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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v5.c32: Notes to Survey

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v5.c32

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Notes to Survey

v5.c32.1

1. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN VEDIC LITERATURE

v5.c32.2

1. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa has interpreted this verse as referring to the fourfold manifestation of *vāc* into *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*.

v5.c32.3

¹ See B. Bhattacharya, *Yāska's Nirukta and the Science of Etymology* (Calcutta, 1952); Siddheswar Varma, *The Etymology of Yāska* (Hoshiarpur, 1953); Kunjunni Raja (G696).

v5.c32.4

² Thieme (G458), pp. 23-24.

v5.c32.5

³ Cardona, pp. 270-273.

v5.c32.6

⁴ "Bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam, sattvapradhānāni nāmāni."
5. "Ṣaḍ bhāvavikāra, bhavantīti vārṣāyaṇir jāyate 'sti vipariṇamate vardhate pakṣiyate vinaśyatīti."
6. "Prāptakrama viśeṣeṣu kriyā saivābhidhiyate kramarūpasya saṃhāre tat sattvam iti kathyate," *Vākyapadīya* 3.1.35.

v5.c32.7

⁷ "Pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaṣṭe."
8. "Kṛdabhihito bhāva dravyavad bhavati."
9. "Indriyanityam vacanam audumbarāyaṇaḥ," *Vākyapadīya* 2.347.

v5.c32.8

¹⁰ Cf. Brough (G8).

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¹¹ "Nāmānyākhyātajānitī śākaṭāyano nairuktasamayaśca; na sarvāṇīti gārgyo vaiyākaraṇāṇām caike," *Nirukta* 1.12.

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¹² "Bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam, sattvapradhānāni nāmāni."

v5.c32.11

2. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENT IN YĀSKA'S *Nirukta

v5.c32.12

3. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PĀṆINI'S Aṣṭādhyāyī

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1. Generally taken to be later than Yāska; but Thieme takes him to be earlier. See the extended discussion summarized in Cardona.
2. “Śiṣṭaḥ śabdeṣu pramāṇam.”
3. “Lokavijñānāt siddham,” see sūtras 1.1.21, 1.1.65.
4. “Tad aśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt,” sūtra 1.2.53. “Siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokataḥ,” Vārttika.
5. “Avyutpanna prātipadika.” See also the discussion in Yāska’s Nirukta.
6. “Prātipadikavijñānācca Pāṇineḥ siddham / Uṇādayo vyutpannāni prātipadikāni.”
7. “Arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syād,” Patañjali, Mahābhāṣya 3.2.41.
8. See Kunjunni Raja (G355); also Devasthali (G327), pp. 206–215.
9. Nyāsa on Kāśikā, edited by S.G. Chakravarti in G851, p. 423. See Brough (G1478), pp. 28-29; also Staal (G1566), pp. 164-167. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri elucidates this point in his Prakriyāsarvasva.
10. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa discusses lakṣaṇā at length in his Mañjūṣā and says in the Paramalaghu-mañjūṣā that according to the grammarians there is no necessity to accept lakṣaṇā as a separate function of words.

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4. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PATAÑJALI'S Mahābhāṣya

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1. The Mīmāṃsakas take śabda to be the sound only, while to the grammarians meaningfulness is an essential feature of a linguistic sign. See Maṇḍana Miśra’s Sphoṭasiddhi, verse 3: “a śabda is the cause for creating the understanding of the meaning” (“arthāvasāyaprasavanimittaṃ śabda iṣyate”).
2. Mahābhāṣya 1.1.
3. Kumārila, Ślokavārttika, sphoṭavāda section, verse 5.
4. See the discussion in chapter 5 of Bhartṛhari. Among the followers of Pāṇini, Vājapyāyana considered the meaning to be ākṛti or jāti, while Vyāḍi took it to be the individual or dravya. Among other scholars of philosophy, the Mīmāṃsakas took ākṛti to be synonymous with jāti, while the Nyāya school took it to be the structural form, as distinct from the universal. Cf. Gautama, Nyāyasūtra, “Jātyākṛtivyaktaas tu padārthaḥ.”
5. Vārttika 1: “siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokataḥ. . . .”
6. Mahābhāṣya 1: “arthavanto varṇāḥ. . . .”
7. Kātyāyana’s vārttika on 1.2.64: “dravyābhidhānam vyāḍiḥ” and “ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktau Vājapyāyanaḥ.”
8. “Jātyākhyāyām akasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyam.”
9. “Sarūpānāṃ ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau.”
10. Mahābhāṣya 1.
11. “Pāṇinidarśane jātidravyau śabdenābhidhiyete.”
12. “Yasya guṇāntareṣvapi prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanyate tad dravyam” (on 5.1.119).
13. On Pāṇini’s sutra 1.4.109.
14. Mahābhāṣya 1.35.5.
15. Buddhau kṛtvā sarvaś ceṣṭāḥ kartā dhiras tanvannitiḥ. Śabdenārthānvacyān dṛṣṭvā buddhau kuryāt paurvāparyam.”
16. “Dhvaniḥ sphoṭaś ca śabdānāṃ dhvanis tu khalu lakṣyate Alpo mahāmś ca keṣāmcid ubhayam tat svabhāvataḥ.” Also: “sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ.”

