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Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s12: XXII The Individual Self and Its Destiny

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s12

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XXII The Individual Self and Its Destiny

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According to the Nyāya, the universe has certain elements which are not corporeal. These are our cognitions, desires, aversions, volitions, and the feelings of pleasure and pain.⁷ All these modes of consciousness are transitory, and so are not themselves to be identified with substances. They are viewed as qualities of the substance called the soul.

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⁷ If pleasure, pain, desire and aversion are regarded as modes of feeling, we have the three modes of consciousness, knowledge, feeling and will.

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The soul is a real substantive being, having for its qualities desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. As a rule the Naiyāyika proves the existence of the self by means of inference, though scriptural evidence is adduced in confirmation.¹ Uddyotakara holds that the reality of the self is apprehended by means of perception also. According to him the object of the notion of " I " is the soul.² The recognition of the different cognitions as mine proves the continued persistence of the soul.³ " When a man is desirous of knowing or understanding (a certain thing) at first, he reflects as to what this may be and comes to know it " this is so-and-so." This knowing of the thing is by the same agent to whom belongs the previous desire to know and the subsequent reflection ; so this knowledge becomes an indication of the presence of the common agent in the shape of the soul."⁴ We remember things which we previously cognised.⁵ When one perceives an object, is attracted by it, struggles to obtain it, it is one soul that is the basis of these different activities.⁶ If our mental life has at each instant a unique qualitative character which constitutes it a moment in the concrete history of an individual subject, it is because it belongs to this self and not to another. Uddyotakara says : " For one who denies a soul, every cognition must be distinct with a distinct object of its own ; and no cognition or recollection would ever be possible."⁷ As a mere complex of sensational and affectional elements, no state of consciousness can be distinguished as mine or another's. The experience of another is not *my* experience, for my self is different from his self. All our mental states, such as remembrance, recognition, awareness of the relative persistence of the self, volition or the assertion of self, sympathy or consciousness of relation to other selves, all these imply the reality of a self.

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¹ N.S., i. I. 10.

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² N.V., iii. I. I. The Vaiśeṣika makes the self an object of yogic perception (V.S., ix. I. I; *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 196).

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³ N.B. and N.V., i. I. 10.

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⁴ N.B., i. I. 10.

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⁵ N.B., iii. I. 14; also iii. I. 7-11.

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⁶ *Ekakartṛkatvaṃ jñānecchāpravṛttīnām samānāśrayatvam* (N.B., iii. iii. 2. 34).

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⁷ N.V., i. I. 10. Vācaspati observes : " If in the absence of the soul the recollection and fusion of cognitions were possible under the hypothesis of every cognition setting up and forming a factor in a series of cognitions, then every cognition would recall and fuse with every other cognition of the same series." This statement of Vācaspati is a paraphrase of Vātsyāyana's remark that " the recognition of one cognition by another cognition would be as possible as the recognition by one body of the experiences of another body " (N.B., i. I. 10).

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The materialist view that consciousness is a property of the body is easily refuted. If it were a property of the body, it would exist in the various parts of the body and its material constituents.¹ If the latter were also conscious, then we have to regard the individual consciousness as the combination of several consciousnesses produced by the different constituents. If body has consciousness, then all matter must have it, since it is of the same nature as the body. If beyond the body there is no soul, then the moral law would seem to be without any significance.² Since the body is changing from moment to moment, no sin can pursue us in subsequent lives. If consciousness is the essential property of the body, then it can never lose its essence, and it should be impossible for us to find bodies devoid of consciousness, as we do in corpses. Consciousness is not found in states of trance. It is not a natural quality of the body, since it does not last as long as the body lasts, as colour and the like do.³ If it were an accidental property of the body, then its cause is something else than the body itself. Again, consciousness cannot be the property of that of which one is conscious but of that which is conscious. If consciousness is a property of the body, then it must be capable of being perceived by others also.⁴ Body is not even an auxiliary of consciousness in view of certain familiar experiences. At best it is an instrument or aid for the expression of consciousness. Body is defined as "the vehicle of actions, sense-organs and objects."⁵ The soul exerts itself to gain or get rid of objects by means of the body, which is the seat of the senses, mind and sentiments. We cannot identify the body with either consciousness or the self which possesses it. Nor can we identify consciousness with the vital processes. Vitality is a name for a particular relation of the self to the body.⁶

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¹ See Sāmkhya Sūtra, iii. 20-21, and Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha on them.

