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Indian Philosophy v1.c7.s5: V Periods of Indian Thought

Indian Philosophy v1.c7.s5

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V Periods of Indian Thought

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It is necessary to give some justification for the title " Indian Philosophy," when we are discussing the philosophy of the Hindus as distinct from that of the other communities which have also their place in India. The most obvious reason is that of common usage. India even to-day is mainly Hindu. And we are concerned here with the history of Indian thought up till A.D. 1000 or a little after, when the fortunes of the Hindus became more and more linked with those of the non-Hindus.

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To the continuous development of Indian thought different peoples at different ages have brought their gifts, yet the force of the Indian spirit had its own shaping influence on them. It is not possible for us to be sure of the exact chronological development, though we shall try to view Indian thought from the historical point of view. The doctrines of particular schools are relative to their environment and have to be viewed together. Otherwise, they will cease to have any living interest for us and become dead traditions. Each system of philosophy is an answer to a positive question which its age has put to itself, and when viewed from its own angle of vision will be seen to contain some truth. The philosophies are not sets of propositions conclusive or mistaken, but the expression and evolution of a mind with which and in which we must live if we wish to know how the systems shaped themselves. We must recognise the solidarity of philosophy with history, of intellectual life with the social conditions.¹ The historical method requires us not to take sides in the controversy of schools, but follow the development with strict indifference.

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¹ In the image of Walter Pater. " As the strangely twisted pine-tree, which would be a freak of nature on an English lawn, is seen, if we replace it in thought, amid the contending forces of the Alpine torrent that actually shaped its growth, to have been the creature of necessity, of the logic of certain facts, even so the most fantastic beliefs will assume their natural propriety when they are duly correlated with the conditions round them of which they are in truth a part " (Plato and Platonism, p. 10).

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While we are keenly alive to the immense importance of historical perspective, we regret that on account of the almost entire neglect of the chronological sequences of the writings it is not possible for us to determine exactly the relative dates of the systems. So unhistorical, or perhaps so ultra-philosophical, was the nature of the ancient Indian, that we know more about the philosophies than about the philosophers. From the time of the birth of Buddha Indian chronology is on a better foundation. The rise of Buddhism was contemporaneous with the extension of the Persian power to the Indus under the dynasty of Achæmenidæ in Persia. It is said to be the source of the earliest knowledge of India in the West obtained by Hecateus and Herodotus.

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The following are the broad divisions of Indian philosophy : (1) The Vedic Period (1500 B.C.–600 B.C.) covers the age of the settlement of the Aryans and the gradual expanison and spread of the Aryan culture and civilisation. It was the time which witnessed the rise of the forest universities, where were evolved the beginnings of the sublime idealism of India. We discern in it successive strata of thought, signified by the Mantras or the hymns, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Upaniṣads. The views put forward in this age are not philosophical in the technical sense of the term. It is the age of groping, where superstition and thought are yet in conflict. Yet to give order and continuity to the subject, it is necessary for us to begin with an account of the outlook of the hymns of the Ṛg-Veda and discuss the views of the Upaniṣads.

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(2) The Epic Period (600 B.C. to A.D. 200) extends over the development between the early Upaniṣads and the darśanas or the systems of philosophy. The epics of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata serve as the vehicles through which was conveyed the new message of the heroic and the godly in human relations. In this period we have also the great democratisation of the Upaniṣad ideas in Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā. The religious systems of Buddhism, Jainism, Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism belong to this age. The development of abstract thought which culminated in the schools of Indian philosophy, the darśanas, belongs to this period. Most of the systems had their early beginnings about the period of the rise of Buddhism, and they developed side by side through many centuries; yet the systematic works of the schools belong to a later age.

