Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v5.c29: 3. Epistemology

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v5.c29

Language
English

3. Epistemology

v5.c29.1

1. See, for example, Russell Fraser, The Language of Adam (New York, 1977), especially chapt. 4, "Mysticism and the Scientific Doom."
2. Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, trans. S.K. Langer (New York, 1953), pp. 8–9.
3. Vākyapadīya 1.123 as translated by T.R.V. Murti in his foreword to Coward (G1700A), p. vii.
4. Murti (G1643), p. 321.
5. Ibid., p. 322.
6. Datta (RB10134), pp. 27–28.
7. See Sāmkhyakārikā 4, Sāmkhyasūtras 1.88, and Yogasūtras 1.7.
8. See Ganganatha Jha (RB9473), p. 80. Prabhākara accepts only five pramāṇas.
9. See Dharmarājādhvarīndra, Vedāntaparibhāṣā, trans. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (RB6306), chaps. 1–6.
10. In Subramania Iyer (G721), p. 45.
11. Translation in Murti (G1643), p. 325.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 326.
14. Ibid.
15. The following discussion regarding the Platonic parallel with vyākaraṇa is based on Murti (G1643), p. 327.
16. Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Mādhava trans. E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough, (London, 1892–1894), p. 219.
17. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 163.
18. Subramania Iyer (G872), karikā 19. Similar arguments are offered to show how the progressively clearer perception cannot be attributed to defects of the senses or memory through resemblance, p. 49.
19. Mahadevan (RB5466), p. 62.
20. Sastri (G706), p. 50.
21. Pandy (RB4131), pp. 400–427.
22. G872, sūtra 20, pp. 51–52; and Vākyapadīya 1.88 and vṛtti.
23. Ibid.
24. G872, sūtra 24, p. 64. See also Subramania Iyer (G1445), in which he makes clear that from the sphoṭa viewpoint whatever distinction of degree or part is made in an object must be done through a guṇa (quality or particular). For the grammarians it is the guṇa and never the universal that serves to express degrees in objects. It should also be noted that of the many possible ways of interpreting the universal, Bhartṛhari prefers the following. A movement like lifting the hand consists of a series of movements. As these movements are transitory they cannot coexist and form a whole of which they would be the parts and in which the universal of the movement of lifting the hand would inhere. Now such a universal is more specific than the wider universal of movement in general. Although it inheres in each moment of movement, it is not cognizable in them alone due to too much similarity between moments of lifting and those of the moments of each movement, such as turning the hand. The moments of each movement are the result of a special effort to make that movement, and they are the substrata of the universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be cognized until a series of moments has been cognized. One or two moments of movement are not enough, but after a series of moments is cognized the cognition of the universal inherent in each movement becomes clear. Lifting, for example, may be identified, and other movements such as turning excluded. The process is similar in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Each is manifested by a series of special efforts to utter letters. One or two utterances of the series are not enough to eliminate other words with similar sounds. But as the complete series of letters is cognized, the cognition of the *sphoṭa* or universal of the particular word is clearly perceived, and meaningful usage of it in speech becomes possible. (*Vākyapadīya* 2.20-21 as interpreted by Subramania Iyer [ G734], pp. 168-169.)

v5.c29.2

26. *Vākyapadīya*, 1.52.

v5.c29.3

27. Moving beyond Sanskrit itself and into the world of languages, I would take the universal error as referring to the necessity of going from the differentiated letters (the error) to the whole *sphoṭa* (meaning or ultimate reality). The fixed sequence and form of differentiation for a particular word-*sphoṭa* would only be a constant error within each language (such as Sanskrit).

v5.c29.4

28. *Vākyapadīya* 1.85.

v5.c29.5

29. *Sphuṭasiddhi*, *sūtra* 22.

v5.c29.6

30. Kaviraj (G1394), pp. 1-18 and 113-132.

v5.c29.7

31. K.A. Subramania Iyer's introduction to G872, p. 26.

v5.c29.8

32. *Vākyapadīya* 1.78-84. Among the analogies offered to explain the process, Bhartṛhari's favorite seems to be that the sounds leave impression seeds (*saṃskāra*, *bhāvanā*, or *bīja*), which, as they mature in the mind, are conducive to an increasingly clear perception of the *sphoṭa*—to which they finally offer a perfect "fitness" or identity. A literal rendering of *yogyatā* could be "to fit in a frame"—the "fit" of the "matured" series of letters into the "frame" of the *sphoṭa*. See also the *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 3.1.8.

v5.c29.9

33. The phrase "function of the mind" here is intended to indicate that *pratibhā* is not a function of the ordinary senses of the *buddhi* stage of consciousness, but is characteristic of the pre-*buddhi* or *śabdatattva* stage.

v5.c29.10

34. It should be clearly understood here that perfect perception of *pratibhā*, however valid in itself, remains outside the realm of *pramāṇa* (which is characterized by sensory perception and discursive cognition). With regard to language, therefore, it is *sphoṭa* when manifested as speech that is *pramāṇa* (and not *sphoṭa* at the unified level of *pratibhā*). The point made above, however, still stands. The cognition of *sphoṭa* at the level of either *śabda pramāṇa* or *pratibhā* is via direct perception, not via inference.

v5.c29.11

35. *Sphuṭasiddhi*, *sūtra* 23, as translated by Subramania Iyer (G872), p. 60.

v5.c29.12

36. Śaṃkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, as translated in Thibaut (RB243), vol. 1, p. 210.

v5.c29.13

37. *Vākyapadīya* 1.142.

v5.c29.14

38. Ibid., 1.123.

v5.c29.15

39. The following summary depends mainly on Subramania Iyer's presentation of Bhartṛhari's position in G734, pp. 144-146.

v5.c29.16

40. Patañjali, *Yogasūtra* 2.53.

v5.c29.17

41. There is considerable debate in current scholarship over whether there should or should not be a fourth level of language, *parā vāk*. Bhartṛhari himself seems to leave open that possibility. The *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1.142 does quote among numerous other passages *Ṛg Veda* 1.164.45, which refers to four levels of *vāc*. Cardona, p. 302, seems to contradict himself, suggesting four levels in the main text—paśyantī being divided into two aspects—but in the footnote observing “that Bhartṛhari did not recognize an absolute fourth level called parā vāc, ‘supreme speech,’ which was recognized by later thinkers, especially in the Kashmir Śaiva school of thought” (p. 369).

Cites (7)