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Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s10: XIX Error

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s10

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XIX Error

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Pramā, or valid knowledge, is distinguished from doubt (saṃśaya) and erroneous knowledge (viparyaya), where the ideas do not lead to successful action. Illusions and hallucinations fail to realise their ends, i.e. do not fulfil the expectations roused by them. We become conscious of error when the demands of our ideal past are not met by the present. We see a white object and take it to be silver, pick it up and find it to be a piece of shell. The new experience of the shell contradicts the expectation of silver. According to the Nyāya, all error is subjective. Vātsyāyana says: “What is set aside by true knowledge is the wrong apprehension, not the object.”³ Uddyotakara observes, taking the mirage as an instance, “the object all the while remains what it actually is: In regard to the flickering rays of the sun, when there arises the cognition of water, there is no error in the object: it is not that the rays are not rays, nor that the flickering is not flickering: the error lies in the cognition: as it is the cognition which instead of appearing as the cognition of the flickering rays, appears as the cognition of water, i.e. as the cognition of a thing as something which it is not.”⁴ Water is not absolutely non-existent, as a flower in the sky, but is not existent here and now, though it is imagined to exist. The rays are the cause of the illusion, though not the object of the illusory perception of water. The realism of the Nyāya is here slightly modified, since it cannot account for the rise of illusions on the view that the world of experienced things with all their peculiar qualities exists independently of any relation to the experiencing subject. All erroneous cognition has some basis in reality. Vātsyāyana says: “No wrong apprehension is entirely baseless.”¹ Error is the apprehension of an object as other than what it is. This view of anyathākhyāti is supported not only by the Nyāya but also by the Jaina logicians, Kumārila and Rāmānuja.

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³ N.B., iv. 2. 35.

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⁴ N.V., i. 1. 4.

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¹ N.B., iv. 2. 35.

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The Naiyāyikas repudiate other theories of error,² which are more metaphysical than logical. The Sautrāntikas hold that in error there is a wrong superposition (āropa) of something which is a form of cognition (jñānākāra) on an external object. The Yogācāras do not admit extra-mental realities, yet for all practical purposes objects are admitted to be real, thanks to the tendencies of beginningless avidyā. Error consists in the superposition of the form of cognition on such objects.³ We know that a cognition is erroneous, since it is sublated by another apprehension⁴ and is devoid of practical efficiency (arthakriyākāritva). In the apprehension “this is silver,” what is sublated is not silver but thisness (idantā), for, in the judgment a form of cognition “silver” is attributed to the “this”; in the sublative judgment “this is not silver,” we sublate the “this” and not the “silver,” for, to deny the latter is to deny its existence as a form of cognition. This is the view of Jñānākārakhyāti, according to which a form of cognition is wrongly referred to an external object. When the illusion is off, the external reference of silver is denied. This view is a corollary from the general metaphysical position of the Yogācāras, that there is no real difference between the self, the object of knowledge and knowledge. The Naiyāyika objects that, on the Yogācāra view, our cognitions should take the form of not “this is silver” but “I am silver,” which is not the case.

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The Yogācāras cannot account for the distinction between truth and error. Subjectivism vitiates the whole position. Sweetness is in the honey and bitterness in the gall, and these qualities are not purely imaginary. The Nyāya formula, that error is the apprehension of a thing as what it is, is applicable even on the Yogācāra view.⁵ The Mādhyamikas hold the asatkhyāti view, that there is only non-being (asat), and that all perception of internal and external objects is erroneous. Non-existent silver manifests itself as existent, thanks to our cognitive mechanism. The Naiyāyika objects that the incorrect apprehension of silver in a shell is produced not by nothing but by something in the piece of shell. If illusions are not excited by external stimuli and have no objective basis, we cannot distinguish one illusion from another. A non-existent thing cannot produce any effect. Erroneous cognitions cannot be traced to residual impressions which are not possible without real objects.¹ The Advaita adopts the anirvacanīyakhyāti. Whatever is manifested in a cognition is the object of that cognition. In the illusion of silver, silver appears to consciousness and is cognised; otherwise we shall have no reason to say that it is the illusion of silver and not of something else. But the silver so cognised is neither real nor unreal nor both real and unreal. If real, the cognition would be valid; if unreal, no activity will be induced;

