantiated by the writings of our philosophers will be explored in the next section.

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2. Development of the Conception of Liberation: The Vaiśeṣikasūtras present liberation as a state where the two necessary conditions for the arising of another body are absent. These two conditions are said to be the conjunction of the internal organ with the self, and a certain “unseen force” (adṛṣṭa) which is instrumental in producing transmigration. It is probable that Kaṇāda equates this unseen force with the accumulation of karma which he mentions in a later sūtra. If so, a person may be held to be liberated either when his karma becomes inoperative or when his internal organ is disjoined from his self. The latter condition is achieved in samādhi.

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Vātsyāyana contributes a lengthy discussion, centering around the question whether liberation is a blissful state or not. He defines apavarga as a condition involving attainment of bliss, and says it is called “Brahman,” thus, linking his discussion to the conception of the Upanishads. However, he immediately turns on those²¹ who say that the self experiences pleasure when liberated. Among his reasons we may note this: pleasure is a positive feeling toward which men characteristically develop passions of attachment or aversion. If to practice a path with an eye to obtaining liberation involves attaching oneself to the gaining of eternal pleasure, then liberation can never be achieved, since any path to liberation involves non-attachment. As we saw above, Vātsyāyana apparently has no objection to renaming absence of pain "bliss," and in this way perhaps can resolve the contradiction in his account.

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Whereas the sūtrakāras' accounts were compatible with the conception of liberation as a state, perhaps of samādhi, achieved through yoga while the body lives, Vātsyāyana's discussion clearly suggests that he conceives of liberation as setting in when the last embodiment of the freed self has died. Praśastapāda's view is the same. Uddyotakara explicitly distinguishes two kinds of perfection: lower, when one is still working off old karma, and the higher, when all the old karma has been worked off.

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So far, except for Vātsyāyana's puzzling use of the word "bliss," there has been nothing to suggest a divergence between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika conceptions. It is with the radical Bhāsarvajña that a real change is wrought within the system. He specifically denies that the purely negative description of liberation can be correct, and asserts that it is a state not only of pleasure but also of consciousness, as against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas like Uddyotakara and Praśastapāda who say that the self loses all its qualities in the highest stage of freedom. No one wants such a state, says Bhāsarvajña.

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The review of various theories about liberation given by Vyomaśiva concludes with a theory held by various schools of Śaivism, including the Pāśupatas, that the self acquires the qualities of Śiva upon being liberated, these being qualities such as eternal knowledge and pleasure. It is likely that this is a reference to Bhāsarvajña's view, though Vyomaśiva is not given to naming his sources. Vyomaśiva's own view follows that of Praśastapāda; release occurs after the old karma wears off and involves annihilation of the specific qualities of the self. He refers to liberation as a "prosperous" state and suggests that the word "bliss" should be construed as "absence of sorrow."

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Śrīdhara's list of current theories is not as extensive or suggestive as Vyomaśiva's. His refutation of those who believe that liberation is blissful does not discriminate Bhāsarvajña's view from that of the Vedāntins, etc. He evidently believes in jīvanmukti, liberation while living, since he cites the Vedas and (surprisingly)

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the Sāmkhyakārikās as authorities for the view and bases some of his arguments on the actuality of that state.

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Udayana defines liberation as the final cessation of sorrow, but his way with other conceptions is original. He teaches that we must pass through various stages of realization corresponding to the freedoms taught in other systems before finally reaching the highest state of indifference (kaivalya) which is the Nyāya version. Udayana calls this “final Vedānta.” As against orthodox Vedānta he evidently feels that they identify liberation too readily with some kind of direct experience. On Udayana’s view such an experience is not enough; one must also have a Naiyāyika’s discursive knowledge of reality as well as a truly devotional attitude.

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Aparārkadeva, the commentator on Bhāsarvajña, further explicates that view, arguing that bliss is not just the absence of sorrow as Vyomaśiva and others think. However, he agrees with the normal Naiyāyika view that bliss is not an eternal quality of the self, since if it were there would be no bondage and nothing to be liberated from. Though he does not spell it out, this would seem to imply that the bliss of the liberated self is a positive quality acquired by the liberated self, perhaps from identification with Śiva.

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One final note: Udayana, it is said, departed from tradition by acknowledging that liberation for all (sarvamukti) is possible and a legitimate end to strive for, reminding us of the Buddhist notion of the bodhisattva who delays liberation in order to work for the salvation of all. Śrīdhara, on the other hand, denies this view, and Śrīvallabha later on also rejects it.