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17. “Varṇasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākṛto dhvanir iṣyate. Vṛttibhede nimittatvaṃ vaikṛtaḥ samapadyate.”
18. “Avasthitā varṇā vaktuś cirāciravacād vṛttayo viśiṣyante.”
19. Mahābhāṣya 1.181.
20. “Kṛpo ro laḥ,” Pāṇini’s sūtra 8.2.18.
21. “Stanakeśavatī strī syāl lomaśaḥ puruṣaḥ smṛtaḥ. Ubhayor antaraṃ yacca tadabhāve napuṃsakam.”
22. “Na vaiyākaraṇais śakyaṃ laukikaṃ liṅgam āsthātum.”
23. “Saṃstyānavivakṣāyāṃ strī, prasavavivakṣāyāṃ pumān ubhayavivakṣāyāṃ napuṃsakam.”

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5. Bhartṛhari

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1. Cf. Frauwallner (RB12599), pp. 134–135.
2. The title Vākyapadīya could have referred originally to the second of the three kāṇḍas (chapters or books) that make up the work. It is definite that about A.D. 1000 Vākyapadīya was generally regarded as applying only to the first two books; Trikāṇḍī was the term that included all three books. The use of the title Vākyapadīya to speak of even the third book, the Padakāṇḍa or the Prakīrṇaka (Miscellany) seems to be no older than the sixteenth century (cf. Aklujkar [ G733], pp. 547–555). It is this use that is most common at present. The first two books, according to one manuscript tradition, consist of verses (kārikās) as well as a prose commentary (vṛtti). The other manuscript traditions have only the kārikās, or kārikās accompanied by a prose commentary (ṭīkā) evidently authored by someone other than the kārikā author. A long line of writers in the Sanskrit tradition has consistently held that the Vṛtti too is Bhartṛhari’s work and is an integral part of the Vākyapadīya (cf. Aklujkar [ G743] . In their understanding the reference of the title Vākyapadīya is not confined to the kārikās. For many modern students of Bhartṛhari’s works, however, that title stands for the kārikās, primarily as well as exclusively. The Vṛtti is not generally viewed as included when references such as “Vākyapadīya 1.5” are made.
3. The word nitya is not intended here in the sense “eternal” (as in “God is eternal”). Even as signifying “permanent” it has two or three shades of meaning, depending on the theoretical context. See Aklujkar (G735), p. 82.
4. See the preceding note.
5. Cf. Aklujkar (G762), p. 12, n. 12.
6. When an expression is mentioned, as distinct from when it is used, it is thought to convey its own form as meaning. A theoretical distinction is made between an expression and its own form in cases of mention, and the former is said to be the signifier and the latter the signified; that is, when self-referring or quoted expressions are compared with the expressions having an external reference, the distinction is not seen in the mode of employment (“use-mention”) of the two, but in what they convey—what the outcome is.
7. The concept varṇasphoṭa, as understood by the Pāṇiniyas, differs from “phoneme” as generally understood by linguists in one important respect. A, a, and ā—that is, short (hrasva), long (dīrgha), and prolonged (pluta) a—are regarded as different realizations of varṇasphoṭa a; in other words, the varṇasphoṭa here is an abstracted or generalized common factor form.
8. The implication is that linguistic units are assumed to be individuals or particulars in the discussion summarized in the preceding paragraph. One of Bhartṛhari’s commentators (Puṇyarāja/Helārāja, at 2.1–2, 19, 39–40) systematizes the sphoṭa view of linguistic expressions as follows: (a) bāhya sphoṭa: individuals (vyakti) and universals (jāti); (b) abhyantara sphoṭa: śabdatattva. This systematization is confirmed by the sequence of statements in 1.84–97.

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9. The foregoing interpretation of 1.148–154 is conjectural, for the passages do not contain an explicit statement to this effect: "The following/preceding is the justification of the claim that knowledge or śāstra-based use of grammatical expressions can lead to merit." I have assumed that such a statement was intended by Bhartṛhari, because the context (1.144–147 and 1.158–174) is one of pointing out the importance of grammar and because the immediately following verses (1.155–157) are concerned with the relation between sādhu śabda and dharma. It is, however, possible that 1.148–157 are not at their original place in the Brahmakāṇḍa.