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² N.B., iii. 1. 4.

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³ N.B., iii. 2. 47.

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⁴ See I.P., vol. i, pp. 284-285. See also N.B., iii. 2. 53-55.

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⁵ N.S., i. 1. 11.

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⁶ Nyāyakandalī, p. 263.

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The self is not the senses but what controls them, and synthesises their contributions.¹ It is the soul that confers unity on the various kinds of apprehensions. The eye cannot hear sounds nor the ear see visions, and the consciousness that I who am seeing a thing now have also heard of it will not be possible if the soul were not different from and beyond the senses. As instruments, the senses imply an agent which uses them. Being only products of matter, they cannot have consciousness as their property. Even when the object seen and the eye are both destroyed, the knowledge that I have seen remains, and so this knowledge is not a quality of either the outer objects or the senses.² Nor is the soul to be identified with manas, which is only the instrument by the aid of which the soul thinks. Since the manas is atomic in nature, it can no more be the self than the body can. If intelligence is a quality of manas, then the simultaneous cognition of things such as yogis have would be inexplicable.³ The self cannot be identified with the body, senses or manas, since it is present even when the body is lost, the senses are cut off and manas is quieted down.⁴ All these belong to the object side, and can never be the subject while self is the subject.⁵

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¹ N.B., iii. 1. 1.

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² N.B., iii. 2. 18.

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³ N.B., iii. 2. 19.

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⁴ P.P., p. 69. See also Bhāṣāpariccheda, pp. 47-49.

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⁵ N.V., iii. 2. 19.

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This permanent self is not buddhi or intellection, upalabdhi or apprehension, or jñāna or knowledge.⁶ Buddhi is non-permanent, while the soul must be permanent.⁷ Our consciousness is to be compared to a flowing stream, where one mental state vanishes as soon as another appears. Whatever be the nature of the object, fleeting like sound or relatively permanent like a jar, cognitions themselves are transitory.⁸ The relative permanence of the object accounts for the relative distinctness of the cognition, but cannot make the cognition itself permanent.⁹ The capacity for recognition cannot be attributed to buddhi.¹⁰ Intellect (buddhi) according to the Naiyāyika is not a substance nor the cogniser, but a quality of the soul which is capable of being perceived. The self is the perceiver of all that brings about pain and pleasure (sarvasya draṣṭā), the experiencer of all pains and pleasures (bhoktā) and the knower of all things (sarvānubhāvī).

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⁶ N.S., i. 1-5.

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⁷ N.V.T.T., i. 1. 10.

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⁸ N.B., iii. 2. 1-2; iii. 2. 18-41.

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⁹ N.B., iii. 2. 44. See also N.V., iii. 2. 45.

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¹⁰ N.B., iii. 2. 3.

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The substance to which these qualities belong cannot be made up of parts, for it is an assumption of the Nyāya that compound substances are destructible while simple ones are eternal. Whatever has an origin is necessarily made up of parts, and when the parts fall asunder, the thing perishes. The soul is partless (niravayava) and eternal. It has no beginning and no end. If a soul once began to be, it will sometime cease to be. The soul cannot be of a limited size, since what is limited has parts and is destructible. The soul must be either atomic or infinite, and of no medium size (madhyamaparimāṇa) like compound substances. It cannot be atomic, since we cannot then perceive its qualities of intellection, will, etc. If it were atomic, it would be impossible to account for the cognition which extends all over the body.¹ If of intermediate size, it must be either larger or smaller than the body. Either way, it cannot occupy the body as it does and should do. If it is of the same size as the body, it will be too small for the body, as it grows from birth onwards. Nor can the difficulty of its changing dimension from birth to birth be avoided. So it is all-pervading, though it cannot cognise many things simultaneously, on account of the atomic nature of manas. It is manas that retains the impressions of acts done in the body, and each soul has normally only one manas which is regarded as eternal.²

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¹ Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā, p. 17.

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² N.B., i. 1. 16; iii. 2. 56.

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The soul is unique in each individual.³ There are an infinite number of souls; if not, then everybody would be conscious of the feelings and thoughts of everybody else.⁴ If one soul were present in all bodies, then when one experiences pleasure or pain, all should possess the same experiences, which is not the case.

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³ N.V.T.T., i. 1. 10; N.B., iii. 1. 14.

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⁴ The possibility of one soul guiding different bodies is admitted as a supernormal phenomenon (N.B., iii. 2. 32).