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It would appear from our rapid survey that the tradition, reported for instance in the Śamkaravijaya of Mādhava, that Naiyāyikas generally take a positive view of liberation and Vaiśeṣikas a negative one, is true only for that section of Nyāya which follows Bhāsarvajña. Just whether he was the originator of that interpretation is not clear from the evidence.

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VI. Arguments for the Possibility of Liberation

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Granted that the above is what our philosophers mean by the terms for “liberation,” why should we believe there is any such state? Doubts about the possibility of complete freedom are not limited to Westerners; early Indians apparently suffered from them too. The Nyāyasūtras discuss several doubts which were raised, and this discussion is reviewed and continued in the subsequent literature. One doubt is that we do not live long enough to prepare for liberation, since the Vedas teach that Brahmins must finish all their other duties before retiring to practice a path. Another is that human nature is naturally so imperfect that no amount of striving will completely rid us of our faults. Furthermore, we cannot help becoming attached to things in the course of living, and since attachment automatically produces bondage we will never become free. Gautama’s response to these doubts is that the scriptural passages which cause the doubts can be construed in other ways compatible with liberation, indeed that properly understood the Vedas encourage a man to retire to meditate and liberate himself. As for the doubts about man’s evil proclivities, Gautama’s answer resembles that of his famous predecessor Gautama the Buddha, who pointed out that happily we know the causes of our imperfection and so can treat the disease; and this answers the last difficulty also, since true knowledge of the causes of attachment will enable a man to practice a method of ridding himself of it. Jayanta adds that just as heat renders a seed ineffective, true knowledge makes one’s past deeds ineffective, so that no new karma is produced.²²

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Later writers felt the need of more rigorous arguments in favor of the possibility of liberation, not perhaps so much because skepticism became stronger but rather because as the system developed it became more enamoured of its method, which involved providing definitions and arguments for everything thought worth discussing.

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The classical Nyāya argument for liberation is inferential: “whatever comes into being successively is perishable, like the wheel of fire,” or in a slightly different form, “the series of sorrows in the self finally gets cut off, because it is a series, like the series of flashes constituting lamplight.” Udayana says everyone accepts this argument. Śrīdhara, however, does not accept it, since he thinks there is a counterexample to be found in the series of colors belonging to atoms of earth, which he takes to be an endless series. Udayana’s answer to that inference is that it equally well proves that the series of colors of earthy atoms also comes to an end.

VII. The Path to Liberation: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View

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We come now to consider precisely how the Naiyāyikas think liberation should be sought, and in particular what relevance philosophical investigations have to the quest.

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1. Causes of Bondage and Liberation: The Vaiśeṣikasūtras present the following picture of the path to be followed in seeking freedom: one should behave according to Vedic precepts; this produces merit (dharma) and eventually exaltation (abhyudaya), whereas impure behavior produces demerit (adharma). Bondage (saṃsāra), however, is caused by both merit and demerit (adṛṣṭa = karma). It is because of our attitudes of desire and aversion that we act in ways which produce more karma, and these attitudes have as a necessary condition the contact between the internal organ (manas) and the self of the individual person. It becomes clear that the method of liberation involves gaining control over one’s internal organ. Yoga is the control of that organ so that it does not come into contact with the external sense organs (indriya); when such contact ceases, there are no more feelings of pleasure and pain for the individual, and this in turn stifles any desires or aversions. Eventually the trance-like state, which as we have seen Gautama likens to deep sleep, sets in, and when this separation of self from internal organ is achieved and the old karma lived out, the self is completely liberated from bondage, since there is no way for karma to come again to operate on him.

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What is not clear from Kaṇāda’s account is how knowledge is related to this process. Gautama’s Nyāyasūtras makes this more explicit. In his second sūtra he presents a fivefold chain of causal conditions leading to bondage. The chain begins with wrong knowledge (mithyājñāna), which is a necessary condition for faults (doṣa), which are in turn productive of activity, which results in (rebirth) which is the cause of sorrow. This is reminiscent of the twelvefold chain of Buddhism (pratītyasamutpāda), which leads from ignorance (avidyā) to rebirth and misery in a somewhat more complicated series; according to the Buddha’s chain the last member of the series, rebirth, is responsible in turn for the first member, ignorance, so that the whole thing is likened to a wheel. We may suppose that Gautama’s version is also wheel-like. In any case, it is clear from what Gautama goes on to say that one seeking liberation from sorrow is to break into this chain by replacing wrong knowledge with right knowledge; thus, the necessary condition for faults being lacking, they in turn will not arise, and activity as a result will not either, nor will birth nor sorrow. And absence of sorrow is liberation.