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10. Anvitābhidhāna-vādins of the later works.

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11. The last three correspond, respectively, to madhyamā, paśyantī, and parāpaśyantī-rūpa. Speech (vaikhari) is marked by an observable presence of breath and sequence in both its upāṃśu and non-upāṃśu varieties.

v5.c32.22

12. As will be apparent from this summary, the link among verses 112–115 is not clear.

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13. There is some overlap in the list that follows by the very nature of the matter involved and because the list evolved through the efforts of generations of thinkers. For the latter reason, there is also an element of variation in the understanding or definition of terms involved. For example, prakaraṇa and sāmarthya obviously had wider meanings in addition to their specific meanings determined on the basis of other factors included in the list(s).

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14. The Vaiyākaraṇas understand dravya in two senses: first, the everlasting substance that underlies all transient physical shapes; and, second, what a demonstrative pronoun (equivalent to "variable" of modern logic) can refer to. The second chapter, a summary of which begins at this point, expands on the first sense. The second sense is given in chapter 4.

v5.c32.25

15. In the first chapter of the third book, all expressions are said to refer, in the final analysis, to Existence. This Existence is then viewed as a universal pervading everything. Here in the second chapter a similar conclusion is reached, but the Existence is said to be a particular. Thus, there are two currents of thought, roughly corresponding to ontological reduction (a) to classes or (b) to individuals in recent western philosophy.

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16. Most, if not all, common sentences would be logically problematic (internally inconsistent) if the words in them were viewed as referring to actually existing entities (for example, in the case of "sprout is born," one could ask: How is the sprout said to be born when it existed?). Explanations of how these sentences are possible vary. One involves distinction between reference and sense (or meaning). Another advocates acceptance of another kind of (verbal or linguistic) existence. The third rests on the observation that words cannot refer to entities in their entirety—in all of their aspects—or purely in themselves. The following summary alludes to this variety of explanations.

v5.c32.27

17. The intention behind calling the arising of an effect a miracle could be of two sorts: either the becoming of the effect cannot be expressed without giving rise to unintended implications—without realizing the inadequacy of language, as in the description of a miracle—or we cannot determine the point of transition—the exact moment or phase in which the cause ceases to exist and the effect comes into being. The transition seems to take place in a flash like a miracle. Helārāja (3.3.81) is aware of both interpretations, and there is contextual support for both. Verses 3.3.78–80 and 82–86 suggest that Bhartṛhari located the logical problems of cause-and-effect relationship in the expression of that relationship and in being not aware of general truths about language's relation to reality in understanding that expression. In other words, he seems to have dissolved the problems rather than solved them. Thus, the first interpretation is contextually justified. Support for the second interpretation can be seen in the adjectives abhāgam, "partless," and akramam "sequenceless," which are used in 3.3.81.

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18. The entity need not be explicity qualified. All that is necessary is a presupposition that *x* can be qualified if necessary (*bhedyatvena vivakṣita*). Second, qualification is to be understood as including predication, even of the simple type such as "*x* is/exists." The present definition allows us to view universals and the like as particulars and permits characterization of all word meanings as particulars or individuals. Thus, all words are said to refer to *dravya* in two ways: the one stated in chapter 3.2 (see the preceding note) and the one stated here in chapter 3.4.

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19. This excelling can also be in such negative respects as being disliked, being despised, and so on (for example, *kutsitatara*, "more censured of the two").

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20. The intended characterization of *sādhana* or *kāraka* should be clear from the summary of the following chapter. The important points to remember are, first, that they are viewed as supports of the action as expressed in the sentence; second, that their actual relation to the action as seen in the physical world does not matter—what matters is the capacities in which the speaker places them—and, third, that the action mentioned in this context is not necessarily physical, observable action characterized by a series of moments; even the meaning of "is" or "exists" is action.

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21. As Helārāja (p. 209.12–13) observes here, while the definitions of *sādhana*, *kriyā*, and so on, like those of the preceding *dravya* and *guṇa*, are established by studying Pāṇinian rules, the characterization of space, time, and so on is a result of a direct attempt to understand their nature; the rules do not provide clues as in the other cases. For Bhartṛhari, *ākāśa* does not seem to be any positive, physical entity. It is nowhere distinguished from *diś* in his writings. He seems to have used the word conventionally in the sense "visible, perceptible space," which, in view of his final rejection of space as an actually existent entity, ultimately comes to mean "space that is generally thought to be perceptible."