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Consciousness is not an essential property of the soul. The series of cognitions can have an end. "As regards the final cognition, it is destroyed either when there are no causes for its continuance (in the form of merit or demerit) or by reason of the peculiarities of time (which can put an end to the operation of merit and demerit), or by the appearance of impressions produced by the final cognition itself.”¹ It follows that the soul which is the substratum of consciousness need not always be conscious. As a matter of fact, it is an unconscious (jaḍa) principle capable of being qualified by states of consciousness.² Consciousness cannot exist apart from self, even as the brilliance of the flame cannot live apart from the flame; but the soul itself is not necessarily conscious. Consciousness is regarded as a quality of the soul produced in the waking state by the conjunction of the soul with manas. It is an intermittent quality of the self.³

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¹ N.V., iii. 2. 24.

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² Udayana views it as a substance possessing knowledge, joy and other pure qualities, eternal, imperishable, unchangeable, not bigger than an atom in size though capable of pervading the body.

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³ N.B. and N.V. on i. 1. 10, and P.P., p. 99.

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The soul is an eternal entity which is from time to time connected with a body suitable to its desert. The body has its source in the acts done by the person, and is the basis of pleasure and pain.⁴ The body is formed under the influence of the unseen force of destiny,⁵ and is the result of the persistence of the effect of the previous acts.⁶ Each man becomes endowed with a body fit for being the medium of the experiences which he has to undergo. The birth of a being is not a mere physiological process. Uddyotakara says: “The karma of the parents who have to enjoy the experiences resulting from the birth of the child, as well as the karma of the personality which has to undergo experiences in the world, both these conjointly bring about the birth of the body in the mother’s womb.”⁷ The connection of the soul with the body is called its birth and its separation from it death.⁸ At the beginning of creation, an activity is set up in the atoms by which they combine so as to form material objects. A similar activity arises in the minds of the souls, which brings about several other qualities consequent upon the past careers of the souls themselves. The concrete history of each soul embraces a number of lives. At any one moment its historically continuous existence is rooted in the past and embraces an outline of the future. Any one life is but a part of a historically conditioned series.

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⁴ N.B., iii. 1. 27. The body is composed mainly of earth, though the other elements help in its formation (iii. 1. 27–29). While the human body is mainly made of earth, the Nyāya admits aqueous bodies formed in the regions of Varuṇa, fiery in those of Sun, and aerial in those of Vāyu. There are not, however, ākāśic, or ethereal bodies.

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⁵ N.B., iii. 2. 60–72.

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⁶ Pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāt (N.B., iii. 2. 60).

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⁷ N.V., iii. 2. 63.

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⁸ iv. 1. 10. The question is asked whether birth and death, i.e. rotation in the wheel of saṃsāra, belong to the soul or the manas. Uddyotakara answers: “If by saṃsāra you mean the action (of entering and moving

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No serious attempt is made to prove the pre-existence theory, since it is generally accepted. Infants show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages; and we cannot reduce the smiles and cries of the baby to mere mechanical movements like the opening and the closing of the lotus flowers.¹ The human being is very much more than a mere flower. The newborn babe's desire for milk cannot be explained on the analogy of the attraction of the iron by the magnet, since the child is not a mere piece of metal.² The objection that children with desires may be produced, even as substances with qualities are produced, is not valid, since desires are not mere qualities but take their rise from previous experience.³ We come into the world "not in entire forgetfulness, and not in utter nakedness," but with certain memories and habits acquired in the previous state of existence.⁴ The argument for pre-existence as well as future life is strengthened by ethical considerations. If we do not assume a past and a future for our souls, then our ethical sense will be violated by loss of merited action (kṛtahāni) and gain of unmerited result (akṛtābhyāgama). There must be a future where we can experience the fruits of our deeds and a past to account for the differences in our lots in the present. When our desert is completely exhausted, our soul is freed from saṃsāra and

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¹ iii. 1. 19-21.

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² iii. 1. 22-24.

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³ iii. 1. 25-26.

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⁴ It may well be said that desires and inclinations prove only the existence of the soul and not its previous existence. After all, the Nyāya theory of new beginnings does not require us to accept a past for our souls.

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off from the bodies), then it belongs to the manas, as it is the manas that actually moves (saṃsarati); on the other hand, if by saṃsāra you mean experiencing (of pleasure and pain), then it belongs to the soul, since it is the soul that experiences pleasure and pain" (N.V., i. 1. 19).