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This true knowledge, Gautama explains, is to be achieved by the classical methods of concentration, meditation, and yoga, but he significantly adds that one may get it by discussion with others. It is this latter means that the Nyāya system is especially concerned to expedite; thus it is necessary to have a complete set of rules for the carrying out of proper discussions which will conduce to true knowledge.

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The “faults” of which Gautama speaks he lists as three: attraction, aversion, and delusion. The last-mentioned is again a significant addition. Kaṇāda speaks primarily of mistakes in attitude, whereas Gautama is concerned about failure of understanding. Gautama also uses the term kleśa in a later section to denote wrong attitudes. He explains that kleśas are not natural events but are caused by wishful ideas (saṃkalpa). These wishful ideas are born from delusions that normal humans are subject to. Vātsyāyana gives a striking example when he cites the fact of male attachment to the female body; that the body is attractive is a misconception which he recommends eliminating by paying attention to the displeasing aspects of the body. But to develop an aversion to the body would be equally wrong; what is to be practiced is an attitude of nonattachment, and it is clearly the opinion of Gautama and Vātsyāyana that this attitude can only be cultivated when things are seen as they really are and not otherwise. Thus knowledge of truth, while not in itself the path to liberation, is an essential part of the procedure of gaining it.

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This general picture is accepted and developed by all the subsequent writers. There are occasional interesting modifications. For example, Candramati, perhaps concerned that the above account may be construed as enjoining one to abstain from meritorious actions, explains “merit” as having two varieties: the kind which produces positive activity, and the kind which produces cessation of activity (nivṛtti). The acquisition of merit of the latter kind results in a state of delight in perfect cognition free from attachment. Presumably we are not, however, to identify this state with liberation, but rather with an advanced stage of yoga.

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As is to be expected, the later writers, presupposing the account summarized above, proceed to the details of precisely how wrong knowledge is produced and the methods by which it is to be eradicated. Some of our writers occasionally allude to implications of their theories for the general Hindu theory of value. For example, after the time of Vedāntins like Maṇḍana Miśra, Bhāskara, and Śaṃkara, the question of the relative importance of knowledge and action becomes more frequently raised, perhaps because of Śaṃkara’s radical endorsement of the path of knowledge to the exclusion of action. The more traditional view, that one must tread a combined path of knowledge and action (jñānakarmasamuccayavāda), defended in Vedānta by Bhāskara, is attributed to the author of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa,²³ and is defended in Vyomavatī and Nyāyakandalī. The nub of the discussion centers over whether one must still perform the actions prescribed in the Vedas even after he has embarked on a discipline leading to liberation. Śaṃkara's answer is no, that one must only attend to the Vedas up to the stage of adept (adhikārin) but not afterwards. By comparison, Naiyāyikas tend to be surprisingly conservative. Udayana may perhaps constitute an exception to this general assessment. He points out that activity prescribed by the Vedas is intended to gain advantage for the agent, and that insofar as that is the case one cannot, for example, explain the actions of ascetics as enjoined, since they do not act purposively. Udayana is no antitraditionalist, however; he spends more than one extended passage complaining about the deterioration of general dharma brought about by decay of faith and self-control.

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The most important modification of the traditional view of the path to liberation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the introduction of the notion that God must at least permit, if not be operative in, the process. The first of our writers clearly to include God in the description of the path is Praśastapāda, whose introduction specifies that merit together with God's injunctions produce the knowledge about reality which is necessary for liberation. However, in later reviews of the same topic this reference is absent; one may safely say that God is not much on Praśastapāda's mind. Uddyotakara brings in God as the creator of merit and demerit, but nothing he says implies any interruption of the machinery by which the self earns good or bad karma by his actions. It is probably with Bhāsarvajña that God begins to play a more positive role, although from the Nyāyasāra all we can glean is that knowledge of God is the touchstone to the removal of wrong attitudes. But none of this is particularly surprising: God is taken to be the author of the Vedas, after all, and thus plays a role of importance for any interpretation of paths which admits that the Vedas are relevant.

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The fact is, as Ingalls remarks, that "among the beliefs concerning man which are essential in the old Nyāya is a belief in the efficacy of human effort. . .Any statement which involves karmavaiphalya-prasaṅga... or akṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅga... is ipso facto wrong. This belief...is common in India."²⁴ The lengthy Sanskrit terms in this quotation are ways of formulating the notions, which Naiyāyikas hold to be faulty, that what men do has no regular connection with their deserts, either because the deserts vary or because the whole process is out of their hands, being controlled by a superior power. In short, the Indians generally believed in freedom of the will at least to the extent that men were not conceived to be pawns in the hand of a superior power.