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22. Vaiśeṣikas, according to Helārāja, pp. 239.3–4, 243.9.

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23. (a) Helārāja (p. 315.18) labels this view in verse 107 as *svasiddhānta*, "Bhartṛhari's own thesis," according to the available editions. But the view in verse 109 is also *svasiddhānta*, according to Helārāja (p. 316.12). (b) There are no words such as *atha vā*, *keṣāmcit*, or *anyeṣām*, indicating *pakṣāntara*, in verses 108 and 109. That these verses express views different from the one contained in 106–107 is something one has to accept on the authority of Helārāja, who, in turn, seems to have (rightly) noticed that the wording of 108–109 indicates different philosophical assumptions.

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24. The assumption here is that an agent must really exist to appear as an agent in a sentence. In the view expressed in verse 105, real existence is not held to be necessary; a tentative, imagined existence is held to be sufficient. Among the thinkers advocating necessity of "real existence" there are two groups: one (probably Sāṃkhya) locates such real existence in the cause, maintaining that cause and effect are essentially identical; the second explains real existence as existence as a universal, clearly implying that the universals are real (as in the Nyāya view) and beyond question (which, of course, is not the case, as the questions of Buddhist logicians show). Although Bhartṛhari can accommodate these views (three in all: *buddhyavasthānibandhana* or *vivakṣānibandhana*, existence; *satkārya*; and *jātivyakti*) as well as the *upacārasattā* (secondary, derivative existence) view expressed in 3.3.45, his first preference is the *śabdārtha* 'rtha view, expressed in 3.7.109 110. Meaning (*śabdārtha*) and reference (*vastvartha* or *bāhyārtha*) are to be distinguished. In understanding usage, attention to what is reflected in language is sufficient. Whether the entity spoken of actually exists (a worthwhile concern if the purpose of inquiry is something else) need not be considered to account for usage, such as "As sprout comes into being." For words carrying out denotation in sentences like this, all existent entities are no different from nonexistent entities. To put the point differently, it is improper to see contradictions in a sentence by asking questions like: "Did the sprout exist before coming into being? If it did, how can it newly come into being? If it did not, how can it perform the action of coming into being?" The use of the word "sprout" is in no way predicated on there being an actual sprout or a referent. The sentence with "sprout" as the subject can proceed as long as there is meaning or sense (*śabdārtha*) for "sprout."

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25. In the original, verses 109-110, the observation about language (specifically, denotation) is said to hold good also in the case of *prajñā* or *buddhi*, "intellect" (specifically, a cognition reflecting an entity). Just as denotation implies acceptance of (some kind of) existence, cognition implies conceding (some kind of) existence. I have left out this mention of intellect and cognition here in order not to obscure the present discussion and also because language and intellect turn out to be ultimately identical in Bhartṛhari's philosophy.

v5.c32.36

26. (a) Actions such as putting the pot on the stove, pouring water into the pot, adding rice to the water, lighting the stove, and more, are subsumed under the one action denoted by "cooks." See summary of the eighth chapter (*Kriyāsamuddeśa*). (b) Helārāja points out that this way of accounting for "A sprout comes into being" differs from the first way (a), in that here the identity of cause and effect is based on a feature of usage called *upacāra* ("extended application") of a verbal root like "cook" to cover subsidiary actions leading to cooking), while in (a) the identity of cause and effect is held to be factual (*vāstava*).

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27. The examples indicated by Bhartṛhari are: "yavāgū mūtrāya sampadyate," "suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ kuṇḍale bhavataḥ," "brāhmaṇāḥ saṃgho bhavati," "brāhmaṇāḥ saṃghibhavanti," "tvad-bhavasi," and "rājan arājā sampadyase/bhavasi." To them Helārāja adds: "kṣīraṃ dadhi sampadyate," "bījād aṅkuro jāyate," "yavāgvā mūtram jāyate," "mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ," and "mahadbhūta brāhmaṇi." The discussion of these examples is determined to some extent by the peculiarities of the Sanskrit language. For this reason, as well as to indicate the relationship of the point here with the preceding, I have preferred simpler examples.

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28. At the beginning of this section, a verse giving the definition of *apādāna* is expected, as in the case of sections on other *kārakas* in this *Samuddeśa*. But the first statement we see at present in it deals with the varieties of *apādāna*. It seems, therefore, that at least one verse has been lost in the known manuscripts. The form of the lost verse is likely to have been "apāye yad udāsīnaṃ calaṃ vā yadi vācalam / dhruvam evatadāveśāt tad apādānam ucyate," that is, essentially the same as the verse quoted by Bhoja (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, chapter 4), Haradatta (*Padamañjarī* 1.4.24), Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (*Śabdakaustubha* 1.4.24), and others.