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rebirth and attains release or emancipation (mokṣa).¹ According to Vātsyāyana, “the fruition of all one’s acts comes about in the last birth preceding release.” ²

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¹ N.B., iii. 2. 67.

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² N.B., iv. 1. 64.

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Release is freedom from pain.³ “ This condition of immortality, free from fear, imperishable, consisting in the attainment of bliss, is called Brahma.” ⁴ Mokṣa is supreme felicity marked by perfect tranquillity and freedom from defilement. It is not the destruction of self, but only of bondage. It is defined negatively as the cessation of pain, and not as the enjoyment of positive pleasure. For pleasure is always tainted with pain. It is caused as much as pain. Uddyotakara urges that if the released soul is to have everlasting pleasure, it must also have an everlasting body, since experiencing is not possible without the bodily mechanism.⁵

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³ i. 1. 9.

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⁴ Tad abhayam, ajaram, amṛtyupadam, brahmakṣemaprāptiḥ (N.B., i. 1. 22).

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⁵ N.V., i. 1. 22. See also N.B., iv. 1. 58. Pleasure is a quality and not a constituent of the soul, according to Vācaspati. See N.V.T.T., i. 1. 22.

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When the scriptural texts speak of the essence of the soul as pleasure, they mean only perfect freedom from pain. The Naiyāyika proves that every idea of liberation includes this minimum of freedom from pain.⁶ Freedom is, in the Nyāya, complete cessation of effort, activity, consciousness and absolute cessation of the soul from body, manas, etc. This state of pure existence to which the liberated souls attain is compared to the state of deep dreamless sleep.⁷ This state of abstract existence, without knowledge and joy, is, however, said to be one of great glory, as the soul possesses the general qualities of vibhutva, or ubiquity, though not the specific ones (viśeṣaguṇa) of knowledge, desire and will. Vātsyāyana criticises the theory that freedom consists in the manifestation of the soul’s happiness on the ground that there is neither evidence nor justification for it. If there is a cause for the manifestation of happiness, it must be either eternal or non-eternal. If the former, then there would be no difference between the soul released and the soul bound. If the cause be non-eternal, what can it be? Not the contact of soul with manas, which by itself brings about nothing. Other aids like merit have to be admitted. But the product of non-eternal merit cannot be eternal. When the merit is exhausted, its product of pleasure must also cease.⁸ It is a state absolutely free even from cognitions, which are, according to the Nyāya, evanescent and productive of activity and so bondage. The Sāṃkhya view, that freedom is a state of pure consciousness, is criticised on the ground that there must be some cause for the emergence of this consciousness; and whatever is caused is non-eternal. Besides, the Sāṃkhya view that the puruṣa is discriminated from prakṛti in mokṣa, so that the latter ceases to function and the former rests in its own nature, credits the unintelligent principle of prakṛti with too much wisdom.¹

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⁶ S.D.S., xi.

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⁷ Suṣuptasya svapnādarśane kleśābhāvavad apavargaḥ (iv. 1. 63)

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⁸ N.B., i. 1. 22. See also Nyāyakandalī, pp. 286–287.

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¹ N.S., iii. 73-78.

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The critic feels that the mokṣa of the Naiyāyikas is a word without meaning. There is not very much to distinguish the Nyāya philosophy from materialism. It regards the individual as neither the soul nor the body, but the result of their union. When there is a separation between soul and body, " nothing whatever can happen to excite sensation," as Lucretius says, " not if earth shall be mingled with sea and sea with heaven." The peace of extinguished consciousness may be the peace of death. The sleep without dreams is a state of torpor, and we may as well say that a stone is enjoying supreme felicity in a sound sleep without any disturbing dreams. The state of painless, passionless existence, which the Nyāya idealises, seems to be a mere parody of what man dreams to be. To lose sensations, passions, interests, to be free from the conditions of space and time, is certainly different from being born anew in God. Men of a feeling heart shun such a monster as cast of brass, which may find a fit dwelling in a sanctuary filled with the statues of gods. The Vedāntin, to whatever school he belongs, argues that freedom consists in quitting this frail, perishable individuality to be taken up into the being of the infinite. Later Naiyāyikas are anxious to make out that the condition of freedom is one of bliss,² but they cannot do so until they revise their conception of the soul's relation to consciousness.

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² Nyāyasāra, pp. 39-41.

Cites (9)