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if both unreal and real, then two contradictory qualities will subsist in one and the same entity. Its nature is really indefinable or anirvacanīya. This inexplicable silver is produced through avidyā with the help of residual traces of the past cognitions of silver revived by the perception of the similarity of silver with the object with which the defective sense-organ is in contact. According to the Advaita, the illusion is a presentative cognition produced by an object actually present to consciousness. Silver is present at the time and place when and where the illusion is produced. Otherwise the illusion is not a presentation. This presented silver lasts as long as the illusion lasts. The Naiyāyika objects that, if the illusory object of silver is created in the absence of silver, then we could see anything of which we have an idea, and there could be no difference between image and percept. The Naiyāyika, however, congratulates himself on the fact that this view can be brought under his anyathākhyāti, since an indefinable object appears to consciousness as real.² Akhyāti (or vivekākhyāti), or non-discrimination, is the name given to Prābhākara's view of error. The difference between the piece of shell we see and the silver we imagine is not noticed, and we say "this is silver." The sublating cognition does not contradict the illusion, but simply recognises the distinction between the perceived and the remembered elements of the erroneous cognition.

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Against this view, the Nyāya urges that, as long as the illusion lasts, there is an actual presentation or perception of silver, and not a mere representation. We are conscious of silver as something presented to consciousness here and now, and not as something perceived in the past and remembered now. Non-discrimination at the time of the illusion cannot induce action. The nature of obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa) is not clearly stated. So it must be said that our immediate perceptual consciousness is itself infected with error.¹

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² N.V.T.T., i. i. 2.

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³ Anādyavidyāvāsanāropitamalikam bāhyam, tatra jñānākārasyāropaḥ (Bhāmatī, i. i. 1).

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⁴ Bhāmatī. Balavad bādhakapratyayavaśāt.

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⁵ Aniruddha on S.P.S., i. 42; Nyāyamañjari, p. 178

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¹ If illusions are not produced by external objects, then there is no difference between dreamless sleep and illusions except that in the latter we have consciousness and in the former not. Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 13; Nyāyamañjari, pp. 177–178.

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² Rāmānuja, criticising the Advaita view, asks, What is the cause of the production of the indefinable silver at the time of the illusion? The cognition of silver cannot produce the object, since the latter is the cause of the former. It cannot be due to a defect in the sense-mechanism, since the sense-organs do not produce effects in the outward objects. Senses cause knowledge and not objects of knowledge.

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¹ Jayasiṃhasūri mentions the theory of alaukikārthakhyāti, which Jayanta attributes to a Mīmāṃsaka. According to it, in the illusory cognition of silver, the object of the illusion is silver, which is different from the ordinary (laukika) silver. What serves our practical needs is laukika, and what does not is alaukika. Even alaukika silver induces some activity. The Naiyāyika asks whether we have any knowledge of alaukika silver and what becomes of it the moment we realise our mistake. Prabhācandra, in his Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, mentions prasiddhārthakhyāti as the view supported by Bhāskara and the followers of the Sāṃkhya. According to it, the object of illusory cognition is not a non-existent thing, but an existent object established by knowledge. Water is the object of the illusion of water, and when this illusory cognition is contradicted by the cognition of the rays of the sun, the latter cognition has for its object the rays of the sun. This view is not satisfactory, since it makes all cognitions valid (Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 187-188; Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, i).

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The Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti is criticised by the other schools, notably the Advaita Vedānta.² Silver existing at some other time and place cannot be an object of perception, since it is not present to the senses. If it is said to be recalled to consciousness, then even in inference of fire from smoke, fire may be said to be recalled to consciousness, and there would be no need for inference at all. Again, to what does the otherwiseness (anyathātva) refer? It cannot refer to the cognitive activity, where the substratum shell cannot impart its own form to a cognition which apprehends silver; not to the result of the cognitive activity, since a presentation does not differ essentially whether it is valid or invalid; not to the object of cognition which is the shell, which cannot identify itself with or transform itself into silver. If the shell is absolutely different from silver, then it cannot be identified with it; if it is both different and not different, then even judgments like "the cow is shorthorned" would be illusory. If the shell actually transforms itself into silver, then the cognition of silver is not invalid and cannot be sublated. If it is said that it is a momentary transformation for the time the illusion lasts, then the perception of silver must be had even by those who do not suffer from any sense defects.³

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² See Vedāntaparibhāṣā, i.

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³ Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha.

Cites (4)