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(3) The Sūtra Period (from A.D. 200) comes next. The mass of material grew so unwieldy that it was found necessary to devise a shorthand scheme of philosophy. This reduction and summarisation occurred in the form of Sūtras. These Sūtras are unintelligible without commentaries, so much so that the latter have become more important than the Sūtras themselves. Here we have the critical attitude in philosophy developed. In the preceding periods we have philosophical discussions, no doubt, where the mind did not passively receive whatever it was told, but played round the subject, raising objections and answering them. By happy intuition the thinkers pitch upon some general principles which seem to them to explain all aspects of the universe. The philosophical syntheses, however profound and acute they may be, suffered throughout from the defect of being pre-critical, in the Kantian sense of the term. Without a previous criticism of the human capacity to solve philosophical problems, the mind looked at the world and reached its conclusions. The earlier efforts to understand and interpret the world were not strictly philosophical attempts, since they were not troubled by any scruples about the competence of the human mind or the efficiency of the instruments and the criteria employed. As Caird puts it, mind was "too busy with the object to attend to itself."¹ So when we come to the Sūtras we have thought and reflection become self-conscious, and not merely constructive imagination and religious freedom. Among the systems themselves, we cannot say definitely which are earlier and which later. There are cross-references throughout. The Yoga accepts the Sāmkhya, the Vaiśeṣika recognises both the Nyāya and the Sāmkhya. Nyāya refers to the Vedānta and the Sāmkhya. Mīmāmsā directly or indirectly recognises the pre-existence of all others. So does the Vedānta. Professor Garbe holds that the Sāmkhya is the oldest school. Next came Yoga, next Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, and last of all Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya. The Sūtra period cannot be sharply distinguished from the scholastic period of the commentators. The two between them extend up till the present day.

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¹ *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. p. 2

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(4) The Scholastic Period also dates from the second century A.D. It is not possible for us to draw a hard and fast line between this and the previous one. Yet it is to this that the great names of Kumārila, Śaṃkara, Śrīdhara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vācaspati, Udayana, Bhāskara, Jayanta, Vijñānabhikṣu and Raghunātha belong. The literature soon becomes grossly polemical. We find a brood of schoolmen, noisy controversialists indulging in over-subtle theories and fine-spun arguments, who fought fiercely over the nature of logical universals. Many Indian scholars dread opening their tomes which more often confuse than enlighten us. None would deny their acuteness and enthusiasm. Instead of thought we find words, instead of philosophy logic-chopping. Obscurity of thought, subtlety of logic, intolerance of disposition, mark the worst type of the commentators. The better type, of course, are quite as valuable as the ancient thinkers themselves. Commentators like Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja re-state the old doctrine, and their restatement is just as valuable as a spiritual discovery.

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There are some histories of Indian philosophy written by Indian thinkers. Almost all later commentators from their own points of view discuss other doctrines. In that way every commentator happens to give an idea of the other views. Sometimes conscious attempts are made to deal with the several systems in a continuous manner. Some of the chief of these "historical" accounts may here be mentioned. Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, or the epitome of the six systems, is the name of a work by Haribhadra.¹

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¹ Mr. Barth says: "Haribhadra, who according to tradition died in A.D. 529, but by more exact testimony lived in the ninth century, and who had several homonyms, was a Brāhmin converted to Jainism. He is famous still as the author of Fourteen Hundred Prabandhas (chapters of works), and seems to have been one of the first to introduce the Sanskrit language into the scholastic literature of the Śvetāmbara Jains. By the six systems the Brāhmins understand the two Mīmāṃsās, the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. Haribhadra, on the other hand, expounds under this title very curtly in eighty-seven slokas, but quite impartially, the essential principles of the Buddhists, the Jainas, the followers of the Nyāya,

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Samantabhadra, a Digambara Jain of the sixth century, is said to have written a work called Āptamīmāṁsā, containing a review of the various philosophical schools.¹ A Mādhyamika Buddhist, by name Bhāvaviveka, is reputed to be the author of a work called Tarkajvāla, a criticism of the Mīmāṁsā, Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta schools. A Digambara Jain, by name Vidyānanda, in his Aṣṭasāhasrī, and another Digambara, by name Merutuṅga, in his work on Ṣaḍdarśana-vicāra (1300 A.D.) are said to have criticised the Hindu systems. The most popular account of Indian philosophy is the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, by the well-known Vedāntin Mādhavācārya, who lived in the fourteenth century in South India. The Sarvasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha assigned to Śaṁkara,² and the Prasthānanabheda by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,³ contain useful accounts of the different philosophies.

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¹ Vidyabhushan, Mediæval Systems of Indian Logic, pp. 23.

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² The ascription seems to be incorrect. See Keith: Indian Logic, p. 242, n. 3.

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³ See Max Müller, Six Systems, pp. 75 to 84.

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the Sāṁkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsā. He thus selects his own school and those with whom the Jainas had the closest affinities, and puts them in between the schools of their greatest enemies, the Buddhists and the ritualists of the school of Jaimini. These last he couples with the Lokāyatikas, the atheistic materialists, not simply from sectarian fanaticism and on his own judgment, but following an opinion that was then prevalent even among the Brāhmins" (Indian Antiquary, p. 66, 1895).

Cites (8)