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29. As the last example indicates, the action of moving away associated with the concept of *apādāna* is not necessarily the actual or physical action of moving away. In conformity with the Vaiyākaraṇas *śabda* (conceptual or semantic, as distinct from *artha*, actual, physical) concept of action (see summary of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*, book 3, section 8 instances in which the movement is only imagined or intellectually entertained are also relevant here.

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30. Cf. Joshi (G1194) pp. 29, 39-40, etc.

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31. Swaminathan (G780), pp. 3-4.

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32. "Dvau śabdātmanau nityaḥ karyaś ceti kaiścid nityā iti dṛṣṭaḥ kaiścid anitya iti. Athavā jātir vyaktiś ceti athavā sphoṭo dhvaniś ca," ibid. p. 13.

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33. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 171.

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34. Swaminathan (G780), p. 28; also Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 74.

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35. "Sākṣāt pratipatter anumānapratipattir gariyasi."

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9. MAṆḌANA MIŚRA

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1. In this logical argument, it seems clear that Kumārila’s attempt to identify *śabda* with the uttered phonemes is effectively discredited by the reasoning of Maṇḍana, who at the same time has vindicated the identification of *śabda* with *sphoṭa*. Although the logical groundwork has largely been completed, Maṇḍana still has to describe in detail exactly how *śabda* as *sphoṭa* may be comprehended using only ordinary memory traces of the phonemes to reveal the *sphoṭa*. He must also show the *sphoṭa* to be not a mere postulation but a perceivable reality, otherwise much of his logical argument simply collapses. These tasks he undertakes in *kārikās* 18–19 of the *Sphoṭasiddhi*.

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10. HELĀRĀJA

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1. See Subramania Iyer (G734), pp. 39–40.
2. Cf. G709, G747.
3. Aklujkar (G750), pp. 165–188.
4. Ibid.
5. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 38.

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12. PUṆYARĀJA

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1. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 41.

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13. KAIYAṬA

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1. Cf. Sarma (G907).
2. “Yathottaraṃ munināṃ prāmāṇyam” *sūtra* 1.¹.29.
3. “Munitraya matenādyatva sādhvasādhu pravibhāgaḥ,” *sūtra* 5.1.21.
4. Kaiyaṭa’s views on different problems connected with language are found scattered in different parts of the commentary. Many of them have been noted and discussed in Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s *Bhūṣaṇa(sāra)*.

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¹ Theodor Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit Works and Authors*, 3 pts. (Wiesbaden, 1962), pt. 1, pp. 718, 440.

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21. ŚEṢA CINTĀMAṆI

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1. Cf. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, *Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa* (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 418–419.

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28. ANNAMBHAṬṬA

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1. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, *Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa* (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, p. 422.
2. P.P.S. Sastri’s introduction to G587.

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32. ŚIVARĀMENDRA SARASVATĪ

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33. (ŚEṢA) CAKRAPĀṆI (DATTA)

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1. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, *Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa* (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 540–541.
2. Cf. *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. 3, p. 275a, and Mimamsaka, *Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra*, pp. 487–495.

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35. NĪLAKAṆṬHA ŚUKLA

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1. See *New Indian Antiquary* 5 (1942): 177–183; also *Journal of the Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library* (1955 1956).

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37. KOṆḌA (OR KAUṆḌA) BHAṬṬA

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1. See volume 1 of this encyclopedia, *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies*, 2d ed., p. 387.
2. *Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts of the Adyar Library*, vol. 9, no. 575.
3. Volume 1 of this encyclopedia, *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies*, 2d ed., p. 422.
4. The summary of this section was prepared through consultation of the dissertation of Gune (G1197).
5. The summary of this section is based on the unpublished dissertation of Deshpande (G1196).

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40. TIRUMALA YAJVAN

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1. See Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, *Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa* (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 413ff.

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42. SADĀŚIVA

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1. See Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, *Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa* (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 416–417.

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45. NĀGEŚA (OR NĀGOJI BHAṬṬA)

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1. For a relative chronology of his works see Gode, (RB6813); also P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra Volume One* (Poona 1930), 453–456.

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57. ĀŚADHARA BHAṬṬA

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1. Shah, RB4735.

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¹ B.N.K. Sharma, *A History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature* (Bombay, 1961), vol. 2, p. 358; Theodor Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit Works and Authors*, 3 pts. (Wiesbaden, 1962), pt. 1, p. 500.

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66. SATĀRĀ RĀGHAVENDRĀCĀRYA GAJENDRAGADAKAR

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