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VIII. Advanced Spiritual Practitioners: Yogis, Sages, etc.

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That certain individuals have remarkable powers because of their spiritual advancement is a generally accepted notion in India. The Naiyāyikas do not question it, and our philosophers make occasional comments clarifying precisely what claims of special powers they are willing to endorse. The reader will not find case histories of yogic experiments here, but we can sift out a few general abilities credited to men with special powers and gifts.

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Kaṇāda says that sages (*ṛṣis*) and “perfected beings” (*siddha*) have special powers of awareness. It is a stock Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that yogic perception is different from ordinary perception and deserves special treatment. The reason for its needing special treatment is that yogis are held to be able to occupy several bodies at once, as well as to have transtemporal experiences. According to some of our philosophers this ability gained through yoga enables an individual to achieve immediate liberation. Since a yogi has the power to move his internal organ into contact with a number of bodies simultaneously and to bring it about that the *karma* accreted from past deeds gets worked off faster than it would take for normal individuals, he can do what would otherwise be inexplicable, namely work off past *karma* at more or less the same time as he achieves enlightenment. This account is detailed especially in *Vyomavatī*.

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About the sages, among whom are normally included those reputed to be the original redactors of the Vedas (God, of course, is the Vedas’ author), we hear from Praśastapāda that, like the gods, they have bodies produced by meritorious *karma*. In this they contrast with ordinary humans, whose bodies are produced by a mixture of good and bad *karma*, and with insects, whose bodies are produced by predominantly bad *karma*. Sages have a regular intuitive ability called *prātibha* which ordinary humans manifest only occasionally. This ability gives them knowledge about past and future as well as present but removed events. The *siddhas* or perfected beings referred to by Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda says, have both perceptual and inferential knowledge of the workings of *karma*. Special drug-induced insights are also attributed to these people. Jayanta says that both yogis and sages can see *dharma*. But later writers have less to say about the special powers of these exceptional types.

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IX. Arguments for Pre-existence and Immortality

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As indicated above, Naiyāyikas were fond of defending standard Hindu doctrines with arguments that could be tested against the rigorous requirements which they established in their theory of inference. I note here a few such arguments without, again, considering at the moment the question of their rigor, since we are not in a position yet to compare them with appropriate standards of criticism.

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In connection with the proof that an individual's self or soul is eternal, Gautama provides some arguments for its preexistence. (1) "Because the new-born infant experiences joy, fear, and sorrow—which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before (the self existed before)," (III.1.18) (2) "(The self must be regarded as eternal) because of the desire for milk from the mother's breast, which is evinced (on birth) and which can only be due to repeated feeding (in the past)." (III.1.21)²⁵ Commentators on this passage add further variations. Uddyotakara argues that the same self is child and man, because of its smile, and Vācaspati points out that the child's fear of falling can only be explained on the hypothesis that it has fallen before and remembers it.

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Now the obvious answer to these arguments is that the phenomena alluded to—reactions of joy and fear, of attraction to the mother's breast—are natural, that is to say, they are events occurring in the body and needing no appeal to an agency inside to explain them. Gautama considers this answer. For example, he has an opponent say that reactions of joy and fear are like the opening and closing of a flower, and his answer is to the effect that the opponent is eventually unable to say what these motions of the flower are due to, and will have to assent to the principle that motions are caused by conscious agents. This principle provides the basis also for the main Nyāya argument for God's existence, as we shall see.

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Again, an opponent argues that the attraction of the child to its mother's breast is like the attraction of iron to a magnet, and needs no conscious agency. Gautama's answer is too short to be completely intelligible, and the commentators labor to interpret it. Vātsyāyana's interpretation is this: iron, alone among metals, is attracted by magnetism. As there is a special factor among the causal conditions of the phenomenon of magnetism which limits the kinds of metals which are attracted by magnets, so there is a special factor among the causal conditions of the phenomenon of breast-feeding which limits the kinds of objects which are attracted to the breast. Now what is the special factor in each of these cases? Vātsyāyana has no opinion to offer about the explanation of magnetism, but as for the child's response to the breast he says that the special factor here is the memory on the child's part of this sort of experience in the past, and that this hypothesis is "entrenched"26 in our actual experience that desire for food proceeds from our memory of past experiences.27

Cites (19)